US leaders believed Germany would likely have been invulnerable had it defeated SU

[Gooner1]

1. The USA is another matter entirely.

Not for Vichy France, which matters when you expect them to get into bed with the Germans.

3. I guess you are familiar with at least Playfair's and Lyman's accounts of the Iraq campaign, and you know what kind of vehicles were possessed by the the Kingcol / Habforce. Not to mention the troops landed in Basra. Now, can you please explain to me, how that couldn't be matched by the Wehrmacht - absent Barbarossa?

Because they couldn't move motor transport by air, and whose ships could they move them in?

4. How is a rapid defeat of the Iraqi rebellion possible, if the Germans can land about a regiment per day, and transfer a sizeable chunck of their air force there?

An infantry regiment a day, maybe to begin with but without transport, artillery, tanks ...

5. I can imagine better circumstances. Say, as per the map shows, there is no war with the largest nation in the world.

You also forget no Barbarossa and no Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union.

6. "Any foothold in the Levant-Iraq would probably only last until the first British tanks show up." - what makes you think so? I suppose you are familiar with the Vichy French tank inventory in the Levant and the German anti-tank capabilities, which could easily be transported via air. Also, let's not forget about the topography of the Levant, which seriously limited the deployment of tanks.

The British launched Operation Exporter and Operation Battleaxe almost simultaneously. Perhaps Wavell decides to lance the Syrian boil first.

[Peter89]

1. The USA is another matter entirely.

Not for Vichy France, which matters when you expect them to get into bed with the Germans.

USA is another matter because they were not in war with Germany during the time when a window of opportunity in NA / ME existed.

3. I guess you are familiar with at least Playfair's and Lyman's accounts of the Iraq campaign, and you know what kind of vehicles were possessed by the the Kingcol / Habforce. Not to mention the troops landed in Basra. Now, can you please explain to me, how that couldn't be matched by the Wehrmacht - absent Barbarossa?

Because they couldn't move motor transport by air, and whose ships could they move them in?

Who said they couldn't move motor transports by air? For example, a Ju 52 could move a Kübelwagen with the matching 4 soldiers. Heavier models, obviously in smaller numbers, could transport heavier motor transports up to an Sdkfz 222 or an Sdkfz 250. In any case, the Germans could deploy a motorized battalion per day via air. Zündapp and BMW motorcycles were also transportable via air.

On the other hand, what was exactly the motorization of the Habforce / Kingcol?

4. How is a rapid defeat of the Iraqi rebellion possible, if the Germans can land about a regiment per day, and transfer a sizeable chunck of their air force there?

An infantry regiment a day, maybe to begin with but without transport, artillery, tanks ...

Could you please remind me of the British tank inventory in Iraq?

Furthermore, light artillery pieces, as well as AT and AA guns could be carried by aerial transport.

5. I can imagine better circumstances. Say, as per the map shows, there is no war with the largest nation in the world.

You also forget no Barbarossa and no Lend-Lease to the Soviet Union.

I am familiar with the numbers; the Lend-Lease in 1941 was not relevant.

6. "Any foothold in the Levant-Iraq would probably only last until the first British tanks show up." - what makes you think so? I suppose you are familiar with the Vichy French tank inventory in the Levant and the German anti-tank capabilities, which could easily be transported via air. Also, let's not forget about the topography of the Levant, which seriously limited the deployment of tanks.

The British launched Operation Exporter and Operation Battleaxe almost simultaneously. Perhaps Wavell decides to lance the Syrian boil first.

Had Iraq been secured, or at the very least the Baghdad/Mosul/Kirkuk area, the northern and eastern pronges of Operation Exporter could not advance on the Levant. Wavell would hardly jeopardize his left flank for an attack on the right flank that could lead nowhere. Besides, the main British interest was near Abadan, and without question, the situation near Basra would determine his attitude. If Basra, Shaibah and consequantly Abadan would fall to Axis hands, I doubt he would try to move his forces for this impossible journey. Especially if the Soviets, as per the map, would occupy Iran. But this is pure speculation. No one can actually know what would have happened if the Germans committed to a strategy that aimed the borders coloured on that map.

[ljadw]

The occupation of Spain would tie that many resources that every other military operation ( not only Barbarossa ) would be impossible .Think on Napoleon .

Hallo ljadw

Why would the occupation of Spain demand more resources than the occupation of Yugoslavia+Greece?

