USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

Discussions on alternate history, including events up to 20 years before today. Hosted by Terry Duncan.
Post Reply
User avatar
Sheldrake
Member
Posts: 3726
Joined: 28 Apr 2013, 18:14
Location: London
Contact:

Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#226

Post by Sheldrake » 15 Oct 2020, 16:38

Gooner1 wrote:
15 Oct 2020, 11:51
Aber wrote:
15 Oct 2020, 09:04
Which plans and when?
Operation Skyscraper was the codename of the invasion plan prepared by Bernard Paget, CinC Home Forces, and staff and sent to the Chiefs of Staff late March 1943.
In it: "The study 'Selection of Assault Areas for a Major Operation in North West Europe' has left a choice of one area only; the Caen beaches, plus the East beaches of the Cotentin Peninsula."
From 'The Crusading General'

"His assessment of the troops required was equally definite, and his plan envisaged:
a. Ten divisions afloat, of which three are required to seize and open Cherbourg.
b. Three divisions for the assault on D-Day plus two more on D plus 1.
c. Four follow-up divisions, two landing on D-Day and two on D plus 1.
d. Four to five airborne divisions."
That was overtaken by the analysis by Frederick Morgan's COSSAC team between March and July 1943 carrying out the staff work on behalf of the Joint Combined Chiefs of Staff. According to Morgan the British favoured pas de Calais and the US favoured Normandy. Wargaming the options at the Largs facility demonstrated that Normandy was the better option - and one that looked something like Paget's. (Probably because all plans in 1943 were based on assault shipping and craft for only three divisions. At the end of the wargames the planners assembled to watch the Canadian Division depart for Sicily with a piper playing them off.

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10054
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#227

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 15 Oct 2020, 17:04

Sheldrake wrote:
15 Oct 2020, 10:27
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
15 Oct 2020, 06:43
Op JUBILEE was also in part directed at the fortified beaches directly defending the port, and in part it was directed at lightly defended beaches nearby. Take a look at where the losses and failures in the attack were. Its been understood since at least Roman times, possibly since Sumerian times, that you don't attack a defended port from the sea. Landing at nearby and lightly defended points on the coast and attacking the port from the landward side is the textbook solution. Precisely why Operation JUBILIEE was aimed at the port directly is beyond me. It appears the Brits had forgotten 500+ years of their experience at littoral warfare.
This is more Monday morning quarterbacking applying 20/20 hindsight.

