USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

Post by Terry Duncan » 06 Apr 2020 11:40

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
05 Apr 2020 09:58
This thread is inspired by my recent reading of Philips Payson O'Brien's How the War was Won, which argues that the air and sea battle - predominantly between Axis and Wallies - dominated WW2. The book seeks to reverse the somewhat recent view that the Eastern Front was the protagonist of WW2 with everything else being supporting players (even if providing decisive support).

The book is analytically rigorous, well-researched, well-written, and wrong. O'Brien documents that the USA devoted ~80% of its production to the air/sea war and that it forced Germany to devote >50% of its production to that war as well. From these well-established facts, he concludes that the air/sea war predominated over the Eastern Front's land war.

There's a huge blind spot to this argument: industrial production isn't the same as national resources, let alone of national destiny. This should be obvious to any citizen of a post-industrial, service-based economy. In '43-'44, Germany had nearly as many men providing military services (~9.5mil) as it had working in all industry (~10-11mil). Apportioning accumulated dead/disabled/captured to military services would make the ledger roughly even by '43 at the latest.

Most military services went into land warfare. Germany subjectively valued these military services at a higher "price" (i.e. opportunity cost) than the "production cost" of removing these men from factories and putting them in the field. Military analysis can't avail itself of market price signals for decisive guidance but it's fair to say that Germany was better served having Army Group South in Ukraine than having another million industrial workers.

-------------------------------------------

O'Brien's book is a real pleasure and the extended preface is just acknowledgement that it motivated this "What If":

What if the U.S. had devoted, say, twice as many resources - 40% instead of 20% - to building up its army for large-scale invasion of Europe ASAP?

Before proceeding, I must acknowledge the tension between this What If and my last, which argued that the Wallies expected the SU to collapse, that they were unwilling in '41/'42 to plan to confront German land forces before destroying Germany's economy via bombing, and that such a bombing campaign would not have worked had the Germans prevailed on the Eastern Front during '42. viewtopic.php?f=11&t=247189

Caveat emptor - this thread sets aside U.S. appetite for land war and queries what should have been done to end the war most quickly, with the minimum of human suffering (even if American suffering/death might have increased).

---------------------------------------------------

The ATL proposal/sketch:
  • From May-November 1940, when America accelerated preparation for a European war, American military planning was absolutely focused on invasion of Europe at the earliest possible date, with intent to engage and defeat the German army in Europe without assuming destruction of German economic potential as a precondition of such engagement.
  • Military spending and doctrine favors control of sea communications, securing air superiority, and cumulative army combat power over strategic bombing and peripheral operations.
  • As a result of these preparations, America - with scant and reluctant support from the British Empire - is able to land in France in May 1943 and to field 60 divisions on the continent by July '43.
  • Due to greater initial army power the Wallies land in the Pas de Calais and take useful ports during the Summer or early Fall of 1943.
  • Due to greater diversions by the Germans from the Ostheer to France, all the SU's 1943 offensives succeed, crushing Army Groups North, Center, and South and reaching Poland/Romania by Fall '43.
  • With far greater American truck production, logistics from the Channel are better and the Americans are able to cross the Rhine during winter '43, around the time the SU reaches the Oder.
  • Germany collapses by April '44 at the latest. The faster Red Army advance has saved hundreds of thousands of Hungarian Jews and untold thousands of other Jews and Europeans. Hundreds of thousands of Germans are captured by Wallied armies instead of killed as well.
----------------------------------------------

Unlike my other ATL's, I'll leave this one as more of a sketch and invitation to discussion than a strong and specific thesis. I'm not as well-read on the U.S. war economy as on the German and invite other thoughts.

At base, it seems to me that the American/British war effort was, from the start, never calculated to confront Germany on land unless and until its economy had been ruined. To that end, we see the Victory Program of 1941 mandating 2-1 numerical superiority for the attacker on land, but not applying such a disadvantage to an aerial attacker - at least AFAICS. In fact, a conventional WW2 bombing campaign needed far more than 2-1 material superiority to succeed while an attacker on land would have prevailed with less than 2-1 total superiority (as the attacker can marshal local/tactical superiority far in excess of his global superiority). This seems so clear to me, in fact, that I suspect the Victory Program of 1941 was written with an ear to the political constraint that a massive land war may not have been politically feasible. And I suspect that all subsequent interpretations/revisions of Wallied grand strategy were informed by similar background beliefs/fears.

