U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

[Politician01]

Not exactly. The OP only stated "I would like to evaluate the likelihood of success for the Victory Plan on its own terms (i.e. assuming German victory over SU), as well as generally discuss the Western Allies' (Wallies) prospects following a '42 German victory over the SU." So a bit ambiguous. It was I that remarked Wedemeyer's planning assumption was "the USSR would be militarily impotent by 1 July 1942".

The Victory Plan of 1941 was a U.S. Army study that assumed that Germany would defeat the SU during summer '42

Even if we go with Autumn of 1942 - its more than a year earlier than the "end of 43" claimed by Gardner.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Not exactly. The OP only stated "I would like to evaluate the likelihood of success for the Victory Plan on its own terms (i.e. assuming German victory over SU), as well as generally discuss the Western Allies' (Wallies) prospects following a '42 German victory over the SU." So a bit ambiguous. It was I that remarked Wedemeyer's planning assumption was "the USSR would be militarily impotent by 1 July 1942".

The Victory Plan of 1941 was a U.S. Army study that assumed that Germany would defeat the SU during summer '42

Even if we go with Autumn of 1942 - its more than a year earlier than the "end of 43" claimed by Gardner.

In the first version of a somewhat detailed ATL that I laid out at HostoryGeek's request, the SU agrees an armistice by September '42.

In the second version - where Germany has to take the Central Urals to force Soviet surrender on harsh terms - armistice occurs in December.

Either version is far earlier than Gardners "end of 43." It's why I'm not responding to his points for now. No point putting in effort if your interlocutor is determined to misrepresent you.

Either version is also consistent with Soviet military impotence by mid-'42, as the German forces needed during fall 42 to compel a settlement would be much smaller than OTL Ostheer.

[Richard Anderson]

Not exactly. The OP only stated "I would like to evaluate the likelihood of success for the Victory Plan on its own terms (i.e. assuming German victory over SU), as well as generally discuss the Western Allies' (Wallies) prospects following a '42 German victory over the SU." So a bit ambiguous. It was I that remarked Wedemeyer's planning assumption was "the USSR would be militarily impotent by 1 July 1942".

The Victory Plan of 1941 was a U.S. Army study that assumed that Germany would defeat the SU during summer '42

Even if we go with Autumn of 1942 - its more than a year earlier than the "end of 43" claimed by Gardner.

Militarily impotent, not "defeated". Not quite the same thing. The other problem is still getting from A to Z without bothering with B, C, D, and et cetera. The production planning document of which Wedemeyer's study was a part, was completed in draft by 23 August 1941, two months into the German campaign in the east. It's assumption for 1 July 1942 was just that - an assumption. It would change frequently as the war progressed.

Thus, the question as always is what gets the Germans to that state. What do they do differently that the Allies could exploit? Curtail the U-Boot war? Excellent as that eliminates the major hindrance to an American build-up in Europe and to British industry. Rommel and Afrika Korps deploy East? Great...so the Med is a British lake by mid 1941 and Africa is in British hands, while Mussolini's government is shaky two years early. Cut the Luftwaffe for more tanks? Okay, so then the interdiction campaign that so badly affected the early stages of the Soviet mobilization doesn't happen? Developing the one variable results in changes to the other variables. If fewer Luftwaffe and U-Boot results in a stronger and earlier CBO, then does Germany then scramble to try to build up the Luftwaffe again after shrinking it?

I also suspect Terry was assuming that a "'42 German victory over the SU" would not produce a real peace dividend for Germany until sometime in 1943, which may be reasonable, but mid 1943 would probably be closer to it.

[T. A. Gardner]

Not exactly. The OP only stated "I would like to evaluate the likelihood of success for the Victory Plan on its own terms (i.e. assuming German victory over SU), as well as generally discuss the Western Allies' (Wallies) prospects following a '42 German victory over the SU." So a bit ambiguous. It was I that remarked Wedemeyer's planning assumption was "the USSR would be militarily impotent by 1 July 1942".

The Victory Plan of 1941 was a U.S. Army study that assumed that Germany would defeat the SU during summer '42

Even if we go with Autumn of 1942 - its more than a year earlier than the "end of 43" claimed by Gardner.

