Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

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Michael Kenny
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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#91

Post by Michael Kenny » 26 Feb 2020, 07:29

Cult Icon wrote:
26 Feb 2020, 07:20

There are sufficient trucks in German divisions to haul decoys.....
Absurd claim.

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#92

Post by daveshoup2MD » 26 Feb 2020, 07:35

Richard Anderson wrote:
24 Feb 2020, 21:16
The problem with absolutes is that real life is rarely absolute. Let me re-write this so it's accurate to reality:

The Germans were rarely tactically outclassed by the Soviets or the Anglo-Americans. Some of their equipment was sometimes superior, particularly by 1943 onward, but they never were able to produce or sustain enough of it, so were also forced to rely on obsolescent makeshifts until the end of the war. And they frequently had better trained officers and soldiers, and a doctrine based upon obtaining direct-fire superiority that was carefully matched to their weapons of choicewhich is why they were able to on average inflict higher casualties on their enemys [sic] than they endured themselves. However, because they never had sufficient manpower, eventually they were forced to degrade the training of officers and soldiers, which began to erode their edge after 1943

There. That's closer to reality now.
The fact that other than during CITADEL and WATCH ON THE RHINE, the Germans were consistently on the defensive at the operational and strategic level, and the Americans, British, Soviets, French, Canadians, Poles, Indians, Italians, New Zealanders, Brazilians, South Africans, etc. were on the offensive - and into good defensive country (Alps, bocage, forest/river/swamp, etc.) presumably had something to do with it, as well. ;)


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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#93

Post by daveshoup2MD » 26 Feb 2020, 07:38

Aida1 wrote:
24 Feb 2020, 18:20

The panzer brigades were a bad idea , set up against the advice of Guderian . They were far too weak . Too many units were being setup in general instead of keeping up to strength the existing ones.
http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/Gli ... rig106.htm
In a note to Hitler of 13.8.1944, it is mentioned that pz brig 105-108 have a lot of officers without experience on the western front and no experience in commanding armored forces. It is proposed that the pz brigades be incorporated in existing pz div( Die Panzer Brigade 106Friedruch Bruns 1982 pp 29-30) .
Concerning the operation mentioned, the history of the pz br 106 mentions a lack of air recce on the enemy dispositions so that the brigade operated without knowing anything about the enemy and his positions . The own recce by wheeled vehicles was too incomplete( Die Panzer Brigade 106 Friedruch Bruns 1982 p 79).
It's almost like the Germans had a bad organization for refitting units that had seen combat and even worse doctrine for getting replacements into the field.

Makes the travails of the Americans and British look minor in comparison, doesn't it?

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#94

Post by daveshoup2MD » 26 Feb 2020, 07:40

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
24 Feb 2020, 19:21
Cult Icon wrote:
24 Feb 2020, 15:43
daveshoup2MD wrote:
24 Feb 2020, 09:29

Inflatable decoys require:
a) rubber;
b) compressors;
c) fuel for the compressors;
d) vehicles to move a-c and the necessary personnel around.

Horse-drawn wagons aren't going to cut it, as demonstrated by the fate of Army Group D.
There were trucks in all divisions.
Not remotely enough. Many had a few utility vehicles for the communications company, pioneers, staff cars for the HQ. In many cases these were French leftovers, after France had been stripped in 1941, in 1942, again in 1943, and yet again in early 1944. There was no pool of underused vehicles on standby.
As any reality-based comparison of the correlation of forces makes clear.

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#95

Post by Cult Icon » 26 Feb 2020, 07:45

how many trucks in a German division? How many decoys? Are the decoys, phony supply dumps, etc. just being transported or is the truck permanently attached to it?

any more posts left dave?

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#96

Post by daveshoup2MD » 26 Feb 2020, 07:49

Cult Icon wrote:
26 Feb 2020, 07:20
The spirit of this thread is examining tactics and operational potentials, not jingoism.

There are sufficient trucks in German divisions to haul decoys.....
And when these "sufficient" trucks are hauling decoys, in daylight in theaters where the Allies had air superiority, burning gas and POL the Germans were always short of, what "aren't" they hauling?

Artillery pieces? Ammunition? Food Consumables? Personnel?

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#97

Post by daveshoup2MD » 26 Feb 2020, 07:51

Cult Icon wrote:
26 Feb 2020, 07:21
looks like the thread is ruined..!
Reality has that effect, doesn't it?

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#98

Post by Cult Icon » 26 Feb 2020, 07:53

daveshoup2MD wrote:
26 Feb 2020, 07:51
Reality has that effect, doesn't it?
No, off-topic jingoism does :lol:
Last edited by Cult Icon on 26 Feb 2020, 07:56, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#99

Post by Cult Icon » 26 Feb 2020, 07:54

Do you realize that German Pz and PzG divisions are motorized and they were the primary units that performed attacks in 43-45?