1 Most of the occupation forces in Yugoslavia and Greece were not German,this would not be the case in Spain .
2 There would be immediately a guerilla war in Spain,which was not the case in Yugoslavia/Greece .
3 Without big occupation forces Britain could ( as in 1810 ) land forces in Spain, attack the Spanish coasts : this would tie German resources .Most of the German forces who invaded Yugoslavia and Greece,could very fast leave for Barbarossa .This would not be the case for Spain .
4 Who would feed the Spanish population ?
Other point : there was no serious reason for Germany to invade Spain,while there were compelling reasons to invade Yugoslavia and Greece .
Finally : the occupation of Spain would make Barbarossa impossible : in the HTL Germany attacked with 150 divisions while 50 divisions were tied elsewhere . Where would Germany get the 30 divisions needed fr the occupation of Spain ? And where would the LW get the additional Geschwader ?
And all this for something that would not benefit Germany at all .The occupation of Gibraltar would only be a waste of resources .

[Boby]

Hallo ljadw

Some comments to your points:

1) You are forgetting there was indeed "guerrilla warfare" in the territory of former Yugoslavia, BUT

2) There is no evidence spanish population would rise in arms against an invading force after 3 years of bloody civil war. In fact, I doubt a german invasion would be very unwelcome. And

3) From where comes the 30 division figure? It is absurd to claim that the Soviet Union needed an occupation army of 50 divisions and Spain 30!

[ljadw]

1 The guerilla war in Yugoslavia started after 22 June 1941,it was tied to Barbarossa
2 A German invasion and occupation of Spain would result in mass starvation and hungry people are not ''reasonable ''.
3 The length of the Spanish coast was 4964 km,of which 710 km of the Atlantic . The Germans would have to defend each of these 4964 km especially as Britain had naval superiority .
Look at the number of divisions that were tied in occupied France (250000 square km,while the surface of Spain is the double .)Whole regions of Spain were still not pacified .

[Peter89]

The Spanish coast was not suitable as an opposed landing site; the Allies could not have air superiority there, the troops could not be carried by small landing crafts, and their turnaround time would be impossibly long, etc. The Channel coast and the Iberian coast are two different things.

Also, Spain was a net food exporter. The problem was that it was not the proper kind of food (fruits, citric fruits, fish, olives, etc.). So it happens these were all in relatively high demand in Germany and in Germany's main food supplier countries. The biggest item of Spanish exports to Germany was actually food. Also, food was the biggest item of the Spanish export to the USA and Britain. Thus, an exchange of calories from Spanish products to wheat, potato, etc. was not impossible, had the Spanish economy been under Axis control.
Moreover, the so-important Allied oil deliveries were actually barely enough to keep the country going. We are talking about less than 40,000 tons of POL (the Spaniards did not have refineries on the mainland) per month, thus below 0.5mt per year. It was not a quantity that could not be supplied by the Axis; it was something Hitler did not want to do, because he didn't want to share the loot in this fashion.

An Axis occupation would not starve Spain to the death, especially if they'd join the Axis - in which case they'd profit from the drain of foodstuffs from other countries which resisted the Axis.

And the Yugoslav guerilla movement started off as soon as the bulk of the German troops moved out of the country. Which happened to coincede with Barbarossa, but the two things were not tied to each other.

[Boby]

1 The guerilla war in Yugoslavia started after 22 June 1941,it was tied to Barbarossa
2 A German invasion and occupation of Spain would result in mass starvation and hungry people are not ''reasonable ''.
3 The length of the Spanish coast was 4964 km,of which 710 km of the Atlantic . The Germans would have to defend each of these 4964 km especially as Britain had naval superiority .
Look at the number of divisions that were tied in occupied France (250000 square km,while the surface of Spain is the double .)Whole regions of Spain were still not pacified .

Hallo ljadw

Im not much impressed. Why would Germany waste 30 divisions if there is a natural barrier in the Pyrenees? Makes no sense.

Spanish population was mostly hungry and on the verge of mass famine in the post-war, also with Franco. So not much difference.

My point stands: people were exhausted after 3 years of deprivations and murder. Don't expect any mass unrest.

[Gooner1]

USA is another matter because they were not in war with Germany during the time when a window of opportunity in NA / ME existed.

The USA was allowing Vichy France a small amount of oil, food and other materials. That would all stop with greater blatant support for Germany.

3. I guess you are familiar with at least Playfair's and Lyman's accounts of the Iraq campaign, and you know what kind of vehicles were possessed by the the Kingcol / Habforce. Not to mention the troops landed in Basra. Now, can you please explain to me, how that couldn't be matched by the Wehrmacht - absent Barbarossa?