In the first version of a somewhat detailed ATL that I laid out at HostoryGeek's request, the SU agrees an armistice by September '42.

In the second version - where Germany has to take the Central Urals to force Soviet surrender on harsh terms - armistice occurs in December.

Either version is far earlier than Gardners "end of 43." It's why I'm not responding to his points for now. No point putting in effort if your interlocutor is determined to misrepresent you.

Either version is also consistent with Soviet military impotence by mid-'42, as the German forces needed during fall 42 to compel a settlement would be much smaller than OTL Ostheer.

Okay, end of 1942, my error sorry. Makes no difference. North Africa still falls. The Germans are not going to be able to do much more than they did to save it. Alamein occurs in October 42, and Torch in November 42. That gives the Germans essentially zero time to respond to those two actions.

As for the "armistice" itself, exactly where are the Germans in Russia? What have they taken they didn't historically and when did that happen? For example, did they take Moscow? What was the cost of that to the Germans? I would assume Stalingrad fell and the Caucuses were taken at roughly the original costs. What did taking Leningrad cost? These questions are important since they give a picture of the state of the German army. I doubt the Luftwaffe to that point is any different in size or composition either, or are there significant differences? What are those if there are?

How "harsh" can terms be if the Germans won after a brutal war that nearly finished them as well? It's hardly realistic that a claim could be made that the Wehrmacht wouldn't have suffered serious and massive casualties winning in Russia. I'd expect that the Germans would have to put in as much, possibly more, to defeat Russia-- which at least has some plausibility to it-- than they did historically. I doubt they could have done much better in 1941 than they did historically.

This still leaves the Germans in exactly the same spot. They have no options for a successful strategic offensive against Britain and the US. That means they can only react to what the W. Allies choose to do. It's the Allies war to lose, not Germany's to win.

[TheMarcksPlan]

For every bomber the Allies loose, they loose 2 pilots and 3-4 other trained personel

Worse than that: 2 pilots and 8 trained personnel. With the B-29 you add a highly-trained flight engineer to that tally.

...and as everyone keeps ignoring in this thread, a heavy bomber costs ~10x an Me-109 to produce. Absolutely unsustainable against an ATL LW producing >5,000 fighters per month, with the fuel to maintain an adequate training program.

Also the Atom bomb is not a war winner itself.

Germany isn't going to surrender after 2 atom bombs like Japan, not when it controls all of Europe, the Middle East, and most of North Africa.
So the Allies are going to have to be willing to incinerate millions of Germans along with millions of foreign workers residing in German cities.

That's just the first problem.

Next they have to be willing to accept an utterly horrific response from the Nazi regime.
OTL Germany had enough Tabun (sarin gas) to kill everyone on earth.
If A-bombs start incinerating German men, women, and children, can anyone really doubt that Germany would kill millions with Tabun?
They'd have thousands of jet aircraft with which to deliver small Tabun payloads and there's no chance of intercepting all - or even a quarter - of a determined bio-weapons raiding program against England.

Further, would we put it past the Nazi regime to start gassing Paris, Athens, Stockholm, Moscow, and other centers under their control if the Allies evince an intent to murder millions of Germans with A-bombs? I don't think so.

So probably the U.S. could subdue Germany with A-bombs if determined to turn WW2 into a conflict that kills 200 million people. Just can't see that happening, however.

-----------------------------------------------

Aside from the A-bomb, folks have suggested a couple other paths to Allied victory over Germany:

