Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

[Aida1]

A great example of the problem the Germans have versus the W. Allies is the use of panzer brigades in October 1944 in the Lorraine.

If you look, for example, at the 106th Panzer Brigade there--led by panzer ace Franz Bake and having some of the most experienced panzer leaders commanding portions of it-- the Germans simply weren't playing at the same level.
The 106th attacked into the 90th US Infantry Division. The 90th, while having some combat experience, was by no means an elite US unit. Bake split his command into two columns of roughly battalion strength each and sent them forward against the 90th with no artillery support, no prior reconnaissance, and only a vague set of objectives. He was, as he had in the East, relying on speed and local combat power to win the day.
As they encountered the 90th's units, these began to get on their communications net and word quickly spread across the front of the German attack. Rather than becoming disorganized and fighting piecemeal, often being surprised, the 90th began to solidify their defense and methodically counterattack the German columns in strength.
At Mairy, the 1st battalion of the 358th, with supporting 3" AT guns from the 607th TD battalion and 105mm howitzers from the regimental cannon company, had been alerted to the German advance and were to use the vernacular, loaded for bear. The Germans rolled up, unaware of what was defending the town. Instead of surprised and confused defenders, the US forces trashed the German panzer column in short order. The Germans tried to flank the town only to run into the 105's and more casualties. While it took the US defenders about 30 minutes to get artillery support once they did the divisional artillery pummeled the now stalled column into wreckage.

It wasn't artillery that made the US successful here, it was telephones and radios. Other parts of the division already engaged, had spread the word and let them know the Germans were coming and gave them even a good idea of what to expect. The US Army's "green book" on the Lorraine barely mentions this battle while from the German perspective it was considered far more important.

Organization and communications make a huge difference, far more than having lots of artillery or firepower.

The panzer brigades were a bad idea , set up against the advice of Guderian . They were far too weak . Too many units were being setup in general instead of keeping up to strength the existing ones.
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... rig106.htm
In a note to Hitler of 13.8.1944, it is mentioned that pz brig 105-108 have a lot of officers without experience on the western front and no experience in commanding armored forces. It is proposed that the pz brigades be incorporated in existing pz div( Die Panzer Brigade 106Friedruch Bruns 1982 pp 29-30) .
Concerning the operation mentioned, the history of the pz br 106 mentions a lack of air recce on the enemy dispositions so that the brigade operated without knowing anything about the enemy and his positions . The own recce by wheeled vehicles was too incomplete( Die Panzer Brigade 106 Friedruch Bruns 1982 p 79).

[Avalancheon]

So how many more casualties did the Allies endure in Normandy compared to the Germans?
And how is this reflected in German v Allied casualties in 1944-45?

"On a man for man basis German ground soldiers consistently inflicted casualties at about a 50 percent higher rate than they incurred from the opposing British and American troops under all circumstances. This was true when they were attacking and when they were defending, when they had a local numerical superiority and when, as was usually the case, they were outnumbered, when they had air superiority and when they did not, when they won and when they lost." -Trevor N. Dupuy.

Indeed it was. The German Horse Gas Masks were a generation in advance of the Allied horse gas masks.

You may have said this in jest, but you are still completely wrong. The lack of an adequate gas mask for horses is one of the reasons why the Germans never used chemical warfare at Normandy. It would have affected their mobility by incapacitating their horses.

But back to topic. Some examples of superior equipment would include the Tiger and Panther tank, the PAK 40 anti-tank gun, the FLAK 36 anti-aircraft gun, the MG 42 machine gun, the STG 44 assault rifle, the Panzerfaust, the Teller mine, the Nebelwurfer rockets, etc. Then there was the Wunderwaffe which had a lesser impact, such as the Me 262 fighter jet, the V1 missile, the V2 rocket, the Type 21 U-boat, etc.

Being strategically outclassed was largely a function of.................

................. being stupid enough to think you could start a war the UK, USA & Soviet Union and win?

Yep, thats part of it.

Their infantry attacks were wasteful and that was not needed. An extremely heavy artillery bombardment is not automaticaly needed either.

