Japan launches Kantokuen - British DoW?

[T. A. Gardner]

What that map shows is a total of what, about 10 to 12 maybe 15 divisions at most invading? A Japanese "army" is the size of a corps. That is, 2 or 3 divisions. I doubt that 4th Army would have much luck advancing given the lack of rail support and roads in that area. It would be lucky to be able to keep one division moving forward.
It also shows the main effort to be towards Vladivostok which would mean advancing across multiple rivers, swampy ground, and forest for the most part. Not the best terrain to be attacking through.
All the Russians really need to do early on is grind the Japanese to a halt and engage them in a battle of attrition. We know from Nomohan that the IJAAF has a pilot quality advantage over the Red Air Force but that it is extremely fragile and lacks quantity. Worse, it has little capacity to really do either ground support or more "strategic" bombing missions, particularly if those are opposed.
So, you have a relatively small IJA ground army mostly attacking on a limited front, with limited objectives, across pretty horrid terrain with very little in the way of air or heavy artillery support against a dug in and prepared enemy with numerical superiority.

The main thing this would do is support the Germans by limiting the forces that could be drawn from the Far East in the Soviet Union to fight them. For Japan they get nothing of strategic significance while their economy collapses in the face of a complete economic embargo.

So, at best Germany might 'win' in Russia with a negotiated peace settlement. The Japanese get kicked in the teeth for the most part out of that, and they still face economic collapse. What's Japan's next move, act against the US-Dutch-British to save their economy? Let's say that it is and it happens sometime in mid to late 1942. That pretty much means the US has far more "stuff" in place in the PI and elsewhere meaning the Japanese don't do anywhere close as good as they did historically suffering defeats and heavier losses.
On the whole, strategically, Japan invading the Soviet Union only benefits her enemies and Germany. Japan gets little or nothing out of it.

[Tom from Cornwall]

I don't see Kantokuen happening except in conjunction with something like my Eastern Front ATL's wherein the SU is clearly on the road to collapse:

Are you still holding to that judgement? It's just that further along you argue that:

The greatest scholar on Nomonhan/Kantokuen, Alvin Coox, was convinced that Kantokuen would mean the SU's fall. I see a lot of merit to that position.

Did Coox also caveat his judgement by there being a more damaged Soviet Union by this stage?

Incidentally, I suppose the Soviet's would have had considerable warning of Japanese intentions from their intelligence sources in Tokyo?

How long do you see it being before the Japanese could then turn south again and strike at Malaya and the DEI?

As in OTL, the RN isn't sufficiently strong to defend Southeast Asia.

True, more than likely, in the short term but possibly not if the attack south was delayed long into 1942. There were several British divisions and fighter squadrons at sea at the time, more might have made it to SE Asia depending on decisions made in this new situation. Another couple of months of training of the inexperienced British land forces in Malaya would also have lent weight to the British defence of that colony perhaps.

The US were also rapidly reinforcing their air force in the Philippines at the time, weren't they?

Regards

Tom

[TheMarcksPlan]

Are you still holding to that judgement? It's just that further along you argue that:

Not a contradiction, just different issues:

1. Would Japan joining the anti-SU war would have resulted in SU's defeat?

2. Whether and under what conditions Japan would have joined the anti-SU war.

Answering "yes" to (1) doesn't imply sufficient conditions for Japan to join the anti-SU war.

Based on my reading of the cabinet discussions and other sources, I am convinced that Japan would have attacked only if it looked like Kantokuen faced weaker opposition than OTL, and if the SU looked bound for imminent defeat and/or military impotence. The cabinet members likened the Far East to a "persimmon" that had to ripen to fall into their lap (i.e. SU needed to be weaker than OTL).

How long do you see it being before the Japanese could then turn south again and strike at Malaya and the DEI?

I haven't reached a firm conclusion yet but at the highest level of analysis Kantokuen shouldn't be seen as precluding the southwards move for very long. The IJA used only three divisions in Malaya. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_ ... n_campaign. So if the circumstance is that Japan is engaged in Manchuria and faces an emergency need to capture the DEI, they could scrape together the required ground forces from China. Chiang's armies had negligible offensive capability so a weakening in China need not imply any significant territorial loss in the short/medium term. Or they could do Malaya/DEI absent simultaneous assault on the Philippines and retask the OTL PI invasion force to Malaya. Use the IJN to screen and isolate the PI then pick it off later. The Japanese had basically limitless confidence that they'd win if the USN charged across the Pacific to operate from the PI, so this seems a feasible option. Not the IJN's preferred option of focusing everything southward and attacking Malaya and PI simultaneously but a good strategic path if the leadership has not given the IJN its preferred option. Recall that the Empire was riven by inter-service rivalry and the IJN's opposition to attack on the SU was as much about diminishing the Army's prestige as about military sense.

An important point that most don't realize: Kwantung Army reached its peak strength of 1.1mil in '42, not in '41. The prospect of war with the SU tied down massive Japanese resources until '44 or so when desperation compelled denuding Kwantung Army. In a "successful Kantokuen" ATL, the Soviet threat to strategic positions in Manchuria disappears with Japanese capture of Primorskiy Krai. Thereafter the Japanese can defend in depth in Northern Manchuria with smaller forces than OTL.

Another couple of months of training of the inexperienced British land forces in Malaya would also have lent weight to the British defence of that colony perhaps.

