Turkey joins the War in May 1941. Soviet Union's Reaction

[Peter89]

Would we see a limited war scenario, with the Soviets only fighting the Germans in Turkey itself?

I can't see Hitler abiding dead Germans at Stalin's hands or vice versa.

While the German move against Turkey means war, maybe not in '41. Stalin might have been better-served merely renounce the M-R Pact, accelerate ongoing mobilization, and extract from Britain/US the technological help formerly given by Germany. Then invade in '42 or maybe wait a bit longer, let the W.Allies bleed in the Mideast. Either way it's a fiasco for Germany and the ATL outcome might be Soviet victory on the relative cheap, plus the long-sought concessions in Turkey.

The W.Allies can't do both Overlord and a big Anatolian campaign so either Greece/Turkey fall to SU or Western Europe. W.Allies choose to save the West of course but SU gets more of Germany than OTL. Maybe most of Germany becomes Communist post-war, SU is much stronger, as are the Eastern European members of Warsaw Pact. Greece and Turkey are communist, the Mid-East aligns with SU markedly (the Baathist parts - everything north of Arabia). That'd be a big swerve of history.

Okays, I think we'll never reach an agreement that Turkey had to be occupied, especially in conjunction with the SU. I simply do not see clearly why do you think that Germany / Axis actually had the power to do that. They couldn't even accomplish to finish off the BE, they couldn't accomplish to finish off the SU - but now they can do both AND Turkey? How?

As you pointed out correctly, the Barbarossa was ill-conceived, but even if the Germans prepare for a 2 years campaign, even if they are able to beat the Soviets (whom - as you pointed out correctly again - were preparing for war at a terrifying pace), and knock them out of the war we are already in the year of 1943, they've lost the war economically.

Also, "the attack of Europe by the Soviets" is highly unlikely before the Germans had to finish off the BE (+keep the US out of the war).

However, to finish off the BE before the US entry into the war or before the hypothetical Soviet attack was possible, especially with the correct strategy (including cooperating with Japan and Italy).

In a matter of 30 days, the British had, under threat of attack by Iraqi
forces at RAF Habbaniya, initiated and won a war that was nevertheless
forced on them by a nationalist political clique determined to remove
British influence from Iraq and to replace it with that of Germany, at
a time when Iraq was critical to Great Britain's survival. That Britain
needed to fight to preserve its rights in Iraq was understood clearly by
the Prime Minister who saw that to lose control of Iraq would not just
deny Britain her precious oil, but allow Germany to dominate the whole of
the Middle East, Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean, threaten Palestine and
Egypt from the east, cut off the aerial line of communication to India
and menace India itself. The loss of Iraq would have made the retention
of the Suez Canal impossible, especially if Rommel had managed to force
his way in from the west.

These threats, at a time when Germany had yet to commit itself to Barbarossa,
were very real at the the time and justified all the pressure Churchill
and the Chiefs of Staff, who unanimously supported the Prime Minister,
brought to bear on a reluctant Wavell. Churchill's instinct, mirroring
that of both Linlighgow and Auchinleck in India, that a deicisive blow
against Iraq was necessary despite the paucity of resources available
to Wavell for the task, was undoubtedly the correct one.

Robert Lyman: Iraq 1941: The battles for Basra, Habbaniya, Fallujah and Baghdad, p. 90.

But as the OTL timeline shows, the Germans could have landed their troops embarked for the Battle of Crete (7th Fliegerdivision, 5th Mountain Division) + at least the crack 22nd Air Landing Division in Iraq, as they were able to fly in their Luftwaffe units with virtually no losses, and operate them on local fuel (although the quality of that fuel was substandard). They could have done it on a much bigger scale and repel the hodgepodge units that the British could throw at them (and train & equip the Iraqi forces as they tried to do in OTL).

Also, if the Japanese attack the colonial empires and leave the US be in a formally neutral state, the push to the Indian Ocean, Burma and India - not to mention the isolation of Australia - in 1942 could have resulted the collapse of the BE.

But back to the original topic, my point here is that the invasion of Turkey was unnecessary for the Axis - either for defeating the BE or the SU. The Barbarossa didn't fail because there wasn't a Caucasus front, and the actions against the BE didn't fail because the Axis didn't invade Turkey.

The Germans could have very easily establish a brigehead in the ME, they just didn't care, because they wanted to invade the SU.

