U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

#121

Post by T. A. Gardner » 14 Mar 2020, 06:50

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
14 Mar 2020, 05:10
From "Endgame in the Pacific: Complexity, Strategy, and the B-29" (https://media.defense.gov/2017/May/05/2 ... ACIFIC.PDF):
The final report of the Eglin staff concluded, “the defensive
armament of the B-29 airplane is not suitable for a series of
unescorted combat operations in theaters where the airplane
will be subjected to more than brief, desultory fighter attacks.”8
Despite the vulnerability and inaccuracy of the system, and
despite aircrew preference for locally controlled gun turrets,
the General Electric remotely controlled defensive system was
selected for the B-29 because it made the problem of pressurization easier for Boeing designers to resolve.9
Concerns about
the inadequacies of the defensive system eventually drove decision makers toward night missions instead of daylight raids.
Bombing was less accurate, but few Japanese fighters could
effectively operate at night; precision bombing could be more
effective during daylight hours,
...once again I'm providing evidence and analysis and you're... not.

The B-29 could not have survived an environment of "more than brief, desultory fighter attacks." It would not have survived over Germany in this ATL, in which hundreds of Ta-152's, Do-335's, and Me-262's would be attacking it during '45. Of course if one ignores the ATL and returns to OTL LW strength, the B-29 probably would have been fine. Please don't do that.

Re the escort caveat of the foregoing quote, P-51's would have been unavailable or ineffective for escorting B-29's operating at their practical ceilings, whereas Ta-152 et. al. were designed for these altitudes in anticipation of the B-29. The B-29 could of course bomb at lower altitudes, but the it's going to hit swarms of Me-109's and, due to its inferior defensive armament compared to B-17, will be much more vulnerable to them.

I must emphasize again that none of this should be surprising. Conventional strategic bombing doesn't work unless one side can achieve air supremacy and has a massive advantage of economic resources. Neither condition would hold in this ATL.
The ad hominem aside, there is plenty of evidence from those that actually used the system that it worked as opposed to a pencil-necked desk jockey zero writing a paper nobody in particular cared about.
Bill Royster wrote:
I have heard much about our remote control turrets, and the supposition seems to be that they were next to worthless. Personally I can't say
enough good things about them. They did the job when need. I used to do quite a bit of squirrel hunting as a youth.. When I came home empty
handed I didn't blame the shotgun. Personally. while flying 31 missions I never had any gun to fail, and if you knew the wing span of the fighter, and
set your sight right, he was a dead pigeon. The Officers on our crew each gave 10 dollars, to be given to the first gunner who brings down a enemy. The attached envelope will show you who got the fifty dollar. We had a fine gunnery system.
Bill Royster One of the poor abused gunners. Just kidding folks
http://twinbeech.com/CFCsystem.htm

https://sites.google.com/site/8thafhsmn ... unner-b-29

Of course, none of that answers the question of how the B-29 was "more fragile."

Why would P-51's-- most likely the H model-- be "unavailable" to escort B-29's when they did that over Japan? The P-47N did likewise. In 1946, the P-82 would be available as well.

But, none of that pre-supposes or eliminates that the Allies change tactics and technology either. They might adopt stand off weapons for delivery instead:

Image

https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/ ... azi-cruise

Image

Image

Now, all the short-range interceptors the Luftwaffe has for bomber busting are largely, if not entirely, worthless. The Germans would need a much better early warning system. They would need fighters and a control system that would allow intercepts up to hundreds of miles from potential targets. They might now have to deal with fighting through an Allied fighter CAP that is screening the launch bombers and still have enough ammunition and fuel to attack the later if they get through the fighter screen.
Flak becomes largely worthless as a close defense to potential targets, particularly if the Allies use high flying near sonic stand-off missiles.

In your version the Germans get better equipment and tactics while the Allies do nothing new or different. I'd say history shows that's likely backwards. The Germans plod along mostly doing the same thing and getting poor results while slowly adopting half-@$$ed new technologies (note: These could be quite advanced in concept but the execution is likely to be sloppy, or put another way the Germans have a good idea for a solution and then adopt an improvised, crappy version to get it in the field fast in small numbers resulting in the Allies recognizing the new technology and having time to counter it).
The Allies on the other hand, take more time putting a solution together but when they field it, it works pretty much as advertised.

You mention the Ta 152 and Do 335. By late 1945 they're obsolescent. Jets and turboprops are the new 'normal' only the Allies are fielding hundreds to the German's tens.

Or, what do the Germans do if say, the USN and RN set 6 to 10 carriers in rotation off Norway to specifically annihilate all coastal shipping? Winter comes and iron ore shipments via Narvik end. Now what? The Germans don't have a navy worth the name. The Luftwaffe's offensive bomber force is pretty crappy in the face of actual air opposition. That could be a problem.