The US were also rapidly reinforcing their air force in the Philippines at the time, weren't they?

This is an interesting issue. IMO a couple months' delay wouldn't have made much difference. A little more training and a few more squadrons won't save Southeast Asia. If the delay pushes us into mid-'42 it's maybe a different story.

As an aside:
At some point I'll post an ATL in which the Wallies aren't as ghoulishly racist and actually plan to defend SE Asia with sufficient forces to repel a Japan that they take seriously. It seems like a "Super-ABDACOM" uniting the American and British forces in the Pacific could have deterred/defeated the IJN. Between the 6 American fleet carriers and 2-4 British, the Wallies should have been able to concentrate naval superiority and back it up with serious land-based air forces.

[TheMarcksPlan]

The main thing this would do is support the Germans by limiting the forces that could be drawn from the Far East in the Soviet Union to fight them. For Japan they get nothing of strategic significance while their economy collapses in the face of a complete economic embargo

You're operating on the assumption that Kantokuen precludes a move on the DEI, a point in dispute. You also seem unwilling even to read the Wikipedia article on Kantokuen.

[T. A. Gardner]

You're operating on the assumption that Kantokuen precludes a move on the DEI, a point in dispute. You also seem unwilling even to read the Wikipedia article on Kantokuen.

An attack on the DEI is an attack on the US and Britain. That was clear from the Atlantic Conference between Churchill and FDR, it was clear from Admiral Hart (US Asiatic Fleet) actively cooperating with the British and Dutch, and from the fact that the US was actively supplying major amounts of war materials to the Dutch.

It does preclude a Japanese multipronged operation to take the PI, Malaysia, and the DEI like they did historically simply because the troops and aircraft would almost certainly tied up in the Soviet Union invasion instead. That means the Japanese end up at war with everybody and have no access to the resources they need to keep their nation's economy functioning.

Japan cannot move against just the DEI. Also maybe you should read even the Wiki entry on Kantokuen more closely. It sounds pretty grim for the Japanese.

[paulrward]

Hello All :

Mr. T.A.Gardner wrote :

An attack on the DEI is an attack on the US and Britain. That was clear from the Atlantic
Conference between Churchill and FDR, it was clear from Admiral Hart (US Asiatic Fleet) actively
cooperating with the British and Dutch, and from the fact that the US was actively supplying major
amounts of war materials to the Dutch.

While it may have been clear to Freewheelin' Franklin Roosevelt, it sure as hell wasn't clear to
the average citizen of the United States. First, let's review the bidding: In July of 1937, Japan
began fighting against China, a significant trading partner of the United States. The response
of the U.S. Government? A series of VERY harsh diplomatic notes. In May of 1939, Japan attacked
the U.S.S.R. on the Nomonhan. The response by the U.S. ? More VERY, VERY harsh diplomatic
notes. Then, in the summer of 1941, the Japanese occupied French IndoChina. The U.S. response
was to stop trading with Japan, and to freeze their assets. And to send them a few more, VERY,
VERY, VERY harsh diplomatic notes.

The fact is, without a direct attack on the United States or it's possesions, such as the
Philippines or Hawaii, getting a bill through the Congress to declare war would be very difficult indeed.
And, back in the 1940s, military officers would be a lot less likely to stick their necks out by starting
hostilities without a DoW.

And, let's put it right out in the open Mr. Gardner thinks that the citizens of the United States
would be ready to go on a Children's Crusade in the Pacific to try to rescue the colonies of a nation
( the Netherlands) which had already ceased to exist! It had been conquered and
occupied by Nazi Germany, and, in response to this, the United States had done......nothing.....

In 1941, the Netherlands government consisted of an office in London, an office in Washington,
and an office in Switzerland. It was a 'Government in Exile' And anyone who knows anything
about Diplomacy knows that there is nothing more impotent than a Government in Exile. They
have all the military and political credibility of a Nevada State Gaming Commissioner.....

If the Japanese occupied the N.E.I., what could the U.S. do ? We had already cut off their
oil, scrap iron, electronic goods, and frozen their credit. Now, I suppose that, like Dean
Wormer in Animal House, Freewheelin Franklin could have put the Japanese on DOUBLE
SECRET PROBATION !, but that wouldn't have done anything but make everyone laugh at
the United States. Which is not the position you want to put yourself in on the world stage.

Now, a really smart Japanese Prime Minister would send an emissary to Hitler with a proposal:
In return for Japan attacking the U.S.S.R. in concert with Operation Barbarrossa, the Japanese
would be given title to French IndoChina, and Netherlands East Indies, and British Malaya.
In addition, Japan would be allowed to eat anything she succeeded in biting off of the U.S.S.R.,
along with China, Mongolia, and Manchuria.

In return, the 700,000 men of the Kwantung Army would go on a program of raising hell and
making noise in the Soviet Far East, along with bombing the port installations and railroads in
Vladivostock, rendering them useless for U.S. Lend Lease Shipments. This has the dual benefit
to the Germans of preventing the Soviets from transferring the 200,000 men, 3,000 tanks, 2,600
artillery pieces, 1,500 tractors, and 1.800 aircraft that were historically moved from the Eastern
Soviet Union to the West between May, 1941 and June, 1942, as well as cutting off the major
shipments of food and other supplies that were shipped in through Vladivostock during the war.