It is dangerous to make sweeping generalisations about the rules of war. While the nature of war may endure, the characteristics of a particular war mean that the rules change. Ask the French about 1940. The rules they learned in 1918 did not apply in 1940. Throughout history successful armies have tested the extent to which the rules flex. At various times it had been possible to seize a port from the sea. The Dutch raid on the naval base in the Medway in 1667 worked pretty well. (The stern of the Royal Charles is in the Rijkmusuem) So did the British attack on Copenhagen in 1807. The Germans seized Norwegian ports from the sea in 1940 and Macarthur's landings at Inchon in 1950 worked.
No I think I can apply general principles here. There are always exceptions, but they do more to prove the rule that refute it. ie: The Medway operation was executed as a raid & was not all that successful tactically or operationally. The number of ships destroyed fell short of the goal. & even ill prepared and surprised defenders were able to make things to dangerous for the Dutch task force to do more. The commander was prudent to withdraw with only a single prize and a handful of the enemy damaged/destroyed.
The nature of C20th warfare meant that a port was needed PDQ after making a landing. Armies of older times did not need to be attached to the umbilical cord of the logistic services with its conveyor belt of men and munitions.
Actually they did. breaking away from the logistics tail and operating with a small mobile supply train was a high risk gambit in any century, requiring a bit of preparation and nerve. Grant made it look easy in the Vicksburg campaign, tho most casual observers miss that his army left a trail of looted country side, captured a supply depot partially intact, & that Grants calculations for his armies ammunition vs the firepower in Vicksburg were correct. Had the Confederates burned the farms of western Mississippi, properly destroyed the supplies accumulated Grant would have been in serious trouble. Similarly the landing force on Guadalcanal would have been in serious trouble in the first weeks had they not captured Japanese rice Their conveyor belt of supply was broken for for a extended period and completely inoperable for the initial weeks.
The attack on Dieppe included attacks on supposedly more lightly defended beaches on either side of the port itself as well as the assault on the beaches on the sea front.
Yes & the heaviest assault losses were on the landing sites at the port, the fortified area. The other reason Dieppe is a poor example is the discarding of the original RUTTER plan. The JUBILEE plan did not even reach the basics in fire support from ships or aircraft. As a test the operation was pointless as it was executed with major components weaker than previously judged necessary and planned for.
Bottom line is the tactical and operational problem of landing in 1942 or or 1943 was significantly different from what developed on the French coast after Hitler endorsed Rommels beach defense strategy in January 1944.
The allied Op Overlord plans were based on the defences before Rommel's six months dash to win the war on D Day.
Actually no. The plans were heavily modified January - March. ie: the decision to initiate the landing at low tide vs the doctrinal reference for high tide. The addition of assault engineer brigades to clear the obstacles and strong points were another. Naval gun fire support was off the chart in terms of quantity compared to previous amphib operations. The plans 21 AG picked up in December looked like something for Sicilly or Salerno. Intelligence concerning the change in German strategy & construction initiatives were appearing in Allied hands as early as January & the assault plans that were suitable for July or October of 1943 were discarded swiftly. Good or bad there were many changes made to adapt to Hitlers endorsement of Rommels strategy.
Re sweeping statements: Von Rundstedt's staff carried out an appreciation in autumn 1943 that it was impossible to prevent a crossing, based on their study of hundreds of years of history. Rommel's failure and the allied success on D Day did nothing to challenge that interpretation of history.
& Runsteadt was correct. Which does not alter that the the tactical and operational problem for the Allies was different with Rommels changes. Leaving aside the beach assault the problem of fighting a large scale battle vs a immediate counterattack/s near the coast was not the same as fighting that days or weeks later & well inland. The air plan was altered, the requirement for increased NGF support and that it would be needed for days or weeks after the initial assault was accepted. Had the strategy and beach defense remained at the condition of December 1943 the OVERLORD and NEPTUNE plans would have looked very different.


Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10054
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#228

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 15 Oct 2020, 17:08

Sheldrake wrote:
15 Oct 2020, 16:38
... Wargaming the options at the Largs facility demonstrated that Normandy was the better option - and one that looked something like Paget's. (Probably because all plans in 1943 were based on assault shipping and craft for only three divisions. ...
Are remarks in the books correct, that Morgan was required to keep his plans in line with only what was available in the UK in 1943?

User avatar
Sheldrake
Member
Posts: 3726
Joined: 28 Apr 2013, 18:14
Location: London
Contact:

Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#229

Post by Sheldrake » 15 Oct 2020, 17:44

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
15 Oct 2020, 17:08
Sheldrake wrote:
15 Oct 2020, 16:38
... Wargaming the options at the Largs facility demonstrated that Normandy was the better option - and one that looked something like Paget's. (Probably because all plans in 1943 were based on assault shipping and craft for only three divisions. ...
Are remarks in the books correct, that Morgan was required to keep his plans in line with only what was available in the UK in 1943?
That is true. The Overlord plan did include options for what to do if more shipping was available. One of these included landings on the eastern Cotentin.

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10054
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#230

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 15 Oct 2020, 18:36

The landing in the eastern Cotientin reaches back another year to a yet earlier invasion plan. I'm on the road and cant post the analysis of it now, but there is a long article on PDF file picking over this British plan and the German defenses. The main defect to the article is it does not identify clearly what staff group was responsible for it. This was pre COSSAC & I cant say which Brit commander had oversight over this planning cell.

