U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Discussions on alternate history, including events up to 20 years before today. Hosted by Terry Duncan.
HistoryGeek2019
Member
Posts: 399
Joined: 06 Aug 2019 03:55
Location: America

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 04 Mar 2020 04:45

To summarize our conversation thus far, it seems that you have proposed division allocations for Germany as follows:
Marcks ATL Division allocations.png
The top right chart is your summary of the OTL division allocations as of June 1942. The top right chart shows how you believe divisions would be reallocated following a peace with the USSR, and the bottom left chart shows how you believe divisions would be allocated as of July 1943 in your ATL. Does this look right?

A few initial reactions:

20 is far too low for the Eastern Front. This goes back to the terms of the peace agreement with Stalin. While Stalin may have sought a peace in order to avoid starvation, I think he would have chosen starvation over disarmament, because disarmament would have allowed Hitler to walk in and occupy the entire Soviet Union. Which is why it really is crucial to know just how far you think Germany could have advanced into the USSR against continued determined resistance by Stalin, and how many divisions they would have needed to do so.

5 also seems pretty low for Iberia. The Allies could easily overwhelm that. It depends on whether the Spanish population will fight with the Allies or against them, which depends on whether Franco joins the Axis or not. I guess for the sake of argument we can assume that Franco joins the Axis as you have outlined. Germany will still need more than 5 divisions. I think the Allies would have been able to find popular support among the Spanish population from the former Republican base, and after a few defeats, Franco's government would have toppled like Mussolini's. So Germany will need a lot more than 5 divisions in Spain.

On the other hand, if Spain joins the Axis in 1942 and Operation Torch goes ahead, I don't see the Allies advancing past Morocco. They would play it conservative and focus on gaining complete air and sea control of the Strait of Gibraltar - so this might free up some of the divisions you allocated to Tunisia. Hitler would still probably send reinforcements to Tunisia, but when he saw that the Allies weren't advancing past Morocco, he would stop there (probably).

I'm having a hard time seeing Germany supply 10 divisions marching through Saudi Arabia to Yemen. The Axis might be able to take Suez, but the Allies can retreat down the Red Sea and control it with air power, preventing the Axis from using the Red Sea for supply ships, and land infrastructure wouldn't be enough for the Axis to support a large ground force. This is the point at which you explain how Germany will gain air superiority over the Red Sea in 1943 because of all the troops that were demobilized, in which case we need to go back to the drawing board and start with OTL German fighters in service, identify your point of departure, and explain how you get to the number it would take for Germany to have air superiority in every theater of the war.

Edit: Typo
You do not have the required permissions to view the files attached to this post.
Last edited by HistoryGeek2019 on 04 Mar 2020 19:37, edited 2 times in total.

HistoryGeek2019
Member
Posts: 399
Joined: 06 Aug 2019 03:55
Location: America

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 04 Mar 2020 05:28

To get the ball rolling on the fighter discussion, here are OTL fighter figures from Mark Ellis' WWII Databook:

LW Fighters.png
RAF Fighters.png
US Fighters.png

Assuming an authorized strength of 12 fighters per squadron and an average in service strength of 10, the RAF fighter strength comes to:

RAF Fighters per squadron.png
You do not have the required permissions to view the files attached to this post.

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Member
Posts: 1450
Joined: 15 Jan 2019 22:32
Location: USA

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 04 Mar 2020 05:38

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:20 is far too low for the Eastern Front.
Call it 40 then.
5 also seems pretty low for Iberia.
Move 5 from Northwest Europe and 5 from reserve.

That makes 135 total divisions by July 1943. Thanks doing the chart.
it really is crucial to know just how far you think Germany could have advanced into the USSR against continued determined resistance by Stalin, and how many divisions they would have needed to do so.
Which is why I tried to lay that out in a longish post. Any specific disagreements?

...other responses in progress...just wanted to give you a chance to respond if you're on the boards tonight.

