U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

[TheMarcksPlan]

All they need is one that has a range of say 50 NM (100 km) or so that can be air launched.

Seriously dude?
How does this significantly impact the aerial attrition economics that are obvious to anyone and that you continually ignore (10:1 cost ratio of heavy bomber vs. Me-109)?
You still need the bomber to get within 50nm of a target!

All this does is add another huge cost item to the already-bad economic attrition picture: how much would such missiles cost, especially in comparison to a chunk of steel filled with boom-stuff?

So, dismissing the possibility of early cruise missiles and stand-off weapons only shows a lack of knowledge of what the Allies were doing.

I am not going to devote one scintilla of effort to this topic unless you can tell me how they would change the aerial economic attrition issues you've consistently ignored, plus the cost of the missiles.

...only if you can address those issues is it even worth considering whether the US could have developed these missiles in the 1940's and deployed thousands of them - an idea I still consider facially implausible.

[Takao]

What's the logic to this utterance? On the one hand the U.S. has enormously more resources, on the other the German peak was 97% of U.S. fighter production...

Would that fighter production be Army alone? Army & Navy? Army, Navy, & Lend Lease?

Paying nonevermind. That the US was also producing a large amount of two & four engine bombers.

Yeah imagine the Germans tripling the production of a fighter type in one year [trigger warning re 43-44 Fw-190 trend]...







As usual with folks here, this is "it didn't happen so it couldn't happen."

Your not making your case here.

Three major variants of the 190 were in production in 1944 - the low-mid altitude A-series fighter, the high altitude D-series fighter, and the F/G-series ground-attack. With the production breakdown as 7,500 fighters & 4,300 ground attack.

For those reading along and not committed to a myopic agenda, the numbers are clear that much higher fighter production was easily possible given (1) reduction in spending on land weapons and (2) greater German economic resources in this ATL.

The numbers are much less clear than you make them out to be, because their is no quick and easy comparison for raw materials...Ammunition does not require the raw materials necessary to build an airplane.

Here's German monthly armaments production by value and category in mid-1944:





Germany was spending >800mil RM **per month** on ammo and powder.
Unit cost of an Me-109 with engine was around 100,000RM.
...so devoting merely half of Germany's OTL ammo/powder resources to Me-109's would make ~4,000 Me-109's.

4,000 Me-109's

So a 109 is made out of brass & powder?

And that's before accounting for greater ATL resources and lower bomb damage.

Yet to be proved.

It's not just feasible for Germany to have produced 5,000 Me-109's/month, it's ridiculous for anyone to deny it in this ATL.

No, it's just ridiculous period.

Just more of the same from the "it didn't happen so it couldn't happen" crowd.
Germany controlled more of the world's pre-war bauxite production than the Allies, had an enormous capital goods industry, and would have had no problem increasing aluminum production in this ATL.

Except they never did, and all German attempts at increasing aluminium production failed.

Because I don't find discussion with this member to be productive, I will not put more effort into responding to his question right now.

You don't want to discuss it, because your whole fantasy collapses without it, and you cannot conclusive prove that it is true.

[Richard Anderson]

What's the logic to this utterance? On the one hand the U.S. has enormously more resources, on the other the German peak was 97% of U.S. fighter production...

Would that fighter production be Army alone? Army & Navy? Army, Navy, & Lend Lease?

Um, "Army & Navy cognizance". All Lend-Lease was drawn from Army and Navy contracts.

Paying nonevermind. That the US was also producing a large amount of two & four engine bombers.

It astonishes me that the bleeding obvious keeps getting missed. Engines. The major bottleneck for German aircraft production. In the U.S. in 1944, Packard Detroit built 22,969 V-1650 Merlin engines. German production of all BMW and DB tactical engine types in 1944 was 41,267, nearly twice that of Packard Detroit.

Big. Whooping. Shit. U.S. production of tactical engine types in 1944 was 232,300.

Yeah imagine the Germans tripling the production of a fighter type in one year [trigger warning re 43-44 Fw-190 trend]...

German production of single and twin-engine fighter aircraft in 1943 was 10,692. In 1944 it was 25,822. It did not triple, it increased by 2.42 times the previous year.