When Bradley recommended expanding the NEPTUNE plan to include UTAH beach it may be his staff already had access to these earlier plans

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 6347
Joined: 01 Jan 2016, 22:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#231

Post by Richard Anderson » 15 Oct 2020, 19:22

Sheldrake wrote:
15 Oct 2020, 17:44
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
15 Oct 2020, 17:08
Sheldrake wrote:
15 Oct 2020, 16:38
... Wargaming the options at the Largs facility demonstrated that Normandy was the better option - and one that looked something like Paget's. (Probably because all plans in 1943 were based on assault shipping and craft for only three divisions. ...
Are remarks in the books correct, that Morgan was required to keep his plans in line with only what was available in the UK in 1943?
That is true. The Overlord plan did include options for what to do if more shipping was available. One of these included landings on the eastern Cotentin.
Projections on landing craft availability drove planning at least as far back as 27 March 1942. At that point it was projected that as of 1 July 1942 there would be sufficient craft - US and UK construction combined - for landing the personnel of either 2 1/2 infantry or 3 armored divisions, but only the motor vehicles of either 40% of a single infantry division or the tanks of 1/2 an armored division. Effectively 39,350 men and 1,339 tanks and MV.

By 1 April 1943, it was anticipated that the personnel of either 4 infantry or 5 armored divisions, the vehicles of 1.25 an infantry or armored division, or the tanks of about 2.25 armored divisions. Effectively 57,564 men and 4,812 tanks and MV.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10054
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#232

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 15 Oct 2020, 19:30

That should do it. On to Berlin.

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10054
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#233

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 15 Oct 2020, 19:47

The plan I referred to had a initial assault of one brigade, a build up of a reinforced division over 48 hours, and a reinforcement to eleven divisions in three weeks; IIRC. The complete establishment required the capture of Cherbourg along the way. This plan was written up originally mid summer & aimed at execution NLT October 1942. Compared to Op TORCH it looks a bit unambitious.

Tom from Cornwall
Member
Posts: 3209
Joined: 01 May 2006, 20:52
Location: UK

Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#234

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 15 Oct 2020, 21:30

British COS response to Gen Marshall's Memorandum of Apr 42 re grand strategy and 'Europe First' debate includes further evidence that, for the British, there was an urgent perceived need to temporarily divert forces to secure the position in the Indian Ocean and Australasia at that point and in order, at least in part, to secure resources for the war in Europe (CAB80/62):
British COS - Apr 42 (CAB80-62).JPG
British COS - Apr 42 (CAB80-62) -2.JPG

TMP wrote:
Once again, a strategy is judged by whether it achieves national/coalition goals. Whichever version of strategy one considers in effect - and there is always room to debate which was actually in effect - that strategy failed spectacularly, leading to what Churchill called the greatest defeat in the Empire's history.
I haven't got it to hand, apologies, but I'm pretty sure that rather than the 'greatest defeat in the Empire's history' Churchill actually called the loss of Singapore the greatest defeat for the British empire since the battle of Yorktown in 1781, wherever that is! :D

In my humble opinion, there is also an argument that he was mistaken and the greatest defeat for the British Empire was actually the defeat of France in May-June 1940.

Andrew Boyd (The Royal Navy in Eastern Waters, p.146) makes the point that despite the loss of her French ally and the diversion of British resources to home defence and the Middle East, in 1941,
Britain persisted with a strategic end [in the Far East] for which ways and means were quite inadequate.
Which appears a sound assessment.

Boyd also highlights the inconsistency between British hopes that American air and naval reinforcement in the Philippines would bleed across into American defence of the approaches to Singapore through the South China Sea and the American reluctance to be seen supporting Britain's colonial empire whilst the British failed to provide its own reinforcements.

Again another sound judgement I think - Norman Friedman's review of Boyd's book also highlights excessive British hopes for American support for the empire which can be seen still in play in the COS paper above.

