Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

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Aida1
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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#31

Post by Aida1 » 24 Feb 2020, 15:54

Avalancheon wrote:
24 Feb 2020, 14:39



The Germans were never tactically outclassed by the Soviets or the Anglo-Americans. Their equipment was often superior, particularly by 1943 onward. And they always had better trained officers and soldiers, which is why they were able to consistently inflict higher casualties on their enemys than they endured themselves. Being strategically outclassed was largely a function of being heavily outnumbered, fighting on multiple fronts, and having all their secrets compromised by ULTRA.
Mostly true although where training was concerned, things went down the hill when units had to be refitted with insufficiently trained men. And where inflicting more casualties is concerned, that would only be true on the eastern front because of red army stupidity.

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#32

Post by Aida1 » 24 Feb 2020, 16:00

Cult Icon wrote:
24 Feb 2020, 06:59
Biased pro-allied jingoism (such as TA Garner's usual, often repeated and whiz-bang sounding mixture of fact/fiction/rhetoric that is unbacked by combat history), defending German wartime rationalizations of always being beaten by enemy numbers, and moving to argue that the OP is "impossible" is not what I am looking for in this thread and the other two. It is boring and lazy and shouldn't even be posted in this thread.
Having more of everything does have its importance to put it mildly. :lol: You would need a big advantage in quality to still win despite being far outnumbered and the germans did not have that, particularly on the western front. Even on the eastern front the German quality advantage in certain aspects was eroded over time. You are not going to find some miracle solution to win despite of that. You as a civilian are not apt to invent tactical solutions that professional soldiers could not find. :roll:


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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#33

Post by Cult Icon » 24 Feb 2020, 16:21

[] A note of caution. Force ratios on the Western front (particularly in Normandy) were significantly higher than what you would typically see on the Eastern front. For this reason, the concentration of artillery would be appreciably magnified.
that's true, which is why in the OP I emphasis Mediterranean experience. In Russia the two sides were about equal in fire support, with the Reds having a dramatically different configuration of artillery and its ammunition strongly subordinated to the operational level. (firing in short bursts with many tubes)

In general, the artillery force ratio was highest in Normandy and lower in southern France, and then steadily dropped as the Allies moved East and the supply lines lengthened. The fighting in the 3rd/1st/9th US Army sector towards Metz and hurtgen forest in the fall of 44' saw a much lower superiority.

The efficiency of artillery seems to dramatically drop in certain terrain, such as the Bocage, Hurtgen forest, and in Italy.
Avalancheon wrote:
24 Feb 2020, 14:39

The Germans were beginning to adapt to Allied fire superiority during Normandy, but it was too little too late. In order for things to have gone differently, they'd have needed to start thinking about this months earlier.

Attacks in the Soviet style might seem wasteful, but they usually worked. One thing they did require was a heavy artillery bombardment before the main attack. The Germans would need to provide this as well if they are to successfully emulate their practices.
I don't mean by copying the Soviets per say but more in terms of adopting some of their practices into their own system. I also find the German (and Soviet) way of maintaining lots of weak divisions to be very wrong and a waste of potential inf. These can be disbanded for inf.

If this new methods work, then the costs can be reimbursed. Historically what happened to the German army in Russia/Italy/West was that their innovation stagnated and their combined arms team disintegrated. In management speak there was a lack of "catalysts" to point out their failings. Instead they stuck to their ways and attributed all their failures to enemy numbers.

The advantage of Soviet developments/doctrine was that it allowed an army with indifferent training and many internal faults to achieve deep breakthroughs. Basically the situation the German army started to find itself going into 1944. German mobile units could maneuver well- indeed the entire army was trained around facilitating maneuver but were fragile in the breakthrough and weak in firepower due to lack of personnel assembled in the break-in area and shells. This can be seen in the attacks in Normandy and in Dec 44-Jan 45, with the Pz and other forward units taking over the attack, with negligible reserves to immediately rejuvenate burnt out inf units. The fighting would have had a different nature if there were training and replacement brigades attached to each Corps. (a basic oversight).