As I've reiterated, the Allies hold the initiative here. The Germans are reacting to what they do. If the German reaction is particularly effective the Allies try something different. It's the Germans always playing catch up to the Allies. The Germans need something that can put them effectively on the offensive against Allied sea power or allow them to attack Allied "strategic" targets. In 1943 - 44 they have neither.

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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

#122

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 14 Mar 2020, 09:13

T.A. Gardner wrote:The ad hominem aside
There is no ad hominem in pointing out that you have repeatedly ignored the ATL conditions and that you have explicitly stated that you don't need to provide numerical analysis to support your contentions.

I think you detect an ad hominem because any reasonable observer would make a negative inference from the aforementioned rhetorical strategies.
But the solution is not to play the refs, it's to stop ignoring the ATL and start providing numerical analysis.
Why would P-51's-- most likely the H model-- be "unavailable" to escort B-29's when they did that over Japan?
The point is that, were the B-29 to use its higher altitude capability unlike in the OTL Japanese bombing campaign, P-51's would be useless at those altitudes while Ta-152's would be quite effective. If, OTOH, the B-29 flew at altitudes similar to B-17/24, it would run into hordes of conventional fighters and the attrition would be unsustainable for the Allies.
But, none of that pre-supposes or eliminates that the Allies change tactics and technology either. They might adopt stand off weapons for delivery instead:
We're arguing about the bomber offensive. If you want to concede that the LW would defeat the conventional bomber offensive and move on to missiles - something that the USAF didn't rely on predominately even 25 years later in Vietnam - we can broach that topic in due course. A precondition of that discussion, however, would be showing the war continues into '46 or '47.
there is plenty of evidence from those that actually used the system
That's one piece of anecdotal evidence. Come on.
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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

#123

Post by Takao » 14 Mar 2020, 21:18

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
13 Mar 2020, 23:02
More than a year; pivot to air war would begin from the end of '41.
Therefore, any post-'41 increases to German production would go to the LW/KM, as Heer production levels will have shown themselves adequate for German strategic goals.

By the beginning of '43, after demobilizing ~2mil from the Heer and with Ukraine's resources coming online, total German production should be at least 20% greater.

OTL Germany was devoting ~50% of its production to Heer at this time; ATL it would be ~25%.

Combining the ~20% delta to overall weapons production with the 25% shifted from Heer to LW would ~double aircraft production.
How do you figure?

Where are the new factories for these 2 million workers? Or, is Germany forgoing slave labor?

One problem with decreasing Heer production by 25% to increase Luftwaffe & Kriegsmarine production, does not mean a 25% increase in Luftwaffe production, since you are dividing between the two.

Another problem, is that there Heer does not require much aluminium, while Luftwaffe production does. Your fantasy does not reconcile this offset.

A Third problem, is that the Ukraine possesses little in the way of aluminium production. Are you planning on making aircraft out of foodstuffs? Iron? Wood? Or coal? Basically, the Ukrain is essentially meaningless to increasing Luftwaffe production.

Thus, your supposed 20% delta increase is mitigated by a lack of facilities and raw material. While your supposed 25% increase is split between the Kriegsmarine, so 12.5%. Which will drop to next to nil, unless the Germans are making steel aircraft.

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
13 Mar 2020, 23:02
What's the effect in '43? For reference, see this chart of 8th AF losses from "Strategy for Defeat":

Image
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a421966.pdf

As you can see, 8th AF heavy bomber losses were 5.1% in '43. As Army AF generals saw 10% loss rate as the limit of sustainability, a doubling of LW strength in '43 would mean that daylight heavy bombing would be unsustainable.

...and that's just with across-board doubling of LW production. And while ignoring the absence of an Eastern Front, and ignoring the impact of greater German defensive success on aircraft production (less bomb damage, less efficiency-harming dispersal of production).
Again, this is pure fantasy for the reasons stated above


TheMarcksPlan wrote:
13 Mar 2020, 23:02
[*]As LW losses were, IIRC, ~1/3 on Eastern Front, no Eastern Front means an additional 50% delta to LW's attrition impact over Germany.
More fantasy...Luftwaffe losses on the Eastern Front were mostly bombers - 3,300 fighters vs. 5,000 bombers & ground attack.

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
13 Mar 2020, 23:02
[*]If the delta to LW production goes more towards fighters than bombers/transports (likely given the absence of large land battles), then LW fighters could easily see another 50% delta.
Unlikely, in that fighters will not bring Britain to the negotiating table, nor will they end the war in Germany's favor. Germany will need both fighters and bombers if it expects to defeat Britain.

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
13 Mar 2020, 23:02
[*]Pick some OTL bombing delta to German aircraft production (-20% for '43?) and pretty much wipe it out.
Well, you can wipe that out for reasons stated above.

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
13 Mar 2020, 23:02
Taken together, these deltas could easily give >5x the LW fighter strength over Germany by the beginning of '44.
Again, your dreaming an impossible dream.