On 6 May, in accordance with the Paris Protocols, Germany concluded a deal with the Vichy French government to
release war materials, including aircraft, from sealed stockpiles in Syria and transport them to the Iraqis. The French
also agreed to allow passage of other weapons and material as well as loaning several airbases in northern Syria, to
Germany, for the transport of German aircraft to Iraq. Between 9 May and the end of the month, about
one-hundred German and about twenty Italian aircraft landed on Syrian airfields.

Under the same protocols the Germans were granted to use the ports of the Vichy France as well - the highpoint of the German-Vichy relations, but it also meant that the Axis does not need Turkey to deploy troops in the ME.

Also, the Reza Shah government, that was pro-German, could have invited German troops in order to prevent the Operation Countenance (which was to be conducted by the British forces anyway, even without Soviet help), thus bypassing the Turks once more, and providing an excellent springboard against an invasion of the Soviet oilfields, if deemed necessary for a 1942 campaign against the SU, or mutual exposure (the Soviets did the same with the Romanian oil fields).

For all I know, it was much more sensible to attack Portugal and / or Spain than Turkey.

[Carl Schwamberger]

... Those without were, in the main, consigned to the eastern provinces - hostilities with the Soviets being considered unlikely, and high intensity combat along modern lines virtually impossible due to the poverty of communications.''
-The Turkish Armed Forces On The Eve Of The Second World War: The British View, by Brock Millman.

Of course we'd want reliable numbers before making a firm conclusion, but that the Turkish senior military staff would make such a judgment of transportation in eastern Anatolia says something.

[OldBill]

Something I've not seen mentioned in all these prognostications of the Turkish military collapsing, is guerilla warfare. The Ottomans had hundreds of years of experience in combatting guerilla's, so I think they (the Turks, former Ottomans) will be fairly proficient at being guerilla's themselves. Germany will have to guard the entirety of their railway communications. There is also the religious aspect of this, if Germany attacks, they can easily (and I believe they would quickly be) painted as Anti-Muslim, even if a large scale religious war doesn't occur from this, enough elements will take up arms that the LOC of Germany will be constantly under attack.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Something I've not seen mentioned in all these prognostications of the Turkish military collapsing, is guerilla warfare. ... even if a large scale religious war doesn't occur from this, enough elements will take up arms that the LOC of Germany will be constantly under attack.

It could also serve as a school for the Brits and later the Yanks for attacking railways and automobile transportation. A larger scale classroom than the North African littoral. They;d be learning the sort of lessons that were not seen until the start of the Italian campaign in 1943.

[TheMarcksPlan]

they've lost the war economically.

I'm going to reserve answering that for my other thread on the topic. viewtopic.php?f=76&t=251476#p2288097

Further thoughts in progress.

Barbarossa didn't fail because there wasn't a Caucasus front

Agreed. Not a decisive factor against SU, or even a major one. Caucasus front isn't even as important as the logistical/strategic consequences of open Straits.

However, to finish off the BE before the US entry into the war or before the hypothetical Soviet attack was possible, especially with the correct strategy (including cooperating with Japan and Italy).

This topic comes up again and again. I don't see how air (or sea?) logistics support a leap to Iraq and beyond, even with Vichy cooperation. Surely you've addressed this somewhere.

[Gooner1]

But as the OTL timeline shows, the Germans could have landed their troops embarked for the Battle of Crete (7th Fliegerdivision, 5th Mountain Division) + at least the crack 22nd Air Landing Division in Iraq, as they were able to fly in their Luftwaffe units with virtually no losses, and operate them on local fuel (although the quality of that fuel was substandard). They could have done it on a much bigger scale and repel the hodgepodge units that the British could throw at them (and train & equip the Iraqi forces as they tried to do in OTL).

Vichy Syria held enough aviation fuel to permit a much greater scale of of German and Italian Air force involvement?
The Airfield at Habbaniya and the port of Basra were already under secure British control by the time the French in Syria had allowed the Germans to use their airfields and had released weapons and supplies from their stocks. The British had moved quickly, it was probably too late for the Axis to do much more than dangle a small number of troops at the end of a very tenuous supply line, perhaps delaying the defeat of the revolt for a few days and diverting some of the reinforcements for Egypt.
Amongst the 'hodgepodge' of units the British assembled in Iraq was 10th Indian Division under the command of Bill Slim.

[Peter89]

Barbarossa didn't fail because there wasn't a Caucasus front

Agreed. Not a decisive factor against SU, or even a major one. Caucasus front isn't even as important as the logistical/strategic consequences of open Straits.

However, to finish off the BE before the US entry into the war or before the hypothetical Soviet attack was possible, especially with the correct strategy (including cooperating with Japan and Italy).