• "Peripheral operations" This is spoken of but not specified. Where do the Allies land? Is there anywhere in Europe that they can? Nobody in this thread will tell us. The Victory Plan mentions "expeditions" in France and the Low Countries but that's risible absent an army capable of 1 on 1 battle against the full Heer.
• Bomber offensive - so far nobody on the other side has explained how the bomber offensive continues against a much stronger LW.
• "Cruise Missiles" or "Technology!" This T.A. Gardner's idea so far; it's completely implausible IMJ. Heavy bombers remained the primary instrument of strategic aerial warfare for decades after WW2; until there's some credible explanation of how tens of thousands of accurate cruise missiles time-travel into the 1940's this idea doesn't deserve much attention.
• Rearm the SU after Japan's fall. Nobody has so far explained why Stalin would subject his rump state to the immediate German response of driving from the Urals to take Western Siberia and detach Central Asia from Soviet control, rendering the SU a bit player in world politics and likely causing collapse of the Soviet regime. Nobody explains how the Allies rearm the SU without the Germans noticing and doing the foregoing. Nobody explains why the SU wouldn't prefer to take Manchuria and Korea from Japan, presenting the West with a fait accompli, and then supporting the Reds in the Chinese Civil War. It's massively superficial "analysis."
• "After the defeat of Japan." Commenters in this thread refuse to engage the likelihood of German assistance to Japan over the Trans-Siberian railroad or via other means. If Germany provides thousands of cheap fighters, for instance, it will be a very long time before even the USN can field enough carrier-based planes to establish air supremacy over landing sites. And a very long time before it can wreck Japanese cities as in OTL, when the B-29's faced very weak opposition. That means either a longer fight against Japan or a peace with Germany in which Hitler stops propping up Japan.

All this brings us back to the topic that everyone in this thread refuses to confront, as did VP41: how do the Allies get back on the ground in Europe and eventually to Berlin?

They just can't.

At least that's my judgment so far. But I'm willing to hear out substantive arguments that don't rely on "something something Technology!"

[TheMarcksPlan]

As for the "armistice" itself, exactly where are the Germans in Russia? What have they taken they didn't historically and when did that happen? For example, did they take Moscow? What was the cost of that to the Germans? I would assume Stalingrad fell and the Caucuses were taken at roughly the original costs.

Please follow the thread if you want to have a productive conversation.

viewtopic.php?f=11&t=247189&start=15#p2250760
viewtopic.php?f=11&t=247189&start=75#p2255840

[T. A. Gardner]

"5,000 Me 109 a month..."

Given in 1942, all Messerschmitt production in Germany turned out 2,658 Me 109 for the year, how's that going to happen? How are the Germans suddenly going to increase Me 109 production by over 2200%? (60,000 / 2658). Where do the factories to do this come from? Hell, were do the rivets needed come from?

[TheMarcksPlan]

5,000 Me 109 a month..."

Obviously that's not in 1942 but certainly by '44.

Please, please, please pay some actual attention to what is being said in this thread instead of making half-cocked comments. You're needlessly cluttering the thread with your lack of attention and irrelevant comments.

[Richard Anderson]

"5,000 Me 109 a month..."

Given in 1942, all Messerschmitt production in Germany turned out 2,658 Me 109 for the year, how's that going to happen? How are the Germans suddenly going to increase Me 109 production by over 2200%? (60,000 / 2658). Where do the factories to do this come from? Hell, were do the rivets needed come from?

Better yet, given that the United States, with much greater resources, turned out a monthly peak of 3,156 single-engine fighter aircraft (Army & Navy cognizance) in March 1944, the notion of Germany turning out 5,000 of a single type per month is simply pie-in-the-sky. The actual German peak for single-engine fighters was 3,031 in September 1944, which was a remarkable achievement reached by prioritizing single-engine lightweight aircraft over multi-engine aircraft...also in September 1944 the Germans completed 226 twin-engine fighter, 407 twin-engine bomber, and 21 single-engine bombers. In March 1944, the US completed 375 twin-engine fighters, 1,110 twin-engine bombers, 750 single-engine bombers, and 1,569 four-engine bombers.

[T. A. Gardner]

5,000 Me 109 a month..."

Obviously that's not in 1942 but certainly by '44.

Please, please, please pay some actual attention to what is being said in this thread instead of making half-cocked comments. You're needlessly cluttering the thread with your lack of attention and irrelevant comments.

So, you are claiming that the German aircraft industry can nearly triple the production of Me 109 fighters in just over a year (end of 1942 to the beginning of 1944), or more generously, in say 18 months including increasing engine production for these planes, and somehow upping the training of pilots by an equal amount so they can actually be used...