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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

#124

Post by T. A. Gardner » 14 Mar 2020, 22:06

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
14 Mar 2020, 09:13
...in pointing out that you have repeatedly ignored the ATL conditions and that you have explicitly stated that you don't need to provide numerical analysis to support your contentions.
I think you detect an ad hominem because any reasonable observer would make a negative inference from the aforementioned rhetorical strategies.
But the solution is not to play the refs, it's to stop ignoring the ATL and start providing numerical analysis.
The OP ATL assumes that the Germans have much greater success in defeating the Soviet Union and make dramatic changes to their wartime planning and operations while the Allies are stuck with an original planning document that they must follow without deviation. That isn't going to produce much of an analysis. It's simply gaming the historical timeline to produce a German victory.
(ME)there is plenty of evidence from those that actually used the system
(YOU)That's one piece of anecdotal evidence. Come on.
Your source is even more anecdotal. That awful paper by Maj. Gordon you cite has the previous quote you gave on pg 28. It is the opinion of handful of test engineers and flight crew at Elgin Air Proving Ground in Florida using a few of the very early B-29's. That would mean the gunners using this system were not overly familiar with it and were used to manned power turrets.

Gordon's technical illiteracy shows throughout the paper, as one might expect from a liberal arts history major (in Russian history) who was never in a technical position with the USAF.

Above the quote you used on the fire control system, Gordon on pg 27 talks briefly about engine fires with the Wright R3350's. Well, Boeing didn't sit still on that, and Gordon is correct on the early aircraft. Boeing and Wright took steps to eliminate that chance as much as they could and then Boeing went further replacing the R3350's with P&W 4360 Wasp Major engines in the B-29D (aka XB-44 and B-50) flying the first one in May 1945. The plan was for the D model to supplant the earlier Wright powered B-29's entirely. The D also introduced stronger materials for construction, a larger vertical tail for better stability. It also doubled the payload.

So, in these cases, Gordon emphasizes the negatives while ignoring the positives.

Gordon talks about bombing inaccuracies quite a bit. However, he conflates naturally occurring problems like cloud cover, the jet stream, etc., with technical issues making the whole sound like a fault of the aircraft. He also does his best to reinforce negatives. For example, on pg 16 he talks about the AN/APQ-13 radar as "primarily intended to aid in navigation..." then on pg 36 he tells us "...the results of radar bombing with the B-29's new AN/APQ-13 radar bombsights was disappointing." So, now the radar is primarily to be used for accurate bombing rather than simply as a navigation aid? Which is it? Gordon can't keep his story straight.

On pg 35 he claims there was little learning between the RAF and USAAF on bombing methods. Yet, the USAAF adopted radar bombing aids from the RAF and improved on these. The USAAF also adopted, sometimes reluctantly, the need for electronic warfare equipment and methods. Much of the USAAF equipment was adopted directly from RAF models. The B-29 it might be noted was the first USAAF aircraft to have a dedicated ESM/ ECM station and operator in the plane. So, the USAAF was paying attention to what the RAF was doing and taking those items they saw as useful and incorporating them into their operations.

This is yet another of his emphasizing the negative while ignoring the positives.

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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

#125

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 14 Mar 2020, 23:17

T.A. Gardner wrote:The OP ATL assumes that the Germans have much greater success in defeating the Soviet Union and make dramatic changes to their wartime planning and operations while the Allies are stuck with an original planning document that they must follow without deviation.
Nope. I've explicitly invited the Allied response throughout this thread. As HistoryGeek has done.

Instead of complaining about what I'm proposing you could actually do some analysis and propose your own response.

If I think your response won't work, I'll argue against it. That's just how these things go.
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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

#126

Post by T. A. Gardner » 15 Mar 2020, 00:35

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
14 Mar 2020, 23:17
T.A. Gardner wrote:The OP ATL assumes that the Germans have much greater success in defeating the Soviet Union and make dramatic changes to their wartime planning and operations while the Allies are stuck with an original planning document that they must follow without deviation.
Nope. I've explicitly invited the Allied response throughout this thread. As HistoryGeek has done.

Instead of complaining about what I'm proposing you could actually do some analysis and propose your own response.

If I think your response won't work, I'll argue against it. That's just how these things go.
Then let's go over this again...

As I and in some cases others, have proposed the Allies could do one or more of several things...

1. The Allies still hold the strategic initiative. Germany has no means to conduct a large scale strategic offensive outside continued land warfare, but that ends with the defeat of the Soviets. This leaves Germany on the defensive.

2. The Allies decide on a "Japan first" strategy, defeating Japan say by 1946 at the latest. This frees up a huge amount of capital investment in naval vessels, etc. This could be redirected into production that would be used against Germany. For example, the US cuts back on carrier aircraft production in favor of long-range escorts and bombers for a strategic air offensive.