This topic comes up again and again. I don't see how air (or sea?) logistics support a leap to Iraq and beyond, even with Vichy cooperation. Surely you've addressed this somewhere.

Indeed I have, just not on this forum and not in English

(You see, I just used to read this forum for a very long time, and I go on and off of it as my time permits me to post. It is still not my primary intellectual battle zone.)

Not entirely offtopic, so I can go into details a bit.

Germany lacked a coherent strategy how to defeat the British Empire and her allies. (Don't forget that the Free French continued to fight on too, even after France itself fell.)

By mid-1940 the Reich found itself in a war it could actually afford. The existing and captured stocks enabled the conclusion of the war before the British could mobilize their superior resources and muster the full help of the Americans. Even though at that time it seemed madness, but Churchill as a real British politican, stood up against the shadow of "unified Europe", and wanted to isolate the Axis into the continent as long as he could.

As Italian Foreign Minister Galeazzo Ciano noted after a visit to Munich in June 1940, Hitler resembled a successful gambler who "has made a big scoop and would like to get up from the table, risking nothing more." Ciano's description was most apt, for Hitler did, indeed, wish to escape a war against Britain. He calculated, quite correctly, that those who stood most to gain from a British defeat were the Japanese and the Americans and not the Germans.

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/AAF ... ffe-3.html

Hitler / the German high command was not unrealistic in 1940, he / they just didn't know what to do. From their POV, the British should have offered peace, or they should offer peace soon.

The first blow came when Italy declared war for no reason, so they've lost a substantial amount and their best quality merchant ships.

Then the Germans tried to challenge the British for air supremacy (something that was not helpful at all, and they were not prepared to do it anyway).

And then, instead of overrunning the British possessions in the Med, they lost their pilots and plans like crazy. And it was clear that a bombing campaign without the prospect of a land invasion meant no real threat to the British.
The Germans did not cooperate with the Italians to occupy the Balkans in time, or to reinforce them in NA, so the British were able to score a number of victories against them.

The Germans also missed the opportunity to consolidate their colonial gains after the occupation of France. The Italian attack towards the British positions in Egypt were extremely important for the Germans, because Egypt, Sudan and Palestine were at the junction of a continous Axis colonial possessions, especially after Iraq rebelled and Iran started to develop strong pro-German sentiments.

They also screwed up the German-Vichy cooperation, and even though a number of the Vichy troops - angered by the British "friendly fire" - were ready to cooperate to some degree - at least for self-defense. They didn't even understand the meaning of the Battle of Dakar. The Paris Protocols were hastily put together, instead of being a part of a grand strategy.

As for our topic at hand, the Axis would be able to encircle Turkey from the northwest, west, south, and potentially, the east by mid-1941, so under the threat of invasion, and presenting the sole prospect of being a trade partner, they could have get everything from Turkey they wanted (which was not too much btw).

(I seriously went through and through about the logistics of a Mediterran / ME campaign, and I firmly believe that the Axis had the necessary men, equipment and matériel in the region to achieve these objectives. It's no wonder why Churchill put so much energy into this theatre. Maybe I'll start a thread about it some time.)

[Peter89]

But as the OTL timeline shows, the Germans could have landed their troops embarked for the Battle of Crete (7th Fliegerdivision, 5th Mountain Division) + at least the crack 22nd Air Landing Division in Iraq, as they were able to fly in their Luftwaffe units with virtually no losses, and operate them on local fuel (although the quality of that fuel was substandard). They could have done it on a much bigger scale and repel the hodgepodge units that the British could throw at them (and train & equip the Iraqi forces as they tried to do in OTL).

Vichy Syria held enough aviation fuel to permit a much greater scale of of German and Italian Air force involvement?

Not Vichy Syria; the German help had to go to Iraq Vichy Syria had enough aviation fuel to allow the German troops to arrive to Iraq. We are pre-Merkur. The Germans had both the airlift capacity and the special troops for this job.

The Airfield at Habbaniya and the port of Basra were already under secure British control by the time the French in Syria had allowed the Germans to use their airfields and had released weapons and supplies from their stocks.

It's another topic why the Germans didn't have their troops in the area in time. But even so, the Germans could have redirected their attack from Crete to Iraq. They simply didn't want to, because the serious and long-term commitment in the ME was a strain on their resources, and they couldn't afford it on the eve of Barbarossa.

The British had moved quickly, it was probably too late for the Axis to do much more than dangle a small number of troops at the end of a very tenuous supply line, perhaps delaying the defeat of the revolt for a few days and diverting some of the reinforcements for Egypt.