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Member
Posts: 1450
Joined: 15 Jan 2019 22:32
Location: USA

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 04 Mar 2020 06:04

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:This goes back to the terms of the peace agreement with Stalin. While Stalin may have sought a peace in order to avoid starvation, I think he would have chosen starvation over disarmament, because disarmament would have allowed Hitler to walk in and occupy the entire Soviet Union.
Terms of armistice would require at least partial disarmament. Recall that in this ATL, the SU's agricultural productivity is down by 20% due to land loss and, unless Germany sends it oil, is down another at least 20%. So Stalin already has to demobilize if he wants to avoid mass starvation.

With the Luftwaffe doing 100-mile milkruns on the Urals factories these are being destroyed rapidly.

So at least partial disarmament is inevitable for the SU, the only issue is whether it comes with a peace that preserves the regime or a war that destroys it (maybe dragging Hitler along with it but Stalin had no allegiance to that cause).

The terms of an armistice would be something like this:
  • SU limited to 40 divisions
  • Limit enforced by carrots and sticks:
    • Occupation of Urals militarily: SU retains political control but German divisions posted at strategic passes and around the major cities.
    • Inspections of Urals factories to ensure minimal armaments production.
    • German provision to SU of ~5mil tons of oil annually (from '43) to maintain food production, Soviet provision of labor and material in Baku and Kuibyshev to restore production.
    • German-Soviet trade of Soviet industrial goods (e.g. rolling stock, pig iron, aluminium) in exchange for "German" food from occupied SU and German technical goods (e.g. machine tools, which were - ironically - critical to Soviet wartime industry).
  • Partial exchange of Soviet PoW's for return of skilled workers to Ukraine and elsewhere.
  • Payment of occupation costs, negotiated and traded off against the foregoing items.
  • Soviet retention of control over Central Asia, possibly German recognition of its sphere of influence in northern Iran (to cause conflict with Britain/US).
Against an objection that the foregoing armistice terms are too harsh for Stalin to accept, I must emphasize the alternative: collapse of the regime amidst mass starvation, total rebellion in Central Asia, total loss of the Urals and Western Siberia, vulnerability to Japanese attack.

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Member
Posts: 1450
Joined: 15 Jan 2019 22:32
Location: USA

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 04 Mar 2020 06:19

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:I'm having a hard time seeing Germany supply 10 divisions marching through Saudi Arabia to Yemen.
I think I said "towards Yemen." Anyway, I was relying on the Hejaz railway but on further inspection it only reached Medina and would have required some upgrading to support 10 divisions. This pushes my timetable for reaching Aden back by a year or so. Any resources for road network in Hejaz?
This is the point at which you explain how Germany will gain air superiority over the Red Sea in 1943 because of all the troops that were demobilized, in which case we need to go back to the drawing board and start with OTL German fighters in service
Yep.

Before getting into that discussion, however, I think it will be much easier if we look at relative production and attrition rates before getting to operational strengths. The latter will depend on the former and production/attrition is much easier to discuss than creating a genealogy of unit strengths ATL vs. OTL and then aggregating them for each side.

User avatar
Aida1
Member
Posts: 1013
Joined: 04 Aug 2019 08:46
Location: Brussels

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by Aida1 » 04 Mar 2020 13:15

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
03 Mar 2020 19:28
Aida1 wrote:
03 Mar 2020 14:44
HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
03 Mar 2020 05:24
So you believe Germany was capable of conquering and occupying the entire Soviet Union if it wanted to.

Where do you see the limit? Could Germany have conquered and occupied China? India? All of Asia? All of Africa? The entire planet?
He does have a fertile imagination. A far too optimistic scenario from the german viewpoint.
...right on cue.
You do not like to be confronted on your far too optimistic scenario even general Marcks rejected for very good reasons.

User avatar
Aida1
Member
Posts: 1013
Joined: 04 Aug 2019 08:46
Location: Brussels

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by Aida1 » 04 Mar 2020 13:43

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
04 Mar 2020 04:45
To summarize our conversation thus far, it seems that you have proposed division allocations for Germany as follows:

Marcks ATL Division allocations.png

The top right chart is your summary of the OTL division allocations as of June 1942. The top right chart shows how you believe divisions would be reallocated following a peace with the USSR, and the bottom left chart shows how you believe divisions would be allocated as of July 1943 in your ATL. Does this look right?