"The flying column, Kingcol, was a miniature force of all arms, about 2,000 strong with 500 vehicles, under the Commander of the 4th Cavalry Brigade, Brigadier J. J. Kingstone, whose orders were to reach Habbaniya as quickly as possible—a strenuous task in the intense heat. The force had to move self-contained, with twelve days' rations and five days' water, and most of the heavy lorries that could be provided for this purpose were not desert-worthy."
"The composition of Kingcol was Headquarters and Signals, 4th Cavalry Brigade; The Household Cavalry Regiment; 237th Battery, Royal Artillery, and one Anti-Tank troop, Royal Artillery; one troop 2nd Field Squadron, Royal Engineers; detachment Boring Section, Royal Engineers; two companies 1st Essex Regiment; detachment 166th Light Field Ambulance; 3rd Reserve and 552nd Motor Transport Companies, Royal Army Service Corps; and eight cars of No. 2 Armoured Car Company, Royal Air Force.")
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/ ... d-2-9.html

500 vehicles for 2,000 men for a fully motorised column is what you should be looking at.

Who said they couldn't move motor transports by air? For example, a Ju 52 could move a Kübelwagen with the matching 4 soldiers. Heavier models, obviously in smaller numbers, could transport heavier motor transports up to an Sdkfz 222 or an Sdkfz 250. In any case, the Germans could deploy a motorized battalion per day via air. Zündapp and BMW motorcycles were also transportable via air.

I'd very much like to see pictures of a Ju52 transporting a Kubelwagen. Which heavier models that could transport Sdkfz 222 or 250 were in service with the German air force in May 1941 please?

Furthermore, light artillery pieces, as well as AT and AA guns could be carried by aerial transport.

And their prime movers are motorcycles I presume.

I am familiar with the numbers; the Lend-Lease in 1941 was not relevant.

699 aircraft and 480 tanks delivered to the Soviet Union from the UK by the end of 1941.
Realistically only the ships of Operation Dervish, PQ1 and PQ2 could reach the Middle East before the end of the year.

Had Iraq been secured, or at the very least the Baghdad/Mosul/Kirkuk area, the northern and eastern pronges of Operation Exporter could not advance on the Levant. Wavell would hardly jeopardize his left flank for an attack on the right flank that could lead nowhere. Besides, the main British interest was near Abadan, and without question, the situation near Basra would determine his attitude. If Basra, Shaibah and consequantly Abadan would fall to Axis hands, I doubt he would try to move his forces for this impossible journey. Especially if the Soviets, as per the map, would occupy Iran. But this is pure speculation. No one can actually know what would have happened if the Germans committed to a strategy that aimed the borders coloured on that map.

An advance from British Palestine into Vichy Lebanon and Syria cuts off German aerial resupply effectively ending the campaign in Iraq too bar the shouting. But yeah given their interior lines, the quantity of supplies and men being received every week and the ending of the campaign in Italian East Africa, mounting a two pronged advance would really pose little problem for the British.

[Gooner1]

The Spanish coast was not suitable as an opposed landing site; the Allies could not have air superiority there, the troops could not be carried by small landing crafts, and their turnaround time would be impossibly long, etc. The Channel coast and the Iberian coast are two different things.

Spanish beaches not suitable for landings will come as a surprise to millions of holiday makers I imagine.

[ljadw]

The Spanish coast was not suitable as an opposed landing site; the Allies could not have air superiority there, the troops could not be carried by small landing crafts, and their turnaround time would be impossibly long, etc. The Channel coast and the Iberian coast are two different things.

Also, Spain was a net food exporter. The problem was that it was not the proper kind of food (fruits, citric fruits, fish, olives, etc.). So it happens these were all in relatively high demand in Germany and in Germany's main food supplier countries. The biggest item of Spanish exports to Germany was actually food. Also, food was the biggest item of the Spanish export to the USA and Britain. Thus, an exchange of calories from Spanish products to wheat, potato, etc. was not impossible, had the Spanish economy been under Axis control.
Moreover, the so-important Allied oil deliveries were actually barely enough to keep the country going. We are talking about less than 40,000 tons of POL (the Spaniards did not have refineries on the mainland) per month, thus below 0.5mt per year. It was not a quantity that could not be supplied by the Axis; it was something Hitler did not want to do, because he didn't want to share the loot in this fashion.

An Axis occupation would not starve Spain to the death, especially if they'd join the Axis - in which case they'd profit from the drain of foodstuffs from other countries which resisted the Axis.