Yes, the British have strategically outplayed the Germans in this case. Slow and insufficient reactions were the signs of the lack of strategy and vision. Besides, the Germans were gearing up for the Barbarossa.

Amongst the 'hodgepodge' of units the British assembled in Iraq was 10th Indian Division under the command of Bill Slim.

Yes, I am well aware. No need for quotation marks.

[Gooner1]

... Vichy Syria had enough aviation fuel to allow the German troops to arrive to Iraq.

That would be thousands of tons of aviation fuel.

It's another topic why the Germans didn't have their troops in the area in time. But even so, the Germans could have redirected their attack from Crete to Iraq. They simply didn't want to, because the serious and long-term commitment in the ME was a strain on their resources, and they couldn't afford it on the eve of Barbarossa.

The Germans didn't have any troops in the area because they didn't have any allies in the area. The nearest they could get to Iraq was the Italian colony of Rhodes - about 1,300 kilometres from Mosul. They could, I suppose, have tried to inveigle Vichy Syria to grant them access earlier .. but that would just have prompted an earlier reply from the British.

[Dark Age]

...
Thank you for this helpful post. I heard Mediterranean/Middle East what-if scenarios before, but no one ever mentions how rich (in oil) the Middle East was in 1940-1941 (meaning how much oil was known/discovered) ....

Whats usually discussed the few times its taken seriously, is how little actual extraction there was, and the limits on export transportation. Take a hard look at how much a month could realistically be moved from Mosul to Germany and compare that with the requirements of the greater Reich. Not just for military operations in the field, but for industrial purposes. To properly exploit occupied Europes industrial potential energy imports comparable to those of 1938 or later was necessary. Germany did have a surfeit of coal, but that was largely low btu soft brown coal. On paper there were large reserves of coal and oil within Germanys reach, but at the realistic production capacity of war crippled Europe that potential won't be realized in 1942 or even 1945. Post war it took the combined peacetime industrial capacity of Europe and the US to reach the energy exploitation levels of 1955. Maybe Germany can reach the levels it needs on its own through some sort of ten year plan. But, importing decisive levels of oil in a year or two is not realistic.

One of the problems the German administrators arriving in Mosul would contend with is the transport system was aimed south. Excepting the vulnerable pipeline diverting to the Levant the transport is set up to carry the oil south to Abadan & nowhere else. What are the physical requirements for taking the oil out of the storage tanks (assuming any are intact) & getting it to refineries somewhere in Europe?

Thank you for the info. I suppose occupying the Middle East for oil in 1941 requires some extensive foresight. I guess Germany wouldn't be significantly stronger in oil if it occupied the Middle East in 1941 until a few years after, at least.

[Carl Schwamberger]

... Vichy Syria had enough aviation fuel to allow the German troops to arrive to Iraq.

That would be thousands of tons of aviation fuel.

It's another topic why the Germans didn't have their troops in the area in time. But even so, the Germans could have redirected their attack from Crete to Iraq. They simply didn't want to, because the serious and long-term commitment in the ME was a strain on their resources, and they couldn't afford it on the eve of Barbarossa.

The Germans didn't have any troops in the area because they didn't have any allies in the area. The nearest they could get to Iraq was the Italian colony of Rhodes - about 1,300 kilometres from Mosul. They could, I suppose, have tried to inveigle Vichy Syria to grant them access earlier .. but that would just have prompted an earlier reply from the British.

Student proposed a plan post Crete, to use the airborne corps to first seize Cyprus, then a port on the Levant coast. Hitler dismissed it. Since such a plan would depend on the Italian Navy for swift follow up it quickly get complicated.

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
As for our topic at hand, the Axis would be able to encircle Turkey from the northwest, west, south, and potentially, the east by mid-1941, so under the threat of invasion, and presenting the sole prospect of being a trade partner, they could have get everything from Turkey they wanted (which was not too much btw).

(I seriously went through and through about the logistics of a Mediterran / ME campaign, and I firmly believe that the Axis had the necessary men, equipment and matériel in the region to achieve these objectives. It's no wonder why Churchill put so much energy into this theatre. Maybe I'll start a thread about it some time.)

Some years ago a acquaintance & I worked out a game model that would serve to examine this. A lot of OB & logistics research necessary to complete it, but the skeleton is on paper. Wonder if I should put that back on the table?

[Dark Age]

If Germany has not resolved the impasse with the USSR, then why would they strike at Turkey first? That is a very risky strategy, especially if the Soviets militarily intervene (which they are damn near certain to do, as TheMarcksPlan points out).