For those reasons, it seems that a Wallied strategy to beat Germany ASAP should have focused on decisive land engagement.
The biggest single issue facing both the US and British forces in both wars was that the pre-war military was a very small organisation, and when it expanded they did not have the experienced staff needed. That would require time and combat. An army raised by the US in 1942 or 43 was going to lose badly if it faced German forces with a couple of campaigns behind them, so throwing a large number of troops across the Channel is a suicide mission even if the supply issues can be improvised enough to get them onto a beach. Testing the generals, staff officers, and even the troops somewhere less critical makes a lot of sense.

The Allied strategy did focus on a decisive land engagement, but did so with the caveat that one should only be sought when winning was almost the only possible outcome. You should only seek a decisive battle when you have maximised your chances of winning. If that means destroying the enemy infrastructure and population as part of gaining that advantage, so be it, not doing so means you are throwing away your mens lives pointlessly. Asking your troops to die in a 50/50 gamble is bad for morale, and after a few such operations they tend to resent the idea and think about surrendering or even mutiny.

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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

Post by OpanaPointer » 06 Apr 2020 12:12

Wargaming follows a set of rules agreed on by the players. What ifs are the soul of wargames, "what if the USN carriers discover the NKB two days out from Pearl?"

It would be lovely if we could have a similar set of rules for what-iffing here.
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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 06 Apr 2020 14:09

There was a recent brief discussion of this between a few of the staff. It was pointed out the existing rules are under read, so whats the point in adding more. ...

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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

Post by OpanaPointer » 06 Apr 2020 14:17

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
06 Apr 2020 14:09
There was a recent brief discussion of this between a few of the staff. It was pointed out the existing rules are under read, so whats the point in adding more. ...
Anything is better than nothing. Can we be free to call people on not following the extant rules?
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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 06 Apr 2020 14:43

Sure. Send a msg to the moderators on the specifics of your complaint. Click on the exclamation icon in the tool bar at the top of the post you wish to report. Its left of the quote icon. Or you can msg the staff directly, tho thats a little less desirable.

Calling in the thread is less desired as it leads to clutter, thread drift, & flame war offenses.

And last, please don't report threads for trivial micro offenses. Investigating those sucks away the moderators time from other tasks. They spend a fair amount of time deleting spam & advertising posts

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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

Post by T. A. Gardner » 06 Apr 2020 17:25

Well, it is certainly possible for the US Army to be much larger than it was. The quickest way to achieve that is simply draft more men to raise the extra divisions then not give the various Allied nations the equipment to create them. After all, about two-thirds of British / Commonwealth AFV were US manufactured by 1944. The Soviets got enough to raise several armies worth of divisions of various sorts. The French eventually got enough equipment to form twelve divisions.

If all that Lend-Lease gear is held in the US instead, the Army could have raised at least 20 to 40 additional divisions (I'm sure somebody's crunched those numbers).

Of course, that would put a crimp on US civilian manpower for industry so...

None of that requires cutting back on anything else, but rather just investing more men into Army units rather than using foreign manpower.

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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

Post by OpanaPointer » 06 Apr 2020 17:47

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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

Post by OpanaPointer » 06 Apr 2020 17:48

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
06 Apr 2020 14:43
Sure. Send a msg to the moderators on the specifics of your complaint. Click on the exclamation icon in the tool bar at the top of the post you wish to report. Its left of the quote icon. Or you can msg the staff directly, tho thats a little less desirable.

Calling in the thread is less desired as it leads to clutter, thread drift, & flame war offenses.

