U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Discussions on alternate history, including events up to 20 years before today. Hosted by Terry Duncan.
HistoryGeek2019
Member
Posts: 399
Joined: 06 Aug 2019 03:55
Location: America

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 11 Feb 2020 03:44

We should begin by identifying the major factors/parameters that will shape the strategic situation between a continentally supreme Germany and the British/American alliance:

1. Time - The first parameter we need to keep in view is time. What specific timeframe are we discussing? Theoretically, the war could last for decades. What will the balance look like in 1943? 1945? 1950? 1960? When making claims about the balance of power, please be clear as to what specific period of time you have in mind (e.g., if you are talking about the size of the German empire's economy in 1943, it is not enough to cite the 1938 GDPs of occupied countries, since it is well known that their economies collapsed under German occupation). When making assertions about Germany's ability to utilize conquered resources (e.g., Caucasian oil), it's important to specify the time period in which it is plausible for these resources to become available and to provide justification for this time period.

2. Space - Perhaps the biggest challenge facing a continental German empire is the vast territory it would need to defend: the entire coast of Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, northern, western and southern France, Italy, Sicily, Greece, the Russian/Persian border, and the border with the Soviet remnant state. Germany also needs to garrison the entire area within these borders. What size ground army would Germany need to do this? How easy would it be for the Allies to find weak points and chip away at Germany's empire little by little?

3. Technology - Which side had superior technology? Which side was progressing faster than the other? Which side's areas of technological advantage would have been more important? Germany had a technological advantage in ICBMs, while the Allies had a technological advantage in fighters, aviation fuel, electronics and artillery (recalling just a few off the top of my head). Perhaps the most important question in this ATL is: which side would be able to mass produce jet fighters capable of operations over mainland Europe first?

4. The Soviet remnant state - What role would the Soviet remnant state play in the ongoing war? How large would it be? What incentive do the Soviets have to make a deal with Germany? Germany has nothing to offer the Soviet Union. The whole point of Barbarossa was to take everything of value from the Soviet Union and leave its people to starve. If Germany has nothing to offer, then why would the Soviet Union ever make peace with it? The Soviet Union's primary source of economic benefit was United States lend-lease, which would be conditioned on ongoing resistance against Nazi Germany. Why would the Soviet Union give up its only source of economic benefit in order to make a deal with Germany, which can offer nothing?

5. Japan - How long would Japan last in this ATL? Presumably the Soviet Union is a lot weaker than in the OTL, so Japan can station fewer troops in Manchuria - but how much of a difference will this make in Japan's war against the USA? OP suggests that Germany could send Japan 10,000 Me 109s. Aside from providing justification for how Germany would have 10,000 Me 109s to spare and by what time these could be manufactured and transported across Asia (keeping in mind that Germany rarely had more than 1,000 fighters in service during the war), the key question is why the Soviet Union would allow the passage of Germany military equipment to Japan, which requires the foregoing point #4 above to be answered. And would Hitler really have the strategic vision to plan long enough in advance to provide the necessary level of support to Japan to prevent its collapse by the time it did in the OTL?

6. Economics - Perhaps just as important as technology in determining the winner is economics. Which side would have the economic advantage? OP cites the 1938 GDPs of German occupied countries as proof that a German controlled Europe would have a larger economy than the Allies. But this is incredibly misleading. It is well known to anyone who was studied WW2 (and to OP) that the economies of occupied Europe collapsed under German occupation. See Table 1.3 from Harrison in "The Economics of WW2" for how French GDP collapsed under German occupation:

WW2 GDPs.png

This is illustrative of the collapse that happened throughout German occupied Europe. It took most western European countries until the early 1950s to recover their pre-war GDPs, and that was with the help of the Marshall Plan. There would be no such help for these countries in this ATL. They would remain blockaded from the world and continue to have their economies plundered by Germany throughout the war. In the OTL, the United States needed to ship 16.5 million tons of food to Europe and Japan in the first year after the war ended in the OTL (source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marshall_ ... estruction) - there would be no such aid in this ATL (but it would be available as an incentive for the Soviet Union to stay in the war). The first country to recover its pre-war GDP in the OTL was Belgium in 1947, but this depended in part on the conscription of German prisoners and Italian migrants (source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belgian_economic_miracle), none of which would have been available in this ATL. Also keep in mind that Belgium was liberated faster than other countries - in September 1944.