Thats because they were using skirmishing lines, a technique that most armys had abandoned by WW1. The Red Army did not aspire to train their infantry for anything more complicated. It is not surprising that they lost so many men when attacking enemy lines.

The tactics may have been subpar, but the overall strategy was sound.

Mostly true although where training was concerned, things went down the hill when units had to be refitted with insufficiently trained men. And where inflicting more casualties is concerned, that would only be true on the eastern front because of red army stupidity.

It was true of the Western front as well, though to a lesser degree. On a man per man basis, the British and Americans were not the equal of the Germans.

[The Ibis]

A great example of the problem the Germans have versus the W. Allies is the use of panzer brigades in October 1944 in the Lorraine.

If you look, for example, at the 106th Panzer Brigade there--led by panzer ace Franz Bake and having some of the most experienced panzer leaders commanding portions of it-- the Germans simply weren't playing at the same level.
The 106th attacked into the 90th US Infantry Division. The 90th, while having some combat experience, was by no means an elite US unit. Bake split his command into two columns of roughly battalion strength each and sent them forward against the 90th with no artillery support, no prior reconnaissance, and only a vague set of objectives. He was, as he had in the East, relying on speed and local combat power to win the day.
As they encountered the 90th's units, these began to get on their communications net and word quickly spread across the front of the German attack. Rather than becoming disorganized and fighting piecemeal, often being surprised, the 90th began to solidify their defense and methodically counterattack the German columns in strength.
At Mairy, the 1st battalion of the 358th, with supporting 3" AT guns from the 607th TD battalion and 105mm howitzers from the regimental cannon company, had been alerted to the German advance and were to use the vernacular, loaded for bear. The Germans rolled up, unaware of what was defending the town. Instead of surprised and confused defenders, the US forces trashed the German panzer column in short order. The Germans tried to flank the town only to run into the 105's and more casualties. While it took the US defenders about 30 minutes to get artillery support once they did the divisional artillery pummeled the now stalled column into wreckage.

It wasn't artillery that made the US successful here, it was telephones and radios. Other parts of the division already engaged, had spread the word and let them know the Germans were coming and gave them even a good idea of what to expect. The US Army's "green book" on the Lorraine barely mentions this battle while from the German perspective it was considered far more important.

Organization and communications make a huge difference, far more than having lots of artillery or firepower.

Hi Terry. To quibble, the German attack at Mairy was in September 1944. While the 90th was not elite, it was at that time led by one of the better US division commanders, Raymond McLain. The 90th had a bad reputation to before McLain took over--a couple of COs were fired during the Normandy Campaign. Under McLain's leadership, and then under Van Fleet's, the division was probably one of the better ones in terms of consistent performance (both McLain and then Van Fleet did well enough to be promoted to corps command). Or at least that's what I recall from the last time I studied the matter.

[Cult Icon]

A great example of the problem the Germans have versus the W. Allies is the use of panzer brigades in October 1944 in the Lorraine.

I've seen you make this bogus rhetoric so, so many times. It was a singular event, not the average engagement. One could easily talk of the failure of 12.AD in Jan 1945 and troubles encountered by 7.AD at Overloon. Neither would be representative as the performance of US AD as a hole. Study the use of depleted 11.Pz vs. 4.AD right AFTER the failure of the Pz Brigades by 5.PzA and it's an entirely different tactical scenario.

You need to acquaint yourself the rest of Pz operations on the Western Front.

[Cult Icon]

True to a degree, but it pays to understand exactly what was going on. Yes, the front widened, but also ammunition rationing was imposed, due to the lengthening of the lines of supply (and some very bad miscalculations of the long-haul assets required. The latter also caused many FA units to be grounded, so their transport could be used as extemporaneous truck units. The result was from early September through early December the capabilities of American FA were severely constrained.

To a degree yes, but in Normandy there was also the problem of inexperience, which led to new troops being unwilling to follow friendly bombardments closely, which was the key ingredient in that synergy. That problem continued to crop up with new divisions as they entered combat through the end of the war.

BTW, are you consciously trying to replace pro-Western Allied jingoism with pro-Soviet jingoism? Neither are better than the other, nor better than the inveterate pro-German jingoism that is also typical.