As usual with folks here, this is "it didn't happen so it couldn't happen."

No, it's a "a little knowledge and a lack of perspective is a dangerous thing."

For those reading along and not committed to a myopic agenda, the numbers are clear that much higher fighter production was easily possible given (1) reduction in spending on land weapons and (2) greater German economic resources in this ATL.

In 1940, Germany, via France, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Italy had access to not quite half the worlds production of bauxite and aluminum production capacity. By 1943, Germany's access to bauxite had essentially not changed and only represented about one-sixth the total production worldwide. Similarly, its aluminum production capacity had shrunk to about one-fifth that of the world and about one-third that of North America.

So a 109 is made out of brass & powder?

No, apparently they were made out of Reichsmarks.

Snip ongoing ad hominems from this poster.

[T. A. Gardner]

The engine issue is a big problem in making "5,000 Me 109 a month." That's 60,000 in a year. Daimler-Benz produced 74,896 DB 600 series engines in WW 2, of that 42,405 were DB 605's. DB 605 production ran for about 30 months at most, possibly as little as 24. Let's go with 30 months that's an average of just over 1400 per month. Doubling production still leaves it well short of the necessary 5,000 engines just for new aircraft per month. That doesn't include replacement ones for planes in service, nor does it include Me 110 production or the requirements for other aircraft that use that engine.
So, even if you somehow could make the airframes, where do the engines of those planes come from?

As for aluminum production, you need lots of electricity to melt the ore into aluminum metal. In the US, ALCOA and other manufacturers built new plants in Northern California, Oregon, and Washington state to take advantage of massive new hydroelectric production from dams constructed on the larger rivers in that region. I don't think Germany is suddenly going to have a massive new source of electrical power to do likewise.

[Richard Anderson]

As for aluminum production, you need lots of electricity to melt the ore into aluminum metal. In the US, ALCOA and other manufacturers built new plants in Northern California, Oregon, and Washington state to take advantage of massive new hydroelectric production from dams constructed on the larger rivers in that region. I don't think Germany is suddenly going to have a massive new source of electrical power to do likewise.

Who needs electricity? Just burn coal and Reichsmarks.

[Carl Schwamberger]

... It astonishes me that the bleeding obvious keeps getting missed. Engines. The major bottleneck for German aircraft production.

... German production of all BMW and DB tactical engine types in 1944 was 41,267, nearly twice that of Packard Detroit.

... U.S. production of tactical engine types in 1944 was 232,300.

In 1940, Germany, via France, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Greece, and Italy had access to not quite half the worlds production of bauxite and aluminum production capacity. By 1943, Germany's access to bauxite had essentially not changed and only represented about one-sixth the total production worldwide. Similarly, its aluminum production capacity had shrunk to about one-fifth that of the world and about one-third that of North America.

...

John Ellis makes both these points in 'Brute Force' Decisions made in the 1930s meant efforts to ramp up production 1941-43 hit hard limits. Many of these remedial actions could have borne fruit in 1947, 46, or even 45, but the end of large scale offensives and defense actions in the east wont magically translate to entire new engine factories, or aluminum refineries & extrusion plants in just one or two years. I believe Tooze discusses in some depth the same limits created by planning & investment before 1941.

Reach back several pages there were some estimates of how many operational ground combat divisions might remain at the end of 1942. 100 of those equals some 2,600,000 army personnel. Then there is the German air force and Navy, which would not, logically, be drawn down. Given the nazi inefficiency in personnel policy OTL how likely is it the skilled labor would be discharged from the remaining standing air, naval, and ground military forces? Both the air force and navy require skilled men, & so do the high portion of modern mechanized ground forces. Or are we to suppose those will be filled with the equivalent of US Military Categorys 3 & 4? The idea of a game changing return of skilled labor to German industry does not look valid. Sure there would be some, 25%, 40%, maybe eventually 60% in the short run, but eventually the return ceases & the need of high quality personnel to fight the more capable western enemy is likely to ramp back up.