As Barbarrossa starts, the Japanese begin moving troops. bombing Vladivostock and the Trans
Siberian Railway, shelling anything within range, sending armies of cavalry across Manchuria,
and in general making a big display of being at war with Russia. At the same time, they send
the troops and ships they used to take Malaya and the Philippines, and occupy the N.E.I.
The Dutch would put up the same sort of stiff resistance they exhibited historically, and would be
defeated in the same way.

The TWO THINGS that the Japanese DO NOT DO are, 1) Try to fight a Climactic Battle against the
Soviets, ( Which they would lose, badly ! ) and, 2) Take ANY sort of military action against either
the United States or Great Britain, or ANY of their territories. The IJN and the troopships sail to
the N.E.I. well out of the range of the U.S. and British air forces ( This is in June of 1941, remember,
there are NO B-17s in the Philippines, and the British air units in Malaya are a sad joke. ), and the U.S.
and British Ground Forces in the Philippines and Malaya are in no position to go on any sort of expeditionary
junket to the N.E.I., being without sea lift capability and also being so out of date militarily as to make
such a move an excercise in futility. Remember, less than a year later, historically, the Japanese Army
used both the British Army in Malaya and the U.S. Army in the Philippines like a pair of inflatable sex dolls.

Britain is too busy hunting the Bismarck to send any battleships to the Pacific, and the U.S. is paralyzed
politically, unable to go to war without a Cassus Belli. As a result, by the end of September, the N.E.I.
has become the J.E.I., and the Japanese Army is having fun marching to and fro on the Kamchatkan
mainland like the Grand Old Duke of York, looking impressively dangerous.

And there you would be at the start of 1942: The lack of Far Eastern troops and Lend Lease Supplies
to stiffen the Soviet Army makes the possibility of a successful Barbarrossa more likely, the Japanese
have enough oil to allow them to continue their relentless slaughter of the Chinese, the last traces
of France and the Netherlands are being swallowed up by the Axis on both sides of the world, Britain
is facing to possibility of once again having to ' Go It Alone ' , and Freewheelin' Franklin is careering
around the White House in his wheelchair, making worthless promises to Winnie during their weekly
phone calls.


Sorry, Mr. Gardner, but, No Pearl Harbor, No Day of Infamy Speech, No D.o.W., no U.S. involvement
in WW2. Unless Hitler does something stupid..... which can NEVER be ruled out !


Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward

[T. A. Gardner]

Gallup poll August 2 1941: Question was "Should America take steps to keep Japan from becoming more powerful, even if it means war?"
51% of Americans said yes.
31% said no.
18% were undecided.

I'd say that the second Japan embarked on a war of expansion into the DEI, Malaysia, etc., the US would have been at war with Japan. The Japanese knew it, the British knew it, the Dutch knew it, and the American public was behind it.

As for Hitler "giving title" to the Japanese over the DEI, not happening. The Dutch government in exile was recognized by the US and any such proclamation by Germany would have no real diplomatic value.

At the time Japan historically declared war, the US had contracts to supply the DEI nearly 1000 tanks, hundreds of aircraft, hundreds of artillery pieces, etc. The Dutch had 3 PBY in Hawaii when Pearl Harbor was attacked. One was airborne on its way to Midway, the others were on Ford Island. These were part of an order to expand the Dutch naval air arm in the DEI. The Dutch ordered nearly 1000 CLTS Marmon Harrington tanks along with 200 heavier MTLS models. They were buying US made P-40 and B-25's to give them a first rate air force along with more available Brewster Buffalo and Curtiss CW 21 to fill the gaps.

If the Japanese go to war against the Russians in June 1941, then the Japanese too are in much worse shape. There are about half as many A6M in service. The IJAAF is even worse off. The Ki 43 I is slowly coming into operational use. Basically, the Japanese are really no better off than at Nomohan facing off with the Soviets in the air. That will also drain their ability to deploy against the US, British, and Dutch.

It still comes down to the Japanese get nothing for attacking the Soviets while this benefits Germany to a great degree. I doubt that Japan wanted to be Germany's lap dog at the risk and expense of having their economy collapse and ending up in a war with the US, Dutch, and Britain on top of one with the Soviets.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Not a contradiction, just different issues:

1. Would Japan joining the anti-SU war would have resulted in SU's defeat?

2. Whether and under what conditions Japan would have joined the anti-SU war.

Answering "yes" to (1) doesn't imply sufficient conditions for Japan to join the anti-SU war.

Thanks for the clarification. I get that.

The IJA used only three divisions in Malaya.

True, and they were at the end of an extremely long and tenuous supply line so vulnerable to both increased fighting capacity if Allies given time to reinforce or to improve their woeful state of training. (I looked back at Jonathon Fennell's description of both the morale and training state of British forces in his "Fighting the People's War" and it is clear that both were woeful, but that perhaps this could (and indeed should) have been rectified in the OTL let alone if given more time).

IMO a couple months' delay wouldn't have made much difference. A little more training and a few more squadrons won't save Southeast Asia.

Possibly, but given rate of reinforcement of Allies a few weeks and months may have led to greater resistance, and then to greater reinforcement. Very difficult to quantify any of that though, obviously.

At some point I'll post an ATL in which the Wallies aren't as ghoulishly racist and actually plan to defend SE Asia with sufficient forces to repel a Japan that they take seriously.