Yes, I am aware of that- it seems only natural that one would prefer to spend shells than blood, and the Congress only allowed a limited group divisions (with none in 44-45). The Soviet method was the reverse- sequence of short duration fires that turned the front into the surface of the moon, spend blood and armored support, and inch forward with waves and waves and multiple echelons of forces following up.

+Not really, I see no room for improvements besides adopting some of the "poor man's" methods of the Soviets- of which seemed to have spread to the militaries of the communists post war. I would be interested if you have any ideas regarding this:

The extreme suppressive firepower of the Allies- General Westphal's "10 to 1"- that encompassed the fighting at Tunisia, Sicily, and Salerno prove of great concern to the OKW as it bodes ill for any attack in the future.

They recognize that the current tactical doctrine is under threat from enemy developments as maneuver/assault cohesion was choked off by highly reactive firepower delivery systems. Sometime after AVALANCHE they set up a training and intelligence group to revamp tactical doctrine, mainly composed of injured and uninjured combat-experienced German staff and field officers with deep service in the mediterranean theatre. These individuals pool their knowledge and experience to create a series of organizational improvements and additional training programs among the entire ground force. It is hoped that these tactical improvements gradually proliferate among the entire ground force in time for the "Second Front" and also be of use to German units fighting against the RKKA.

What would the new countermeasures against Allied suppressive firepower entail and what possible equipment would be needed?

What skills would the new training courses focus on?

How would German organization, communication systems, and assault tactics among their motorized and unmotorized formations change?

How would this innovation change the fighting in Italy and France?

[Michael Kenny]

DP

[Michael Kenny]

the FLAK 36 anti-aircraft gun.......

Hmm..........in what way was the 8.8cm AA gun superior to the UK 3.7 inch of the US 90mm?
And can I have the casualty figures for Normandy that show the German losses were lower than the Allies. It seems you forgot to include this vital 'proof'.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Inflatable decoys require:
a) rubber;
b) compressors;
c) fuel for the compressors;
d) vehicles to move a-c and the necessary personnel around.

Horse-drawn wagons aren't going to cut it, as demonstrated by the fate of Army Group D.

There were trucks in all divisions.

Not remotely enough. Many had a few utility vehicles for the communications company, pioneers, staff cars for the HQ. In many cases these were French leftovers, after France had been stripped in 1941, in 1942, again in 1943, and yet again in early 1944. There was no pool of underused vehicles on standby.

[Avalancheon]

Hmm..........in what way was the 8.8cm AA gun superior to the UK 3.7 inch of the US 90mm?

It was not so much due to technical superiority as it was to the manner in which the gun was used. The Germans were much more willing to use their anti-aircraft guns against ground targets than the British or Americans were.

And can I have the casualty figures for Normandy that show the German losses were lower than the Allies. It seems you forgot to include this vital 'proof'.

Dupuys data sets were drawn mainly from the Italian theater, not from France. However, there were a few battles in France where the Germans inflicted higher losses than they sustained.

[Michael Kenny]

It was not so much due to technical superiority as it was to the manner in which the gun was used. The Germans were much more willing to use their anti-aircraft guns against ground targets than the British or Americans were.

Would that be a roundabout way of admitting the 8.8cm was in no way 'technical superior' to the contemporary US, Soviet and UK AA guns?

there were a few battles in France where the Germans inflicted higher losses than they sustained.

I am pretty sure you have access to the overall total of German and Allied casualties for 'Normandy' I know there are quibbles about dates etc. but do they show German losses were less than Allied losses?

[Richard Anderson]

Nice schematic, but where is it from? What is its context? I know Sherry L. Dowdy was/is a mapmaker for CMH, but that does not look like a CMH publication?

Closing with the Enemy by Doubler. IIRC the context was on basic doctrine and also how US divisions attacked on a broad front with the main effort in columns.

Okay, thank you. The problem with that is that I don't think Doubler ever systematically looked at how any divisions, regardless of nationality, actually attacked in World War II. Problematically, that schematic is not from an Army FM, nor did Army FM's in either the 100-series or the 7-series provide or define any such schematic. So no, there was no such Army "basic doctrine" to that effect. Rather, it was the result of the frontages occupied, the missions assigned to divisions by higher command, and experience that defined it.