Regards

Tom

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10054
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#235

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 15 Oct 2020, 22:24

Heres the essay concerning the British 1942 invasion plans. My memory served incorrectly on the landing strength and build up schedules. Also it does identify this specific plan as a product of Motbattens staff. It also remarks on the four or five other landing plans all under the name SLEDGEHAMMER and the confusion thus created by their disparate strategic objectives and directions. I can only agree with that.
Attachments
D-Day1942D-Day194423revNov09 copy.pdf
(731.57 KiB) Downloaded 31 times

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Banned
Posts: 3255
Joined: 15 Jan 2019, 23:32
Location: USA

Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#236

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 16 Oct 2020, 00:22

Tom from Cornwall wrote:British COS response to Gen Marshall's Memorandum of Apr 42
Thanks for sharing these documents.

Not sure where our debate stands but my reply is simply what I've been saying all along:

Yes, Britain needed to defend India and Australia's LoC. No, that doesn't mean offensives against Bougainville and Buna were thereby endorsed by the British.

Do you get what I'm saying? I feel like we are talking past each other.
greatest defeat for the British empire since the battle of Yorktown in 1781, wherever that is!
Ha I wish I could gloat from this side of the pond but all my ancestors were on your side back then (or in a different pond).
Boyd also highlights the inconsistency between British hopes that American air and naval reinforcement in the Philippines would bleed across into American defence of the approaches to Singapore through the South China Sea and the American reluctance to be seen supporting Britain's colonial empire whilst the British failed to provide its own reinforcements.
True. In case my previous statements sounded of King-style Anglophobia, I should be clear that American early-war strategy against Japan failed spectacularly as well, and we bare much of the blame for British failures. Also we were very racist against Japan as well - probably worse than the British (one of the causes of all this trouble was our immigration ban on Japanese people - something the Japanese didn't take too kindly).
https://twitter.com/themarcksplan
https://www.reddit.com/r/AxisHistoryForum/
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

Gooner1
Member
Posts: 2776
Joined: 06 Jan 2006, 13:24
Location: London

Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#237

Post by Gooner1 » 16 Oct 2020, 12:41

Sheldrake wrote:
15 Oct 2020, 16:38
That was overtaken by the analysis by Frederick Morgan's COSSAC team between March and July 1943 carrying out the staff work on behalf of the Joint Combined Chiefs of Staff.
Yes. The difference between the two is that Morgan's planning was based on what materiel was likely to be available for the invasion whilst Paget's was an appreciation on what a successful invasion would require. Morgan wrote that his plan would work if "there were not more than 12 German, full-strength mobile field divisions in France."

Tom from Cornwall
Member
Posts: 3209
Joined: 01 May 2006, 20:52
Location: UK

Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#238

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 16 Oct 2020, 18:40

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
16 Oct 2020, 00:22
Not sure where our debate stands but my reply is simply what I've been saying all along:

Yes, Britain needed to defend India and Australia's LoC. No, that doesn't mean offensives against Bougainville and Buna were thereby endorsed by the British.

Do you get what I'm saying? I feel like we are talking past each other.
I'm trying to point out that any debate on US Strategy during WW2 needs to recognise that it didn't happen in a vacuum and American arguments over resource allocation were affected both by events on the ground (and in air and at sea) and by their allies. I'm using the similar and contemporary impact on British strategy of Australian opinions (and more broadly those of all Britain's dominions) as I have much primary source evidence to hand.
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
16 Oct 2020, 00:22
Yes, Britain needed to defend India and Australia's LoC. No, that doesn't mean offensives against Bougainville and Buna were thereby endorsed by the British.
The British wanted either direct American support in the Indian Ocean or US action which diverted Japanese resources out of that area. The British also wanted (needed!) direct American support to reinforce the defence of Australia and New Zealand in order for those two Dominions to leave ground and air forces in the Middle East. I've not got into British records for after mid-1942 - it may well be that the strategic relief provided by results of the battle of Midway eased British desire for US defensive and diversionary offensive support sufficiently for them to start pushing for American support to other key British areas of interest (ie Middle East itself). Perfidious Albion at work. :lol: :lol:
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
16 Oct 2020, 00:22
Also we were very racist against Japan as well - probably worse than the British (one of the causes of all this trouble was our immigration ban on Japanese people - something the Japanese didn't take too kindly).
There's no doubt that underestimation of the Japanese threat was real but in almost all the high-level (WSC, British COS) papers/letters/memoranda/JIC assessments the key driver for the assumption that Japan wouldn't attack south in 1941 is that it made no strategic sense as Japan would lose in the end. Churchill actually said something along the lines of 'the Japanese are sensible people' when arguing against what he perceived as excessive requests from British commanders in the Far East for reinforcement. I can dig out the exact reference for that if you are interested.

