What if the USS Yorkown’s VB-3 actually sank the Akagi at Midway?

[glenn239]

Back about 7 years ago on the Combined Fleet website I was involved in some discussions with Jon Parshall and Tony Tully about Fuchida’s account of the Battle of Midway. Tony at that time had indicated that the key to the lack of credibility in Fuchida’s account was the Famous Five Minutes. Specifically, that Fuchida had claimed Akagi was packed with aircraft for takeoff, while Richard Best, who attacked Akagi, had examined her carefully at low level after dropping his bomb and saw few aircraft on deck.

I said that I’d look at it. Then some years later I actually did. First, I read all the squadron reports and notice immediately that Yorktown’s VB-3 report was an exact mirror image match for Fuchida’s account. Specifically, this,

Meanwhile Bombing Squadron Three commenced its approach from the north with the objective a very large carrier of about 25,000 tons believed to be the AKAGI. Its flight deck was covered with planes spotted aft

This is an exact match for Fuchida’s account of Akagi’s launch status. Then, in reading Lord’s Incredible Victory, I saw that there was an old controversy between Yorktown and Enterprise veterans as to who had bombed the Soryu, with Lord wryly indicating that according to claims, apparently Soryu must have sailed back to Japan untouched.

I then applied the theory to the attack, assuming that Best actually bombed the Soryu. It runs as follows – during the approach Best had become distracted by a squadron air supply emergency and did not properly scout the enemy formation. He never saw the Akagi. Instead, when McClusky told him to attack the “right hand” carrier, he assumed that McClusky actually meant the Soryu, then some distance to the north but to the right of the second carrier he could see, the Kaga. Since under doctrine McClusky should attack the “far” carrier, he decided to ignore the instruction and attack Kaga. Only after bombing the Soryu did he see the Akagi and piece together that he’d made a mistake. Well, as much a mistake as can possibly be made while heroically blowing an IJN carrier of out of the water with just 3 aircraft and no fighters in support.

Anyways, that’s the gist of the theory that falls out from the exercise of comparing Fuchida to the VB-3 action report. With the Midway wrecks finally being mapped in 2019, after Kaga was found I contacted Tony Tully and outlined it, expecting that the actual answer would soon follow from the sea floor. Sadly, the deep sea mission has been delayed.

On an unrelated thread here a poster expressed interest in these matters, so I’m breaking the discussion out into a new thread. The second post is the answers to the many questions and observations Richard was kind enough to make elsewhere.

[glenn239]

No Glenn, the "Nagumo Report" says nothing of the sort. Where is the word "charging" found in that entry? Where is the word "doctrine" found in that entry? If that citation "rises to the level of proving that IJN warships would by doctrine charge [sic] towards enemy torpedo planes" then how do you explain the various cases of IJN warships "turning away" from such attacks, such as Yamato off Samar?

Note that yes, the Nagumo Report does say that all the surface forces charged the torpedo bombers. Specifically, it says it here on page 8,

To minimize the target area, the Akagi turned to course 300 degrees and stayed on this course. At a time when all of our surface units had maneuvered themselves into maximum defense against the torpedo planes, enemy dive bombers were suddenly noted among the clouds overhead at 0726.

“All” should include the guard destroyers. If you check the action track from the Nagumo Report, you will see from the Soryu’s sinking position relative to Akagi’s bombing position how Soryu’s guard destroyer could have arrived in the vicinity of Akagi if moving to attack VB-3 coming up from the south.

No problem, I was on vacation last month and understand. I will be happy to wait for your citations supporting a VB-3 attack on one of the guard destroyers.

Soryu’s guard destroyer is identified as Isokaze on page 192 of Shattered Sword. The target of VB-3’s B-14 and B-15 (Elder and Cooner) is identified as Isokaze on page 105 of A Glorious Page in Our History.

Um, if Arashi was "far to the east of Akagi" then how could she "attend to the wounded Akagi"?

That’s the point. I don’t think she could be ‘far to the east’ to pick up Osmus and attend Akagi. Yet, she did. Therefore, Osmus’s plane presumably crashed closer to Akagi’s bomb location than supposed in Shattered Sword. There is an additional crash, that of Iyozo Fujita, a fighter pilot from Soryu who was battling Yorktown aircraft then later picked out of the water by Akagi’s guard destroyer Nowaki. This also suggest that Yorktown’s torpedo aircraft - and therefore her dive bombers - were much closer to Akagi than shown in Shattered Sword or commonly supposed.