In short, OP has done nothing to establish that Germany would have an economic advantage over the Allies in this ATL. In other threads OP has claimed that Germany would have a population advantage over the Allies, but this is plainly false:
WW2 Populations.png
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_c ... on_in_1939

The Allies have a nearly 2:1 population advantage over Germany in this ATL (even generously assuming the Soviet remnant state retains only 40 million people who remain "neutral"). OP might object that Germany's population would be "more industrial" than the Allies' population, but that's on him to prove (and also to prove how this "industrial" population could be more "mobilized" than the already mobilized Allied populations). Also note that the Allied system of managing these populations was established long before WW2 - everyone in the Allied population served their purpose in the war effort once the war started, whether it was working on a colonial plantation in India or a factory in Detroit. Germany, on the other hand, would be attempting to implement a colonial management of this population from scratch, not really having any clue how to do it, and getting results similar to what they got in the OTL - a GDP that by 1944 was less than a third of the United States. I've also left out China/Japan until OP can plausibly establish that Japan would remain in the war for any meaningful period longer than it did in the OTL.

I will have more to say but this is enough to get the conversation started. Thanks for starting this thread OP. It is a great place to consolidate all our thoughts on this important topic.
You do not have the required permissions to view the files attached to this post.

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Member
Posts: 1450
Joined: 15 Jan 2019 22:32
Location: USA

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 11 Feb 2020 06:38

Before getting to any of the questions (probably tomorrow), some revisions to your framing of the issue.



First, the Axis manpower sphere should include, or discuss the inclusion of, additional countries by '43:
  • Spain/Portugal, which would have joined the Axis by '43 if SU falls or be conquered. The Wallies certainly can't field an army to stop even a 50-division Westheer in '43 (though they might try and lose a few hundred thousand men).
  • Turkey. Same as with Iberia, they join or are conquered. Axis can take European Turkey in a few weeks, can land from Greek islands, and come from the Caucasus. Turkey would likely have joined the Axis once the SU was cooked; failure to do so would have meant being dismembered by Bulgaria/Greece/Italy/Iraq/Iran/Kurdistan/Georgia/Armenia.
  • Sweden and Switzerland. Again, they either cooperate deeply with the Axis or are conquered. OTL they both contributed massively to the German war effort until the tide turned, here they're hostages trading more intensely and unevenly with Germany.
The inclusion of Turkey as a battlefield or Axis partner implies the next framing issue: war in the MidEast. There will be an Iranian front, Egyptian front, and an Iraqi/Turkish front. [discussed further below - see proposal]

Second, before including the non-Dominion British Empire (India and Africa) in the economic balance, I'd like to see proof that they made an economic contribution as great as Luxembourg's to the Axis. These societies had no meaningful industry or agricultural surplus. The only way in which they become economically relevant is if Britain and/or its Dominions start importing black/brown people to staff the war industries. They'd probably rather keep their racist societies than stop Hitler's racist policies. Same goes for Latin America and its economic contributions (the U.S. allowed only ~140k Mexicans to help with U.S. agriculture and deported them a few years later in Operation Wetback).

The same would go for Free France if, in fact, it's even nominally on the Allied side. Either the workers immigrate to suddenly multi-cultural wartime US/UK or there's no meaningful industry or agricultural surplus flowing from them. And it's disputable whether the French Maghreb is on the Axis or Allied side. Given Russia's fall in Summer '42 in this timeline, does Torch proceed as OTL? If Turkey is with the Axis, there is a massive crisis in the Mid East that will require so much shipping and ground forces that it's probably impossible to mount Torch in '42. By '43 the Iberian Peninsula is with the Axis, making Torch logistically impossible except maybe a landing in Western Morocco. Monty's victory at Alamein is probably impossible if the Wallies need to stop ~40 divisions moving into Iran and fight/reinforce Turkey.

A lot of the economics depends on what happens in the year or so after the SU falls, especially in the MidEast:
  • whether Turkey joins the Axis, leading to a Palestine/Iraq front, or resists Axis advance, leading to an Anatolian front.
  • How much force the Wallies need to hold a front in Iran against, say, ~30 German divisions (supported by a double-track line through the Caucasus/Baku and a single-track line from Batumi).
  • For both of the foregoing, the shipping resources available to the Wallies and how many divisions could be supported with these resources.
  • Whether the Iranian/Turkish fronts can be operated in conjunction with a buildup for Second Alamein.
My initial judgement, subject to revision per an ensuing research/discussion proposal:

With the SU out of the war, Germany has at least 120 divisions freed for mischief elsewhere. Send 30 into Iran, 20-30 through/with Turkey, depending on circumstance, and 50-80 to force Franco's compliance or steamroll Iberia. We'll have to dig into the shipping figures a bit more, but 40 divisions in the MidEast seems the ceiling for Wallied forces there. So they lose in Iran/Anatolia/Palestine, maybe disastrously (e.g. Kasserine on Ostheer Kesselschlacht scale). They lose quicker if Turkey isn't with them (probably wouldn't be IMO). There's no Alamein and no Torch if the Wallies want to make a decent fight in Iran. If Turkey joins the bad guys they take Palestine/Levant pretty quickly, after which 8th Army retreats from the Western Desert (some combination of up the Nile towards Sudan and down the Hejaz railway towards Yemen).