The British Chiefs of Staff predicted that war with Japan would be calamitous - but the RN, certainly, withdraw forces from Singapore in order to fight the war that they were already in. I know that's true for RN submarines (which would have been a god send against Japanese amphibious forces) who had actually trained for just such a scenario. The needs of Mediterranean, however, dragged them west.

Edited to add: A little bit here about the withdrawal of British submarines from the Far East in March 1940 in an interesting article by James Goldrick:

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=JNm ... 41&f=false

Regards

Tom

[The Ibis]

Tom,
What did you think of Fennell's book? I've seen it pop up several times recently.
Thanks

[Tom from Cornwall]

Incidentally, the British discussed this from a different perspective after the war had broken out:

Winston S. Churchill to Anthony Eden
(Churchill Papers, 20/46)

12 December 1941

Before you left you asked for views of COS on the question whether it would be to our advantage for Russia to declare war on Japan. COS considered views are as follows:

(a) Russian declaration of war on Japan would be greatly to our advantage provided, but only provided, that the Russians are confident that it would not impair western front either now or next spring.

[…]

3. This appreciation raises the following questions:

(a) What air and land forces have the Russians in the Far East and what is the Russian estimate of the Japanese forces against which they would have to contend?
(b) How high do the Russians assess their ability as regards both trained personnel and equipment to maintain a war on two fronts, as the Vladivostok route would be closed?
(c) Have the Russians plans for striking at the mainland of Japan by air?
(d) Would the Russians welcome or facilitate the use of their bases in the Far East by the Americans.

Regards

Tom

[Tom from Cornwall]

Tom,
What did you think of Fennell's book? I've seen it pop up several times recently.
Thanks

Well worth getting hold of, in my opinion. He concentrates on using a variety of sources to discuss the moral and fighting performance of British Commonwealth forces on a world-wide scale - so it is a beast of a book as it covers the whole range of Commonwealth forces and covers all the campaigns they were involved with. Uses morale reports, censor reports, etc to really delve down into the highs (and lows) of British morale and how it changed throughout the war.

It's not a traditional narrative history though - so it can be quite a heavy read in places.

700 pages of book + 200 pages of notes and bibliography - what's not to like.

Regards

Tom

[paulrward]

Hello All :

I have read with interest Mr. Gardner's # 22, and have the following comments:

Gallup poll August 2 1941: Question was "Should America take steps to keep Japan
from becoming more powerful, even if it means war?"
51% of Americans said yes.
31% said no.
18% were undecided.

Mr. Gardner, look at your own numbers. A BARE majority ( 51 % ! ) supports ' tak(ing) steps to
keep Japan from becoming more powerful, even if it means war.' This DOES NOT MEAN they support
WAR, only ' taking steps '. And it is ONLY 51% ! 31 % ( nearly one third of the populace ) is against
doing ANYTHING that could lead to war, and another 18% haven't thought about it. Let us assume
you somehow get a DoW through Congress, and now the 18 % have to come to a decision. If they split
evenly on the issue, that means you are going to war with 60 % of the American people in favor of a
war, and 40 % AGAINST IT ! Does this sound like a real mandate for military action to you ? All it would
take would be one or two military disasters ( and in the summer of 1941, the Japanese were perfectly
capable of kicking the U.S. Army's and Navy's backsides ) and that number would switch around very
quickly. Now you have a war with the majority of the people AGAINST IT ! Just like Viet Nam !
Protests ! Draft Evasions ! Industrial Slowdowns ! Yeah, that sounds like the perfect formula for a
victorious war.

I'd say that the second Japan embarked on a war of expansion into the DEI, Malaysia, etc.,
the US would have been at war with Japan. The Japanese knew it, the British knew it, the
Dutch knew it, and the American public was behind it.

You'd say it, but the British did NOT ! In fact, the British came to the conclusion that if the
Japanese went into the N.E.I., they could only commit to military action IF the U.S. ALSO committed
to it. And, Freewheelin' Franklin, despite his statements to Churchill, could NOT definitively state
that the U.S. Congress would go along with a war to save the N.E.I. In fact, in discussions held in
the summer of 1941, it was pretty much conceded by the Roosevelt Cabinet that getting a DoW to
save the N.E.I. was going to be a very hard sell. This was why, when the Japanese went into
French IndoChina, the U.S. essentially huffed and puffed, and then stopped selling oil to Japan.

This was ALL that Roosevelt could do without Congressional approval. Now, if the Japanese went
into the N.E.I., and Roosevelt went to Congress and said, " Hey, I made a secret commitment to
the British to go to war..... " the fat would be in the fire ! A lot of Republican Congressmen and
Senators would be standing up and demanding to know what the hell else Roosevelt had committed
the United States to without the Advice and Consent of the Senate ! I can see the headlines in the
Chicago Tribune right now - ' Roosevelt Declares Secret War on Japan '

Further, Mr. Gardner, you did not read my posting carefully. I SPECIFICALLY STATED that the
Japanese would be leaving the British alone, NOT attacking any British or U.S. possessions. In
other words, NO INVASION OF MALAYA. ( At least, NOT in 1941 ! ) This means that for the British
to go to war, they first of all have to decide if the game is worth the candle, and then, exactly
HOW they can go to war against Japan on the other side of the world while they are still fighting
for their lives in Europe and Africa. Not an attractive prospect.