A few initial reactions:

20 is far too low for the Eastern Front. This goes back to the terms of the peace agreement with Stalin. While Stalin may have sought a peace in order to avoid starvation, I think he would have chosen starvation over disarmament, because disarmament would have allowed Hitler to walk in and occupy the entire Soviet Union. Which is why it really is crucial to know just how far you think Germany could have advanced into the USSR against continued determined resistance by Stalin, and how many divisions they would have needed to do so.

5 also seems pretty low for Iberia. The Allies could easily overwhelm that. It depends on whether the Spanish population will fight with the Allies or against them, which depends on whether Franco joins the Axis or not. I guess for the sake of argument we can assume that Franco joins the Axis as you have outlined. Germany will still need more than 5 divisions. I think the Allies have been able to find popular support among the Spanish population from the former Republican base, and after a few defeats, Franco's government would have toppled like Mussolini's. So Germany will need a lot more than 5 divisions in Spain.

On the other hand, if Spain joins the Axis in 1942 and Operation Torch goes ahead, I don't see the Allies advancing past Morocco. They would play it conservative and focus on gaining complete air and sea control of the Strait of Gibraltar - so this might free up some of the divisions you allocated to Tunisia. Hitler would still probably send reinforcements to Tunisia, but when he saw that the Allies weren't advancing past Morocco, he would stop there (probably).

I'm having a hard time seeing Germany supply 10 divisions marching through Saudi Arabia to Yemen. The Axis might be able to take Suez, but the Allies can retreat down the Red Sea and control it with air power, preventing the Axis from using the Red Sea for supply ships, and land infrastructure wouldn't be enough for the Axis to support a large ground force. This is the point at which you explain how Germany will gain air superiority over the Red Sea in 1943 because of all the troops that were demobilized, in which case we need to go back to the drawing board and start with OTL German fighters in service, identify your point of departure, and explain how you get to the number it would take for Germany to have air superiority in every theater of the war.
In the summer of 1941 OKH Op Abt (V) had planned for 38 inf div, 10 pz div , 4 mot and 2 mot as occupation troop USSR and operation troop Kaukasus(2 pz, 1 mot, 2 mountain of this for operations south of the Kaukasus). It was worked in detail were all these divisions would be stationed. The west would get 38, Norway 11, Denmark 1 and the southeast (Crete,greece, yougoslavia) 8 div. 52 divisions would be disbanded.

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 7624
Joined: 02 Sep 2006 20:31
Location: USA

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 04 Mar 2020 18:40

Aida1 wrote:
04 Mar 2020 13:43
...

In the summer of 1941 OKH Op Abt (V) had planned for 38 inf div, 10 pz div , 4 mot and 2 mot as occupation troop USSR and operation troop Kaukasus(2 pz, 1 mot, 2 mountain of this for operations south of the Kaukasus). It was worked in detail were all these divisions would be stationed. The west would get 38, Norway 11, Denmark 1 and the southeast (Crete,greece, yougoslavia) 8 div. 52 divisions would be disbanded.
Not a expert heres, but from following similar discussions & literature that looks adequate for the short run. One longer term factor would be the actual need for manpower for industrial development. Aside from improving over all productivity in the Reich there the need for exploring th capture resources. The policy in 1942 was to marginalize or destroy a large portion of the skilled labor and management. Meaning that has to come out of a relatively small pool of Germans and a few Allies or acceptable 'Aryan' nationalities. How much pressure there is for further demobilization is a unknown at this point. I mean there would be pressure, but would it be enough to cause further demobilization? Or hinder mobilization later were a threat to develop?

A wild card here in the overall discussion is when the US actually enters the war & how much initial enthusiasm there is. Theres a difference between some sort of anger after a major surprise attack & a more gradual escaltion as was occurring between the US and Germany. the latter might mean the US entry the was 3, 6, 9 months later, but in a more orderly and efficient manner, vs the chaos of the early 1943 emergency. Best case the Allied cargo shipping is much better organized. Much of the cargo ship shortage of the 1942-43 was lack of organization and stable planning. There were some abrupt and deep changes in cargo shipping allocations 1943-43 that did nothing for coherent & efficient management.