By mid-'43, the Axis controls all of the continent and most of the ME/North Africa. The Caucasus and Kuibyshev oil will be coming back online, with resources devoted to Maikop/Grozny and Kuibyshev first. Those fields alone (~10mil tons/yr given assuming that Baku was ~2/3 of SU's pre-war production) roughly triple the Wehrmacht's oil supply if none is diverted to the civilian economy (some would be though). Reactivating Baku could bring another ~20mil tons/year, but you'll surely say that the Wallies will bomb it silly.


Proposal for Discussion of the MidEast Fronts as Prelude to the Broader ATL
---------------------------------------

In order to carry the "smouldering Baku" point, you'll have to show (1) that the Wallies hold a front in Iran within range of Baku and (2) that they can logistically support a massive air army in Iran. [This assumes the Wallies don't start a war with the rump SU to bomb from Turkestan.] (1) is easier to show, although it requires stopping the Germans in the Iranian plateau. The inland connections from the Persian Gulf ports were weak in '42, though through strenuous efforts in this timeline could have been upgraded earlier (requires more shipping of railroad troops, rails, locos, etc. however).

(2) is more doubtful. Deploying 8th Air Force in Britain required about half of U.S. transatlantic shipping up to '43. The shipping route to Abadan/Basra would require ~4x as many ships.

If you want to argue that the Allies would have held the front in Iran and successfully deployed something like 8th Air Force to destroy Baku, I propose that you make the logistical argument that this would be feasible and that you identify the forces deployed. If you agree to do that bit of research, then I will agree to attempt a similarly-documented argument regarding the Heer's ability to support at least 30 divisions driving into Iran. That "alternative front" has been at the center of a lot of our discussions, so it would be useful for us both to commit to making our best case and maybe those interested here can chime in or referee as well.

...with that issue "resolved" (hope springs eternal), we could move on to considering economics with either Germany lacking Baku or Germany having another ~30mil tons of oil by '44.



...having written all this, I now realize that I'm assuming the SU makes peace, something you don't concede. I don't want to go back to the start though... I'll make the peace argument in due course (tomorrowish), so if you want to accept the reciprocal research/argument proposal on the basis that the Allies can give more ground in Iran then for now I'd only hold you to showing they can logistically support something like 8th Air Force (or whatever you want to show is necessary) in the MidEast and a weaker land force in Iran.
Last edited by TheMarcksPlan on 11 Feb 2020 06:49, edited 1 time in total.

daveshoup2MD
Member
Posts: 177
Joined: 01 Feb 2020 18:10
Location: Coral and brass

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by daveshoup2MD » 11 Feb 2020 06:48

This post was edited as it just was a copy of a previous post, adding nothing new.

//Georg

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Member
Posts: 1450
Joined: 15 Jan 2019 22:32
Location: USA

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 11 Feb 2020 07:13

@daveshoup2MD

Welcome to the forum. I assume you're simply repeating/quoting your previous post because you feel it wasn't properly addressed. I read your post the first time but didn't find it specific enough, or offering enough evidence, to merit a response. No offense, it's just that folks here have heard those arguments time and again.

In addition, this is an ATL (an Alternative TimeLine or "what if") that presupposes what the Victory Program expected when it was written: that Russia has fallen during mid-'42. There are many, many threads in this forum in which you can debate whether there was a chance of Germany beating the Soviet Union and I'd welcome and address your substantiated analysis there.

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Member
Posts: 1450
Joined: 15 Jan 2019 22:32
Location: USA

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 11 Feb 2020 07:40

Richard Anderson wrote:Later, beginning in mid 1940, intelligence input from British sources was used to establish an accepted production estimate of 1,000 per month in June 1940, rising to 1,550 per month for June 1941 to August 1942. It was the American Embassy in London's Economic Warfare Division in early 1943 that established a statistical analysis using known serial number sequences from captured German tanks, which recast the estimates as 327 per month in August 1942.

So it is not "obvious...that the US estimated German weapons production by reference to their own potential production, adjusted for Germany's economy" and in fact they did nothing of the sort.
There are at least two levels of intelligence: raw data/reports and analysis.
Like the US/UK, Hitler received reports on Wallied tank production. Unlike the U.S. his analysis was that the raw intelligence was incorrect because "we can't do miracles and neither can they." So Hitler analyzed raw intel in comparison to his own production; Wallies analyzed raw data absent a similar reason to reject it as implausible. In fact the Germans should have been producing AFV's at 1,000/mo given their economic potential, as in fact they did later in the war.