As for Hitler "giving title" to the Japanese over the DEI, not happening. The Dutch
government in exile was recognized by the US and any such proclamation by Germany would
have no real diplomatic value.

Not Happening, says YOU ! This is EXACTLY what happened with French IndoChina ! Hitler told Vichy to
give IndoChina to the Japanese, and the French, like good little frogs, only asked, " How High ? " You say
it would have " no real diplomatic value ". Big deal. The notion that something has ' Diplomatic Value'
is not worth discussing during a war. What it would have is Propaganda Value ! The German American
Bund and the George Washington Society could trumpet it to the heavens that Japan was moving into
the N.E.I. with the explicit permission and assistance of the Netherlands Government in the Hague. As
for Queen Wilhemina, let her bitch and moan in London. A Government in Exile has ' no real diplomatic
value ' !

At the time Japan historically declared war, the US had contracts,,,,, These were part
of an order....The Dutch ordered ......They were buying.......... to fill the gaps.

Mr. Gardner, look at your own posting. The Dutch had contracts, orders, they were buying. NOTHING
WAS THERE ! They had only a few obsolete bombers and fighters, a few aging cruisers, a dozen or so
destroyers and an equal number of submarines. They were impotent. And, as for the Marmon-Herrington
Two Man Tank......

Marmom Herrington

marmon herrington.jpg (51.49 KiB) Viewed 619 times

Yeah. Two thirty caliber machine guns and a big wind up key ! You really gotta laugh at that thing.

If the Japanese go to war against the Russians in June 1941, then the Japanese
too are in much worse shape.

Mr. Gardner, if the Japanese go to war against the Russians in June 1941, they are NOT doing it to
defeat the Russians, or even to FIGHT the Russians. They are doing it to simply prevent the Soviets
from re-deploying their Far Eastern Forces into the west. They are a delaying force, playing
Cunctator in order to pin down Soviet military assets long enough to allow the Germans to finish
off the Soviet Army outside of Moscow. Then, once the U.S.S.R. is beaten, the Japanese can
feed on some of the available bits and pieces on the Pacific Rim, while at that same time finishing
off China with no Soviet interference.

And, as for the Soviet Far Eastern Air Force, it was armed, in the summer of 1941, with a mix of
Polikarpov I-16s and I-153s. Neither of which could compete with the A6M1, and which were, at
best, evenly matched against the Ki-27. What is more, the quality of Soviet pilots was poor in
1941. Their flight hours had been drastically cut back for over a year due to fuel shortages, and
they were getting an average of one hour of flight time per week. Barely enough to keep
competent, much less stay at a fine edge for aerial combat.

,,,,, That will also drain their ability to deploy against the US, British, and Dutch.

Mr. Gardner, I will say it again, ad infinitum to the point of ad nauseum, the Japanese do NOT
ATTACK EITHER BRITAIN OR THE U.S. ! They stay away from both nations and their possessions,
and only go after the N.E.I. and Kamchatka ! This leaves both the U.S. and Britain in the
exact same posiition they had occupied a year earlier with IndoChina - sputtering angrily but
impotently against the Japanese aggression, and doing NOTHING ABOUT IT !

Britain hoped that if Japan went into the N.E.I., that the United States would declare war,
and Britain would have a real ally against Hitler, but would NOT have to do any real heavy lifting
in terms of fighing in the Pacific. Roosevelt, on the other hand, wanted Churchills' commitment
to have the British attack the Japanese in the event of an N.E.I. invasion, and then the
United States could somehow contrive to have a few ships sunk by the Japanese, allowing
the U.S. to be dragged into the war, protesting and screaming. In other words, it was a case
of " After you, my dear Alphonse!" " No, After YOU, my dear Gaston..."

This is paralysis in action ! If the Japanese invaded the N.E.I., the United States and Britain
would sit on their hands, working desperately to build up their own forces to resist the Japanese,
but taking no action to provoke the Japanese before Churchill and Roosevelt felt that they were
ready to go to war. And that was sometime in the summer of 1942, when the Philippines would
be finished with it's re-armament program of over 150 B-17s, about 200 P-40 fighters, a division
of light armor, several more divisions of infantry, some artillery, and a buildup of ships for the
Asiatic Fleet that would all serve as a deterrent to Japan. In 1941, Roosevelt was threatening
the Japanese, desperately playing for time to try and keep them immobile until the U.S. had
completed it's arms buildup in the Pacific. That was why he moved the fleet to Pearl Harbor.
It was to keep the Japanese from taking any action. If the Japanese took action anyway,
then Roosevelt's policy would have been seen for the failure it ultimately proved to be.

Mr. Gardner, playing for time does NOT mean going to war ! It is the exact opposite !

It still comes down to the Japanese get nothing for attacking the Soviets while this benefits Germany to a great degree.

Here. Mr. Gardner, is where your intellectual blind spot becomes glaringly obvious. It is ONLY if the Allies
WIN that Japan gains nothing. If, on the other hand, IF the U.S.S.R. is defeated, and the U.S. is politically
neutralized, then Japan gets EVERYTHING ! Once the Soviets are out of the war, it is back to being
GAME ON between Germany and Britain ! This means a deepening U-Boat War, more bombings of British
cities, the Armies of the Reich moving down from Russia into the Middle East, while at the same time, Japan
can start putting diplomatic, economic, and military pressure on the Britain in the Far East. Historically,
Australia and New Zealand demanded their troops back. This might get even worse, and if the Japanese
begin taking covert diplomatic actions in India, supporting Gandhi and Nehru, the British could find themselves
facing an Indian Uprising when they can least resist it. Seeing the way the wind is blowing with the collapse
of the USSR, Sweden and Turkey might join the Axis in the same way that Spain did, as active collaborators.