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#34

Post by Aida1 » 24 Feb 2020, 17:03

Cult Icon wrote:
24 Feb 2020, 16:21



If this new methods work, then the costs can be reimbursed. Historically what happened to the German army in Russia/Italy/West was that their innovation stagnated and their combined arms team disintegrated. In management speak there was a lack of "catalysts" to point out their failings. Instead they stuck to their ways and attributed all their failures to enemy numbers.
A nice sounding phrase but simply not true. You must really be very ignorant if you think that tactics did not adapt. And the combat arms team supposedly disintegrating is something you invented. Where is the source for all this stuff except your own very personal opinion ?
You clearly are in denial about the effect of a strong enemy superiority in numbers not compensated by a strong advantage in quality.

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#35

Post by Aida1 » 24 Feb 2020, 17:07

Cult Icon wrote:
24 Feb 2020, 16:21

The advantage of Soviet developments/doctrine was that it allowed an army with indifferent training and many internal faults to achieve deep breakthroughs. Basically the situation the German army started to find itself going into 1944. German mobile units could maneuver well- indeed the entire army was trained around facilitating maneuver but were fragile in the breakthrough and weak in firepower due to lack of personnel assembled in the break-in area and shells. This can be seen in the attacks in Normandy and in Dec 44-Jan 45, with the Pz and other forward units taking over the attack, with negligible reserves to immediately rejuvenate burnt out inf units. The fighting would have had a different nature if there were training and replacement brigades attached to each Corps. (a basic oversight).
You are in denial here of the material and personnel situation of the german army in 1944. You are playing with stuff that did not exist anymore. :roll:
It is time for you to have a reality check. :roll:

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#36

Post by Michael Kenny » 24 Feb 2020, 17:10

This is what 'firepower' looks like. It is part of the GOODWOOD battlefield.
3117 Bras b.jpg
3117 Bras  .jpg

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#37

Post by Cult Icon » 24 Feb 2020, 17:21

Hopefully lazy grandstanding, biased trolling, and aida1's daisy chain of banned accounts won't take over this thread, I'm not counting on it :lol:

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#38

Post by Cult Icon » 24 Feb 2020, 17:30

Avalancheon wrote:
24 Feb 2020, 14:39

The Germans were never tactically outclassed by the Soviets or the Anglo-Americans. Their equipment was often superior, particularly by 1943 onward. And they always had better trained officers and soldiers, which is why they were able to consistently inflict higher casualties on their enemys than they endured themselves.
Going to disagree with this. Maybe early war, in the mid-late war there was significant erosion in fighting value. On avg. the German forces in Italy/NA were better on avg. than those in the Western front.

According to study "The GI Offensive in Europe" the first group US Army infantry divisions were trained as well as they could have, with limitations chiefly being the lack of combat experience among trainers. It was a comparatively small army, with training duration over 1 yr and repeats on every level. There were differences in quality, with the early formations (US 1.ID being representative of high quality with West point grads and pre-war professional) being the best and 106.ID being representative of a lower quality unit (many US divisions were raided 2-3 times for replacements). But certainly the US army did not suffer from the severe problems of the German army in 43-45.

US Artillery/general advantages/replacement system was so effective that it ironed out potential catastrophes of failed US divisions .

The only german advantage I can think of is the deep experience of their officers and NCO corps which lead to good tactical leadership among elements and the impression of punching above their weight class . However by the 3rd, 4th year etc. this was not so clear. US army PTSD studies (from "On Killing", Grossman) typically put the man in combat as being a psychiatric casualty in less than 1 yr. The biographies of Fritz Bayerlein (Spayd) show an interesting character and how years of combat exhaustion and demoralization can gradually affect a top soldier.

My favorite timeframe for "When the Odds were Even" are the fights between the US and Germans in Dec 44- Jan 45. KW II/III German units vs US 1st/7th Army units- with neither side being markedly better than the other.
Last edited by Cult Icon on 24 Feb 2020, 18:07, edited 2 times in total.