Intelligence deficiencies include failures of analysis, such as failing to consider the context for evaluation of data. Deficient analysis of deficient intelligence analysis can also evince deficient intelligence.

HistoryGeek2019
Member
Posts: 399
Joined: 06 Aug 2019 03:55
Location: America

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 11 Feb 2020 17:42

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
11 Feb 2020 06:38
  • Spain/Portugal, which would have joined the Axis by '43 if SU falls or be conquered. The Wallies certainly can't field an army to stop even a 50-division Westheer in '43 (though they might try and lose a few hundred thousand men).
  • Turkey. Same as with Iberia, they join or are conquered. Axis can take European Turkey in a few weeks, can land from Greek islands, and come from the Caucasus. Turkey would likely have joined the Axis once the SU was cooked; failure to do so would have meant being dismembered by Bulgaria/Greece/Italy/Iraq/Iran/Kurdistan/Georgia/Armenia.
  • Sweden and Switzerland. Again, they either cooperate deeply with the Axis or are conquered. OTL they both contributed massively to the German war effort until the tide turned, here they're hostages trading more intensely and unevenly with Germany.
You're going to have to explain why these countries would join the Axis, knowing that it would result in them being blockaded and hence having their economies destroyed. As for Germany conquering all these countries, you're again going to have to explain how Germany has the manpower to do so while at the same time defending and garrisoning the entirety of Europe (and massively increasing Luftewaffe and U-boat production).
Second, before including the non-Dominion British Empire (India and Africa) in the economic balance, I'd like to see proof that they made an economic contribution as great as Luxembourg's to the Axis. These societies had no meaningful industry or agricultural surplus. The only way in which they become economically relevant is if Britain and/or its Dominions start importing black/brown people to staff the war industries. They'd probably rather keep their racist societies than stop Hitler's racist policies. Same goes for Latin America and its economic contributions (the U.S. allowed only ~140k Mexicans to help with U.S. agriculture and deported them a few years later in Operation Wetback).

The same would go for Free France if, in fact, it's even nominally on the Allied side. Either the workers immigrate to suddenly multi-cultural wartime US/UK or there's no meaningful industry or agricultural surplus flowing from them. And it's disputable whether the French Maghreb is on the Axis or Allied side. Given Russia's fall in Summer '42 in this timeline, does Torch proceed as OTL? If Turkey is with the Axis, there is a massive crisis in the Mid East that will require so much shipping and ground forces that it's probably impossible to mount Torch in '42. By '43 the Iberian Peninsula is with the Axis, making Torch logistically impossible except maybe a landing in Western Morocco. Monty's victory at Alamein is probably impossible if the Wallies need to stop ~40 divisions moving into Iran and fight/reinforce Turkey.
I believe you're the one who said "a resource is a resource". If you're going to claim that population is the most important economic resource, well here you go, the Allied population dwarfed that of the Axis. Putting them to work is just a "mobilization issue" or a "bottleneck", right? Or are you finally conceding that having a larger population does not mean having larger economic output? How about you respond to my refutation of your reliance on Harrison Table 1.1, or how about you simply concede that the Axis would be at an economic disadvantage to the Allies in your ATL.
With the SU out of the war, Germany has at least 120 divisions freed for mischief elsewhere. Send 30 into Iran, 20-30 through/with Turkey, depending on circumstance, and 50-80 to force Franco's compliance or steamroll Iberia. We'll have to dig into the shipping figures a bit more, but 40 divisions in the MidEast seems the ceiling for Wallied forces there. So they lose in Iran/Anatolia/Palestine, maybe disastrously (e.g. Kasserine on Ostheer Kesselschlacht scale). They lose quicker if Turkey isn't with them (probably wouldn't be IMO). There's no Alamein and no Torch if the Wallies want to make a decent fight in Iran. If Turkey joins the bad guys they take Palestine/Levant pretty quickly, after which 8th Army retreats from the Western Desert (some combination of up the Nile towards Sudan and down the Hejaz railway towards Yemen).
How many divisions does Germany have total? How many are deployed in each front (Norway, northwest Europe, Iberia, Mediterranean, Turkey, Caucasus, Russian Front, garrisons). How many are capable of offensive operations? What is the state of their training and equipment? What changes in German industrial output from the OTL does your ATL presuppose?
By mid-'43, the Axis controls all of the continent and most of the ME/North Africa. The Caucasus and Kuibyshev oil will be coming back online, with resources devoted to Maikop/Grozny and Kuibyshev first. Those fields alone (~10mil tons/yr given assuming that Baku was ~2/3 of SU's pre-war production) roughly triple the Wehrmacht's oil supply if none is diverted to the civilian economy (some would be though). Reactivating Baku could bring another ~20mil tons/year, but you'll surely say that the Wallies will bomb it silly.
You need to provide justification for these dates. At what point are each of these oil fields captured in your ATL? How long does it take Germany to repair them? How long does it take Germany to put the transportation infrastructure in place to transport the oil back to refineries in Germany and then distribute refined gasoline and aviation fuel to its armed forces? Give justifications for your dates.