And the Yugoslav guerilla movement started off as soon as the bulk of the German troops moved out of the country. Which happened to coincede with Barbarossa, but the two things were not tied to each other.

Spain survived during the war because of the food and oil imports from the US .
Between 41-45 it imported 4,2 million tons,= 800000 ton a year (source : elephant in the garden ),something Germany could not sell Spain even if these quantities were available,because the transport facilities were not sufficient .Germany produced/imported 8,5 million tons of oil in 1941 while Spain imported more than 1 million ton from the US .Germany had not 2500 trains to send 1 million tons of oil to Spain .
If these imports were stopped and the Allies would attack the Spanish industry, very soon the Spanish state would collapse .
There was no reason for Spain to join Germany ,even if Germany would export oil and food to Spain,as it was obvious for everyone that already in the Autumn of 1940 Germany had lost all chances to win .
If Germany cancelled Marita and Barbarossa and went to Spain,for which there was no reason,it could not afford to invade Spain and to leave it .Everything Germany had conquered ,had to be defended.
The Allies could attack and invade Spain from the Balearic Islands and Morocco.
That after the war there was no rebellion in Spain against Franco,was due to the fact that Franco had a big army and that Argentine exported food to Spain .

[Peter89]

USA is another matter because they were not in war with Germany during the time when a window of opportunity in NA / ME existed.

The USA was allowing Vichy France a small amount of oil, food and other materials. That would all stop with greater blatant support for Germany.

I recall the deliveries did not stop when the Vichy French shot at the British. USA, formally a neutral, would not stop its otherwise not so meaningful deliveries to Vichy France because they'd let the Germans land and refuel in the Levant. I think they didn't OTL; but I have to check the dates for American deliveries to Vichy France. In any case, They definately didn't stop the deliveries after Dakar.

3. I guess you are familiar with at least Playfair's and Lyman's accounts of the Iraq campaign, and you know what kind of vehicles were possessed by the the Kingcol / Habforce. Not to mention the troops landed in Basra. Now, can you please explain to me, how that couldn't be matched by the Wehrmacht - absent Barbarossa?

"The flying column, Kingcol, was a miniature force of all arms, about 2,000 strong with 500 vehicles, under the Commander of the 4th Cavalry Brigade, Brigadier J. J. Kingstone, whose orders were to reach Habbaniya as quickly as possible—a strenuous task in the intense heat. The force had to move self-contained, with twelve days' rations and five days' water, and most of the heavy lorries that could be provided for this purpose were not desert-worthy."
"The composition of Kingcol was Headquarters and Signals, 4th Cavalry Brigade; The Household Cavalry Regiment; 237th Battery, Royal Artillery, and one Anti-Tank troop, Royal Artillery; one troop 2nd Field Squadron, Royal Engineers; detachment Boring Section, Royal Engineers; two companies 1st Essex Regiment; detachment 166th Light Field Ambulance; 3rd Reserve and 552nd Motor Transport Companies, Royal Army Service Corps; and eight cars of No. 2 Armoured Car Company, Royal Air Force.")
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/ ... d-2-9.html

500 vehicles for 2,000 men for a fully motorised column is what you should be looking at.

No, that's not what we are looking at. What you call a "fully motorised column" was actually a ragtag of forces with little military training, familiarity with their weapons (some units didn't even shoot with them) and durability. Of that 500 vehicles, not one but a sizeable chunk were buses from Jerusalem and Haifa. Buses, flatbed trucks with their civilian drivers carried the supplies for the column.

Their supplies were so low that any stalemate or prolonged (meaning, lasting for more than two weeks) fighting around Habbaniya would mean their end.

Who said they couldn't move motor transports by air? For example, a Ju 52 could move a Kübelwagen with the matching 4 soldiers. Heavier models, obviously in smaller numbers, could transport heavier motor transports up to an Sdkfz 222 or an Sdkfz 250. In any case, the Germans could deploy a motorized battalion per day via air. Zündapp and BMW motorcycles were also transportable via air.

I'd very much like to see pictures of a Ju52 transporting a Kubelwagen.

Sure.

Which heavier models that could transport Sdkfz 222 or 250 were in service with the German air force in May 1941 please?

Ju 90 for sure, but probably the BV 222 too.

Furthermore, light artillery pieces, as well as AT and AA guns could be carried by aerial transport.

And their prime movers are motorcycles I presume.