[Russ3Z]

Nevertheless some personnel return would happen, some significant portion of the Army will be discharged, and some proportion of those people will be skilled labor. Add in the fact that equipment losses in the East are no longer happening at anywhere near the same rate, combined with the eventual flow of new oil (repaired and online by 44 in this ATL?), and Germany now has the ability to mechanize more of its Army, or provide more fuel for the LW or KM, or some combination. Another option is greater mechanization of farms, which, if further agricultural reforms can be carried out, could release a further tranche of labor for industry. I can't speak for how likely this last option, especially, would be, but it is certainly within the realm of possibility. Finally, greater coal/oil supplies may allow some revitalization of occupied European industry.

Naturally, the Allies will of course try to target the new oil fields once they've been repaired, making Germany's ability to project power into Persia and the Middle East that much more important.

[Richard Anderson]

Nevertheless some personnel return would happen, some significant portion of the Army will be discharged, and some proportion of those people will be skilled labor.

The problem with that is that it apparently assumes the Wehrmacht simply inducted "skilled labor" willy-nilly, which is simply not true. We know from remarks Fromm made in February 1941 that the number of UK-gestellten (deferred personnel) was nearly the size of the Heer, thus something close to 7 million (unfortunately the record of the conference did not give the exact numbers). And that was after the rebalancing of the force since July of the previous year, which saw a large number of men that had been inducted released either temporarily for "work leave" or permanently. From then on, the Wehrmacht assiduously worked at getting more personnel at the pointy end, while simultaneously ensuring the best supply of skilled men to industry as possible. So we find that Fromm's main hope for replacements for the Ostheer, JG 22, while especially large as those things went 565,060 men "fit for service", 72,435 were service deferred as UK-gestellte.

I don't think by the end of 1942 there would be many in the Feldheer qualifying as UK-gestellte, especially after the waves of personnel comb-outs in the intervening 22 months.

Add in the fact that equipment losses in the East are no longer happening at anywhere near the same rate, combined with the eventual flow of new oil (repaired and online by 44 in this ATL?), and Germany now has the ability to mechanize more of its Army, or provide more fuel for the LW or KM, or some combination. Another option is greater mechanization of farms, which, if further agricultural reforms can be carried out, could release a further tranche of labor for industry. I can't speak for how likely this last option, especially, would be, but it is certainly within the realm of possibility. Finally, greater coal/oil supplies may allow some revitalization of occupied European industry.

Um, unlikely, given the likely state of any Soviet oilfields by the time a victorious Germany occupies them in 1942. Between the lack of rail lines and rolling stock to get it out, the Germans simply didn't have the resources to rehabilitate the oilfields and get them working in any reasonable length of time. On top of that there is the simple lack of refinery capacity. BTW, Soviet crude is not going to help the Luftwaffe, which depended on synthetic production for its 87-octane fuel. Combined with the limited production of TEL, the Luftwaffe will continue to have problems.

Furthermore, motor mechanization is dependent not just on gasoline and diesel, but also on engines and transmissions, both of which were industrial bottlenecks as well.

Nor is it likely that "more oil" will revitalize occupied Europe's economy. It wasn't just the loss of oil that was problematic; it was the interruption of normal international trade routes. So for example while France had bauxite, it had limited aluminum processing capability since it was more profitable to trade for goods than build the massive electrical plants required for processing the bauxite. Germany of course took what bauxite they wanted to feed their greater processing capability, but gave nothing in return, so it did nothing to revitalize France's economy.

Naturally, the Allies will of course try to target the new oil fields once they've been repaired, making Germany's ability to project power into Persia and the Middle East that much more important.

Nope. They'll target the refinery capacity at Ploesti and then later the synthetic plants, just as they did historically. Only this time it will be with North Africa and probably Crete and possibly Malta, Sardinia, and Corsica secure as bomber bases.

[T. A. Gardner]

Mechanizing farms in Germany is very likely to be a non-starter. Most German farms were very small family ones set up with most of the labor being done by hand. Mechanizing the work simply isn't cost effective on that small a scale. The British during WW 2 mechanized more farming due to labor shortages, not particularly because it was efficient. In the US, farms were much larger (the average in 1940 was 174 acres) so using mechanized equipment made sense as it allowed more efficient farming on a larger scale.
Aside from that, the German automotive industry can't supply all the vehicles the military needs, even on a reduced scale of mobilization. Where does the capacity to manufacture farm machinery come from. Now, I could see the military cutting down on requisitioning horses from farms which would help bring their efficiency back up some. That would make at least a start to increasing allotments in rationing.