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#39

Post by Aida1 » 24 Feb 2020, 17:32

Michael Kenny wrote:
24 Feb 2020, 17:10
This is what 'firepower' looks like. It is part of the GOODWOOD battlefield.

3117 Bras b.jpg3117 Bras .jpg
And culticon will be hard put to find a solution to being on the receiving end of that. :lol:

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#40

Post by Aida1 » 24 Feb 2020, 17:34

Cult Icon wrote:
24 Feb 2020, 17:21
Hopefully lazy grandstanding, biased trolling, and aida1's daisy chain of banned accounts won't take over this thread, I'm not counting on it :lol:
Take a reality check. You make many unrealistic statements about the german army with zero sources to support it. :roll:

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#41

Post by Richard Anderson » 24 Feb 2020, 17:44

Cult Icon wrote:
24 Feb 2020, 08:27

Image
Nice schematic, but where is it from? What is its context? I know Sherry L. Dowdy was/is a mapmaker for CMH, but that does not look like a CMH publication?
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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#42

Post by Richard Anderson » 24 Feb 2020, 17:55

Cult Icon wrote:
24 Feb 2020, 16:21
In general, the artillery force ratio was highest in Normandy and lower in southern France, and then steadily dropped as the Allies moved East and the supply lines lengthened. The fighting in the 3rd/1st/9th US Army sector towards Metz and hurtgen forest in the fall of 44' saw a much lower superiority.
True to a degree, but it pays to understand exactly what was going on. Yes, the front widened, but also ammunition rationing was imposed, due to the lengthening of the lines of supply (and some very bad miscalculations of the long-haul assets required. The latter also caused many FA units to be grounded, so their transport could be used as extemporaneous truck units. The result was from early September through early December the capabilities of American FA were severely constrained.
The efficiency of artillery seems to dramatically drop in certain terrain, such as the Bocage, Hurtgen forest, and in Italy.
To a degree yes, but in Normandy there was also the problem of inexperience, which led to new troops being unwilling to follow friendly bombardments closely, which was the key ingredient in that synergy. That problem continued to crop up with new divisions as they entered combat through the end of the war.

BTW, are you consciously trying to replace pro-Western Allied jingoism with pro-Soviet jingoism? :D Neither are better than the other, nor better than the inveterate pro-German jingoism that is also typical. :D
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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#43

Post by T. A. Gardner » 24 Feb 2020, 18:03

A great example of the problem the Germans have versus the W. Allies is the use of panzer brigades in October 1944 in the Lorraine.

If you look, for example, at the 106th Panzer Brigade there--led by panzer ace Franz Bake and having some of the most experienced panzer leaders commanding portions of it-- the Germans simply weren't playing at the same level.
The 106th attacked into the 90th US Infantry Division. The 90th, while having some combat experience, was by no means an elite US unit. Bake split his command into two columns of roughly battalion strength each and sent them forward against the 90th with no artillery support, no prior reconnaissance, and only a vague set of objectives. He was, as he had in the East, relying on speed and local combat power to win the day.
As they encountered the 90th's units, these began to get on their communications net and word quickly spread across the front of the German attack. Rather than becoming disorganized and fighting piecemeal, often being surprised, the 90th began to solidify their defense and methodically counterattack the German columns in strength.
At Mairy, the 1st battalion of the 358th, with supporting 3" AT guns from the 607th TD battalion and 105mm howitzers from the regimental cannon company, had been alerted to the German advance and were to use the vernacular, loaded for bear. The Germans rolled up, unaware of what was defending the town. Instead of surprised and confused defenders, the US forces trashed the German panzer column in short order. The Germans tried to flank the town only to run into the 105's and more casualties. While it took the US defenders about 30 minutes to get artillery support once they did the divisional artillery pummeled the now stalled column into wreckage.

It wasn't artillery that made the US successful here, it was telephones and radios. Other parts of the division already engaged, had spread the word and let them know the Germans were coming and gave them even a good idea of what to expect. The US Army's "green book" on the Lorraine barely mentions this battle while from the German perspective it was considered far more important.