3. The Allies aggressively pursue a crushing defeat on German U-boats. Even in this timeline where it deviates at the end of 1943, the U-boat war is pretty much won. Deploying the Type XXI etc., won't significantly change this. All that does is force the Allies to ramp up already extant countermeasures that they already were beginning to produce (directional and active sonobuoys, homing torpedoes, scanning sonars, etc.). The objective here is to be able to pull some of the capital investment out of this activity into ones for a defeat of Germany. As it was, the Allies spent about $10 billion collectively defeating the U-boat. If they can reduce spending by just several billion, that is a huge new amount of funding that can go into other production.

4. Deploy new technologies. The cruise missile is not only possible, but easily doable. Use these to supplement a bomber campaign. Add in an IRBM like the MX 774 "Manhattan" version (eg., a nuclear IRBM). Maybe add in an AAM, SSM, and other missile technology. By 1945 the US is well ahead of Germany in this except for the missiles themselves where Germany is running about even.

5. Rearm the Soviets and help them rebuild their economy.

6. Do peripheral sniping on German territory forcing them into maintaining larger forces and putting capital into fortifications and defenses around their periphery. At the same time encourage and assist resistance movements within Germany's territory forcing them into repressing the civilian population as well as keeping large garrisons in occupied countries.

The real question in this scenario isn't How the Allies can win but rather How does Germany win?

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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

#127

Post by Politician01 » 15 Mar 2020, 12:38

T. A. Gardner wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 00:35

1. The Allies still hold the strategic initiative.
The USSR just collapsed, British troops are getting their asses kicked in North Africa, British Bombers are beeing slaughtered, Malta falls, the Allies are losing shipping space at an unprecedented rate, there is no hope of an Invasion of Europe, but the Allies hold the innitiative………

Allied planers dont have the power of hindsight, they dont even have a fraction of our Information at their disposal. They only know that the Germans can transfer a shitload of troops and material from the East and that they can Transfer a shitload of Workers into their Industry.

They also know that during WW1 It took a coalition of Britian/France/Italy/Russia and the US to defeat Germany. Now Italy is a German ally and France/Russia defeated. They will start to count how many divisions they will need, they will count how many dead this will cost. They will come to the conclusion that it cannot be done and that the war in Europe should be ended through negotiations, so that the Americans can concentrate on Japan. Realpolitics.
T. A. Gardner wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 00:35

2. The Allies decide on a "Japan first" strategy, defeating Japan say by 1946 at the latest. This frees up a huge amount of capital investment in naval vessels, etc. This could be redirected into production that would be used against Germany. For example, the US cuts back on carrier aircraft production in favor of long-range escorts and bombers for a strategic air offensive.
Once the US abandones the war in Europe it is not comming back. Prolonging the war until 1947 is fantasy anyways:

Prior to the Quebec Conference, 1943, a joint British–American planning team produced a plan ("Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan") which did not call for an invasion of the Japanese home islands until 1947–48.[21][22] The American Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that prolonging the war to such an extent was dangerous for national morale.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Downfall

Points 3-6 are basically: The Allies can do Things differently and better. Without the largest land war in human history - so can the Germans.
T. A. Gardner wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 00:35
The real question in this scenario isn't How the Allies can win but rather How does Germany win?
Oh but the question IS how can the Allies win. Because if they cant answer it German has won. And Germany has won after the collapse/surrender of the USSR because with the USSR out of the picture, the Allies will not be able to answer that question.

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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

#128

Post by Takao » 15 Mar 2020, 13:24

Politician01 wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 12:38

The USSR just collapsed, British troops are getting their asses kicked in North Africa, British Bombers are beeing slaughtered, Malta falls, the Allies are losing shipping space at an unprecedented rate, there is no hope of an Invasion of Europe, but the Allies hold the innitiative………
The USSR has collapsed...Well, that remains to be seen. TMP mostly failed on this area in his previous thread, so he created this one where the Germans have defeated the Soviets as a given.

British troops are being getting their arses kicked in North Africa only if the Germans have developed transporter technology to move everything out of the USSR to NA. Their railnet would be overwhelmed and the Italians didn't have the shipping to do it.

British Bombers are being slaughtered with what exactly? The Germans did not have all that many night fighters in the USSR. Further, TMP's fighters spam is totally unrealistic given the strategic situation.

Malta falls...And?

The Allies are losing shipping at an unprecedented rate? Well, they are building shipping at an even more unprecedented rate...Not to mention ASW escorts.


Politician01 wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 12:38
Allied planers dont have the power of hindsight, they dont even have a fraction of our Information at their disposal. They only know that the Germans can transfer a shitload of troops and material from the East and that they can Transfer a shitload of Workers into their Industry.
Allied planners don't have the power of hindsight?
So what...This whole thread is based on nothing but the German planners having the power of hindsight.

What's good for the Goose is good for the Gander.

Politician01 wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 12:38
They also know that during WW1 It took a coalition of Britian/France/Italy/Russia and the US to defeat Germany. Now Italy is a German ally and France/Russia defeated. They will start to count how many divisions they will need, they will count how many dead this will cost. They will come to the conclusion that it cannot be done and that the war in Europe should be ended through negotiations, so that the Americans can concentrate on Japan. Realpolitics.
They would also know that, in WW1, the Russians were defeated, and those German forces were transferred West...And they still won.

