Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

Post by Cult Icon » 07 Mar 2020 05:31

Cult Icon wrote:
29 Feb 2020 14:11
every post you make will be matched with a contribution from the Aida1 foundation :lol:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a47LTMtUnGw
Not the least bit curious about reading the soon to be hundreds and then soon to be thousands of Aida1 troll posts directed towards me. Seen under 100 Aida1 accounts already

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

Post by Aida1 » 07 Mar 2020 08:56

Cult Icon wrote:
07 Mar 2020 05:31
Cult Icon wrote:
29 Feb 2020 14:11
every post you make will be matched with a contribution from the Aida1 foundation :lol:
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a47LTMtUnGw
Not the least bit curious about reading the soon to be hundreds and then soon to be thousands of Aida1 troll posts directed towards me. Seen under 100 Aida1 accounts already

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The truth is you dislIke being contradicted and refuse discussion. At least one other user has had a go at you a few times here and you did not seem to like that either. :lol: He gave you a lesson on real German tactics contrary to what you proposed which is exactly the opposite. :roll:
Basically, you do not read original sources . And this leads you into false assumptions. You seem to think that germans did no thinking on tactics and needed an internet user 75 years after the war to teach them tactics. :roll: You could have made the effort of actually reading the documents written by officers during the war whose dayjob it was to work out tactical instructions based on frontline experiences. I quoted some of that here and in other threads. More realistic than what you came up with.
Your tactical concept is flawed for several reasons. You seem to presuppose that the germans can only attack a very strong position which is wrong. The enemy line is not strong and deep everywhere. Actually, you would try to avoid strength. You give the germans a large amount of dummies they did not have the ability to produce. A bit of orginal research could have learned you that. You give them large amounts of manpower they did not have either and have the not very orginal idea of trying to saturate the enemy firepower with that in the futile hope they do not have enough shells and bullets to kill all your infantry. :roll: Very wasteful of lives and doomed to failure. One can always do better than that and real German tactics were.It would do you good to read real tactical instructions. :lol:

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 07 Mar 2020 12:06

Aida1,

Have you seen any specific lessons learnt in the OKH documents from the fighting in Sicily or Southern Italy in 1943? I'm wondering whether any lessons were learnt from the somewhat fragmented response of 16 Panzer Division at Salerno in Sep 43, for example. And whether any of the dispositions made or fortifications constructed in Normandy were as a result of tactical analysis of what happened earlier in the Mediterranean.

Regards

Tom

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

Post by Aida1 » 07 Mar 2020 17:32

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
07 Mar 2020 12:06
Aida1,

Have you seen any specific lessons learnt in the OKH documents from the fighting in Sicily or Southern Italy in 1943? I'm wondering whether any lessons were learnt from the somewhat fragmented response of 16 Panzer Division at Salerno in Sep 43, for example. And whether any of the dispositions made or fortifications constructed in Normandy were as a result of tactical analysis of what happened earlier in the Mediterranean.

Regards

Tom
I have seen some of those. There is a publication with Ausbildungshinweise of 5.5.1944 which contains a chapter on fighting the anglo amerikans based on experiences in Italy and also from the pacific. Has a pretty realistic description of what to expect in case of a landing. Quick counterattack to destroy the first landing is emphasised because the combat power of landed units is very high. Also pointed out that the allies can even land in terrain that is supposedly inpassable so every type of terain has to be secured. Given the wellknown controversy about how to use the German armored reserves it is pretty clear not everybody was on the same page where fighting the allies was concerned, particularly concerning the necessity to push them back in the sea quickly..

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

Post by Cult Icon » 08 Mar 2020 00:45

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let me guess from the legions of banned accounts: it was all Hitler's fault and being outnumbered

German officer corps were near perfect in their thinking- they had the best uniforms after all

lots of tedium and hero/genius worship of dead men here. Their ghosts must appreciate the unpaid labor of rare individuals, still alive- carrying their banner :lol: :lol: :lol:

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

Post by Aida1 » 08 Mar 2020 09:13

It is a big mistake to think that one becomes a tactical genius because of reading books on military history. This thread shows how a civilian can fall in a deep hole when he thinks that he can do better at tactics than those that learned it the hard way. And disdaining reading the actual tactical instructions based on practical combat experiences of the time makes it only worse. When one compares the actual tactical instructions with what is presented here, one sees the difference immediately. Massing a lot of infantry in a small space is not really a very intelligent answer to enemy fire superiority. It only leads to a big butchers bill. :roll: And a concept needs to work with what was effectively available in manpower and material.
I keep myself to the ideas of the actual german commanders who were much better at tactics and operations than any civilian internetuser 75 years later.
Historically it is very well known what Hitlers decisions actually were and it does not come from memoirs contrary to one of the more boring assertions you hear on internet forums. Ironically,he made the same mistake as the author of this thread by overinvolving himself in details better left to the professionals..
And being outnumbered in all aspects does make you lose a war if you lack a massive qualititve superiority that more than compensates that.