In order to carry the "smouldering Baku" point, you'll have to show (1) that the Wallies hold a front in Iran within range of Baku and (2) that they can logistically support a massive air army in Iran. [This assumes the Wallies don't start a war with the rump SU to bomb from Turkestan.] (1) is easier to show, although it requires stopping the Germans in the Iranian plateau. The inland connections from the Persian Gulf ports were weak in '42, though through strenuous efforts in this timeline could have been upgraded earlier (requires more shipping of railroad troops, rails, locos, etc. however).

(2) is more doubtful. Deploying 8th Air Force in Britain required about half of U.S. transatlantic shipping up to '43. The shipping route to Abadan/Basra would require ~4x as many ships.

If you want to argue that the Allies would have held the front in Iran and successfully deployed something like 8th Air Force to destroy Baku, I propose that you make the logistical argument that this would be feasible and that you identify the forces deployed. If you agree to do that bit of research, then I will agree to attempt a similarly-documented argument regarding the Heer's ability to support at least 30 divisions driving into Iran. That "alternative front" has been at the center of a lot of our discussions, so it would be useful for us both to commit to making our best case and maybe those interested here can chime in or referee as well.
I will research what I can, but you need to show how Germany would support a 30 division force driving into Iran (while also conquering Spain, Portugal and Turkey and sending 10,000 Me 109s to Japan and restoring Europe's economy with nitrogen fertilizer that is no longer needed by the army except to conquer Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Iran and Egypt while holding the entire front from Norway to the Urals ...), whereas in the OTL Germany could only support a single panzer division (the 13th) at the spearhead of its late 1942 drive on Ordzhonikidze.

HistoryGeek2019
Member
Posts: 399
Joined: 06 Aug 2019 03:55
Location: America

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 11 Feb 2020 18:32

What you really need to do is give a step by step explanation of what you think Germany will do in this ATL, starting with the fundamental pre-Barbarossa changes in economic and military planning, and note all major departures from the OTL. So first explain how German industry is oriented differently than in the OTL, then how the invasion of the USSR proceeds differently from the OTL, specifying the size of German forces in each sector and the time at which they conquer the various regions of the USSR, and then specify what a final victory in the east looks like and when it happens and where the final border is between Germany and the USSR.

Then you need to explain how Germany reorients its industry and military after victory in the east. When and where are divisions redeployed, how many are left in each sector and how long does it take to redeploy them. And you need to do the same for economic projects (e.g., increased Luftewaffe production and how it would be allocated among fighters, bombers, etc), development of raw materials in the east, changes in chemical fertilizer usage, etc.

It is only with such a broad, comprehensive overview of Germany's military and economic situation that we can begin to have a fruitful conversation. Otherwise it feels like you are constantly pulling things out of thin air ("Germany will just conquer Spain/Turkey/Persia, and send 10,000 Me 109s to Japan, and restore all of Europe's agriculture with chemical fertilizer that the army no longer needs except for the aforesaid campaigns ...)

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Member
Posts: 1450
Joined: 15 Jan 2019 22:32
Location: USA

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 11 Feb 2020 20:19

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:As for Germany conquering all these countries you're again going to have to explain how Germany has the manpower to do so while at the same time defending and garrisoning the entirety of Europe (and massively increasing Luftewaffe and U-boat production).
Let's stick with '42 for now and the campaigns I've described. You're jumping around temporally to a point where the Wallies can mount a more substantial invasion.
The additional campaigns use only forces freed from the East - 90-120 divisions with the another 20-50 divisions staying in the East. That leaves the '42 garrisons where they were OTL.
By '44 when the Wallies have a substantial invasion force, the campaigns in Iberia and the MidEast are done and Europe is secure until at least '46.
If you want to argue for earlier - or any - invasion of Europe, you'll need to demonstrate the forces to be deployed, shipping resources used, ammo/guns produced, etc. I'll note that the U.S. Army maxed out at 91 divisions and BE maybe 50 iirc. That's inclusive of the Pacific, btw, which is why I point to '46 as the earliest possible invasion date (unless Japan is allowed to survive in the ATL).

We should stick to '42 and early '43 for now.
HistoryGeek2019 wrote:Putting them to work is just a "mobilization issue" or a "bottleneck", right?
You make some good rhetorical points, touche. Let me be more clear about what I mean:

I don't foresee any possibility of mobilizing the populations of India/Africa/LatAm into the war economy, so I don't think they count.
As I explain above, there's no industry in their home countries and no policy of bringing them into the metropoles.
The populations occupied by Germany, however, certainly were mobilized - to varying degrees - for Germany's benefit and the intent was deeper mobilization.