[TheMarcksPlan]

So a 109 is made out of brass & powder?

Engines. The major bottleneck for German aircraft production.

This is more of the same: "It didn't happen so it couldn't happen"

Specifically, these posters are assuming that German investment decisions would be no different than OTL.

Labor is the ultimate bottleneck. Labor moved from one production area to another, and matched with different investment decisions, equals greater production in the other area.

The posters objections here are particularly absurd given that German ammo/powder production increased by a factor of >3 OTL between early '42 and mid-44.

The posters would have you believe that Germany would make similar investments to increase ammo/powder production as OTL in this ATL, despite the absence of an Eastern Front!

[TheMarcksPlan]

As for aluminum production, you need lots of electricity to melt the ore into aluminum metal.

Synth fuel plants consumed 13% of Germany's electricity. They'll be shut down by mid-'43, when the Russian oil is flowing. That alone gives you sufficient electricity to double aluminum production.

...and then there's increased coal mining. Might the millions of soldiers demobilized and/or not casualties contribute some coal production delta?

...and then there's increased food supply due to greater German conquests (taking and holding SU's entire Chernozem region) and higher agricultural productivity vs. OTL (replenishment of European agriculture's oil and fertilizer). Food supply was a binding constraint on coal production, as coal mining burns a lot of calories. More coal means more electricity, especially considering that Europe had much idle generating capacity OTL due to coal shortages. And if Germany needs to build more generating capacity, they can easily do so. See, e.g., Germany's reconstruction of the Zaporizhe generating station, an investment that the Red Army nullified OTL but that would be part of Ukraine's economic revival in this ATL.

Were I to participate in somebody else's ATL, I think I would do more than simply state the first objection that comes to mind. I would, for example, consider whether the ATL contains conditions responsive to an objection that I find obvious. That's what I would do if I wanted to have a productive discussion, anyways.

Between the lack of rail lines and rolling stock to get it out, the Germans simply didn't have the resources to rehabilitate the oilfields and get them working in any reasonable length of time.

Sometimes it's bad to be right:

The author notes in advance that most AHF members given to posting in his threads will supply the usual knee-jerk reaction, "rail transport won't work..." The author expects that none of these posts will contain numerical analysis at even a mediocre level. Nonetheless, the author will attempt to stick to the numbers and not let his opinion of these posts occupy too much of the thread.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Nevertheless some personnel return would happen, some significant portion of the Army will be discharged, and some proportion of those people will be skilled labor.

There is no historical support for the idea - propounded by some here with an agenda - that Germany was incapable of telling the difference between a skilled and unskilled worker. Following Barbarossa, the German army instituted a program to exchange some older soldiers of particular value to the economy for other younger men who were drafted. That's just one example. As with any massive bureaucracy, there's friction and things don't happen overnight. Over the course of a year or so, however, partial demobilization of the Heer would have freed thousands of skilled workers and millions of workers in general.

Another option is greater mechanization of farms, which, if further agricultural reforms can be carried out, could release a further tranche of labor for industry.

IMJ the primary concern would be to raise agricultural output as quickly as possible. On the menu of options for doing this, mechanization is possible but is very far down the line. Simply restoring fuel supplies to occupied Europe is a de facto increase in mechanization, as in OTL much of Europe didn't have fuel to utilize existing mechanization.

More significant, IMO, is fertilizer production. German agronomists estimated that a ton of nitrogen fertilizer produced 15 tons of grain. https://books.google.com/books?id=uPMsA ... er&f=false

Between the synth fuel plants and ammo/powder production, ATL Germany can repurpose a small portion of its giant chemicals industry to fertilizer production, causing massive increases in European food production. In Ukraine, for instance, Soviet agriculture made very little use of fertilizer OTL. In this ATL, Ukraine probably produces more food than in OTL 1940 and, given the lower "excess" population (deaths and evacuation), the grain surplus would be even greater. Contrary to conventional wisdom, the Germans had no problem extracting food from Ukraine (Ostheer largely fed itself from occupied territories), so the Ukraine breadbasket is going to feed a giant increase in productive activity across Europe.