Mr. Gardner, many years ago some friends and I combined three commercially available wargames manufactured
by Simulations Publications Incorporated, called War in the East, War in the West, and War in the Pacific,
to try to game exactly what would happen if the U.S. is kept OUT of the war by adroit actions of the Axis
Powers. For the Allies, it wasn't pretty. With no U.S., the Allies peter out in 1945, leaving only North
and South America. And Argentina has a lot of Germans living there.......


Respectfully :

Paul R. Ward

[The Ibis]

Tom,
What did you think of Fennell's book? I've seen it pop up several times recently.
Thanks

Well worth getting hold of, in my opinion. He concentrates on using a variety of sources to discuss the moral and fighting performance of British Commonwealth forces on a world-wide scale - so it is a beast of a book as it covers the whole range of Commonwealth forces and covers all the campaigns they were involved with. Uses morale reports, censor reports, etc to really delve down into the highs (and lows) of British morale and how it changed throughout the war.

It's not a traditional narrative history though - so it can be quite a heavy read in places.

700 pages of book + 200 pages of notes and bibliography - what's not to like.

Regards

Tom

Thanks Tom. Adding to the list!

[History Learner]

"If the Japanese enter the war on Hitler's side...our cause is hopeless."

Major General A. K. Kazakovtsev, Operations Chief of the Far Eastern Front in 1941

"We dreaded and we feared the specter of the Kwantung Army. We pleaded with the Russians, since the very day of Pearl Harbor, to pin down the Kwantung Army, relieve pressure upon our hardpressed forces in the Philippines, and thereby “save the Pacific” from the Japanese, as General MacArthur put it. At the same time we (and the Soviets) worried lest the Japanese assault the USSR first, like the jackal Mussolini had jumped the reeling French in 1940. . . . When, for example, the American Military Mission proposed to the Russians, in December 1943, that a U. S.-supplied logistical base be set up east of Lake Baikal in Siberia, the Soviet Army authorities were shocked by the idea and “literally turned white.”

ALVIN D. COOX, “The Myth of the Kwantung Army,” 1958

With hindsight we can easily see this would have been grossly wrong in favor of the Soviets.

First, the Soviets never let their forces in Siberia or the Pacific fronts along the Manchukuo border drop to anything close to parity with the Japanese. They always had far more troops stationed there than Japan. What they did was ship trained units to European Russia as reinforcements without their equipment and then stood up a new draft of men to replace them with the same equipment in the Far East. The Soviets always had gross advantages in the number of tanks--not to mention better ones--, artillery, aircraft, etc., in the Far East compared to Japan.

As the Nomohan incident proves rather conclusively, Japan could barely keep one infantry division supplied and supported for offensive operations along most of the Manchurian border as well as into Mongolia. The Japanese simply don't have the logistics infrastructure to support a large offensive into Russia with any real hope of success.

Then there's China to consider. Even if Japan doesn't strike South and against the US, the IJA will be forced to keep considerable troops in China to face off against the various Chinese factions. Even if no offensive operations occur, they will have to keep a dozen plus divisions there just to occupy ground and prevent a Chinese offensive from success.

Then there's the US, British, and DEI response to this offensive. If the three just place a total embargo on trade with Japan, the Japanese have something like six months and they're out of oil, rubber, aluminum, etc. Their economy collapses and that ends the story right there--no war in the Pacific needed.

So, how does Japan win such a scenario? The answer is, they don't. They lose and lose big. Even if the Soviet defense is incompetent the Japanese lose. They can't support a broad defense in China and an offensive into the Soviet Union while not having the imports to maintain their economy. Top that off with the offensive being just the IJA as the IJN really wouldn't have much use or input into such a campaign while the IJN would continue to build and maintain a large navy as a rival service who really doesn't care too much what the IJA is doing.

It's not a matter of hindsight, but one of the available research. Case in point: on June 1st, 1941 between both Far Eastern Front and the Trans-Baikal Military District had a combined total of 650,693 personnel. Japanese War Planning for Kantokuen would have them at 50 Divisions by D+90, or over 1.25 Million men; Soviet operational planning was for 60 Divisions, which would mean 840,000 men. Further, the qualitative and logistical edge was with the Japanese:

The Soviets, on the other hand, operated under the shadow of the raging war with Germany. Although the Far Eastern and Trans-Baikal Fronts had access to a formidable array of weaponry, the demands of the fighting in Europe meant that strength was siphoned away by the week. Moreover, the state of those vehicles that remained was often mixed: prior to the beginning of transfers westward in 1941 some 660 tanks[130] and 347 aircraft[131] were inoperable due to repair needs or other causes. Because the Soviets only possessed a limited offensive capability on the Primorye and Trans-Baikal directions, they could never hope to achieve a decisive victory over the Kwantung Army, even if they succeeded in slowing or stopping them.[132] Furthermore, attacking into the teeth of a prepared enemy, especially one with his own fortified regions and heavy concentrations of troops immediately opposite the border, was "the hardest kind of offensive," requiring "overwhelming numbers and massive means of assault" to succeed,[133] neither of which the Soviets possessed.[134]