Well, I wouldn't call the Kettenkrad a motorcycle, but yes, that was the primary mover for them in these units. Although its towing capacity was limited, it could tow both the 3.7cm PAK and the 2cm Flak - not to mention smaller Gebirgsjäger / Fallschirmjäger guns, including recoilless ones.

I am familiar with the numbers; the Lend-Lease in 1941 was not relevant.

699 aircraft and 480 tanks delivered to the Soviet Union from the UK by the end of 1941.
Realistically only the ships of Operation Dervish, PQ1 and PQ2 could reach the Middle East before the end of the year.

Let's start with a simple notion: before 22 June 1941, there was no British aid to the Soviet Union. If we establish that fact, and take a look at the timeline of the events in the Middle East campaigns, a lot of things gets clear in an instant. The decisive operations in Iraq were over by 22 June 1941. Thus, their delivery to the Middle East is either an opposed landing around Basra, or a more comfy unloading in Egypt - or alternatively, on the eastern edge of the Arab peninsula.

Moreover, 699 aircrafts and 480 tanks were not delivered with their trained crews and ground echelons. For the same reason as why Germany couldn't transfer 1000 planes and 10 divisions to the ME in 1941, the British couldn't do it either.

Had Iraq been secured, or at the very least the Baghdad/Mosul/Kirkuk area, the northern and eastern pronges of Operation Exporter could not advance on the Levant. Wavell would hardly jeopardize his left flank for an attack on the right flank that could lead nowhere. Besides, the main British interest was near Abadan, and without question, the situation near Basra would determine his attitude. If Basra, Shaibah and consequantly Abadan would fall to Axis hands, I doubt he would try to move his forces for this impossible journey. Especially if the Soviets, as per the map, would occupy Iran. But this is pure speculation. No one can actually know what would have happened if the Germans committed to a strategy that aimed the borders coloured on that map.

An advance from British Palestine into Vichy Lebanon and Syria cuts off German aerial resupply effectively ending the campaign in Iraq too bar the shouting. But yeah given their interior lines, the quantity of supplies and men being received every week and the ending of the campaign in Italian East Africa, mounting a two pronged advance would really pose little problem for the British.

Like I said, this is pure speculation. On both sides, actually. We'll never know how a different German strategy could effect the overall situation in the Mediterraneum. What I know for sure is that the British have won in Iraq because they acted swiftly and deciseively, and because Rashid Ali acted so ineptly. Equally important was that the Germans put their Schwerpunkt elsewhere. The balance between the force of arms, the quality of troops, the strategic situation, etc. did not favor the British. This is why, in my opinion, the British string of success in IEA, Iraq, Levant and Iran was their most impressive operational sequence in the war.

[Peter89]

Spain survived during the war because of the food and oil imports from the US .
Between 41-45 it imported 4,2 million tons,= 800000 ton a year (source : elephant in the garden ),

Where did you find this number?

That study speaks of an average of 39,992 tons for August 1940 to December 1945, which is not 1941-1945, but way less. It is 2,559,488t instead of 4,200,000t.

something Germany could not sell Spain even if these quantities were available,because the transport facilities were not sufficient.

How can you tell?

Germany produced/imported 8,5 million tons of oil in 1941 while Spain imported more than 1 million ton from the US .Germany had not 2500 trains to send 1 million tons of oil to Spain .

No. Spain imported 511,772t of all POL products in 1941. Check the very source you've referred to.

If these imports were stopped and the Allies would attack the Spanish industry, very soon the Spanish state would collapse .

Now the question comes whether the Allies could attack the Spanish industry or not. And would it really worth the casualties?

There was no reason for Spain to join Germany ,even if Germany would export oil and food to Spain,as it was obvious for everyone that already in the Autumn of 1940 Germany had lost all chances to win .

Had that been true, the minor Axis allies would not join Germany in the autumn of 1940.

If Germany cancelled Marita and Barbarossa and went to Spain,for which there was no reason,it could not afford to invade Spain and to leave it .Everything Germany had conquered ,had to be defended.

25 and Marita did not have to be cancelled in order to conquer the Iberian peninsula.

Besides; I doubt it very much that Franco or the Spaniards would go for an armed resistance. We can talk about it day and night, but the occupation of the Iberian peninsula could have more gains than losses.

The Allies could attack and invade Spain from the Balearic Islands and Morocco.

The Balearic Islands were not in Allied hands - neither was Morocco.