[TheMarcksPlan]

The author notes in advance that most AHF members given to posting in his threads will supply the usual knee-jerk reaction, "rail transport won't work..." The author expects that none of these posts will contain numerical analysis at even a mediocre level. Nonetheless, the author will attempt to stick to the numbers and not let his opinion of these posts occupy too much of the thread.

Ok let's put some first order numerical analysis to the issue of Germany moving Russian oil. If I don't do it, of course nobody else will.

The operative parameters are (1) the burden of moving Russian oil in terms of freight ton-kilometers and (2) Europe's total freight ton-kilometer capacity in the ATL.


First, let's look at the fuel required to triple LW fuel consumption. OTL the LW consumed ~2mil tons per year. https://i.imgur.com/dJAFt8s.jpg
So we need ~4mil tons from Russia to triple LW's OTL fuel consumption.

From Maikop/Grozny to Germany is ~2,000km: ~8bil FTK required to triple LW fuel consumption.

In 1943, the Deutsche Reichsbahn (DRB) produced 178bil FTK. So tripling the LW's fuel consumption would require 4.5% of the DRB's 1943 haulage capacity. This is almost certainly lower than the amount of FTK's saved by a peace on the Eastern Front.

So we can put to bed any suggestion that Germany would have been incapable of massively accelerating LW activity via Russian fuel supplies, even absent any increase in DRB capacity.

-----------------------------------------------------

To move greater amounts of fuel from Russia to Europe - say 20mil tons of oil - would have required more investment, but not any insuperable burden. Baku is farther than Maikop of course - about 3,000km from Germany. The other big source of Russian oil - Kuibyshev/Samara - is about as far from Germany as is Maikop.

Let's say Germany moves 12mil tons from Baku (3,000km journey) and 8mil from Maikop, Grozny, and Kuibyshev (2,000km).
That's 52bil FTK or 29% of the DRB's OTL 1943 capacity.

So we're gonna need some investment to make this work. What kind of investment?

First, we'll want to offload as much of these shipments as possible from the rail network to shipping. With the Black Sea pacified, this is a safe option. With Turkey on the Axis side, shipments can go via the Straits, through the Aegean, then via the Corinth Canal into the Adriatic in safety. Italy had about 3mil GRT shipping by '43 (IIRC- anybody know the exact figure?), which should mean about 5mil deadweight tons shipping capacity. Romania and Turkey will have some shipping capacity as well. Even if these aren't tankers, they can load oil barrels for shipment. Using the ports at Batum (for Baku oil) and Novorosysk/Tuapse/Rostov (for Maikop/Grozny), we can probably move >10mil tons of oil on the aforementioned sea routes. If needed, Italy can build more ships as well. That removes ~half the burden from the rail network.

For the remaining 26bil FTK, we'll need more rolling stock than OTL. How much more? We'll have to expand the DRB's rolling stock by ~13%.

As a graphic I provided upthread showed, German spending on rolling stock was 2.1% of total munitions spending in early '42 and 1.6% in mid-44. So despite the critical importance of rolling stock to the German economy, its actual share of expenditure was quite low. Many of Germany's heavy industrial firms had experience building rolling stock so the plant for an escalation of production already existed (indeed many of the firms could switch from weapons to rolling stock easily).

We'd need a bit more analysis to fix a figure on the cost of rolling stock needed to move 20mil tons of oil from Russia to Germany by early '44, but given the low salience of rail production in overall production, I'd be surprised if building this capacity required more than 5% of Germany's OTL munitions expenditure.

[T. A. Gardner]

It's far worse than you make out. The typical German tank car train at the time consists of 20 to 25 cars moving 340 to 440 metric tons of fuel. The limitation is locomotive pulling power on that. To move 12 million tons of fuel in a year requires about 75 trains a day.