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

Post by Terry Duncan » 08 Mar 2020 11:13

Cult Icon wrote:
08 Mar 2020 00:45
Image

let me guess from the legions of banned accounts: it was all Hitler's fault and being outnumbered

German officer corps were near perfect in their thinking- they had the best uniforms after all

lots of tedium and hero/genius worship of dead men here. Their ghosts must appreciate the unpaid labor of rare individuals, still alive- carrying their banner :lol: :lol: :lol:
I really suggest you quit this approach, it will not end well as there are only two accounts here with "Aida" contained in them, the first, "Aida" has never made a single post since joining in 2002 and the other is a person you are accusing of holding multiple banned accounts, "Aida1" - and the Aida1 account is not associated with the ISP address of anyone already banned either. You may suspect somone is a previously banned member but unless you have actual evidence nothing can be done about it. If you are going to ignore someone, please do so and do not inflict a running commentary of your views about them on the rest of us as it is tiresome.

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

Post by Cult Icon » 10 Mar 2020 18:27

Improved Large counterattack to seize vital real estate, in support of a defense

***The first purpose of this is to get larger results from counterattacks by seizing ground and temporarily crippling an opposing division. Historically there was a routine use of 1-3 companies of troops and sometimes regimental battlegroups to halt Allied moves. However, these counterattacks- even when achieving their goals- were frequently costly with much of the counterattack force decimated by small arms fire and TOT (Time on Target) strikes, from a few battalions to up to 20 battalions. With more successful large attacks, this would also reduce the necessity/frequency, and thus the losses from smaller counterattacks leading to overall smaller casualties as a whole.

***The second purpose would be to preserve integrity of frontline defenses by drawing from GHQ units (Army reserve) than active forces. The historical practice of 1. using newly arrived units to perform hasty and ill planned large counterattacks while they were not experienced in operating in that sector or 2. to weaken divisional frontages by gather the forces from active divisions to perform a counterattack was rather risky and led to an overall weakening of the Army's defense efforts if these counterattacks failed with heavy losses. Also, the losses of experienced personnel with hard won and irreplaceable local knowledge/skills was a drawback. Newly arrived units, if they failed, would then subsequently not obtain their defensive potential for the remainder of their lifecycle.

***The third would be to minimize the expenditure of motorized formations, which would be needed for future offensive operations.

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

Post by Cult Icon » 11 Mar 2020 13:56

Order of Battle:

Allied: US Inf division with TD, Tank bat

Axis:

Breakthrough element (only GHQ assets):
2 x FKL company
2 x Engineer company
Heavy Tank Battalion (1-2 battalions)
Assault Gun or Tank Destroyer Brigade/Battalion (2-3)
Assault Regiment 1 (2 battalions each)
Assault Regiment 2
Assault Regiment 3
Assault Regiment 4
*Inf organized as maneuverable and light infantry types- like a parachute battalion.

Rear area element:
Dummy Regiment
Flak Battalion

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

Post by Cult Icon » 11 Mar 2020 17:56

Similar principles as before:

Strong allied position on an important Hill, road network, etc. (held by 1 inf regiment on a two miles or less front), with the other regiment to its flank and one in the rear. Army HQ has a planning and training staff that prepares GHQ assets and deploys them with these "sledgehammer" blows to periodically eject Allied forces from positions and cripple selected inf divisions. They will be referred to as "GHQ Assault Group".

Assault units attack as much as possible and rotate their units into the fight as they move in and out of the suppression, recovery, regrouping, and finally the assault ready stage. Defending Allied inf battalions will have to deal with XX-X times more strong attacks then they historically experienced, putting extremely high pressure on defending troops and denying them sufficient time for recovery and reorganization.

Rear area of Axis populated as before.