Politician01 wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 12:38
Once the US abandones the war in Europe it is not comming back. Prolonging the war until 1947 is fantasy anyways:

Prior to the Quebec Conference, 1943, a joint British–American planning team produced a plan ("Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan") which did not call for an invasion of the Japanese home islands until 1947–48.[21][22] The American Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that prolonging the war to such an extent was dangerous for national morale.
The Allies don't need to invade Japan. Establishing a blockade in 1944-45, essentially checkmates Japan. Strave them into submission, and All those land forces become available for use in Europe/North Africa.


Politician01 wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 12:38
Oh but the question IS how can the Allies win. Because if they cant answer it German has won. And Germany has won after the collapse/surrender of the USSR because with the USSR out of the picture, the Allies will not be able to answer that question.
Atomic bombs...The Allies win!

So, now we are back to how does Germany win...Before 1945-46.

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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

#129

Post by Politician01 » 15 Mar 2020, 14:25

Politician01 wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 12:38
They would also know that, in WW1, the Russians were defeated, and those German forces were transferred West...And they still won.
Really? This was WITH France and Italy still in the game, and after Russia bleeding the Germans dry for 3 years not 11 months. Also without a Japan that is rampaging through the Pacific and is seen as the main enemy by Americans.

Politician01 wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 12:38
The Allies don't need to invade Japan. Establishing a blockade in 1944-45, essentially checkmates Japan. Strave them into submission, and All those land forces become available for use in Europe/North Africa..
The United States Navy urged the use of a blockade and airpower to bring about Japan's capitulation. They proposed operations to capture airbases in nearby Shanghai, China, and Korea, which would give the United States Army Air Forces a series of forward airbases from which to bombard Japan into submission.[25] The Army, on the other hand, argued that such a strategy could "prolong the war indefinitely" and expend lives needlessly, and therefore that an invasion was necessary. They supported mounting a large-scale thrust directly against the Japanese homeland, with none of the side operations that the Navy had suggested. Ultimately, the Army's viewpoint prevailed.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Downfall

The "Europe First" strategy did not go down well with factions of the US military, driving a wedge between the Navy and the Army. While USN Fleet Admiral Ernest King was a strong believer in "Europe First", contrary to British perceptions, his natural aggression did not permit him to leave resources idle in the Atlantic that could be utilized in the Pacific, especially when "it was doubtful when—if ever—the British would consent to a cross-Channel operation"

In the first six months the U.S. was in the war, the U.S. army deployed more than 300,000 soldiers overseas to the Pacific while less than 100,000 were sent to Europe.[16] The U.S.'s first major offensive during World War II was in the Pacific: Guadalcanal in August 1942.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Europe_first

The US would not invest more troops into the European theatre because with the USSR out of the picture, the war there was lost. The Navy would want to concentrate against Japan, the Army would have no arguments for transferring more troops to Europe. And if the US concentrates on Japan, it will not come back and restart a larger war in Europe.

Politician01 wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 12:38
Atomic bombs...The Allies win!So, now we are back to how does Germany win...Before 1945-46.
The Allies dont know when the bomb will be ready, if it will work, and only a few thousand people know about it anyway. So, now we are back to how do the Allies win?

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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

#130

Post by Takao » 15 Mar 2020, 17:10

Politician01 wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 14:25

Really? This was WITH France and Italy still in the game, and after Russia bleeding the Germans dry for 3 years not 11 months. Also without a Japan that is rampaging through the Pacific and is seen as the main enemy by Americans.
The Russians didn't bleed Germany white, they bled Austria-Hungary. Italy did not do all that well in the war, and mostly opposed Austria-Hungary.

Japan was never seen as the main enemy in WW2.

Politician01 wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 14:25

The United States Navy urged the use of a blockade and airpower to bring about Japan's capitulation. They proposed operations to capture airbases in nearby Shanghai, China, and Korea, which would give the United States Army Air Forces a series of forward airbases from which to bombard Japan into submission.[25] The Army, on the other hand, argued that such a strategy could "prolong the war indefinitely" and expend lives needlessly, and therefore that an invasion was necessary. They supported mounting a large-scale thrust directly against the Japanese homeland, with none of the side operations that the Navy had suggested. Ultimately, the Army's viewpoint prevailed.
The Navy wanted a blockade of Japan, because they wanted to be seen as winning the Pacific War. The Air Force favored a continuation of bombing Japan, because they wanted to be seen as winning the Pacific War. While the Army favored invasion, because they wanted to be seen as winning the war. All 3 services were trying to get a larger slice of the post-war budget, which all saw as not being very large.

This would not be the case in the ATL, as Germany had not been defeated yet.