Now, the Germans are initially going to have a single line starting about Stalino heading into the oil fields. A rough guess based on VanCreveld et. al., would say the Germans can run about 20 trains a day per section of that line. All of those trains can't be hauling oil out. Obviously you need to be shipping equipment to repair and service the oil fields in along with food and other supplies for the workers. So, some fraction of the 20 trains a day will be hauling oil out. This would break down to one train moving per section for about an hour, then pulling into a siding to allow a train to move in the other direction that was in the next section. Of course, coordination is imperfect on this so trains will often sit in the siding or on the track waiting for the train moving in the opposite direction to arrive and clear the track.

Next, the efficiency of a single line is relatively low. Per section of the line you can only have one train moving in it at a time. The Germans will also have to build coaling stations, watering stations, sidings, etc., along the line along with installing signals, telegraph communications, etc. They likely will have to spend considerable time hauling in ties, rails, ballast, and other sundries to repair, improve, and keep the line in operation. It's hard to say what the average train speed would be but I'd say it would likely average around 20 to 30 miles an hour.

Rolling stock will hardly be the problem compared to the bottleneck the rail system itself poses.

Then you have to consider the weather and its impact on rail operations. If any of the major rivers lack a rail bridge, that will require construction although the Germans might be able to barge individual cars across in the interim.

I'd estimate, on a single line from the Caucuses that the Germans would be very lucky to get a million tons of oil out after a year of holding the fields. It's more likely to be closer to 500,000 tons. And, that would be mostly unrefined.

Shipping using the Black Sea would be limited. Sure, you could move the oil in barrels but that means delivering the barrels to be filled to the oil fields first... If the oil is unrefined, that's going to be a very inefficient means of moving it as well.

Also, given the time it takes a single train to make the trip from the oil fields to Germany plays a role too. Given the distance involved this could easily be 1 to 2 weeks from loading to unloading in Germany. Therefore you tie up a much larger portion of the available locomotives and rolling stock due to the sheer distances involved.

If the Germans face partisan resistance who attack the rail system regularly, this too will reduce the efficiency of the system overall. So, in the first year shipments might well fall under 100,000 tons.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Now, the Germans are initially going to have a single line starting about Stalino heading into the oil fields. A rough guess based on VanCreveld et. al., would say the Germans can run about 20 trains a day per section of that line.

Once again, this is a simplistic statement that OTL conditions would hold. Once again it's "didn't happen ergo couldn't."

You're stating that the same conditions (one train line from Stalino) that held during OTL Blau would hold when the Germans have had firm control over everything west of the Don since Fall '41. There is absolutely no reason to believe this (let alone to post it publicly).

There are multiple lines running east from the Stalino area: http://users.tpg.com.au/adslbam9//Railways1941.png

Standard German double-track lines sustained 72 trains/day. They'd be upgraded in this ATL to that standard. OTL the Germans invested billions of RM into the Russian rail network during '42-'43 (see this thread: viewtopic.php?f=66&t=203286). ATL those investments would focus on the Ukraine-Caucasus axis, especially after armistice with the SU.

To the extent necessary, more investment would occur: OTL the DRB had trouble getting raw materials in competition with the Wehrmacht's urgent demands. ATL the demands of the biggest-ever land war are gone, DRB can be supplied as much steel and labor as necessary to ensure the transport of Caucasian oil.

I'd estimate, on a single line from the Caucuses that the Germans would be very lucky to get a million tons of oil out after a year of holding the fields.

Yeah but your estimate is based on what happened during the OTL Blau offensive, not what would have happened had Germany advanced to the Don in '41, repaired the lines behind it, and then taken Maikop/Grozny in mid-'42. Before you ask where that comes from, see my earlier posts about actually following the thread. So your estimate is irrelevant and off-topic.

To move 12 million tons of fuel in a year requires about 75 trains a day.

About the capacity of ONE German-standard double-track line. Thank you for making my point.

If the oil is unrefined, that's going to be a very inefficient means of moving it as well.

What are you talking about? That's how the oil industry works.

Therefore you tie up a much larger portion of the available locomotives and rolling stock due to the sheer distances involved.

Are you aware of the metric "Freight ton-kilometers"? The distance is baked into the calculations I posted. FTK's actually overstates the relative burden of long trips, as on such trips the freight cars spend less proportional time unloading/loading.