The last aspect I see is the usual bias in under consideration of the actions the US and UK would take. Which is ironic considering the topic of the thread. One example might be here:
HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
04 Mar 2020 04:45
...
I'm having a hard time seeing Germany supply 10 divisions marching through Saudi Arabia to Yemen. The Axis might be able to take Suez, but the Allies can retreat down the Red Sea and control it with air power, preventing the Axis from using the Red Sea for supply ships, and land infrastructure wouldn't be enough for the Axis to support a large ground force. This is the point at which you explain how Germany will gain air superiority over the Red Sea in 1943 because of all the troops that were demobilized, in which case we need to go back to the drawing board and start with OTL German fighters in service, identify your point of departure, and explain how you get to the number it would take for Germany to have air superiority in every theater of the war.
I'm unsure what the strategic benefit would be for advancing into that region, tho it is adjacent to Syria/Iraq/Persia, which do have regional global strategic value. As soon as the attack on the USSR came the Brits accelerated long term planning for a 'front' in that region. Much of that went unrealized & not beyond the early stages. The results were things like suppressing the assorted revolts, building the Persian LL transport route, improved port facilities, some transport improvements in Iraq, establishment of skeleton military forces as a foundation for deploying a army/s in the region. The US got behind this & paid/executed much of the work. This in the long terms affects the German occupation strength of the USSR. Its a logical part of the British peripheral strategy to build up the infrastructure in this region, support alone opposed to the nazis, like former Soviet citizens/military who fled south o the Cauasus. & Eventually deploy air and ground forces in larger strength.

HistoryGeek2019
Member
Posts: 399
Joined: 06 Aug 2019 03:55
Location: America

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by HistoryGeek2019 » 04 Mar 2020 19:46

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
04 Mar 2020 06:04
HistoryGeek2019 wrote:This goes back to the terms of the peace agreement with Stalin. While Stalin may have sought a peace in order to avoid starvation, I think he would have chosen starvation over disarmament, because disarmament would have allowed Hitler to walk in and occupy the entire Soviet Union.
Terms of armistice would require at least partial disarmament. Recall that in this ATL, the SU's agricultural productivity is down by 20% due to land loss and, unless Germany sends it oil, is down another at least 20%. So Stalin already has to demobilize if he wants to avoid mass starvation.

With the Luftwaffe doing 100-mile milkruns on the Urals factories these are being destroyed rapidly.

So at least partial disarmament is inevitable for the SU, the only issue is whether it comes with a peace that preserves the regime or a war that destroys it (maybe dragging Hitler along with it but Stalin had no allegiance to that cause).

The terms of an armistice would be something like this:
  • SU limited to 40 divisions
  • Limit enforced by carrots and sticks:
    • Occupation of Urals militarily: SU retains political control but German divisions posted at strategic passes and around the major cities.
    • Inspections of Urals factories to ensure minimal armaments production.
    • German provision to SU of ~5mil tons of oil annually (from '43) to maintain food production, Soviet provision of labor and material in Baku and Kuibyshev to restore production.
    • German-Soviet trade of Soviet industrial goods (e.g. rolling stock, pig iron, aluminium) in exchange for "German" food from occupied SU and German technical goods (e.g. machine tools, which were - ironically - critical to Soviet wartime industry).
  • Partial exchange of Soviet PoW's for return of skilled workers to Ukraine and elsewhere.
  • Payment of occupation costs, negotiated and traded off against the foregoing items.
  • Soviet retention of control over Central Asia, possibly German recognition of its sphere of influence in northern Iran (to cause conflict with Britain/US).
Against an objection that the foregoing armistice terms are too harsh for Stalin to accept, I must emphasize the alternative: collapse of the regime amidst mass starvation, total rebellion in Central Asia, total loss of the Urals and Western Siberia, vulnerability to Japanese attack.
I dispute the plausibility of Stalin agreeing to any settlement that requires him to disarm, cede territory that hasn't yet been occupied by the Germans, allow German inspectors in his territory, or pay occupation costs. He would rather kill half his own population and keep absolute control over a remnant state centered on Irkutsk than give Hitler a free ticket to occupy the entire USSR. The most he will agree to in any scenario is a cease-fire along the current front-line, with the possible creation of a 100-200 KM demilitarized zone.

Before I respond to your post about Germany trying to conquer the entire USSR, I need to ask how you see Hitler responding to Stalin's stance as I've outlined it above.