It's just the nature of geography. Germany had to fight France in 1940 with that same risk (when it was greater).

Realistically, there can be no invasion of Turkey without first resolving the dispute with the Soviet Union. They need an update to the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact, some diplomatic accommodation that covers their flank.

If Germany and the Soviet Union agree to divide Turkey then this agreement can be reached. I doubt this will happen though which strengthens your's, Kingfish's and MarcksPlan's point of Soviet intervention (against Germany). You couldn't really trust Stalin to honor any agreement otherwise (outside of jointly attacking Turkey with Hitler, as Soviet forces aren't committed), so there is no flank protection.

If the Germans embarked on a Mediterranean strategy and were then invaded by Russia, that would be a total disaster. It would put them in a worse position than OTL.

What choice do they have? Even if they didn't attack Turkey (fought Britain and fought in North Africa)? Why would any intelligent person assume the Red Army could be destroyed West of the Dneiper-Dvina Line (and the Soviet Union defeated) if they would just retreat and do a scorched earth strategy in the face of an invasion like they did in 1708, 1812 and Summer 1942? One (more reasonable/less narcissistic) than Hitler would have to assume this in 1940-41.

As crazy as this alternative sounds (fighting Turkey in 1941 if it doesn't join the Axis), it might work better for Germany, even if Stalin attacks/declares war. It would have sounded crazy that in 1805 and 1809, that Austria (and Russia for the former year) declaring war on France works to Napoleon's benefit, as he was fighting the British (and Spain/Portugal in the Peninsular War for the latter year: 1809) but it did work to Napoleon's advantage, as he won both wars.

Any sensible person would assume that the only way to destroy the Red Army in battles of annihilation was to provoke Stalin to attack first (since the intelligent strategist would have to assume the Russians would just retreat/scorch earth when invaded). Attacking Turkey (if they couldn't ally with it) might be this very provocation, again, as crazy as it sounds.

Exactly. The simple fact of the matter is that we never got to see the Soviet Union fight at full capacity. They were taken completely by surprise during operation Barbarossa, losing much of their population, territory, and infrastructure. The Red Army was repeatedly decimated in encirclement battles, which also had serious consequences for their ability to fight.

Whatever advantages the Germans gain by being on the defensive (such as easier logistics, and lower Soviet motivation) are outweighed by the fact that they will be fighting against the USSR when it is at full capacity. That is a very daunting prospect.

Give me a freaking break. A state cannot complain 'we didn't fight to our full capacity because we were attacked." This would be like a professional fighter complaining his opponent blitzed attacked him off the bell, in the first seconds of the fight, which is legal and should be prepared for.

The Soviet Union did fight to it's full capacity and their incompetence/ineptitude is what helped Germany have initial success. The Russians lost the territory/infrastructure you are talking about; they held it first and failed to defend it. The Russian Juggernaut you are talking about never existed..ever.

In fact, I would argue the Great Patriotic War saw the Soviet Union fight beyond its capacity, as spiritually they were fighting for their very lives against an enemy that wanted to enslave/exterminate them. This spiritual advantage can be lost if Stalin attacks Hitler making setbacks, military disaster and German counter-attack more damaging than the original timeline. And a large amount of that territory/population/infrastructure, will still be taken by the German's when they counter-attack. The Russians aren't stronger on the attack, overall.

[Dark Age]

To further add, the Soviets/Russians not fighting to their full capacity would have validity, if they RETREATED LIKE 1812 AND 1942 ( in the beginning of the war in June-July 1941).

The Russians aren't stronger on the attack (offensive war against Hitler). Attack is harder than defense/counter-attack (the Red Army in 1941 was already inept at defense/counter-attack so its attack/offense would probably have been even worse)

On the contrary (to being stronger on attack), the Soviets in 1941 are stronger on the retreat. That sees their full capacity/potential.

[Peter89]

...
As for our topic at hand, the Axis would be able to encircle Turkey from the northwest, west, south, and potentially, the east by mid-1941, so under the threat of invasion, and presenting the sole prospect of being a trade partner, they could have get everything from Turkey they wanted (which was not too much btw).

(I seriously went through and through about the logistics of a Mediterran / ME campaign, and I firmly believe that the Axis had the necessary men, equipment and matériel in the region to achieve these objectives. It's no wonder why Churchill put so much energy into this theatre. Maybe I'll start a thread about it some time.)

Some years ago a acquaintance & I worked out a game model that would serve to examine this. A lot of OB & logistics research necessary to complete it, but the skeleton is on paper. Wonder if I should put that back on the table?

I'd be very much interested!