Well, yeah, because in his original report Best made no mention of what side the bridge was on, so what his later recollections were are somewhat moot, especially given that:

I do not believe Best's later observations are "moot". I take them very seriously. You asked for specific sourcing on where Best arrived at that conclusion his target's bridge was to starboard, (ie, Soryu), and I provided it.

He described a broadside on, very non-doctrinal attack, with his three aircraft section, which precisely matches the account of the attack in the Akagi deck log "Three bombers dove on Akagi from positions 80 degrees to port. Bombs were released at about 500 meters altitude. The first was a near miss 10 meters abreast the bridge; the second hit near the elevator amidships; the third hit the flight deck on the port side, aft.”

Correct, the direction of attack Best describes is that also shown in Akagi’s log. Now, here are the bomb hits on Soryu,

https://www.google.ca/search?q=soryu+bo ... mbPPlp4RQM:

We came in at a 70-degree dive angle, released at 2,000 feet, and were cocked back at a steep climb angle to observe the bombing results. The first bomb hit forward of the bridge and tore up the deck. The second bomb hit the lead fighter on the fan tail of a group of six or seven Zeros, which were in the process of launching (the first Zero ran through my bomb sight as I put my eye to the telescope at 3,500 feet). The third bomb hit among the Zeros,

https://www.pacificwar.org.au/Midway/June4.AM3.html

The picture of the bomb hits on Soryu looks more like Best’s own description of his bomb hits than anything to do with Akagi.

Next, here is a Soryu eyewitness survivor account of the bombing of Soryu,

The ship received her first attack at MIDWAY on 5 June around 1000 from three U. S. dive bombers, each of which scored a direct hit on the flight deck. The first bomb fell amidships, the second well forward, and the last aft on the port side. At the beginning of the attack only three of the SŌRYŪ's planes were topside

http://propnturret.com/tully/viewtopic.php?f=20&t=3383

The POW describes three direct hits from three US aircraft only, all three hits in the locations Best describes, just noted in a different order.

That later authors managed to muddy the waters - starting with Walter Karig who started the whole weird "Separating into two sections, the ENTERPRISE squadron aimed for the carrier SORYU to the northwest and the KAGA on her right. The YORKTOWN planes dove on AKAGI." business in 1947 - rather misses the point.

The fact that there was a controversy about whether Yorktown attacked Akagi or not between 1942 and the 1960’s suggests that the conclusion Best bombed the Soryu in 2020 is not particularly radical or revisionist. It’s simply re-opening an immediate post-battle debate by the USN dive bomber pilots themselves, one that continued for decades afterwards.

I see you are back to Fuchida is a reliable witness again...

I hear Fuchida even claimed to have led the attack on Pearl Harbor. :>)

Fuchida’s personal account of the attack in For That One Day doesn’t match Best’s version or the Nagumo Report. It does, however, match VB-3’s much better.

So if Fuchida "had the Nagumo report in his possession" (how do you know BTW?),

See Shattered Sword page 439 and XVI / XVII of Fuchida’s Battle That Doomed Japan on how he got a copy of the Nagumo Report. Then, read the text of Fuchida’s book. For example, here on page 168,

“at 0820 the TONE plane was heard from against and this time it reported, “Enemy force accompanied by what appears to be aircraft carrier bringing up the rear”

Then compare it to the actual Nagumo Report text of 0520 (0820),

0520 Radio message from Tone's plane on #4 search line to Comdr. Mobile Force: "The enemy is accompanied by what appears to be a carrier."

shouldn't he have used its entry "0726... ?

No. Fuchida was in hospital after the battle under virtual house arrest and seems not to have contributed to the Nagumo Report. His eyewitness account was not available for it in June 1942. One does not cut and paste another report for ones own eyewitness account in ones own memoires.

Also, if the "Nagumo Report" was actually in the possession of ONI in 1947 and it was restricted CONFIDENTIAL...how did Misuo Fuchida obtain a copy? Did he FOIA it?

As per above pages, he was granted access to such reports because of his job, and appears to have nipped a draft copy version at some point and stashed it for his personal future use.

