Carl Schwamberger wrote: ↑
01 Nov 2020 02:10
Richard Anderson wrote: ↑
31 Oct 2020 23:19
... how shambolic an operation the US Army was until c. mid-1943.
Sort of like the German Army in 1938?
No, worse. So many hasty, but theoretically reasonable decisions on mobilization were made that affected other aspects of mobilization that it is difficult to see how things could have been done better without perfect hindsight. Among other things, the decision to do basic training at the division was possibly one of the worst.
In any case, the assessment as of 1 October 1941 remains critical. At that time exactly 1 (one) division, the 1st, was rated as ready for action. Worse, it was anticipated that by 1 April 1942 that strength would grow to all of three (3) infantry divisions (1st, 2d, and 3d), one motorized infantry division (4th), and two armored divisions (1st and 2d).
Notably the former Hawaiian Division reorganized as two divisions, the 24th and 25th, and remained tied to the islands for support for some time. The 27th Inf Div, originally planned as a defensive augmentation of the Philippines, actually shipped to Hawaii incompletely trained at the end of February 1942 to ensure security of the territory. Ditto, the 32d and 41st were shipped at the request of Australia, even though neither had completed training either, in March 1942. The 37th Inf Div at least had finished training when it went to reinforce the Fijis in May 1942. Then there was the hodgepodge that was Americal.
All defensive deployments, all prior to Midway. The arrival of the 40th Inf Div in Hawaii in August 1942 was the first that facilitated offensive operations in the Pacific, allowing the transfer of the 25th Inf Div to Australia, which supported continuing operations at Guadalcanal and New Guinea.
Meanwhile, eight divisions (1st, 3d, 9th, 29th, and 34th Inf Div, 1st and 2d Arm Div, and 82d A/B Div) went to support defensive and offensive operations against Germany by the end of 1942. That effectively emptied the cupboard.