Well, it depends, how many do you want inf divisions to haul?

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#100

Post by daveshoup2MD » 26 Feb 2020, 08:07

Cult Icon wrote:
26 Feb 2020, 07:54
Do you realize that German Pz and PzG divisions are motorized and they were the primary units that performed attacks in 43-45?

Well, it depends, how many do you want inf divisions to haul?
Not specified in the OP, was that? Now the maskirovka is to be conducted by the same truck companies that are moving the only mobile forces - and their supplies - the Germans have around the operational area?

Yes, that will work ...

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#101

Post by daveshoup2MD » 26 Feb 2020, 08:08

Cult Icon wrote:
26 Feb 2020, 07:53
daveshoup2MD wrote:
26 Feb 2020, 07:51
Reality has that effect, doesn't it?
No, off-topic jingoism does :lol:
What is your definition of jingoism?

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#102

Post by Cult Icon » 26 Feb 2020, 08:10

Brilliant!!! You want them to use all of the trucks? :D

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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#103

Post by Richard Anderson » 26 Feb 2020, 08:18

Cult Icon wrote:
26 Feb 2020, 05:52
Your comment on POWs in the preceding page.
Sorry, but that still makes no sense. How does "The only clear way to pay attention to POW numbers throughout the war from small unit actions to larger actions." relate to what I said on page 5? Which was, "What do "prisoners" in the West have to do with the German replacement system? "Routine combat...bloated up the numbers"? What is that supposed to even mean? You don't think there were encirclements in the West or operational art?"

The POW data patterns and the nature of the last campaigns was different.
Okay, great, a declarative statement finally. So what "data patterns" have you discerned in your research? And how do you find the "nature" of the last campaigns different?
I disagree with your prior statement.
Great. Why?
You seem to interpret it as a slight against the Allies.
Nope, I interpret it as a slight against reality, like your assertions regarding the functioning of the Ersatzheer and the replacement system.
I do think you kind of have a pro-allied bias and I suspect that you find the OP offensive- like all the Moscow 41' what-ifs- despite not directly saying so.
Nope, no "pro-allied bias", just a pro-reality bias. I don't find anything offensive in the "OP", other than it seems remarkably marshmallowy. Anyway, the Germans did just that, but in more concrete ways, such as Sonderstab Oehmichen.
Leaving is appropriate, I don't think I can keep up with all your articles on side issues. Take this as you will.

And no, strangely enough I'm discussing things- largely on topic- like a normal poster on a What-If thread.
Yep, you are discussing things like a normal what-if poster...that may be the problem...there seems to be a distinct pattern of what-if posters getting on their high hat when their premises are questioned or when errors in their assumptions are pointed out.
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American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#104

Post by Richard Anderson » 26 Feb 2020, 08:24

Cult Icon wrote:
26 Feb 2020, 07:54
Do you realize that German Pz and PzG divisions are motorized and they were the primary units that performed attacks in 43-45?
That would astonish the 39., 57., 106., 161., 255., 282., 320., and 332. ID and the 3. and 5. FJD, 12., 26., 272., 352., and 560. VGD, to name but a few.
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Re: Tactical innovation, adapting to Allied suppressive firepower

#105

Post by Cult Icon » 26 Feb 2020, 08:41

Anderson, this is a "What if" thread, not a history thread. It's meant to be speculative- the German OKW never did such a thing as to examine the problems with allied fire supremacy and orchestrate changes to doctrine. My OP shows that I aimed to go after tactical and operational issues & hear what interested persons had to say on the military dilemma.

You went after a lot of tangents on differences we have on various issues (the 106th Infantry,, etc. and such as this recent on, POW data patterns)- not really necessary and valid to the OP, which you never bothered to address. You also are attributing views that I never held or stated by pulling out comments and expanding on "What you think I mean" and then going forward with "this is why you are wrong". That's strawman stuff and off topic. I accept differences of opinion and won't correct every nonfactual statement I see. There are so many in this thread now from posters other than me. :lol: You don't have to pull the trigger on everything and challenge all views that you don't agree with. Maybe even your exalted self is ignorant of some things. I don't get the sense that you are much interested in the Red Army and the East, for example.

You don't have to post if you don't find the premise valid and that's simple. I think it's a valid one- that the Germans failed to figure out how to break-through due to Soviet/allied developments and could have done better, after studying so many problems with German attacks in 43-45. Do you believe that they did the best they could have?

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