BTW, the "9 strong and the attacks were sequential" business derives from Smith, who managed to contradict himself after getting it right.

The idea that Kido Butai’s elite air commander standing on the deck of the Akagi and watching it being dive bombed with himself in the crosshairs would rely on some American named Smith to tell him what he witnessed is an infeasible one.

Why is it noteworthy?

Because Shattered Sword pg 237 says that Soryu’s 5” AA guns did not fire during the attack on Soryu. Best confirms his target did not fire, that she was taken completely by surprise.

Conversely, the VB-3 report states,

Upon sighting our aircraft, the objective turned left 90 degrees to the north in order to launch planes and the sides of the carrier turned into a veritable ring of flame as the enemy commenced firing small calibre and anti-aircraft guns.

The Yorktown carrier is therefore not Soryu, which Shattered Sword states did not fire its main AA armament at its attackers. Yorktown's carrier is the Akagi.

More noteworthy: who did the other 11 VB-3 SBD attack?

13 attackers on Akagi as per page 48 of Monograph no. 93,

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/M ... /JM-93.htm

There is an interesting feature of the diagram in that report linked – notice the hit marked “dud” near the forward elevator. That’s four bombs – a dud on the forward elevator, a miss to port, a hit on the central elevator, a hit on the aft fantail. Glorious Page in Our History states that Best’s squadron took off armed with 1 x 1,000lbs bomb each, one short of the number shown in the diagram.

Hope that answers your questions.

[Richard Anderson]

Note that yes, the Nagumo Report does say that all the surface forces charged the torpedo bombers. Specifically, it says it here on page 8,

To minimize the target area, the Akagi turned to course 300 degrees and stayed on this course. At a time when all of our surface units had maneuvered themselves into maximum defense against the torpedo planes, enemy dive bombers were suddenly noted among the clouds overhead at 0726.

“All” should include the guard destroyers. If you check the action track from the Nagumo Report, you will see from the Soryu’s sinking position relative to Akagi’s bombing position how Soryu’s guard destroyer could have arrived in the vicinity of Akagi if moving to attack VB-3 coming up from the south.

Where is the word "charged" or "doctrine" in that passage?

Soryu’s guard destroyer is identified as Isokaze on page 192 of Shattered Sword. The target of VB-3’s B-14 and B-15 (Elder and Cooner) is identified as Isokaze on page 105 of A Glorious Page in Our History.

That's nice, but in their actual action report the target of B-14 and B-15 was a "light cruiser" while those of B-12 and B-16 (Butler and Wiseman) was a "battleship". None were identified as a "destroyer" or by name. I suspect that A Glorious Page in Our History is keying off the misunderstanding produced by Karig, Morison, and Smith early on.

That’s the point. I don’t think she could be ‘far to the east’ to pick up Osmus and attend Akagi. Yet, she did. Therefore, Osmus’s plane presumably crashed closer to Akagi’s bomb location than supposed in Shattered Sword. There is an additional crash, that of Iyozo Fujita, a fighter pilot from Soryu who was battling Yorktown aircraft then later picked out of the water by Akagi’s guard destroyer Nowaki. This also suggest that Yorktown’s torpedo aircraft - and therefore her dive bombers - were much closer to Akagi than shown in Shattered Sword or commonly supposed.

You are building assumptions upon assumptions.

I do not believe Best's later observations are "moot". I take them very seriously. You asked for specific sourcing on where Best arrived at that conclusion his target's bridge was to starboard, (ie, Soryu), and I provided it.

Okay.

Correct, the direction of attack Best describes is that also shown in Akagi’s log. Now, here are the bomb hits on Soryu, (snip)

Yeah Glenn, I know that's the way your hobby-horse rocks, but no, sorry, I'm not interested in going further down your rabbit hole.

[Richard Anderson]

BTW, for those paying attention, Glenn's "what if" requires Leslie abd VB-3 overflying - and ignoring - Soryu and Hiryu in order to get to Akagi, while simultaneously requiring Best's Division of VB-6 aborting its attack on Kaga, then ignoring Akagi, and overflying Akagi and Hiryu to attack Soryu...of course, it also helps if, like Glenn, you suffer from massive doses of confirmation bias. When Fuchida confirms Glenn, Fuchida is a reliable witness. When he disagrees with Glenn he is unreliable. When Best's et al written reports immediately after the battle disagree with Glenn then they are unreliable. When Best's memories confirm Glenn they are unreliable. Wash, rinse, repeat. :roll: :roll: :roll:

This silliness and the additional silliness of an imaginary Kriegmarine/Regia Marina "combined fleet" tracking down, encircling, and "capturing" an allied convoy of "50 ships" is enough to warrant ignoring further silly posts from glenn239. I might mock them, but I'm not going to be serious again.