And last, please don't report threads for trivial micro offenses. Investigating those sucks away the moderators time from other tasks. They spend a fair amount of time deleting spam & advertising posts
Copy that. :thumbsup:
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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

Post by Richard Anderson » 06 Apr 2020 18:20

Mobilization of the U.S. Army in World War II

Prewar Mobilization and Planning, 1 July 1940-7 December 1941

As of 1 July 1940 the United States Regular Army consisted of 13,797 officers and an enlisted strength totaling 243,095 (authorized enlisted strength had been expanded from 227,000 to 280,000 on 13 June and to 375,000 on 26 June), including the Army Air Corps. The strength of the National Guard officer corps was about 21,074 and enlisted strength was 226,837. There were also approximately 33,000 Reserve officers and 104,228 ROTC (Reserve Officers’ Training Camps) and CMTC (Citizens’ Military Training Camps) graduates in the Organized Reserve Corps. Finally, the CCC (Civilian Conservation Corps), established by President Roosevelt as part of the “New Deal,” had provided a taste of military discipline, barracks and field life to approximately 250,000 young men.

Active units included the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Cavalry Divisions, 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th Infantry Divisions (the 4th had just been activated in June 1940, the 7th and 8th were just being activated), the Philippine Division, the Hawaiian Division (later forming the 24th and 25th Divisions, and the 7th Cavalry Brigade (Mechanized – which on 15 July was redesignated the 1st Armored Division). There were 39 infantry regiments active, including two Philippine Scouts, five armored regiments, and 14 cavalry regiments, including one Philippine Scouts. There were also nominally 37 field artillery “regiments,” including four Philippine Scouts, but many only had a single battalion active. Finally, there were also 38 coast artillery regiments, including two Philippine Scouts. Twenty-three of these were fixed harbor defense regiments of variable size, the others were 14 antiaircraft (only two of which were designated “mobile” – the others were “semi-mobile”) and one railway gun regiment.

It is a measure of the weakness of the Army that these combat regiments alone at full strength would have numbered about 300,000 officers and men. In other words about 40,000 more officers and men than were then in the entire Army, without any allowance of strength for the Army Air Corps, combat support and service support units, or overhead for training establishments, casuals, transients, and headquarters personnel.
The National Guard comprised the 26th-38th, 40th, 41st, and 43rd-45th Divisions. There were 82 Guard infantry, 78 Guard field artillery and nine Guard cavalry regiments. The Guard also manned 37 coast artillery regiments including 11 harbor defense regiments, three mobile 155mm gun regiments and 23 semi-mobile antiaircraft regiments.

Through July 1940 mobilization was based upon plans formulated by Douglas MacArthur during his tenure as Chief of Staff in 1932 and updated in 1938 by Chief of Staff Craig. Under that plan, mobilization would be accomplished by federalizing the National Guard and by augmenting the force by about 400,000 through voluntary enlistment and conscription, creating an “Initial Protective Force” of about one million men. However, in the wake of the outbreak of the European war in September 1939, and the rising tension with Japan in the Pacific, it was seen that this force would be woefully inadequate to fight a multi-theater war overseas while simultaneously protecting American possessions and the continental United States.

Unfortunately there had been little thought given to and no planning exercises carried out (quite simply because no budget had allowed for such) pre-war for any expansion beyond the initial million men. Thus, all mobilization activities in the U.S. Army that occurred after 16 November 1940, when the induction of the National Guard began and the Selective Service Act took effect, occurred extemporaneously. It was this ad hoc nature of the mobilization that led directly to later problems in fielding ground forces adequate to prosecute the war effectively.

Between 16 September 1940 and 1 July, 1941 the expansion of the Regular Army authorization, the federalization of the National Guard, the recall of Reserve officers, and conscription had increased the size of the Army to 1,326,577 officers and men, including the Army Air Corps. These measures resulted in an expansion of the Army to 36 active divisions, the 1st and 2nd Cavalry, the 1st-9th, 24th-38th, and 40th, 41st, and 43rd-45th Infantry Divisions, the Philippine Division, and the 1st-4th Armored Divisions. By 7 December 1941 conscription had further increased this total to 1,638,086 officers and men, but with an increase of only a single division, the 5th Armored. However, that strength had only been maintained – by the narrowest of margins – just 20 days before the initial one-year term of service authorized by Congress for the Guard, draftees and Reserve officers was to expire on 27 August 1941. Following testimony by Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, Congress passed an indefinite extension of service beyond the initial one-year term by a single vote on 7 August.