So, why was this not possible in 1940 when the Germans had defeated France, weren't engaged in a war in Russia, had Britain on the ropes, their industrial base was untouched by bombing...?

:roll:

[Richard Anderson]

So, why was this not possible in 1940 when the Germans had defeated France, weren't engaged in a war in Russia, had Britain on the ropes, their industrial base was untouched by bombing...?

:roll:

OO! OO! OO! I can answer that...

Basically, to provide the required Transportgruppen for WESERUBUNG and GELB and to bring units up to maximum strength the Luftwaffe raided much of the training establishment, especially the advanced and multi-engine establishment, shutting down much of the training and losing a good number of training cadre in the process.

So there were 15 training Jagdflieger Staffeln in 1940 to support 29 Jagdgruppen. One for two. There were 4 training Stukaflieger Staffeln 10 Stukagruppen. One for two and a half. Worst, there were 10 training Kampflieger Staffeln for nearly 46 Kampfgruppen. One for four and a half. It was not enough then and it was never much better later.

There simply wasn't a strong enough infrastructure in the Luftwaffe to support wartime commitments from the beginning and there was no real capacity to create such as the war went on.

[Takao]

...and as everyone keeps ignoring in this thread, a heavy bomber costs ~10x an Me-109 to produce. Absolutely unsustainable against an ATL LW producing >5,000 fighters per month, with the fuel to maintain an adequate training program.

Everyone ignores it...Because you have not explained where you are getting all this aluminium from. Germany had pretty much maxed out her production and Soviet production was 20% that of Germany.

Germany isn't going to surrender after 2 atom bombs like Japan, not when it controls all of Europe, the Middle East, and most of North Africa.
So the Allies are going to have to be willing to incinerate millions of Germans along with millions of foreign workers residing in German cities.

That's just the first problem.

No one expects Germany to surrender after only 2...Look at how many the US produced in the following months. They would be completing 3 per month. That's 24 by March, 1946. Then, the US goes on a party spree.

Your problem is that your thinking historically...Stuck in the Pacific War.

Next they have to be willing to accept an utterly horrific response from the Nazi regime.
OTL Germany had enough Tabun (sarin gas) to kill everyone on earth.
If A-bombs start incinerating German men, women, and children, can anyone really doubt that Germany would kill millions with Tabun?

Your presuming that there is a Nazi Party left. Or whomever takes over will wish to continue.

They'd have thousands of jet aircraft with which to deliver small Tabun payloads and there's no chance of intercepting all - or even a quarter - of a determined bio-weapons raiding program against England.

More aircraft that Germany does not have the aluminium to produce.

Further, would we put it past the Nazi regime to start gassing Paris, Athens, Stockholm, Moscow, and other centers under their control if the Allies evince an intent to murder millions of Germans with A-bombs? I don't think so.

Let them...Bye-Bye German slave laborers...Hello uprisings in every nation under German control. Bye-Bye Greater German Empire.

[*]"Peripheral operations" This is spoken of but not specified. Where do the Allies land? Is there anywhere in Europe that they can? Nobody in this thread will tell us. The Victory Plan mentions "expeditions" in France and the Low Countries but that's risible absent an army capable of 1 on 1 battle against the full Heer.

Hard to say, without knowing what German units are stationed where.

Norway or North Africa would be a start...Any where the Germans have to use sea routes to supply and land troops.

[*]Bomber offensive - so far nobody on the other side has explained how the bomber offensive continues against a much stronger LW.

Because, you have not sufficiently explained how the Luftwaffe is much stronger. No extra production facilities, the USSR is not much help providing extra Aluminium...oh, that's right, the Germans are building steel aircraft now. Germany only lost about 3,000 fighters on the Eastern Front 42-44. So your 5x more powerful LW doe not seem to be all that more powerful.

[*]"Cruise Missiles" or "Technology!" This T.A. Gardner's idea so far; it's completely implausible IMJ. Heavy bombers remained the primary instrument of strategic aerial warfare for decades after WW2; until there's some credible explanation of how tens of thousands of accurate cruise missiles time-travel into the 1940's this idea doesn't deserve much attention. [/quote]
Historically, with the end of the war, the US refunded most of their programs. But, this is not historical...Is it.