For example, after five years of experience, in the Ardennes the German LXVI AK assigned the mission of breaking through the 106th Division to the 18. VGD. General Lucht and Generalmajor Hoffmann-Schonborn realized the screen of the Schnee Eifel allowed them to concentrate the division with one regiment on the far left and two to the far right, connected by just the divisional FEB...but that was terrain and enemy dispositions that allowed them to do so. Further south, the 26. VGD was arrayed more conventionally, with GR 77. holding an extended outpost line on the line of departure, with GR 77. massed behind it on the far right and FR 39. on the far left. Again, it was terrain and the extended American dispositions that allowed then to do so...plus the fact that the Germans had massed three divisions against one.

Essentially, ALL divisions attacked on the frontage higher command assigned them, which was a function of troops and terrain. That typically meant that one regiment was assigned the main effort and if lucky got a narrow front and the lions share of supporting units. It was rare though that the terrain and enemy dispositions was cooperative enough for the extremes undertaken by Lucht and Hoffman-Schonborn...more usual was the solution used by 26. VGD, which tended to have more indifferent results.

The real problem American infantry divisions (and I believe to an extent British) was not at the grand tactical level of how divisions were deployed. That was regulated by necessity (and often by a misreading of terrain and inflexible orders from higher command, as in the Hürtgenwald). It was more in how the regiments and battalions were fought, which doctrinally was based on what was at best an updated version of Great War tactics. I well remember the description of the counterattack of the 2d Battalion, 432d Infantry to relieve the the artillery groupment composed of the 589th and 592d (astride the Auw-Bleialf road) in support of the 422d Infantry on 16 December by one of the officers there with the battalion CO. The battalion had been hastily trucked forward from Born, Colonel Puett stood in the center of the road with his company commanders, ordered one company in line to the right, one to the left, and one to the rear, declared himself the line of departure, and waited for the companies to deploy before giving the order to advance. Such linear and schematic tactics were common, especially in new units, because it was the "school solution", but it rapidly broke down in the face of German automatic firepower superiority at the tactical level.

That seems to be what Doubler and others have focused upon, but they tend to miss what the tactical solutions to counter them were, which were very different from the schematics. For example, experienced units tended to mass forward their attached mobile automatic firepower, the MGMC M16, M17, and M17A1 and their heavier supporting firepower (by dismounting the .50 caliber AA M2 MG from trucks and organizing ad hoc platoons augmenting the .30 caliber M1917A1 in the battalion) and as infantry-tank coordination was learned made better use of armor. They also eliminated the doctrinal linear attack formation and developed more "German-like" column formations to find and exploit weak points in the enemy defense.

Of course though, the discussion of how armored divisions were employed is slightly different.

[Richard Anderson]

"On a man for man basis German ground soldiers consistently inflicted casualties at about a 50 percent higher rate than they incurred from the opposing British and American troops under all circumstances. This was true when they were attacking and when they were defending, when they had a local numerical superiority and when, as was usually the case, they were outnumbered, when they had air superiority and when they did not, when they won and when they lost." -Trevor N. Dupuy.

Yep. Trevor also recognized the reductio ad absurdam that many people created from that statement...he knew full well how and why despite the truth of his statement, the Germans still lost the war.

You may have said this in jest, but you are still completely wrong. The lack of an adequate gas mask for horses is one of the reasons why the Germans never used chemical warfare at Normandy. It would have affected their mobility by incapacitating their horses.

The Germans didn't use gas because it would have incapacitated their horses? Who knew?

But back to topic. Some examples of superior equipment would include the Tiger and Panther tank, the PAK 40 anti-tank gun, the FLAK 36 anti-aircraft gun, the MG 42 machine gun, the STG 44 assault rifle, the Panzerfaust, the Teller mine, the Nebelwurfer rockets, etc. Then there was the Wunderwaffe which had a lesser impact, such as the Me 262 fighter jet, the V1 missile, the V2 rocket, the Type 21 U-boat, etc.

The functional weapons in that list aided and abetted German tactics, but they did not solve the operational and strategic dilemmas faced by the Wehrmacht.