On 6 December 1941, one day before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor the Chief of Staff of GHQ U.S. Army, Maj.Gen. Lesley J. McNair, responded to a War Department proposal to form 27 reserve divisions over the course of the next three years. He rejected the proposal as only being suitable if the sole objective of the Army was hemisphere defense. He further estimated that to prosecute operations successfully in the case of war breaking out would require the formation of 200 divisions. It appears that it was this estimate that was later fixed upon by President Roosevelt a few weeks later when he announced the “Victory Plan” which included a 213-division Army. That this “plan” was never an actual part of mobilization planning and was never realistically practicable was later to become painfully obvious.

[edited for readability]
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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

Post by Richard Anderson » 06 Apr 2020 18:52

The real problem for the U.S. Army was the tiny size of the trained force they had to work with. As of 31 January, of the eight active infantry divisions, five had about half their required enlisted strength and the remaining three had about one-fifth. Of the three cavalry divisions, one had effectively zero strength, the 3d Cavalry Division was "active", but not organized, while the other two were at half strength.

So the first task was to fill up, organize, and equip all those units so they could provide cadre for new organizations. Cadre for a new division was roughly 1,400 key officers, NCO, and enlisted...so for every new division an existing division cadred, those had to be inducted and trained to the division standard.

The situation was worse for the National Guard, where first superannuated officers, NCO, and even enlisted had to be demobilized and replaced. It also meant that a leavening of Regular Army officers and NCO were provided, again drawing from the Regular divisions struggling to come up to strength.

Then on top of that the Cavalry, Infantry, and Artillery were perforce stripped of personnel to form the new Armored Force...the four divisions active by the end of FY 1941 (30 June), theoretically 50,788 O&EM with 1,536 tanks, were created in the course of a year from a cadre of just 530 officers, 9,329 enlisted men, and about 400 “modern” tanks.

Anyway, assuming the starting point is 1 July 1941 and 36 active divisions, in theory all should have been "ready" by February-June 1942 and from that time if none were committed could clone a new division, which would in turn be ready one year later. The cadre division would then take c. two months to retrain back to standard and could clone another set of divisions, and so on, theoretically until manpower ran out.

Except that is a perfect world. In the real world, units were committed to the worldwide crisis, some before they were theoretically ready for deployment. Then some of them started to suffer casualties and since the replacement training program was in abeyance to accelerate the intake of inductees to forming new divisions, replacements were drawn from divisions in training, which then had to be replaced and retrained, setting back their readiness dates, and so on. There were also schemes to improve the technical quality of the troops and providing more educated officers, which spawned the ASTP program, which drew trained personnel away from divisions that had to be replaced and retrained...and so on.

Sure, we know NOW that those things badly affected the mobilization of the U.S. Army, but they did not know it then. They thought they had corrected some of the mobilization problems from the Great War - the only other such mobilization exercise they had ever engaged in - but they were unaware they created new ones as well. For example, based on zero real world data they miscalculated the probable casualty and thus replacement rates for the new quasi-arms, the Armored Force and the Tank Destroyer Command, which again reduced the intake of personnel into the casualty intense arm, Infantry.
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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 06 Apr 2020 20:27

T. A. Gardner wrote:
06 Apr 2020 17:25
After all, about two-thirds of British / Commonwealth AFV were US manufactured by 1944. The Soviets got enough to raise several armies worth of divisions of various sorts. The French eventually got enough equipment to form twelve divisions.

If all that Lend-Lease gear is held in the US instead, the Army could have raised at least 20 to 40 additional divisions (I'm sure somebody's crunched those numbers).
Wouldn't that just replace French, Soviet and British Commonwealth units with American units - i.e. no overall increase in units at all?

And again, as I think Richard mentioned, the British cut back on AFV production in anticipation of the receipt of American tanks in 1944 - allowing the spare resources to be used for another part of the war effort. I'll see if I can find out what that was.

Regards

Tom

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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

Post by Richard Anderson » 06 Apr 2020 20:39

So then, the OP specifies "U.S. military strategy is reoriented towards the army from 1940", which does not mean from "May". The U.S. fiscal year was 1 July to 30 June and was typically budgeted by the end of January of the previous fiscal year, so FY 1940 (1 July 1939-30 June 1940) was budgeted 1 January 1939. Furthermore, no further supplementary budget was approved until after the crunch - after the French signed the armistice with Germany. That is nice because it conforms nicely with the FY.