I am happy to include those populations if you want to describe how they contribute to the economy.

Do you have plausible path to black/brown migration to US/UK during the war, or large-scale Wallied investment to establish war industries in Bombay? If not, those populations are economically irrelevant.


The end product is economic, not demographic. Excluding the colonials/Latins is simply a heuristic for their exclusion from the Wallied war economies. It makes the economic comparison easier than including the excluded populations but assigning them a value of zero.
HistoryGeek2019 wrote:At what point are each of these oil fields captured in your ATL? How long does it take Germany to repair them? How long does it take Germany to put the transportation infrastructure in place to transport the oil back to refineries in Germany and then distribute refined gasoline and aviation fuel to its armed forces?
Again, I'm sticking with '42-early '43 for now. The oil isn't back online yet. I'd say mid-'43 for Maikop/Grozny/Kuibyshev and late '43 for Baku. Both taken during fall '42. To be discussed in more detail later.
HistoryGeek2019 wrote:I will research what I can, but you need to show how Germany would support a 30 division force driving into Iran
...which I said I would do... For now, we're framing the issues.
sending 10,000 Me 109s to Japan
Again you're jumping around temporally, let's stick to the first half-year or so after SU falls. Reinforcement of Japan would be a '44 move and we'll address it in due course.
Last edited by TheMarcksPlan on 11 Feb 2020 20:30, edited 2 times in total.

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Member
Posts: 1450
Joined: 15 Jan 2019 22:32
Location: USA

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 11 Feb 2020 20:26

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:What you really need to do is give a step by step explanation of what you think Germany will do in this ATL, starting with the fundamental pre-Barbarossa changes in economic and military planning, and note all major departures from the OTL
The utility of this VP41 framing is skipping over the Barbarossa issues that have confused our post-Barbarossa discussions in the past. You raise some valid objections to that "skipping over," so here's what I see as our options for moving the discussion forward:

1. I specify (for both our convenience) aspects of my other ATL's to be imported and we continue the discussion on that basis.
2. We move this discussion to my last Barbarossa ATL.
3. We grant VP41 its expected outcome based on some change in the SU and proceed from OTL conditions at the PoD. Could be, for instance, that Stalin doesn't recover from his late-June depression, the clique around him mounts a coup, it's a mess, the SU disintegrates.

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Member
Posts: 1450
Joined: 15 Jan 2019 22:32
Location: USA

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 11 Feb 2020 20:36

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:How about you respond to my refutation of your reliance on Harrison Table 1.1, or how about you simply concede that the Axis would be at an economic disadvantage to the Allies in your ATL.
How about you admit that you were wrong about the SU/Japanese economies in '42? (inclusive of colonies as I specified)

Let's tie any discussions to the actual numbers and not look ahead, demanding global concessions. My reflective equilibrium may indeed settle as you suggest - Allied economic advantage, especially if and when Japan is defeated. But I have valid reasons for not jumping to that conclusion, including points you seem resolved to ignore. The migration of Europeans into German heavy industry, for example, immediately doubles their productivity (at least). I've made this point repeatedly and you have never acknowledged it.

By '44 or so, it is possible for Germany to have ~double its OTL industrial labor force and not to be suffering from serious bombing attacks. Combined with revival of occupied economies, European production is going to be enormous in that timeline.

Re your points about the Marshall Plan and rebuilding Europe, note that '44-'45 bombing/land war did most of the damage, most of which doesn't occur in my ATL (to be argued later). And note that France and Belgium recovered by '47 or so, while Germany was kept down by the Allies.

...but again let's stick to '42/'43 for now.
Last edited by TheMarcksPlan on 11 Feb 2020 20:42, edited 1 time in total.

HistoryGeek2019
Member
Posts: 399
Joined: 06 Aug 2019 03:55
Location: America

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 11 Feb 2020 20:41

I wouldn't expect the Allies to mount an invasion of mainland Europe in 1942 or 1943 if the Soviet Union were defeated in 1942. If that is all you're trying to prove in this thread, then no sane person would disagree with you.

What I thought we were trying to do is show what would likely happen, year by year, following a German defeat of the Soviet Union. In order to do that, you need to establish what a German victory in the east looks like, when it happens, where the borders are, what it costs Germany to achieve, and what Germany does next. You also need to establish what happens to the Soviet remnant state in order to determine how many forces Germany needs to leave facing its border with Russia. Only when we have a clear picture of what happens between Germany and Russia in 1941 and 1942 can we begin to speculate what the Allies do in 1942 and 1943.

Until you put together something comprehensive along those lines, then this conversation is impossible, as you simply pull divisions and Me 109s and fertilizer out of thin air in response to every objection.