1. German Inf division holds the front, Assault elements pass through them.
2. Short, preparatory bombardments before attacks using division, corps, and GHQ artillery.
3. 4 x Assault Regiments with armor and engineer (FKL and engineer) support make alternating attacks, in particular focusing on two allied inf battalions and on the boundary lines of two inf battalions. As before, inf that would be deployed in waves with the Tigers as inf support and the SP guns behind them as overwatch. A 24/7 day/night attack cycle begins, aiming at finishing the battle in 1-2 days.
4. Two allied inf battalions are overrun and destroyed, and the Assault Regiments with their armored support focus on rolling up the flanks of the Allied division until the Allied units are ordered to retreat from the position. The GHQ assault group advances to the furthest extent possible and halts in appropriate positions. Allied losses should be roughly equivalent to a regiment, making them in the short-run, unsuitable for full offensive operations and improving the Axis situation in that sector.
5. The gains are occupied by the worn Assault Regiments and its armor until the German inf division moves up its forces to dig-in and relieve the GHQ assault group, which withdraw to the rear in support against a possible Allied-counterattack.
6. When the situation stabilizes, the GHQ assault group is withdrawn for rebuilding and the next mission.

****** On Inf resources: 8 x ~800 men = 6,400 light inf available for use.
******If highly successful, this technique can be repeated a second time.

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

Post by Richard Anderson » 11 Mar 2020 18:40

Cult Icon wrote:
11 Mar 2020 13:56
Axis:

Breakthrough element (only GHQ assets):
2 x FKL company
2 x Engineer company
Heavy Tank Battalion (1-2 battalions)
Assault Gun or Tank Destroyer Brigade/Battalion (2-3)
Assault Regiment 1 (2 battalions each)
Assault Regiment 2
Assault Regiment 3
Assault Regiment 4
*Inf organized as maneuverable and light infantry types- like a parachute battalion.

Rear area element:
Dummy Regiment
Flak Battalion
"What you mentioned so far appears to be tactical and in equipment basis- incremental little steps rather than a major restructuring." :D

So as to enable these "sledgehammer" tactical blows, you want to concentrate significant assets...that is 25% of all Heer FKL units and a major commitment of s.Panzer assets...against an "important Hill, road network, etc. (held by 1 inf regiment on a two miles or less front)". What does that achieve other than a tactical result? Where is the operational or strategic result?
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

Post by Aida1 » 11 Mar 2020 19:56

Cult Icon wrote:
11 Mar 2020 17:56
Similar principles as before:

Strong allied position on an important Hill, road network, etc. (held by 1 inf regiment on a two miles or less front), with the other regiment to its flank and one in the rear. Army HQ has a planning and training staff that prepares GHQ assets and deploys them with these "sledgehammer" blows to periodically eject Allied forces from positions and cripple selected inf divisions. They will be referred to as "GHQ Assault Group".

Assault units attack as much as possible and rotate their units into the fight as they move in and out of the suppression, recovery, regrouping, and finally the assault ready stage. Defending Allied inf battalions will have to deal with XX-X times more strong attacks then they historically experienced, putting extremely high pressure on defending troops and denying them sufficient time for recovery and reorganization.

Rear area of Axis populated as before.

1. German Inf division holds the front, Assault elements pass through them.
2. Short, preparatory bombardments before attacks using division, corps, and GHQ artillery.
3. 4 x Assault Regiments with armor and engineer (FKL and engineer) support make alternating attacks, in particular focusing on two allied inf battalions and on the boundary lines of two inf battalions. As before, inf that would be deployed in waves with the Tigers as inf support and the SP guns behind them as overwatch. A 24/7 day/night attack cycle begins, aiming at finishing the battle in 1-2 days.
4. Two allied inf battalions are overrun and destroyed, and the Assault Regiments with their armored support focus on rolling up the flanks of the Allied division until the Allied units are ordered to retreat from the position. The GHQ assault group advances to the furthest extent possible and halts in appropriate positions. Allied losses should be roughly equivalent to a regiment, making them in the short-run, unsuitable for full offensive operations and improving the Axis situation in that sector.
5. The gains are occupied by the worn Assault Regiments and its armor until the German inf division moves up its forces to dig-in and relieve the GHQ assault group, which withdraw to the rear in support against a possible Allied-counterattack.
6. When the situation stabilizes, the GHQ assault group is withdrawn for rebuilding and the next mission.