[*]Rearm the SU after Japan's fall. Nobody has so far explained why Stalin would subject his rump state to the immediate German response of driving from the Urals to take Western Siberia and detach Central Asia from Soviet control, rendering the SU a bit player in world politics and likely causing collapse of the Soviet regime. Nobody explains how the Allies rearm the SU without the Germans noticing and doing the foregoing. Nobody explains why the SU wouldn't prefer to take Manchuria and Korea from Japan, presenting the West with a fait accompli, and then supporting the Reds in the Chinese Civil War. It's massively superficial "analysis."

The Soviets take Manchuria & Korea with what exactly?

[*]"After the defeat of Japan." Commenters in this thread refuse to engage the likelihood of German assistance to Japan over the Trans-Siberian railroad or via other means. If Germany provides thousands of cheap fighters, for instance, it will be a very long time before even the USN can field enough carrier-based planes to establish air supremacy over landing sites. And a very long time before it can wreck Japanese cities as in OTL, when the B-29's faced very weak opposition. That means either a longer fight against Japan or a peace with Germany in which Hitler stops propping up Japan.

Oh great...Even More airplanes Germany does not have aluminium for. Where is Germany getting all this aluminum?

Over a Trans-Siberian Railway that Germany does not control(I'd love to see Stalin tear it up out of spite).

Germany sends thousands of cheap fighters(must be made of wood). Sending short-ranged fighters to fight a very long ranged Pacific War is not a very smart move. Too many islands to far apart to be mutually supportive.

how do the Allies get back on the ground in Europe and eventually to Berlin?

They just can't.

At least that's my judgment so far. But I'm willing to hear out substantive arguments that don't rely on "something something Technology!"

What does it matter?

Decades of planning a Pacific War never once considered an invasion of Japan - the very idea was an anathema to US military planners. Yet, in 1945, there they were, planning to invade Japan.

Plans change as the situation changes, and what holds true now, may not hold true 2 or 3 years from now.

Besides, for all you know it will be something something technology.

[TheMarcksPlan]

he United States, with much greater resources, turned out a monthly peak of 3,156 single-engine fighter aircraft (Army & Navy cognizance) in March 1944, the notion of Germany turning out 5,000 of a single type per month is simply pie-in-the-sky. The actual German peak for single-engine fighters was 3,031 in September 1944

What's the logic to this utterance? On the one hand the U.S. has enormously more resources, on the other the German peak was 97% of U.S. fighter production...

So, you are claiming that the German aircraft industry can nearly triple the production of Me 109 fighters in just over a year (end of 1942 to the beginning of 1944), or more generously, in say 18 months

Yeah imagine the Germans tripling the production of a fighter type in one year [trigger warning re 43-44 Fw-190 trend]...







As usual with folks here, this is "it didn't happen so it couldn't happen."

For those reading along and not committed to a myopic agenda, the numbers are clear that much higher fighter production was easily possible given (1) reduction in spending on land weapons and (2) greater German economic resources in this ATL.

Here's German monthly armaments production by value and category in mid-1944:





Germany was spending >800mil RM **per month** on ammo and powder.
Unit cost of an Me-109 with engine was around 100,000RM.
...so devoting merely half of Germany's OTL ammo/powder resources to Me-109's would make ~4,000 Me-109's.

4,000 Me-109's

And that's before accounting for greater ATL resources and lower bomb damage.

It's not just feasible for Germany to have produced 5,000 Me-109's/month, it's ridiculous for anyone to deny it in this ATL.

Where is Germany getting all this aluminum?

Just more of the same from the "it didn't happen so it couldn't happen" crowd.
Germany controlled more of the world's pre-war bauxite production than the Allies, had an enormous capital goods industry, and would have had no problem increasing aluminum production in this ATL.

Because I don't find discussion with this member to be productive, I will not put more effort into responding to his question right now.