Politician01 wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 14:25
The "Europe First" strategy did not go down well with factions of the US military, driving a wedge between the Navy and the Army. While USN Fleet Admiral Ernest King was a strong believer in "Europe First", contrary to British perceptions, his natural aggression did not permit him to leave resources idle in the Atlantic that could be utilized in the Pacific, especially when "it was doubtful when—if ever—the British would consent to a cross-Channel operation"
Well, to be fair, it would take awhile to build up for a cross-channel invasion. Also, the USN did not factor much into how a European war would be fought.

Politician01 wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 14:25
In the first six months the U.S. was in the war, the U.S. army deployed more than 300,000 soldiers overseas to the Pacific while less than 100,000 were sent to Europe.[16] The U.S.'s first major offensive during World War II was in the Pacific: Guadalcanal in August 1942.
Yes...The decision was to go over to the defensive in the Pacific. Problem was there was very little to defend with, and far more territory that needed defending. Ergo, defensive forces must be moved there to defend.

The invasion of Guadalcanal was nicknamed Operation Shoestring for good reason. Further, without the decisive defeat of Japan at the battle of Midway, there would have been no invasion of Guadalcanal.

Politician01 wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 14:25
The US would not invest more troops into the European theatre because with the USSR out of the picture, the war there was lost. The Navy would want to concentrate against Japan, the Army would have no arguments for transferring more troops to Europe. And if the US concentrates on Japan, it will not come back and restart a larger war in Europe.
That's funny...WW1 was not over when Russia surrendered. Why would WW2 be so?

WW2 would end when Britain surrendered or Germany surrendered.

The US would continue to send forces to Europe if only to defend Britain from invasion. Not to mention to attack German territory on the periphery. The Allies can move more troops to the periphery faster than Germany can move in their forces.

Politician01 wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 14:25

The Allies dont know when the bomb will be ready, if it will work, and only a few thousand people know about it anyway. So, now we are back to how do the Allies win?
The Allies know reasonably when it will be ready. They also know that it will work.

Your thinking only of Fat Man, while ignoring Little Boy. They did not know when Fat Man would be ready or if it would work(Hence the Trinity test). Little Boy was certain to work, so certain to work, that it was never even tested. The flip side is that Fat Man was much easier to produce.

So, we are now back to how does Germany win before 1945.

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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

#131

Post by Richard Anderson » 15 Mar 2020, 17:22

Takao wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 17:10
Yes...The decision was to go over to the defensive in the Pacific. Problem was there was very little to defend with, and far more territory that needed defending. Ergo, defensive forces must be moved there to defend.
Indeed. In 1942 ten divisions (including the 1st and 2d MARDIV) deployed to the Pacific and "only" eight to Europe and North Africa, but the first division to deploy was the 34th ID, to England, on 8 January 1942. Furthermore, that movement, while somewhat symbolic, was considered critical enough that the division deployed five months earlier than its nominal readiness date.
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T. A. Gardner
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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

#132

Post by T. A. Gardner » 15 Mar 2020, 19:12

Politician01 wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 12:38
T. A. Gardner wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 00:35

1. The Allies still hold the strategic initiative.
The USSR just collapsed, British troops are getting their asses kicked in North Africa, British Bombers are beeing slaughtered, Malta falls, the Allies are losing shipping space at an unprecedented rate, there is no hope of an Invasion of Europe, but the Allies hold the innitiative………
Yes, they do. But to digress... First, this defeat of the Soviet Union doesn't come out of nowhere. The OP ATL says the Soviets lose by the end of 1943. That means things had to start shifting to make that happen prior to that date. What happens differently? AGS wins at Stalingrad? The Germans succeed at Kursk?
None of that would have much, if any, impact on the US - British bombing campaign to that point. For example, the first massive firebombing of a Germany city, Hamburg, would still occur on 27 July 1943. Most larger German cities are already under considerable stress from Allied bombing raids.
In N. Africa, the British win at Alamein in October 1942 and the US lands in Vichy French colonies in November 1942.
Allied planers dont have the power of hindsight, they dont even have a fraction of our Information at their disposal. They only know that the Germans can transfer a shitload of troops and material from the East and that they can Transfer a shitload of Workers into their Industry.
Given that the Germans don't have hindsight either, they have to deal with cleaning up the Eastern Front and stabilizing things there well into 1944. The Soviets agreeing to terms doesn't end things in the East instantly and permanently. Therefore, the odds are near 100% that the historical timeline in North Africa still holds, and the Axis is pushed out of N. Africa, since that happens well before the Germans win in the East.
Transferring troops and material from the East back to Germany won't happen in an instant either. This could take more than a year to accomplish. The bottleneck is how much rail capacity is available and what the Germans prioritize.
For example, if they prioritize getting the Caspian oil fields up and running, then they could be pushing manpower and equipment into that region. At the end of 1942 they have a single rail line available starting at Stalino. That is a major bottleneck for the Southern Russia region. If trains hauling oil and other resources are given priority, there are fewer to move troops with. Sure, you can have them move by road, but that's going to be much slower and put a lot of wear and tear on equipment.
They also know that during WW1 It took a coalition of Britian/France/Italy/Russia and the US to defeat Germany. Now Italy is a German ally and France/Russia defeated. They will start to count how many divisions they will need, they will count how many dead this will cost. They will come to the conclusion that it cannot be done and that the war in Europe should be ended through negotiations, so that the Americans can concentrate on Japan. Realpolitics.
Except that Germany in WW 1 knocked Russia and Italy out of the war but still lost. The German economy in 1917 was teetering on collapse. The Germans were digging up the water pipes in cities to get the lead for bullets...
The US and Britain won't make some neat accounting spreadsheet and decide they can't win. They'll make rational decisions about how they can win given what they have and what they know Germany has.
For example, with the Allies holding N. Africa, they know with near certainty that Germany has no means of applying any sort of strategic offensive that is meaningful against them. The Soviets are done in the East but that blocks further German actions in that region. Germany cannot effective bombard Britain and certainly cannot invade it. The Germans can't take back N. Africa. For both, they lack the navy and amphibious capacity to do it. Those are immutable facts that would still hold given the historical timeline to the point where it is altered.
T. A. Gardner wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 00:35