So anyway, the defense expenditure for FY 1940 totaled $1.66-billion, 17.5% of the total government expenditure. The War Department actual expenditure for procurement delivered in the last six months of FY 1940 was $664-million and it appears that total FY expenditure was c. $1-billion, while Navy Department expenditure for calendar 1940 was $1.14-billion. So the 1940 budget was well exceeded by actual expenditure from supplemental appropriations (and also because some of the fiscal year deliveries counted as expenditures were appropriated in the previous FY). Note also that Navy figures are total "Amount appropriated" column of Statement 8, "Expenditures of the Navy, 1794 through 30 June1960" in the 1960 edition of Financial Report Fiscal Year 1960 by the Department of the Navy, Office of the Comptroller (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1960): 43-44, while Army expenditures are for procurement (including R&D) only and exclude civilian and military personnel, real estate acquisition, and construction costs.

Congress enacted two supplemental national defense appropriations on 26 June and 9 September, placing almost $1.25 billion additionally at the disposal of the War Department for FY 1941 procurement, more than a hundred-fold increase over the average appropriation of the 1930s and a ten-fold increase over the previous year.

In FY 1941, total defense expenditure was $6.435-billion, 47.1% of total. Army procurement expenditure totaled $2.761-billion. Navy expenditure was $4.46-billion.
In FY 1942, total defense expenditure was $25.66-billion, 73% of total. Army procurement expenditure totaled $9.446-billion. Navy expenditure was $21.15-billion.
In FY 1943, total defense expenditure was $66.70-billion, 84.9% of total. Army procurement expenditure totaled $26.92-billion. Navy expenditure was $31.04-billion.
In FY 1944, total defense expenditure was $79.1-billion, 86.7% of total. Army procurement expenditure totaled $36.46.13-billion. Navy expenditure was $21.8-billion.
In FY 1945, total defense expenditure was $83-billion, 89.5% of total. Army procurement expenditure totaled $36.6-billion. Navy expenditure was $29.2-billion.

Some of the additional costs incurred by the War Department may be inferred based on the construction expenditure under the cognizance of the Corps of Engineers (excluding the Manhattan Project) 1July 1940-15 August 1945, which was estimated as $20.66-billion...funded both from War Department and civilian expenditures.
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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

Post by Sheldrake » 06 Apr 2020 21:01

T. A. Gardner wrote:
06 Apr 2020 17:25
Well, it is certainly possible for the US Army to be much larger than it was. The quickest way to achieve that is simply draft more men to raise the extra divisions then not give the various Allied nations the equipment to create them. After all, about two-thirds of British / Commonwealth AFV were US manufactured by 1944. The Soviets got enough to raise several armies worth of divisions of various sorts. The French eventually got enough equipment to form twelve divisions.

If all that Lend-Lease gear is held in the US instead, the Army could have raised at least 20 to 40 additional divisions (I'm sure somebody's crunched those numbers).

Of course, that would put a crimp on US civilian manpower for industry so...

None of that requires cutting back on anything else, but rather just investing more men into Army units rather than using foreign manpower.
Would the wives and mothers of Americans really think it a good idea to increase the numbers of American war dead as opposed to Russian , British , Canadian or Frenchmen? Lease Lend was quite a good way to get other country;'s soldiers to do the fighting.

Some of those figures might need checking. My rough calculation is that the British took 25,000 M4 C 3,500 M3 and C 2,000 M6=5 plus C 5,000 M5 half tracks
It is true that a high proportion of Medium tanks were Lease Lend. However, the British manufactured around 40,000 of their own tanks, 20,000 armoured cars and over 100,000 Bren carriers so in terms of AFVs that wasn't strictly true

Equipping 40 Divisions of existing British Army

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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

Post by Richard Anderson » 06 Apr 2020 21:22

Sheldrake wrote:
06 Apr 2020 21:01
T. A. Gardner wrote:
06 Apr 2020 17:25
Well, it is certainly possible for the US Army to be much larger than it was. The quickest way to achieve that is simply draft more men to raise the extra divisions then not give the various Allied nations the equipment to create them. After all, about two-thirds of British / Commonwealth AFV were US manufactured by 1944. The Soviets got enough to raise several armies worth of divisions of various sorts. The French eventually got enough equipment to form twelve divisions.