[maltesefalcon]

The question posed in the OP is not a What If? in the sense this forum usually discusses. It's more of a who gets credit for an event that happens all them same.
There is no potential change in the OTL possible or even proposed in this instance. Perhaps It should be moved or locked?

[Eugen Pinak]

BTW, for those paying attention, Glenn's "what if" requires Leslie abd VB-3 overflying - and ignoring - Soryu and Hiryu in order to get to Akagi, while simultaneously requiring Best's Division of VB-6 aborting its attack on Kaga, then ignoring Akagi, and overflying Akagi and Hiryu to attack Soryu...of course, it also helps if, like Glenn, you suffer from massive doses of confirmation bias. When Fuchida confirms Glenn, Fuchida is a reliable witness. When he disagrees with Glenn he is unreliable. When Best's et al written reports immediately after the battle disagree with Glenn then they are unreliable. When Best's memories confirm Glenn they are unreliable. Wash, rinse, repeat. :roll: :roll: :roll:

And I have a theory, that Genn just likes to invent even more improbable theories about Midway battle

The funniest thing is: if one believes Fuchida is reliable witness, he should believe everything he wrote - including his claim that "Akagi" was attacked by 3 (three) aircraft.

[Carl Schwamberger]

The question posed in the OP is not a What If? in the sense this forum usually discusses. It's more of a who gets credit for an event that happens all them same.
There is no potential change in the OTL possible or even proposed in this instance. Perhaps It should be moved or locked?

Have my own thoughts on this. Recommend you message a complaint with your concerns.

[glenn239]

The question posed in the OP is not a What If? in the sense this forum usually discusses. It's more of a who gets credit for an event that happens all them same.
There is no potential change in the OTL possible or even proposed in this instance. Perhaps It should be moved or locked?

Moved where or locked why?

[glenn239]

BTW, for those paying attention, Glenn's "what if" requires Leslie abd VB-3 overflying - and ignoring - Soryu and Hiryu in order to get to Akagi, while simultaneously requiring Best's Division of VB-6 aborting its attack on Kaga, then ignoring Akagi, and overflying Akagi and Hiryu to attack Soryu..

It requires nothing of the sort.

Best did abort an attack on Kaga. So that requirement is met. Since Best attacked Kaga against orders, the theory is that Best's situational awareness was lacking - the only reason why he would not attack Akagi as ordered is because he didn't see the Akagi due to heavy clouds and being distracted. So the "ignoring" requirement for Best with Akagi is also met - he did ignore Akagi before attacking Kaga.

In terms of the Soryu, you've misunderstood the implication completely. What it means if Yorktown attacked Akagi is that Soryu was northwest of Akagi at the time of the attack, not northeast as assumed in Shattered Sword and Glorious Page in our History. The evidence that Soryu was northwest of Akagi is here,

https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/Japan/ ... hart-2.jpg

Soryu's sinking location is shown northwest of Akagi's bombing location and its sinking location in the Nagumo Report. This is why the surveillance - interrupted - of the actual battlefield in 2019 is of interest. Because this mapping should determine whether Soryu was northeast (Shattered Sword) or northwest (Nagumo Report) of Akagi at the moment it was hit. If northeast, Yorktown sank the Soryu because Leslie did not overfly any carriers to attack one beyond. If northwest, then Best sank the Soryu because the pilots that attacked Soryu would have had to overfly another carrier to reach her, and only Best did that.

Best never claimed the Akagi in his VB-6 battle report. He claimed a "KAGA" type. Only VB-3 from Yorktown claimed "Akagi" by name.

[glenn239]

The funniest thing is: if one believes Fuchida is reliable witness, he should believe everything he wrote - including his claim that "Akagi" was attacked by 3 (three) aircraft.