2. The Allies decide on a "Japan first" strategy, defeating Japan say by 1946 at the latest. This frees up a huge amount of capital investment in naval vessels, etc. This could be redirected into production that would be used against Germany. For example, the US cuts back on carrier aircraft production in favor of long-range escorts and bombers for a strategic air offensive.
Once the US abandones the war in Europe it is not comming back. Prolonging the war until 1947 is fantasy anyways:

Prior to the Quebec Conference, 1943, a joint British–American planning team produced a plan ("Appreciation and Plan for the Defeat of Japan") which did not call for an invasion of the Japanese home islands until 1947–48.[21][22] The American Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that prolonging the war to such an extent was dangerous for national morale.
Why would the US "abandon" the war in Europe? All they do is slow down their offensive operations on the ground there-- eg., not invade Sicily or Italy for example-- until they are finished with Japan. They could still maintain a bomber offensive, just as the British are doing. If the Germans try to step up bombing of Britain, the Allies beef up their defenses against this. The Luftwaffe, just as in the BoB, can't sustain the sort of losses they'd suffer from such a campaign and the results would be far less effective than the Allies bombing of Germany simply because the Luftwaffe can only deliver a fraction of the payload the Allies can.
That a delay could impact morale is a far cry from the US deciding it can't win and should simply quit the war. There was never something as negative as that in their thinking.
Points 3-6 are basically: The Allies can do Things differently and better. Without the largest land war in human history - so can the Germans.
The Allies have more options. Germany isn't going to build a navy that can challenge the British and US. Isn't going to happen. The German aircraft industry isn't going to match British and US production in either quality--for the most part-- or quantity. For example, the Germans are not going to build anywhere close to what the US and Britain did in four-engine bombers. They simply don't have the capacity and aren't going to get it anytime soon.
T. A. Gardner wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 00:35
The real question in this scenario isn't How the Allies can win but rather How does Germany win?
Oh but the question IS how can the Allies win. Because if they cant answer it German has won. And Germany has won after the collapse/surrender of the USSR because with the USSR out of the picture, the Allies will not be able to answer that question.
No, the question is how does Germany not lose? As I pointed out, a stalemate favors the Allies. Germany is limited to internal resources while the Allies' access to resources grows. The Allies have the option of rearming the Soviet Union and a worldwide trade network. The Germans have little option on trade if the Allies won't agree to let them do so. That's the problem for Germany even if there was a general peace. Germany could remain economically and socially isolated by the rest of the world. Germany has little access to the sea even in this ATL.

Worse, if you assume that the Nazis do what they did historically, they continue to depopulate Eastern Europe, and eschew science and technology in favor of their planned Volksgemeinshaft state. Even then it's a case of Germany wins and round 3 goes to the rest of the planet.

But, once the US has nukes Germany is pretty much finished. The US will have or get delivery systems the Germans can't stop and that means Germany ends up in ashes. If the Germans don't discover plutonium (it was kept secret in the US) on their own, they have little option for retaliation. At best, they might get a few uranium bombs at huge expense and massive effort, but it's not going to return the sort of hurt the US can throw on them with plutonium bombs.
Then the British and Soviets join in on that fun at some point...

So, it remains that the Allies get to decide on what they will do. That gives them the strategic initiative, not Germany. Germany can only react and hope that their defenses are sufficient to cause the Allies to decide to sue for peace. Germany can't force a peace by military action onto the Allies. They can't bomb them into submission. They can't invade and conqueror them. All Germany can do is wait the Allies out and hope that their own economy and social structure doesn't collapse in the meantime.

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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

#133

Post by Politician01 » 15 Mar 2020, 20:00

Takao wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 17:10
The Russians didn't bleed Germany white, they bled Austria-Hungary. Italy did not do all that well in the war, and mostly opposed Austria-Hungary.
They kept occupied and killed Austrian troops that could have been sent to the Western Front-however you forgot the most important factor France.