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Member
Posts: 1450
Joined: 15 Jan 2019 22:32
Location: USA

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 11 Feb 2020 20:45

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:Until you put together something comprehensive along those lines, then this conversation is impossible, as you simply pull divisions and Me 109s and fertilizer out of thin air in response to every objection.
That's an unfair statement about my '42/'43 narrative. You're jumping around to '44 events that you judge impossible, but haven't even heard any argument about them. It's just gut feeling. And it's irrelevant to how the analysis of '42/'43 should proceed.

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Member
Posts: 1450
Joined: 15 Jan 2019 22:32
Location: USA

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 11 Feb 2020 20:47

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:You also need to establish what happens to the Soviet remnant state in order to determine how many forces Germany needs to leave facing its border with Russia. Only when we have a clear picture of what happens between Germany and Russia in 1941 and 1942 can we begin to speculate what the Allies do in 1942 and 1943.
Which is why I've asked you how you want to proceed. On the basis of VP41's expectations, with SU modifications and OTL Germany? Or on the basis of another ATL (i.e. mine for convenience)?

HistoryGeek2019
Member
Posts: 399
Joined: 06 Aug 2019 03:55
Location: America

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 11 Feb 2020 21:25

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
11 Feb 2020 20:47

Which is why I've asked you how you want to proceed. On the basis of VP41's expectations, with SU modifications and OTL Germany? Or on the basis of another ATL (i.e. mine for convenience)?
You should argue for whatever scenario you think is most likely. As long as it is plausible, we can pick up the conversation from there.

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Member
Posts: 1450
Joined: 15 Jan 2019 22:32
Location: USA

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 11 Feb 2020 23:29

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
11 Feb 2020 21:25
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
11 Feb 2020 20:47