[ljadw]

Barbarossa was scheduled for the Summer :Marita started in April, a big Felix could only start in April, not earlier .Distance Bayonne -Sevilla is 1000 km , the same as the distance to Moscow and the units in Sevilla had to return .Distance Bayonne-Warsaw 2400 km .
Germany had only 19 PD available ,more than the half would be tied by the invasion of Spain .These divisions would have to cover a distance of more than 2000 km and would be nonoperational when they were back ( May or June ) in Bayonne ).The attack on Yugoslavia and Greece would be impossible with less than 10 PZD and Barbarossa could not start in June but would have to be delayed to 1942 .
The Axis could not prevent an allied invasion of the Balearics and of Morocco .
The invasion and thus occupation of Spain and Portugal would be suicidal as it could have only defensive result: in 1941 the situation of Germany was that catastrophic that it had as only answer to invade the Soviet Union and to HOPE that this would convince Britain to give up .Time was running against Germany and Germany was running out of time .
In October 1940 Franco refused to let his country to become an ally of Germany,because the German demand to enter Spain was a proof that Germany was losing .Thus, WHY would Franco say yes in April 1941 to what he had refused in October 1940 ?
There were no gains at all for the occupation of the Iberian peninsula .

[ljadw]

Spain survived during the war because of the food and oil imports from the US .
Between 41-45 it imported 4,2 million tons,= 800000 ton a year (source : elephant in the garden ),

Where did you find this number?

That study speaks of an average of 39,992 tons for August 1940 to December 1945, which is not 1941-1945, but way less. It is 2,559,488t instead of 4,200,000t.

something Germany could not sell Spain even if these quantities were available,because the transport facilities were not sufficient.

How can you tell?

Germany produced/imported 8,5 million tons of oil in 1941 while Spain imported more than 1 million ton from the US .Germany had not 2500 trains to send 1 million tons of oil to Spain .

No. Spain imported 511,772t of all POL products in 1941. Check the very source you've referred to.

If these imports were stopped and the Allies would attack the Spanish industry, very soon the Spanish state would collapse .

Now the question comes whether the Allies could attack the Spanish industry or not. And would it really worth the casualties?

There was no reason for Spain to join Germany ,even if Germany would export oil and food to Spain,as it was obvious for everyone that already in the Autumn of 1940 Germany had lost all chances to win .

Had that been true, the minor Axis allies would not join Germany in the autumn of 1940.

If Germany cancelled Marita and Barbarossa and went to Spain,for which there was no reason,it could not afford to invade Spain and to leave it .Everything Germany had conquered ,had to be defended.

25 and Marita did not have to be cancelled in order to conquer the Iberian peninsula.

Besides; I doubt it very much that Franco or the Spaniards would go for an armed resistance. We can talk about it day and night, but the occupation of the Iberian peninsula could have more gains than losses.

The Allies could attack and invade Spain from the Balearic Islands and Morocco.

The Balearic Islands were not in Allied hands - neither was Morocco.

Elephant in the Garden P7 ,Table 6
Oil imports
1941 1,023 million or 0,912 million
1942 0,532 million or 0,837 million
1943 0,908 million or 0,960 million
1944 0,771 million or 0,601 million
1945 0,981 million or 0,888 million
The results of both are 4,2 million in 5 years which is 0,8 million average .
Germany could never have provided Spain with 1 million ton of oil in 1941,even if it had a higher production : the distances were to high, much to high : the distance from the Ruhr to Sevilla ( going and returning ) was more than 5000 km : a train transporting 400 ton of oil would need more than two months to go to Sevilla and to return.

[Peter89]

Elephant in the Garden P7 ,Table 6
Oil imports
1941 1,023 million or 0,912 million
1942 0,532 million or 0,837 million
1943 0,908 million or 0,960 million
1944 0,771 million or 0,601 million
1945 0,981 million or 0,888 million
The results of both are 4,2 million in 5 years which is 0,8 million average .
Germany could never have provided Spain with 1 million ton of oil in 1941,even if it had a higher production : the distances were to high, much to high : the distance from the Ruhr to Sevilla ( going and returning ) was more than 5000 km : a train transporting 400 ton of oil would need more than two months to go to Sevilla and to return.

Jesus, ljdaw, did you read it?

The following table compares our estimates at the annual level in equivalent metric tons of coal with the
currently available annual figures. Our estimates seem to be roughly in the same neighborhood, although
there are some substantial differences. We used a factor of 1.75 to convert our annual totals of metric tons
of petroleum products to equivalent metric tons of coal. This was the factor that minimized the differences
in the two sets of estimates. At this time we could only speculate on the sources of the differences.

The actual import numbers are on p 44-45, in the appendix.