****** On Inf resources: 8 x ~800 men = 6,400 light inf available for use.
******If highly successful, this technique can be repeated a second time.
This is called nibbling at the enemy. Not an operational breakthrough. And in general Tiger are not supposed to be inf support . Also, it is doomed to failure as there is not really an answer to allied firepower in here. You too easily assume the allied units will be overrun. Why would they be? Your waves of infantry will be pinned down , maybe even before they start when they are detected. And your opponent conveniently seems to have no reserves he can move into battle. :roll: And no counterattack.
Resembles ww1 british nibbling attacks but with much less firepower on the attacking side.
And you are playing with material and manpower resources on the german side that were not available. :roll:
A real german attack would be completely different. Would be conducted by several Panzerdivision if it is more than a local counterattack. Tanks would be up front in high numbers .You really need some reading on german tactics because they are better.

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 15 Mar 2020 21:19

Aida1 wrote:
07 Mar 2020 17:32
Tom from Cornwall wrote:
07 Mar 2020 12:06
Aida1,

Have you seen any specific lessons learnt in the OKH documents from the fighting in Sicily or Southern Italy in 1943? I'm wondering whether any lessons were learnt from the somewhat fragmented response of 16 Panzer Division at Salerno in Sep 43, for example. And whether any of the dispositions made or fortifications constructed in Normandy were as a result of tactical analysis of what happened earlier in the Mediterranean.

Regards

Tom
I have seen some of those. There is a publication with Ausbildungshinweise of 5.5.1944 which contains a chapter on fighting the anglo amerikans based on experiences in Italy and also from the pacific. Has a pretty realistic description of what to expect in case of a landing. Quick counterattack to destroy the first landing is emphasised because the combat power of landed units is very high. Also pointed out that the allies can even land in terrain that is supposedly inpassable so every type of terain has to be secured. Given the wellknown controversy about how to use the German armored reserves it is pretty clear not everybody was on the same page where fighting the allies was concerned, particularly concerning the necessity to push them back in the sea quickly..

Rommel repeated those observations when he took command of Army Group B early 1944, & kept them in the table to the end. Drawing on the experience of the 1943 Mediteranean campaigns Rommel argued withe the East Front veterans about how Brit & US firepower created a tactical environment unlike the east. For the most part the Eastern veteran generals would not accept the idea of enemy fire superiority & in June attempted the same methods that worked vs the Red Army.

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

Post by Cult Icon » 22 Apr 2020 13:15

"Victory at Mortain" critiques 30.ID a bit for overallocating artillery support (max., 8 battalions) and ammunition supply for the fight on Hill 314. By allocating so much support, the other fights & counterattacks involved by 30.ID units received less support and became less successful (slugfest). The 3 companies of 2./IR120 were under 700 when they took their positions and took 40% casualties during the siege. Stober's 17.SS vol.1 reveals that KG Fick was actually a battalion sized group based around two companies. A SS prisoner taken earlier on reveals that KG Fick was demoralized due to the earlier trauma that decimated the division (Fighting for St. Lo and the retreat after COBRA) which effected combat morale in the unit and desire to attack.

Weiss' Firemission memoir is very revealing on the tactics employed on both sides- and why although successful, IR120 did use up a lot of ammo. Basically KG Fick used very small attack groups, either half-platoon to company sized of infantry, sometimes supported by a platoon of tanks or assault guns (a company of AG and a company of tanks was allocated to KG Fick)- (in particular advancing upon the main roads) in a great number of bull-headed obvious attacks, day and night and sometimes occurring several times in one hour. Weiss would bracket them with a fire mission either before or after they seized a roadblock or position, and they would quickly retreat and try again.

Weiss, the only forward observer left, would launch a vast number of fire missions from 3 OPs during the fight. He finally settled on an OP that was difficult to hit with anything except mortars. The biggest threat to his position was phosphorous rounds, but the the SS only fired a few of this rare ammunition on him. The SS also deployed infantry, sniper, and mortar/artillery crews to knock out the OP, without much success as he usually managed to get a fire mission on them to scatter them or knock them out. His communication means was primarily from radios.

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

Post by Cult Icon » 22 Apr 2020 13:23

insights from this fight:

1. Specially trained and equipped, anti-FO combat groups were required. The SS anti-FO teams were unsuccessful. They destroyed 1 out 2 FO teams on Hill 314/317.

2. However, the tactic of using very small forces to make attacks- sometimes several times in one hour- and retreat when the first shells drop was successful in forcing FO's to expend too many fire missions.

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