Fuchida in his memoires stated that Akagi was attacked by nine aircraft. I can post the excerpt if you'd like, though I rather suspect you've already read it since your research library must include Fuchida's memoires if you have opinions on this topic. Fuchida witnessed the first three attacks only because he was nearly killed by the blast of the third bomb dropped and knocked senseless.

[glenn239]

Where is the word "charged" or "doctrine" in that passage?

The use of the word "all" surface forces in the Nagumo Report is by definition therefore inclusive of plane guard destroyers. The reasoning is that, since by doctrine plane guard destroyers should presumably maintain station behind their carriers, therefore if they did not, then the reason they moved should also be doctrinal.

That's nice, but in their actual action report the target of B-14 and B-15 was a "light cruiser" while those of B-12 and B-16 (Butler and Wiseman) was a "battleship". None were identified as a "destroyer" or by name. I suspect that A Glorious Page in Our History is keying off the misunderstanding produced by Karig, Morison, and Smith early on.

You asked for citation and the citation was given.

You are building assumptions upon assumptions.

Two planes had crews fished out of the water by destroyers assigned to Akagi, one American, one Japanese. Neither crash works with the Shattered Sword reconstruction very well because they're so far away from Akagi's bombing and sinking axis. Both crashes fit well with the Nagumo Report ship locations because they are on Akagi's bombing and sinking axis.

In the case of the Japanese fighter pilot, according to Beyond Pearl Harbor, he engaged VT-3 while it was on its run towards Hiryu. He aborted and started to return to Soryu, crashing due to anti-aircraft fire from friendly ships. When he bailed out, he landed in the water and looked around and he saw three distant columns of smoke in the distance, the three burning carriers.

He was returning to Soryu when he was hit by AA and Soryu was undamaged at that momen. But Soryu had already been bombed by the time he had bailed out and looked from the water presumably just minutes later - one of the three columns of smoke. These columns each were quite the distance away from him.

If you look at the Nagumo Report Action Track linked in the post above, what I theorize happened was that he was engaged against VT-3 near the point marked as the Akagi's bomb location. When he broke off, it was just minutes before Soryu was hit. He flew to the point on the track marked Akagi's sinking location, was hit by AA there and bailed out. From the water at that position, as you see, the three carrier smoke columns would all at quite a distance from him. You see how the bombing position of Akagi and the sinking positions of Kaga and Soryu are almost equal distance in three directions, and quite the distance from the point marked for sinking location of Akagi? I think he saw what he saw at 1030 because he bailed out close to the position marked as Akagi's sinking location. The reason why he came to maybe 8-10 hours later with the burning Akagi nearby, and was rescued by her guard destroyer Nowaki, is because Akagi had moved from her position marked bombing towards her position marked sinking, and had arrived in the area that he was bobbing in the water. All as per the map supplied in the Nagumo Report.

Yeah Glenn, I know that's the way your hobby-horse rocks, but no, sorry, I'm not interested in going further down your rabbit hole.

Glad to be of assistance in answering all the questions you asked. The mapping of the battlefield in 2020 will resolve the matter as per my previous post on the bombing location of Soryu relative to Akagi at 1025.

[Richard Anderson]

It requires nothing of the sort.

No, Glenn, it does. Keep it up all you want, but I have zero interest in engaging with you further on your latest nonsensical hobbyhorse.

[Richard Anderson]

Glad to be of assistance in answering all the questions you asked. The mapping of the battlefield in 2020 will resolve the matter as per my previous post on the bombing location of Soryu relative to Akagi at 1025.

No Glenn, it won't, meanwhile, I have zero interest in engaging with you further on your latest nonsensical hobbyhorse.

[glenn239]

It requires nothing of the sort.

No, Glenn, it does. Keep it up all you want, but I have zero interest in engaging with you further on your latest nonsensical hobbyhorse.

Yes, this was noted in your previous post. Thank you for the interest you have shown.

If you have no further interest in this 'what if' discussion, be so kind as to cease posting.

[Richard Anderson]

Yes, this was noted in your previous post. Thank you for the interest you have shown.

If you have no further interest in this 'what if' discussion, be so kind as to cease posting.

It is not a "'what if' discussion" it is your latest nonsensical hobbyhorse on a par with your scheme of how B-17s and TBD's as level bombers were the best way to destroy the Kido Butai. Plotting the locations of the wreckage will tell you where the wreckage is, it will not tell you where the ships were when attacked or what their orientation was.