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 7624
Joined: 02 Sep 2006 20:31
Location: USA

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 09 Mar 2020 18:57

I think the attenuated mobilization of the US was referred to in some earlier posts. Don't have time to check right now. Just want to reiterate the point of the US starting to slow its mobilization in mid 1944. In 1943 in a few few specific items. Some where there are projections for the expected military production and related output for 1945-46 absent any slowdown 1944-45. A close look at that projection would give a better picture of what the Allies might accomplish even absent atomic weapons.

A related item would be the cargo shipping available for other tasks if the Red Army is reduced to a inactive rump in the east. Material shipments to the USSR would fall below 1942 levels of OTL, probably to the levels of the first half of 1941. That frees a lot of deck space for moving Brit & US combat power around the Atlantic, MTO and Far East.

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 7624
Joined: 02 Sep 2006 20:31
Location: USA

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 09 Mar 2020 19:19

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
04 Mar 2020 04:45
... This is the point at which you explain how Germany will gain air superiority over the Red Sea in 1943 because of all the troops that were demobilized, in which case we need to go back to the drawing board and start with OTL German fighters in service, identify your point of departure, and explain how you get to the number it would take for Germany to have air superiority in every theater of the war.

Edit: Typo
As I see it there is no long term demobilization of air power for Germany. Maybe a drop in operational aircraft in 1942 as production is adjusted and groups shift to new models. But, if Allied production remains at OTL levels the German AF can't afford to cut back on a single aircraft or crewman. OTL in June 1944 the RAF & AAF in the UK alone outnumbered the entire GAF 2-1 or more. Across the entire arc of the Western Europe, Mediterranean, and Middle East the ratio was easily 3-1. Using OTL numbers theres no 'saving' the Luftwaffe with a couple thousand operational aircraft freed up from the east. the disparity in production, operational aircraft, and aircrew are too great.

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Member
Posts: 1450
Joined: 15 Jan 2019 22:32
Location: USA

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 11 Mar 2020 22:22

HistoryGeek2019 wrote:I dispute the plausibility of Stalin agreeing to any settlement that requires him to disarm, cede territory that hasn't yet been occupied by the Germans, allow German inspectors in his territory, or pay occupation costs. He would rather kill half his own population and keep absolute control over a remnant state centered on Irkutsk than give Hitler a free ticket to occupy the entire USSR. The most he will agree to in any scenario is a cease-fire along the current front-line, with the possible creation of a 100-200 KM demilitarized zone.
Responding to this has given some pause because I felt like I had already established the Urals inspection/occupation regime and you had called it reasonable. But looking back I suppose I hadn't been quite so specific.

I'm going to respond to your objections in a couple ways:

First, I will argue that the SU's predicament in ATL September '42 is so bad that Stalin would have no choice but to accept something like the terms I described - we can disagree on the details and I invite you to propose a revision. To that end, I will argue that a Soviet refusal to accept something like the terms I describe would obviously lead to continuation of the war, which would predictably lead to the end of Stalin's regime. I challenge you to articulate a framework in which Stalin's rational interests would lie with continuation of the war rather than a peace that maintains his internal power.

Second, I will respond to your prompt about Hitler's course of action if Stalin refuses something like the peace terms I sketched.

Third, I will gesture at a compromise between our views of possible Nazi-Soviet compromise, ranging from a slightly later armistice to no Nazi-Soviet armistice. If you find my arguments about the September '42 armistice unconvincing, we'll have to end this discussion or agree on a suitable substitute armistice/Ostkrieg. I hope we can find agreement for an interesting discussion...

I'll do the German response to Soviet intransigence in September '42 first because it informs the other discussions:
HistoryGeek2019 wrote:Hitler responding to Stalin's stance as I've outlined it above.
Destroy Urals factories during fall/winter 42-43 via bombing and begin the advance into the Urals and Central Asia.

As I've linked elsewhere, the LW showed the ability to destroy Soviet factories in its raids on GAZ in Gorky, which cost the LW little and shut down production in that factory. In comparison to those raids, the ATL raids on the far more important Urals factories would be (1) of far lower range and thus easier to generate sorties and bomb tonnage and (2) opposed by a weaker VVS, due to the SU being weaker overall in this ATL (i.e. 25% weaker VVS at start of '42 assuming uniform distribution of Soviet production reductions from OTL).