Which is why I've asked you how you want to proceed. On the basis of VP41's expectations, with SU modifications and OTL Germany? Or on the basis of another ATL (i.e. mine for convenience)?
You should argue for whatever scenario you think is most likely. As long as it is plausible, we can pick up the conversation from there.
Well we might disagree about what's plausible but here's my scenario:
  • I'd incorporate my last ATL in which Germany has 5 more panzer divisions and motorizes 5 more standard ID's. viewtopic.php?f=11&t=243557
  • Germany captures a line roughly Svir-Moscow-Voronezh-Don (inclusive) in '41.
  • Red Army loses ~2mil more PoW's in '41, as a result of which Ostheer casualties by May '42 are ~500k lower (i.e. the additional captured soldiers don't contribute to tactical bloody casualty attrition rates). Winter clothing saves ~100k additional frostbite casualties.
  • From late '41, population of SU is ~25% lower, meaning 25% weaker RKKA in '42, 25% lower industrial/armaments production.
  • Due to loss of Ukraine '41 harvest during quicker German advance and loss of ~Donets-Don Chernozem regions, Russian food supply is ~10% worse during '42, accelerating the onset of starvation mortality as discussed here and in following replies: viewtopic.php?f=76&t=246246&start=105#p2248718
  • '42 Ostheer benefits from lower ATL casualties, from earlier substitution of foreign labor for soldiers, and from economic planning for a slightly-larger army as discussed in the linked ATL. There's no - or ameliorated - Winter Crisis because Germany has built warming sheds for Ostheer's trains, anticipating a 2-summer campaign. Germany does not cut army production in June '41 as in OTL. Ostheer's May '42 strength is 3.2mil versus 2.6mil OTL and its units have full complements of all authorized equipment. LW is slightly weaker than OTL on Eastern Front.
  • ATL force ratio of 3.2mil Germans vs. 4.3mil RKKA (75% of 5.7mil) is 64% more favorable to Ostheer than OTL's 2.6mil vs. 5.7mil. Ostheer is also better-armed, per soldier, than ATL.
  • From May '42, Ostheer advances from its ATL '41 line, taking Gorkii, Maikop, Stalingrad, and cutting the Murmansk railway by mid-June. Behind AGS, Ostheer has, by spring, rebuilt the Donets-Don rail network behind AGS, whereas in OTL Blau the trans-Don operations were hampered by ongoing reconstruction of these networks, which were only captured in July '42 (see, e.g., viewtopic.php?f=66&t=203286&start=180#p1872078 and following discussions).
  • During July, AGN advances to Archangelsk, AGC from Gorkii down the Volga to Kazan, AGS from Stalingrad up the Volga to Saratov. The Red Army's Don-Volga position east of Voronezh becomes a massive salient and is evacuated/captured by August. In the Caucasus, AGS crosses the Terek during July and forces the mountain passes during July.
  • August sees Ostheer advance beyond the Volga south of Saratov and west of Kazan, while its main body clears the rest of the Volga and occupies Kuibyshev. In the Caucasus, AGS breaks out from the mountain passes into Georgia and invests/captures the Black Sea ports/cities (Novorossiysk, Tuapse, Sochi, Sokumi), from its Terek bridgeheads it takes Grozny and Makhakchala.
  • September-October sees the advance to Ostheer's putative winter line outside the Caucasus: Perm-Ufa-Orenburg-Ural River. In Caucasus, Baku falls to advances south along the Caspian coast and west from Georgia. Black Sea ports fall as well, making the sea a friendly lake.
  • From August, LW begins bombing important Urals factories, achieving results similar to its bombing of Gorky's GAZ factory in OTL. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bombing_o ... rld_War_II. T-34 production is largely halted. From September, LW begins bombing Magnitogorsk, rapidly shutting down Soviet steel production.
Stalin agrees a an armistice in ~September '42 for the following reasons:
  • Japan, always eager to see peace between Germany and SU, and no longer in fear of the weakened Red Army, informs Stalin that no more LL shipments will be allowed into Vladivostok. Combined with loss of Murmansk/Archangel, LL capacity is ~10% of OTL via only the low-capacity Persian corridor. Loss of the Caucasus means only the Central Asian supply route remains; increasing its capacity will take at least a year and massive Allied investment into new rail lines though Eastern Iran and Central Asia.
  • Soviet food situation is catastrophic and there is now no possibility of mass famine relief from Wallies. Due to loss of the entire European agricultural regions, Soviet agricultural productivity would be ~20% lower on poorer Siberian/Kazakh lands. Due to loss of Caucasus/Kuibyshev, SU cannot supply agriculture with sufficient fuel for production across more low-yield acreage. Starvation mortality/morbidity in factories - particularly in the critical Urals - has reached crisis levels significantly above OTL due to lower food supplies during '41 and '42 (as described above).
  • Assuming 40mil prewar-population from in Siberia (Urals included), 15mil in Central Asia, evacuation of ~20mil of prewar occupied population, and ~3mil additional permanent military losses (more encirclements in '41 and '42) Soviet population is only ~70mil. The loyalty of Central Asia's ~15mil is dubious, however, and the anticipated German advance from the Ural River into Kazakhstan will prompt uprisings such as seen in OTL Caucasian Muslim populations.
  • Given 20% lower agricultural productivity from land factors, and inability to supply fuel for tractors, Soviet agriculture will need at least 70% of the workforce in '43 to save the country from starvation if the war continues.
  • Stalin's generals/advisers inform him that a '43 RKKA can number 3mil men against Germany at best.
  • Cuts to LL aid from OTL mean SU has to produce its own explosives/powder and trucks, implying a weaker army and/or more men moved from the Army into factories.
  • The ongoing destruction of Urals factories make it unlikely that even a smaller army can be adequately armed in '43.
Given the foregoing factors, Stalin concludes that there is no feasible plan for further resistance to the Germans. Continuing the war will mean large-scale starvation, the Urals will fall and Central Asia will revolt. The SU will be a small Siberian nation with no oil and the regime will likely collapse. Stalin believes that Hitler has no desire to conquer Siberia. Stalin believes that resumption of trade will place the endurance of the SU into Hitler's best interests. Both of Stalin's judgments are true.

Hitler, perceiving Stalin's eagerness to maintain his regime, hold the Far East against renewed Japanese threat, and retain control over Central Asia, offers an armistice on the following terms:
  • SU will demobilize 80% of its army, allowing for resumption of agriculture to avoid starvation.
  • SU will pay 30% of its GDP in occupation costs for the duration of the war.
  • SU will be allowed a small army to occupy Central Asia and Northern Iran east of Tehran.
  • SU will demilitarize the Urals. German inspection patrols of the factories and fortifications - to be dismantled - will be allowed. Production at Urals factories must be converted to civilian products.
  • Resumption of trade with Germany, who will provide some emergency food aid from occupied SU and (later) oil in exchange for Soviet assistance with returning Baku to production. Such food aid will come from food no longer consumed by the Ostheer. In the future, the parties envision the SU providing industrial products such as rolling stock and pig iron in exchange for food and oil from the former SU.
  • A declaration that the SU will not permit any nation at war with Germany to base military forces on its territory.
  • The end of central support for partisan units in occupied SU, a declaration instructing partisans to end their struggle.
  • Permission for Axis to ship supplies via the Trans-Siberian railroad. Germany proposed assistance to SU to build the capacity of the railroad with higher-tech signalling infrastructure.
Given the demilitarized buffer in the Urals and the mostly-demobilized RKKA, Germany posts only 20 divisions along its new border with the SU. These are sufficient to enforce the treaty by occupation of the undefended Urals if necessary.

Return to “What if”