Would anyone else like to pose the question? Otherwise it's something that I will address in more detail down the road.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Outline of German Economic Resources by ATL 1944

A central aspect of this ATL is that the Germans will possess significantly more economic resources after conquering the SU and integrating labor and natural resources into the Grossraum.

To that end, further analysis will discuss the following subcomponents of the greater ATL German/Axis economy:

• A larger German labor force due to:
  • Demobilization of Heer below OTL levels
  • Fewer permanent casualties
  • Greater use of foreign labor
• Incorporation of Russian and (later, to a lesser extent) Middle Eastern oil resources into the German/European economy, resulting in:
  • Diversion of large chemical industries and their resource demands to other areas (e.g. fertilizer production)
  • Revival of occupied economies, particularly agriculture
• Greater contribution by occupied economies to the German war effort as their economies revive and as the political situation - German hegemony on at least a mid-term horizon - increasingly favors collaboration.
  .
• Increased German access to bottleneck raw materials such as chromium (all of Turkey's production to Axis) and rubber (shipped more easily - even if on submarines - via the Indian Ocean).
  .
• Dramatic decline in bomb damage to the German economy, including:
  • Direct bombing effects - damage to capital stock and interrupted production
  • Indirect bombing effects - foregone investment in underground and otherwise-hardened production facilities, in fire-fighting equipment, replacement housing stock, and other areas that diverted >4mil German laborers by 1944
  • Given fewer bombing sorties, a reduction in Flak expenditure
• Trade with the rump Soviet Union

This analysis will have to include discussion of the top-line stats/facts about resource distribution within the larger Grossraum, such as shipping in the Med/Black seas and rail transport. The author notes in advance that most AHF members given to posting in his threads will supply the usual knee-jerk reaction, "rail transport won't work..." The author expects that none of these posts will contain numerical analysis at even a mediocre level. Nonetheless, the author will attempt to stick to the numbers and not let his opinion of these posts occupy too much of the thread.

...anyway that's a roadmap of where my posts in this thread are headed. Any constructive suggestions and additional data sources always welcome (but unproductive, non-analytical myopia expected).

[T. A. Gardner]

"Cruise Missiles" or "Technology!" This T.A. Gardner's idea so far; it's completely implausible IMJ. Heavy bombers remained the primary instrument of strategic aerial warfare for decades after WW2; until there's some credible explanation of how tens of thousands of accurate cruise missiles time-travel into the 1940's this idea doesn't deserve much attention.

Then you must not know much about US developments in this area. The US was developing quite sophisticated missile technology from about 1943 on. Compared to the Germans, in most areas they were ahead--significantly--by mid 1944. The difference was, the US didn't see a pressing need for these weapons historically so they limited development to R&D and trials and testing and didn't press to get them in service simply because they saw no overt need for them.

Here, they might. So, they push hard to get one or more in service. All they need is one that has a range of say 50 NM (100 km) or so that can be air launched. They could easily use television guidance for accuracy, but radar is an alternative. The USAF throughout the postwar era had in service such weapons, but they were rarely used. These were usually referred to as "stand-off" missiles rather than cruise missiles but that is really their purpose.
For mass delivery, or for nuclear delivery, a CEP of say 2 or 3 miles at a 50 NM range is all that's really required. That is sufficient to ensure a hit on a large city. So, as I showed earlier, you have a mass wave of bombers launch such a cruise missile / stand-off missile from 50 or so miles from the target, with each plane carrying say 2. That could amount to a 1000 missile strike on say Hamburg using something equivalent to a V-1 buzz bomb with better accuracy. The planes could "peck" the lobes of German early warning radar such that they stay undetected by use of lower altitudes until they reach the launch point. The raid isn't detected, and the Germans can't respond.



The US was well ahead of the Germans in guidance systems by 1944. Germany had several CLOS systems using visual sighting with a joystick, but little else developed into something that could even be tested. The US on the other hand, had similar CLOS systems, television with command guidance, active radar homing, semi-active radar homing, and even anti-radiation homing being actively tested and in some cases deployed operationally.

So, dismissing the possibility of early cruise missiles and stand-off weapons only shows a lack of knowledge of what the Allies were doing.