Regarding the Fall/Winter campaign into the Urals/Kazakhstan:
Previously I had ended this ATL in September with the Germans at a Perm-Ufa-Orenburg-Ural River line.
Soviet intransigence at this point leaves the Germans another month or so of campaign season to continue their advance before Rasputitsa, and the whole winter as well - if needed.
The Urals are not a great physical barrier - especially in their critical central sector containing the most important cities. See, for instance, the topographical map in Wiki:
Image

From Perm to Sverdlosk (Yekaterinburg) and Nizhny Tagil is ~150 miles. Over normal terrain, the Ostheer could easily cover that in a month. Here is Google Streetview of the highway into Yekaterinburg, about 30 miles from the city: https://www.google.com/maps/@56.8041849 ... 312!8i6656

As you can see, this is not very imposing terrain.

Furthermore, the "mountains" sheltering Chelyabinsk to its East are only ~20 miles wide, with a wide incursion of flat, arable land (marked with a red circle below):

Image


Through the central Urals, an advance averaging 2 miles per day from September 1 means the Ostheer takes those cities during mid-November. Given the narrowness and/or tameness of the "mountains" in this region, I think that's a reasonable prediction of Ostheer progress.

That advance through the Central Urals takes Nizhny Tagil, Chelyabinsk, and Yekaterinburg, after which there is no great natural obstacle to the Ostheer until Lake Baikal.

Elsewhere on the front:
-East of Ufa the Urals are higher and thicker, so Ostheer would hold the front there and reinforce the Central Urals drive.
-South of the Urals, along the Ural River itself and in a Southeasterly direction into Kazahkstan, there is only some rolling hills and wide steppe perfect for the Ostheer.

The drives by AGC through the Central Urals and AGS to the south of the Urals would encircle the Southern Urals, Magnitogorsk, and the last remaining centers of Soviet heavy industry. It would look something like this (black arrows added):

Image

If the Ostheer has taken the Central Urals and flanked the Southern Urals by the mid-November, then Magnitogorsk will fall before the end of '42. In any event, it and all other non-occupied industrial centers will already have been destroyed by the LW.

Meanwhile, the Ostheer will be advancing into Central Asia and the populations of those countries will be in revolt. By the end of '43, the SU will have lost the Urals, will be losing control of, or will have lost control of, Central Asia, and will have no prospect of building an army to stop the Ostheer.

For historical reference, consider the Russian Civil War and the long retreat of the Whites from the Urals to Transbaikal:

Image

As you can see, once the Reds broke through the Urals it took about a year to reach Lake Baikal. That advance was primarily along the Trans-Siberian railroad, similar to the advance I sketched upthread re continuation of the war (only I specified 2 years for the Ostheer out of a too-pessimistic abundance of caution).

----------------------------------------------------------------

I'll return to my other points about Stalin's rational interest calculus later, just wanted to present this scenario to you first.

I wonder what you think the Soviet response is once (1) the Central Urals have fallen and (2) the Southern Urals have been flanked. It's seems clear to me at that point that Stalin would perceive resistance as futile and would take almost any deal that would allow him to remain in power instead of beginning a long retreat across Siberia similar to what his comrades inflicted on the Whites.

A reasonable compromise between us might be a December/January armistice instead of September.
I don't think this changes much: the Iberian campaign doesn't launch until Spring '43 in my ATL, while the ~30 divisions assigned to the Turkey/Iran theaters are superfluous to the drive through/around the Urals.
Last edited by TheMarcksPlan on 11 Mar 2020 22:33, edited 1 time in total.

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Member
Posts: 1450
Joined: 15 Jan 2019 22:32
Location: USA

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 11 Mar 2020 22:27

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
09 Mar 2020 19:19
HistoryGeek2019 wrote:
04 Mar 2020 04:45
... This is the point at which you explain how Germany will gain air superiority over the Red Sea in 1943 because of all the troops that were demobilized, in which case we need to go back to the drawing board and start with OTL German fighters in service, identify your point of departure, and explain how you get to the number it would take for Germany to have air superiority in every theater of the war.