Soviet forces in the Far East were dispersed over a vast arc from Mongolia to Vladivostok. Without the ability to capitalize on this deployment by striking deep into Manchuria from multiple axes, their strength would be fatally diluted and prone to piecemeal destruction at the hands of the Japanese, who could maneuver freely on their interior lines, concentrating their power at will while the immobile Red Army was fixed in place.[135] The only saving grace for the Soviets was that the remoteness of the Far East from European Russia meant that Japan alone could never hope to deal a mortal blow to the USSR, for which the former would be reliant on Germany.[136]

Organizationally, although Soviet forces in the Far East on paper amounted to some 32 division-equivalents by December 1941,[137] they were regarded as only barely sufficient for defensive operations. Compared to a typical Japanese division, pre-war Red Army units possessed slightly less manpower, but had greater access to long-range, higher caliber artillery. After the German invasion, however, the Red Army was reorganized so that each division had scarcely half the manpower and a fraction of the firepower of either its German or Japanese counterpart. Hence, to achieve superiority on the battlefield the Soviets would have to concentrate several divisions to counter each of the opponent's.[138]

Further:

Lastly, the quality of both personnel and equipment in the respective armies cannot be ignored. As the Soviets drained their best, most well-trained divisions to fight in the west, the overall standard of the forces in the east correspondingly diminished, forcing the STAVKA to rely more heavily on its fortified regions in defensive operations.[149] Meanwhile, the Kwantung Army opposite them then constituted "the cream of the entire Japanese armed forces,"[150] and was receiving reinforcements by the day. A large proportion of its units were elite Type A divisions,[r] many of which had seen extensive service in China. The quality of the Japanese officer corps was also very high, as many figures who would go on to have notable careers in the Pacific War including Tomoyuki Yamashita (head of the Kwantung Defense Command and later First Area Army), Isamu Yokoyama (1st Division, later 4th Army), Mitsuru Ushijima (11th Division),[152] and Tadamichi Kuribayashi (1st Cavalry Brigade, Mongolia Garrison Army)[153] held commands there. While both sides primarily relied on bolt-action rifles and light automatic weapons as the backbone of the infantry, Japanese artillery often found itself outranged by the heavy Soviet guns at Khalkhin Gol, to the point where the IJA felt compelled to move their 15 cm howitzers closer to the front in order to bring them to bear, even at the expense of cover.[154] Even though the Japanese managed to disable a considerable number of Soviet guns through counterbattery fire,[155] their lack of range at extreme distances and shortage of ammunition left them at a distinct disadvantage against the Red Army.[156]


The formidable 152 mm ML-20 Howitzer-Gun was capable of out-ranging most Japanese pieces, and fired a shell weighing 43.6 kg.
Tanks presented a mixed picture as well: although the most modern machine available to the Kwantung Army in 1941, the Type 97 Chi-Ha, had thicker armor (up to 33 mm)[157] compared to the Soviet BT and T-26, its low-velocity 57 mm gun common to medium tanks of the era was outmatched by the long-barreled 45 mm weapons mounted on its opposite numbers, while the 37 mm gun used on the Ha-Go and Te-Ke had an effective range of less than a kilometer.[158] In general, while the "handcrafted, beautifully polished" Japanese tanks were more survivable thanks to their diesel engines (the gasoline powerplants used by the Russians were especially fireprone[159]), their lesser numbers meant that each loss was more damaging to the IJA than each destroyed "crudely finished," "expendable" BT or T-26 was to the Red Army.[160] The balance in the air would have been strongly in favor of the Japanese. Although the most modern fighter in the Soviet Air Force arsenal available in the Far East, the Polikarpov I-16, was a firm opponent of the Nakajima Ki-27,[161][s] the majority of planes in-theater were considerably older. Furthermore, the Soviets had no answer to either the Mitsubishi A6M, which had been fighting in China since 1940,[162] or the high-speed Ki-21 bomber, which could fly faster and farther than its contemporary, the SB-2.[163][164] Japanese pilots were also highly experienced, with IJNAS airmen averaging roughly 700 hours of flight time by late 1941, and IJAAF aviators averaging 500. Many of these fliers had already tasted combat against China or the VVS in previous battles.[165] In comparison, German pilots received about 230 hours of flying time and Soviet pilots even less.[166]

As for the Khalkhin Gol example:

During the actual fighting at Khalkhin Gol both the Japanese tanks and infantry consistently outfought their Soviet opponents: although the BTs were better on paper than the Japanese Ha-Gos, the Yasuoka Group tankers knocked out many more Soviet vehicles in pitched engagements than they themselves lost in return, and each time the Red Army attempted infantry attacks on the Japanese positions they were slaughtered. The worst case of this was the series of probes Zhukov launched on 7/8 August to "feel out" the defenders prior to the big show on the 20th; the combined results of these were over 1,000 abandoned corpses on the Soviet side and several tanks knocked out, whereas Japanese casualties (not just killed, but casualties) numbered just 85. On the whole, prior to Zhukov's general offensive on August 20th the battle was largely a stalemate, with the Soviets being on the receiving end of a nearly 3 to 1 casualty ratio (a ratio also present at Lake Khasan, where the Japanese were even more outnumbered and outgunned).