And it might be better said that the "Wunderwaffe" only had the effect of modifying some Allied tactics and operations.

Yep, thats part of it.

Yep, it's the elephant in the room in any discussion of tactical or weapons superiority.

Thats because they were using skirmishing lines, a technique that most armys had abandoned by WW1. The Red Army did not aspire to train their infantry for anything more complicated. It is not surprising that they lost so many men when attacking enemy lines.

The tactics may have been subpar, but the overall strategy was sound.

Yep, the Soviets faced reality and utilized tactics that worked sufficiently well for them...the enemy of the perfect and all that after all.

It was true of the Western front as well, though to a lesser degree. On a man per man basis, the British and Americans were not the equal of the Germans.

It's too bad that for the winning of wars the individual capability of one army versus another "on a man per man basis" is not always the path to victory.

[Richard Anderson]

Yes, I am aware of that- it seems only natural that one would prefer to spend shells than blood, and the Congress only allowed a limited group divisions (with none in 44-45). The Soviet method was the reverse- sequence of short duration fires that turned the front into the surface of the moon, spend blood and armored support, and inch forward with waves and waves and multiple echelons of forces following up.

You think that the U.S. Congress limited the size of the Army in World War II? Seriously? That is such a fundamental misreading of reality that I am unsure how to proceed in this discussion?

The size of the U.S. Army in World War II had exactly zero to do with a preference "to spend shells than blood".

+Not really, I see no room for improvements besides adopting some of the "poor man's" methods of the Soviets- of which seemed to have spread to the militaries of the communists post war. I would be interested if you have any ideas regarding this:

I am unsure what the "poor man's" methods you refer to? The ability to mass greater strength than your enemy is not a "poor man's" method.

The extreme suppressive firepower of the Allies- General Westphal's "10 to 1"- that encompassed the fighting at Tunisia, Sicily, and Salerno prove of great concern to the OKW as it bodes ill for any attack in the future.

They recognize that the current tactical doctrine is under threat from enemy developments as maneuver/assault cohesion was choked off by highly reactive firepower delivery systems. Sometime after AVALANCHE they set up a training and intelligence group to revamp tactical doctrine, mainly composed of injured and uninjured combat-experienced German staff and field officers with deep service in the mediterranean theatre. These individuals pool their knowledge and experience to create a series of organizational improvements and additional training programs among the entire ground force. It is hoped that these tactical improvements gradually proliferate among the entire ground force in time for the "Second Front" and also be of use to German units fighting against the RKKA.

What would the new countermeasures against Allied suppressive firepower entail and what possible equipment would be needed?

What skills would the new training courses focus on?

How would German organization, communication systems, and assault tactics among their motorized and unmotorized formations change?

How would this innovation change the fighting in Italy and France?

The problem is, the Germans did just that. Or do you believe the Germans did not utilize convalescents and limited duty personnel within the Ersatzheer to do just that? The fact that they were unable to devise a Wehrmacht-wide solution to the crushing Allied superiority in the air, sea, and land simply indicates that there was no such solution, not that they didn't try to find one.

[Cult Icon]

Give the OP some time, I am interested in what you have to say on that.

[Richard Anderson]

It was not so much due to technical superiority as it was to the manner in which the gun was used. The Germans were much more willing to use their anti-aircraft guns against ground targets than the British or Americans were.

Yes, and it seemed to really work out well for them in the West at least two or maybe three times...at Halfaya Pass during BREVITY and during BATTLEAXE. The example of CRUSADER is less well-defined and I cannot think of a really solid example from the rest of the campaigns in North Africa, in Sicily or Italy, or in Northwest Europe. The hey-day of the 88 as an actual rather than a mythical all-purpose tank killer was actually pretty short and was continuously resisted by the Luftwaffe.

Dupuys data sets were drawn mainly from the Italian theater, not from France. However, there were a few battles in France where the Germans inflicted higher losses than they sustained.

"Dupuy's data sets" were almost entirely tactical. Yes, in France and in the Ardennes there were a few battles where the Germans inflicted higher losses than they sustained...on average their advantage had degraded, but they were still superior at the tactical level. The problem was their operational capability had degraded much more and their strategic incapability had not changed one iota.