If all that Lend-Lease gear is held in the US instead, the Army could have raised at least 20 to 40 additional divisions (I'm sure somebody's crunched those numbers).

Of course, that would put a crimp on US civilian manpower for industry so...

None of that requires cutting back on anything else, but rather just investing more men into Army units rather than using foreign manpower.
Would the wives and mothers of Americans really think it a good idea to increase the numbers of American war dead as opposed to Russian , British , Canadian or Frenchmen? Lease Lend was quite a good way to get other country;'s soldiers to do the fighting.

Some of those figures might need checking. My rough calculation is that the British took 25,000 M4 C 3,500 M3 and C 2,000 M6=5 plus C 5,000 M5 half tracks
It is true that a high proportion of Medium tanks were Lease Lend. However, the British manufactured around 40,000 of their own tanks, 20,000 armoured cars and over 100,000 Bren carriers so in terms of AFVs that wasn't strictly true

Equipping 40 Divisions of existing British Army
Lend Lease to Britain totaled 7,489 light tanks, 20,069 medium tanks, and 12 heavy tanks.

British tank production figures are a bit squirrelly, but numbered about 145 light tanks, 12,310 cruiser tanks, and 10,433 infantry tanks from November 1940-May 1945.
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Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

Post by Sheldrake » 06 Apr 2020 22:34

Richard Anderson wrote:
06 Apr 2020 21:22
Sheldrake wrote:
06 Apr 2020 21:01
T. A. Gardner wrote:
06 Apr 2020 17:25
Well, it is certainly possible for the US Army to be much larger than it was. The quickest way to achieve that is simply draft more men to raise the extra divisions then not give the various Allied nations the equipment to create them. After all, about two-thirds of British / Commonwealth AFV were US manufactured by 1944. The Soviets got enough to raise several armies worth of divisions of various sorts. The French eventually got enough equipment to form twelve divisions.

If all that Lend-Lease gear is held in the US instead, the Army could have raised at least 20 to 40 additional divisions (I'm sure somebody's crunched those numbers).

Of course, that would put a crimp on US civilian manpower for industry so...

None of that requires cutting back on anything else, but rather just investing more men into Army units rather than using foreign manpower.
Would the wives and mothers of Americans really think it a good idea to increase the numbers of American war dead as opposed to Russian , British , Canadian or Frenchmen? Lease Lend was quite a good way to get other country;'s soldiers to do the fighting.

Some of those figures might need checking. My rough calculation is that the British took 25,000 M4 C 3,500 M3 and C 2,000 M6=5 plus C 5,000 M5 half tracks
It is true that a high proportion of Medium tanks were Lease Lend. However, the British manufactured around 40,000 of their own tanks, 20,000 armoured cars and over 100,000 Bren carriers so in terms of AFVs that wasn't strictly true

Equipping 40 Divisions of existing British Army
Lend Lease to Britain totaled 7,489 light tanks, 20,069 medium tanks, and 12 heavy tanks.

British tank production figures are a bit squirrelly, but numbered about 145 light tanks, 12,310 cruiser tanks, and 10,433 infantry tanks from November 1940-May 1945.
We can quibble about the numbers. Lease lend was around 45% of total British production. http://www.isc.meiji.ac.jp/~transfer/pa ... Coombs.pdf
Wjhen it com,es to AFVs the British turned out a lot of tracked armoured carriers, light tanks, scout cars and armoured cars. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_a ... rld_War_II

But the main question is what is the logic in preferring to equip the under trained and over expanded US Army instead of the British Canadian and Russian forces that need the kit?

As a theoretical exercise in deploying the largest possible US army it might need to cannibalize lease lend production, but it does not make strategic sense in coalition warfare. Ok maybe as a Brit I can draw on a tradition of fighting to the last German/Russian/Frenchman/ Hessian/American but it makes sense for the country with the manufacturing capacity and money to do that bit and hire poorer countries to share in the fighting and casualties. ;)

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