In reality the Japanese Army's claims of damage inflicted on the Soviet side were significantly understated compared to the real thing, a situation paralleled by the Finnish Army's claims in the Winter War. According to figures used by the Japanese in the aftermath of the battle, their estimate of Soviet casualties was about 18,000 ("not less" than their own) with 400 AFVs destroyed - the real figures were 27,880 and 386, respectively. The only major overclaim was in the air, where IJAAF aviators reported over 1,200 downed Red planes, more than six times the actual total. The Soviet 1st Army Group, for their part, initially gave Japanese casualties as 29,085, which was much closer to the truth than the 50 or 60 thousand often seen in "official" sources.

Further:

According to page 71 of Ed Drea's "Soviet-Japanese Tactical Combat," a big part of why Komatsubara was caught off-guard by Zhukov was because the existing logistics immediately available to the 1st Army Group (2,600 trucks, including 1,000 fuel tankers) were inadequate to meet the needs of an attack the size of the one actually launched, estimated at 5,000 trucks. To bridge the gap, Zhukov was sent an additional 1,625 from European Russia, which proved "barely adequate" to do the job. The concentration of these together with his existing motor pool was seen as "incomprehensible" to the Japanese, but it demonstrated that the other parts of the Soviet Far East were either unwilling or unable to help Zhukov and STAVKA had to tap the main body of the Red Army to settle the issue at Khalkhin Gol.

Had the Japanese commitment to Nomonhan been much larger from the beginning, it appears that the corresponding supply burden on the Soviet side to counteract it might indeed have been borne entirely by trucks from European Russia, which would have progressively weakened Soviet capabilities there on the eve of the premeditated war against Finland. Such a thing would have been unacceptable to Stalin and the top leadership, putting a hard cap on the extent to which the Red Army could send additional support to the battlefront.

Furthermore, going through the 1st Army Group TO&E (http://www.armchairgeneral.com/rkkaww2/ ... n_cut1.pdf), for the climactic battle in August the Soviets only had 262 towed artillery pieces of 76 mm to 152 mm in caliber, a total recently boosted by the 76 guns of the 57th Rifle Division that arrived that month (the majority of the 1st Army Group's reinforcements were compiled in July, not August). Adding up the combined total from both the Japanese forces that were defeated at Khalkhin Gol (82 field guns plus 16 regimental guns that could double as field artillery) together with the relief force (350 to 400 field pieces and regimental guns depending on some specifics) and the Soviets are suddenly horribly outgunned, even if their ML-20s had a range advantage. Looking back on it, Coox's claim that this grouping was "fatally deficient" in artillery seems totally absurd, considering it alone had half again the firepower of Zhukov's entire force. What was he thinking?

The only decisive advantage the Red Army would still possess would be the number of tanks, and the Japanese reinforcement group would have had up to 200 anti-tank guns and 276 AT Rifles with them as well. If the 23rd Division and the two regiments from the 7th Division were alone enough to knock out nearly 400 Soviet tanks and armored cars, I don't think even the entire combined armored strength of the Trans-Baikal Military District would have been enough to defeat them had they been there from the start. Frankly, under the circumstances of a "maximum effort" from the Kwantung Army out of the gate it's looking more and more like Zhukov might not have been able to achieve anything like the victory he historically won within the framework of Soviet political and military planning at the time, even allowing for more leeway from Stalin; instead 1st Army Group might have been stalemated and bled white. I may have to retract my initial claim that Soviet victory was inevitable under most all circumstances - in a vacuum, yes, but realistically I'm not so sure.

[T. A. Gardner]

The short version is this, and nobody's gotten around it yet. In fact, others are arguing that in fact this is the case.

1. The Japanese at best gain some ground into the Soviet Union at a relatively high cost in combat strength as they have--at best-- parity in manpower for their offensive and are likely to be outnumbered. Japanese "fighting spirit" won't cut the mustard in making up for lack of strength. If their offensive bogs down even a little, they are likely going to end up in a war of attrition they can't afford or win--regardless of what the outcome with Germany is.

2. The US, Dutch, and British will embargo Japan totally leading to a loss of imports that will cripple their economy within months. Therefore, if the offensive takes more than say 3 to 4 months to conclude--a virtually impossible scenario-- Japan loses as their economy collapses. Germany won't win in Russia by October so, the Japanese are totally hosed here.

3. The Japanese cannot fight a simultaneous war in China, against the Soviets, and invade the Philippines, DEI, and Malaysia getting into a war with those nations--and the US to prevent the crippling of their economy. They don't have sufficient troop strength for all three. On top of the 50 divisions needed in Manchukuo, they'll need a couple dozen more in China, and at least a dozen well-equipped ones to even attempt to attack the PI, DEI, and Malaya. This will also involve using most of their merchant fleet being taken out of regular service to move troops and supplies. Another non-starter. The Japanese can't come up with close to 100 divisions that are of reasonable quality for this.

4. The only beneficiary of this plan is Germany who gets a significant edge during the early stages of Barbarossa.

5. If Japan gets into a war with the US, regardless of what's happening in Europe with Germany, Japan loses that war. Germany can't help Japan to any worthwhile extent and the US will crush Japan.

Bottom line, the Japanese would have to be complete idiots to embark on this line of military action as it doesn't benefit them in the least.