Organization and communications make a huge difference, far more than having lots of artillery or firepower.

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#44

Post by Cult Icon » 24 Feb 2020, 18:08

Richard Anderson wrote:
24 Feb 2020, 17:44

Nice schematic, but where is it from? What is its context? I know Sherry L. Dowdy was/is a mapmaker for CMH, but that does not look like a CMH publication?
Closing with the Enemy by Doubler. IIRC the context was on basic doctrine and also how US divisions attacked on a broad front with the main effort in columns.

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#45

Post by Richard Anderson » 24 Feb 2020, 18:18

Cult Icon wrote:
24 Feb 2020, 17:30
Going to disagree with this. Maybe early war, in the mid-late war there was significant erosion in fighting value. On avg. the German forces in Italy/NA were better on avg. than those in the Western front.
War-weariness and the erosion of quality manpower also had an effect generally to degrade the Wehrmacht. Meanwhile, I suspect you have never read the 10. Armee evaluation of the 3. Panzergrenadier Division in Italy. If it was the "average" for Italy then the German forces in Italy were not very good at all.
According to study "The GI Offensive in Europe" the first group US Army infantry divisions were trained as well as they could have, with limitations chiefly being the lack of combat experience among trainers. It was a comparatively small army, with training duration over 1 yr and repeats on every level. There were differences in quality, with the early formations (US 1.ID being representative of high quality with West point grads and pre-war professional) being the best and 106.ID being representative of a lower quality unit (many US divisions were raided 2-3 times for replacements). But certainly the US army did not suffer from the severe problems of the German army in 43-45.
Sadly, Mansoor's work while seminal, is now very dated. It needs to be combined with a good reading of Harold Brown's appendix on the training and deployment of the infantry division in Draftee Division, which correctly identifies many of the other problems, as well as some I touch on in For Purpose of Service Test. The fundamental problem was that American training was focused too much on infantry-artillery cooperation within the infantry division and gave no significant time for infantry-artillery-armor combined arms training. There was also the unrelated, but very problematic issue of personnel turnover during training, which significantly increased the planned one-year organization-training-deployment cycle, extending it to an average of over two years.

Nor were "West Point grads and pre-war professional" a good measure of success...and it is also difficult to assess, since Marshall deliberately scrambled leadership cliques such as that in the expanding Army. Notably, in the creation of the original Armored Force, he placed Infantry officers as commanding generals of divisions formed from the Cavalry and Cavalry officers in command of divisions formed from the Infantry and then carried that on throughout. There is also the not so inconvenient fact that possibly one of the worst division commanders was a "pre-war professional" of the ring-knocker variety, while possibly one of the best division (and later corps) commanders was a pre-war banker. :D

Nor is there any evidence that the 106th ID was a "lower quality unit". Yes, it suffered personnel turmoil, but the personnel it received as replacements before its final training and deployment were very high-quality ATSP men. Oh, and its CG, while not a ring-knocker, was a career pre-war Army professional.
US Artillery/general advantages/replacement system was so effective that it ironed out potential catastrophes of failed US divisions .
You are a follower of the "US Army replacement system good" rather than the "US Army replacement system bad" trope? Neither are precisely correct, probably "US Army replacement system necessary" is the closest to reality trope.
The only german advantage I can think of is the deep experience of their officers and NCO corps which lead to good tactical leadership among elements and the impression of punching above their weight class . However by the 3rd, 4th year etc. this was not so clear. US army PTSD studies (from "On Killing", Grossman) typically put the man in combat as being a psychiatric casualty in less than 1 yr. The biographies of Fritz Bayerlein (Spayd) show an interesting character and how years of combat exhaustion and demoralization can gradually affect a top soldier.
The "deep experience" effect seemed to be from early 1941 to about mid 1943, before attrition began eroding it. However, I am not sure I would put Bayerlein in that category, but then it is so hard to separate the fact from his fictional narratives.
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American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

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