I do recognise that there is much anecdotal evidence of racism at a lower level - Japanese eyesight being a particularly strange fixation for many airmen it seems. There is probably need for a good academic paper that compares the level of anecdotal reports of racism to that which can be found in contemporary records.

Do you have any primary source documentation for your continued highlighting of anti-Japanese racism as being a key element in the calamity which struck both the British and American empires in late 1941/early 1942? Either US or British primary sources?

For a more rounded view, I'd recommend:

Kennedy, Greg, 'Anglo-American Strategic Relations and Intelligence Assessments of Japanese Air Power, 1934 - 1941', The Journal of Military History, Jul 2010, pp.737-773.

It offers illuminating comment on British intelligence reports by relatively junior RAF officers embedded for short periods with Japanese air units and a host of references to other useful papers, book chapters, etc.

Regards

Tom

Tom from Cornwall
Member
Posts: 3209
Joined: 01 May 2006, 20:52
Location: UK

Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#239

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 16 Oct 2020, 18:42

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
15 Oct 2020, 22:24
Heres the essay concerning the British 1942 invasion plans. My memory served incorrectly on the landing strength and build up schedules. Also it does identify this specific plan as a product of Motbattens staff. It also remarks on the four or five other landing plans all under the name SLEDGEHAMMER and the confusion thus created by their disparate strategic objectives and directions. I can only agree with that.
Carl,

Thanks for posting up the paper. Some of the planning papers are available on line at the British National Archives in the COS files. It would be interesting to compare the two. Oh to be retired! :idea:
On to Berlin
:thumbsup:

Regards

Tom

User avatar
Sheldrake
Member
Posts: 3726
Joined: 28 Apr 2013, 18:14
Location: London
Contact:

Re: USA executes an Army (and Europe) First strategy

#240

Post by Sheldrake » 17 Oct 2020, 01:14

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
16 Oct 2020, 18:40
I do recognise that there is much anecdotal evidence of racism at a lower level - Japanese eyesight being a particularly strange fixation for many airmen it seems. There is probably need for a good academic paper that compares the level of anecdotal reports of racism to that which can be found in contemporary records.

Do you have any primary source documentation for your continued highlighting of anti-Japanese racism as being a key element in the calamity which struck both the British and American empires in late 1941/early 1942? Either US or British primary sources?
One piece of evidence for a gross under estimation of the problems of fighting the Japanese occurs in FSR 1935 Vol 2 Chapter X section 98 which makes some extremely complacent remarks about fighting in bush and jungle. To summarise. It is tough to fight in tropical climates. Jungles and bush pose problems with very limited visibility and cross country movement. But its OK because any European army with trained troops will face the same difficulties. There is a couple of paragraphs about fighting an uncivilised enemy referring the reader to a colonial office manual on training troops for bush warfare.

50 years earlier Sir Garnett Wolseley's field service pocket book had much better guidance emphasising the quality of individual infantry in bush and his preference for a smaller number of highly motivated and trained troops. He referred to the difficulties of taking recruits from the streets of UK cities UK or the bazaars of India and expecting them to be capable in one to one fights with people who knew how to fight in the terrain. He was a thinking of Zulu's and Afghans, but the experienced Japanese army also had an advantage over the under trained troops defending Malaya and Burma.

Post Reply

Return to “What if”