The ad hominem aside, there is plenty of evidence from those that actually used the system that it worked as opposed to a pencil-necked desk jockey zero writing a paper nobody in particular cared about.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑14 Mar 2020, 05:10From "Endgame in the Pacific: Complexity, Strategy, and the B-29" (https://media.defense.gov/2017/May/05/2 ... ACIFIC.PDF):
...once again I'm providing evidence and analysis and you're... not.The final report of the Eglin staff concluded, “the defensive
armament of the B-29 airplane is not suitable for a series of
unescorted combat operations in theaters where the airplane
will be subjected to more than brief, desultory fighter attacks.”8
Despite the vulnerability and inaccuracy of the system, and
despite aircrew preference for locally controlled gun turrets,
the General Electric remotely controlled defensive system was
selected for the B-29 because it made the problem of pressurization easier for Boeing designers to resolve.9
Concerns about
the inadequacies of the defensive system eventually drove decision makers toward night missions instead of daylight raids.
Bombing was less accurate, but few Japanese fighters could
effectively operate at night; precision bombing could be more
effective during daylight hours,
The B-29 could not have survived an environment of "more than brief, desultory fighter attacks." It would not have survived over Germany in this ATL, in which hundreds of Ta-152's, Do-335's, and Me-262's would be attacking it during '45. Of course if one ignores the ATL and returns to OTL LW strength, the B-29 probably would have been fine. Please don't do that.
Re the escort caveat of the foregoing quote, P-51's would have been unavailable or ineffective for escorting B-29's operating at their practical ceilings, whereas Ta-152 et. al. were designed for these altitudes in anticipation of the B-29. The B-29 could of course bomb at lower altitudes, but the it's going to hit swarms of Me-109's and, due to its inferior defensive armament compared to B-17, will be much more vulnerable to them.
I must emphasize again that none of this should be surprising. Conventional strategic bombing doesn't work unless one side can achieve air supremacy and has a massive advantage of economic resources. Neither condition would hold in this ATL.
http://twinbeech.com/CFCsystem.htmBill Royster wrote:
I have heard much about our remote control turrets, and the supposition seems to be that they were next to worthless. Personally I can't say
enough good things about them. They did the job when need. I used to do quite a bit of squirrel hunting as a youth.. When I came home empty
handed I didn't blame the shotgun. Personally. while flying 31 missions I never had any gun to fail, and if you knew the wing span of the fighter, and
set your sight right, he was a dead pigeon. The Officers on our crew each gave 10 dollars, to be given to the first gunner who brings down a enemy. The attached envelope will show you who got the fifty dollar. We had a fine gunnery system.
Bill Royster One of the poor abused gunners. Just kidding folks
https://sites.google.com/site/8thafhsmn ... unner-b-29
Of course, none of that answers the question of how the B-29 was "more fragile."
Why would P-51's-- most likely the H model-- be "unavailable" to escort B-29's when they did that over Japan? The P-47N did likewise. In 1946, the P-82 would be available as well.
But, none of that pre-supposes or eliminates that the Allies change tactics and technology either. They might adopt stand off weapons for delivery instead:
https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/ ... azi-cruise
Now, all the short-range interceptors the Luftwaffe has for bomber busting are largely, if not entirely, worthless. The Germans would need a much better early warning system. They would need fighters and a control system that would allow intercepts up to hundreds of miles from potential targets. They might now have to deal with fighting through an Allied fighter CAP that is screening the launch bombers and still have enough ammunition and fuel to attack the later if they get through the fighter screen.
Flak becomes largely worthless as a close defense to potential targets, particularly if the Allies use high flying near sonic stand-off missiles.
In your version the Germans get better equipment and tactics while the Allies do nothing new or different. I'd say history shows that's likely backwards. The Germans plod along mostly doing the same thing and getting poor results while slowly adopting half-@$$ed new technologies (note: These could be quite advanced in concept but the execution is likely to be sloppy, or put another way the Germans have a good idea for a solution and then adopt an improvised, crappy version to get it in the field fast in small numbers resulting in the Allies recognizing the new technology and having time to counter it).
The Allies on the other hand, take more time putting a solution together but when they field it, it works pretty much as advertised.
You mention the Ta 152 and Do 335. By late 1945 they're obsolescent. Jets and turboprops are the new 'normal' only the Allies are fielding hundreds to the German's tens.
Or, what do the Germans do if say, the USN and RN set 6 to 10 carriers in rotation off Norway to specifically annihilate all coastal shipping? Winter comes and iron ore shipments via Narvik end. Now what? The Germans don't have a navy worth the name. The Luftwaffe's offensive bomber force is pretty crappy in the face of actual air opposition. That could be a problem.
As I've reiterated, the Allies hold the initiative here. The Germans are reacting to what they do. If the German reaction is particularly effective the Allies try something different. It's the Germans always playing catch up to the Allies. The Germans need something that can put them effectively on the offensive against Allied sea power or allow them to attack Allied "strategic" targets. In 1943 - 44 they have neither.