It was the French that bore the brunt of the Western Front in WW1 sustaining around 60% of all casualties. (Dead/wounded/captured)
Now the main ally of WW1 is defeated, Russia just folded as well, the Italians are German allies and then there are the Japanese.

Takao wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 17:10
Japan was never seen as the main enemy in WW2.
The American people favored early action against Japan. In one of the few public opinion polls taken during the war, in February 1943, 53% of Americans said that Japan was the "chief enemy" compared to 34% choosing Germany.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Europe_first
Takao wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 17:10
That's funny...WW1 was not over when Russia surrendered. Why would WW2 be so?
Because France and Russia would be defeated, Italy a German ally and Japan another foe that was not there during WW1.
Takao wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 17:10
The US would continue to send forces to Europe if only to defend Britain from invasion. Not to mention to attack German territory on the periphery. The Allies can move more troops to the periphery faster than Germany can move in their forces.
Yeah sure - hundreds of thousands of men would be sent to Britain and some peripheral, tertiary battlefields, instead of the Pacific... Right.

Takao wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 17:10
The Allies know reasonably when it will be ready. They also know that it will work.
By the Summer of 1942 the Allies knew when the bomb would be Ready and that it would work? Got a source for that?

Takao wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 17:10
So, we are now back to how does Germany win before 1945.

So we are back to the question how the Allies think that they can win the war in the summer of 1942 after the fall of the USSR.

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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

#134

Post by Politician01 » 15 Mar 2020, 20:42

T. A. Gardner wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 19:12
The OP ATL says the Soviets lose by the end of 1943.
Middle of 42.
T. A. Gardner wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 19:12
Given that the Germans don't have hindsight either.
They however get spared to fight THE LARGEST LAND WAR IN HUMAN HISTORY. Half a Million Partisans without any heavy equipment are Peanuts compared to 6 Million Red Army soldiers with 20 000+ tanks and Aircraft. You can TRIPLE OTL German casualties (except Aircraft) sustained in Italy and Western Europe - and the Germans would be fine without an Eastern Front. Just a 50% casualty increase for the Allies however would present them with serious difficulties.
T. A. Gardner wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 19:12
Except that Germany in WW 1 knocked Russia and Italy out of the war but still lost. The German economy in 1917 was teetering on collapse.
Italy was never really knocked out of the War, Russia was replaced with the US, France bore the brunt of Allied casualties. ATL Italy is an ally of Germany, Russia AND France defeated.
T. A. Gardner wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 19:12
The US and Britain won't make some neat accounting spreadsheet and decide they can't win. They'll make rational decisions about how they can win given what they have and what they know Germany has.
Yeah and after making some neat Accounting spreadsheet, they make the rational decision that they cant win, because they know that the Axis has much more divisions, that Britain doesnt have the manpower to make more divisions, that casualties would be monstrous and that they have to fight against Japan as well.
T. A. Gardner wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 19:12
Why would the US "abandon" the war in Europe? All they do is slow down their offensive operations on the ground there-- eg., not invade Sicily or Italy for example-- until they are finished with Japan.
:lol: :lol: :lol:
T. A. Gardner wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 19:12
For example, the Germans are not going to build anywhere close to what the US and Britain did in four-engine bombers. They simply don't have the capacity and aren't going to get it anytime soon.
They however can accelerate the development of AA weapons like the Me 262, R4m rockets, Wasserfall rocket ect ect
They however can concentrate 100% of their LW against the Allies.

For every bomber the Allies loose, they loose 2 pilots and 3-4 other trained personell, the Germans loose around 50 pilots for every 100 single engine fighters that get shot down. So even with a 1:1 Ratio, 500 Bombers for 500 fighters, the Allies loose 1000 pilots and 1500 to 2000 other trained personell for just 250 German pilots. The odds are in their favor.
T. A. Gardner wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 19:12
No, the question is how does Germany not lose? As I pointed out, a stalemate favors the Allies.
As I pointed out and backed up with facts: Britain has no manpower left, its industry is collapsing, the Germans have better AA weapons and better rocket technology. American public will demand to concentrate on Japan and to ende the unwinnable war in Europe. Also the Atom bomb is not a war winner itself.

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Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

#135

Post by Richard Anderson » 15 Mar 2020, 20:54

Politician01 wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 20:42
T. A. Gardner wrote:
15 Mar 2020, 19:12
The OP ATL says the Soviets lose by the end of 1943.
Middle of 42.
Not exactly. The OP only stated "I would like to evaluate the likelihood of success for the Victory Plan on its own terms (i.e. assuming German victory over SU), as well as generally discuss the Western Allies' (Wallies) prospects following a '42 German victory over the SU." So a bit ambiguous. It was I that remarked Wedemeyer's planning assumption was "the USSR would be militarily impotent by 1 July 1942".
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