Carl Schwamberger wrote: ↑
19 Sep 2020 16:23
Rich, you appear to be considering combat ready formations.
No, I am considering deployable formations. I don't think it would be very useful to just ship people to France and organize and train them there. I also doubt that any such scheme would past the smell test in the White House, Congress, or the Munitions Building.
I was not. Basically sending two or three RA divisions and 2-3 NG divisions plus two corps HQ as they existed in September 1939 across the water in the autumn/winter of 1939 & filling them out on the fly with new recruits and reserve officers.
As of 1 July 1940, the strength of the National Guard officer corps was about 21,074 and enlisted strength was 226,837. Of those 21,074 officers, only about 6,800 had completed a course of instruction in a service school, otherwise the mass of them were essentially untrained.
Certainly not a trained force.
No kidding. What do you call an untrained and unorganized mass of men? A mob. Meanwhile, please review the real world examples of the actual American Great War deployments, which appears to be your analog. Prior to the war, the active divisional elements, minus the 2d Brigade, conducted a CPX in August 1937 followed by maneuvers at Indiantown Gap in September. The 2d Brigade, with the 5th and 7th FA, conducted maneuvers at Pine Camp in September 1937 as well. After elements of the division participated in Army-Navy Landing Exercise No 4 at Culebra in January-February 1938.
There was nothing else until the Plattsburg maneuvers of fall 1939.
Nor was there an army or corps structure. FUSA conducted the Pine Camp maneuver in 1935, nothing then until Plattsburg. Its mission was supervising defensive contingencies by the I, II, and III Corps areas. There were no corps headquarters fully active after 1925; they were periodically activated with RA and OR personnel for CPX's, otherwise they maintained caretaker administrations of the corps areas, which had no tactical function or capability. The last actual maneuver any corps HQ was provisionally activated for was the 1935 Pine Camp maneuver.
More of color guard or a preparation force to set up for a combat worthy AEF later. How trained they might be by 10 May 1940 varies widely by who is leading them at the top and what priorities they set for training vs logistical preparation.
Since your priority appears to be getting bodies to France, I'm not sure how any training or organization enters into it? Meanwhile, please note the example of the 1st Expeditionary Division, which was in a better state than any Regular division, including its descendant, in 1939.
What Ive not looked at much is any air component with a hypothetical AEF. P36s & B18s ?
As of 30 June 1938 the AAC consisted of 20,196 Off & EM, by 30 June 1939 that "expanded to 22,387. As of 31 July 1939, there were 16 HB, 400 MB, 276 LB, 494 Fi, 356 Rcn, 118 T, 735 Tr, and 7 Com aircraft on hand.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018