Edit: Typo
As I see it there is no long term demobilization of air power for Germany. Maybe a drop in operational aircraft in 1942 as production is adjusted and groups shift to new models. But, if Allied production remains at OTL levels the German AF can't afford to cut back on a single aircraft or crewman. OTL in June 1944 the RAF & AAF in the UK alone outnumbered the entire GAF 2-1 or more. Across the entire arc of the Western Europe, Mediterranean, and Middle East the ratio was easily 3-1. Using OTL numbers theres no 'saving' the Luftwaffe with a couple thousand operational aircraft freed up from the east. the disparity in production, operational aircraft, and aircrew are too great.
No demobilization of *air* power.
Rather, a demobilization of *land* troops to support an escalation of air power.
Milch et. al. planned to produce 80,000 planes in 1945. Obviously they didn't, but Milch's projections were - bombing aside - usually reality-based and fairly accurate.
In this ATL 1945, Germany will have significantly greater overall resources and - depending on scenario - should be spending significantly less - both proportionately and absolutely - on land weapons.
So for Germany to be producing over 100,000 planes is eminently doable. And with the oil of Russia and the Middle East, they'll have the gas to fly those planes and to train sufficient pilots for them.

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 7624
Joined: 02 Sep 2006 20:31
Location: USA

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 12 Mar 2020 04:24

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
11 Mar 2020 22:27
...
Milch et. al. planned to produce 80,000 planes in 1945. Obviously they didn't, but Milch's projections were - bombing aside - usually reality-based and fairly accurate. ...
Depends on who is counting and how. John Ellis in 'Brute Force' placed production at 80,000+ for 1944. I suspect this number included remanufactured airframes from worn out or damaged that had depot or factory rebuilds. There is a logical argument for counting that way. Like others Ellis pointed out this was predominately single engine models as the priority of bombers and transport aircraft was curtailed significantly. More important is Ellis mentioned the measurement for engines is as critical as airframes. He did not chart this one in one of his 54 tables. Reading between the lines & doing some back of the envelope estimating US/Brit engine production for 1944 may have been close to triple German output. Perhaps theres some handy stats for this from a decent source? Googles not helping me at the moment for this.

Ellis places US aircraft production for 1944 at 105,000 & Brit at a bit over 40,000. Large four engine aircraft like the B29 & Lancasters, the B24, Stirling, ect.. figure significantly in that total. Exactly how much US production was cut back in 1944 I can't say, but there was a significant cancelation of production intended to supply the air battles of 1945-46.

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Member
Posts: 1450
Joined: 15 Jan 2019 22:32
Location: USA

Re: U.S./UK forced to implement something like the Victory Plan of 1941

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 12 Mar 2020 08:22

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
12 Mar 2020 04:24
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
11 Mar 2020 22:27
...
Milch et. al. planned to produce 80,000 planes in 1945. Obviously they didn't, but Milch's projections were - bombing aside - usually reality-based and fairly accurate. ...
Depends on who is counting and how. John Ellis in 'Brute Force' placed production at 80,000+ for 1944. I suspect this number included remanufactured airframes from worn out or damaged that had depot or factory rebuilds. There is a logical argument for counting that way. Like others Ellis pointed out this was predominately single engine models as the priority of bombers and transport aircraft was curtailed significantly. More important is Ellis mentioned the measurement for engines is as critical as airframes. He did not chart this one in one of his 54 tables. Reading between the lines & doing some back of the envelope estimating US/Brit engine production for 1944 may have been close to triple German output. Perhaps theres some handy stats for this from a decent source? Googles not helping me at the moment for this.

Ellis places US aircraft production for 1944 at 105,000 & Brit at a bit over 40,000. Large four engine aircraft like the B29 & Lancasters, the B24, Stirling, ect.. figure significantly in that total. Exactly how much US production was cut back in 1944 I can't say, but there was a significant cancelation of production intended to supply the air battles of 1945-46.
Yeah I don't dispute that historical allied production was higher in nominal terms, let alone after adjustment for frame-weight and/or engines. But two points:

First and to repeat, the Germans control a lot more resources in this ATL.

Second, Germany need only produce sufficient cheap fighters to defend and to cover an invasion of England, whether threatened or actual.

Return to “What if”