US leaders believed Germany would likely have been invulnerable had it defeated SU

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Re: US leaders believed Germany would likely have been invulnerable had it defeated SU

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 19 Oct 2020 11:36

Cult Icon wrote:I have never seen a historian advance this argument of horrible German engineering and how they should have used a time machine to copy late war US practices- usually it's about their logistics.
Gardner seems to believe that engineering incompetence caused their logistical problems, which is absurd. https://www.engineeringdaily.net/what-t ... g-culture/ ("Germany’s prowess in engineering is indisputable.")

On the only directly-relevant point he's attempting to make (Germans didn't build enough train depots during Barbarossa), an explanation based on engineering incompetence is even more absurd. If the lack of depot construction in '41 was due to engineering incompetence then how did the Germans build 600k m3 of depot space in the year or so after Barbarossa? Did the engineering corps read Civil Engineering for Dummies during Winter '41-'42?

Obviously it's impossible for a national engineering culture to go from incompetent to proficient in one winter. Railroad depot construction during Barbarossa didn't happen because the Germans didn't plan for a longer war, not because Germans don't know how to build depots.
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Re: US leaders believed Germany would likely have been invulnerable had it defeated SU

Post by Cult Icon » 19 Oct 2020 11:51

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Oct 2020 11:36
Gardner seems to believe that engineering incompetence caused their logistical problems, which is absurd. https://www.engineeringdaily.net/what-t ... g-culture/ ("Germany’s prowess in engineering is indisputable.")
I've never seen a civil engineer research on German offensives in the Eastern Front... Historians seem to lack the interest and expertise in this area. Every time I see this argument and its associated, emotionally evocative pictures being posted it looks like a red herring for winning forum arguments.

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Re: US leaders believed Germany would likely have been invulnerable had it defeated SU

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 19 Oct 2020 12:08

Cult Icon wrote:
19 Oct 2020 11:51
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
19 Oct 2020 11:36
Gardner seems to believe that engineering incompetence caused their logistical problems, which is absurd. https://www.engineeringdaily.net/what-t ... g-culture/ ("Germany’s prowess in engineering is indisputable.")
I've never seen a civil engineer research on German offensives in the Eastern Front... Historians seem to lack the interest and expertise in this area. Every time I see this argument and its associated, emotionally evocative pictures being posted it looks like a red herring for winning forum arguments.
A detailed study by a real civil engineer would be a good addition to the literature.

But one doesn't have to be an engineer to know that it's absurd to claim Germany couldn't build rail depots.
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Re: US leaders believed Germany would likely have been invulnerable had it defeated SU

Post by Richard Anderson » 19 Oct 2020 16:37

David Thompson wrote:
19 Oct 2020 04:47
A fact-free opinion post from Richard Anderson was removed pursuant to forum rules and prior warnings.
Sorry David Thompson, but I think that is incorrect and unfair. Yes, my reply was brief, but not fact-free in context of the overall series of threads and posts alluded to. My reply was brief, because, 1) my time was constrained and 2) I try to avoid direct replies to TMP, because I have him on ignore and try only to make exceptions when others have highlighted his problematic posts. As in this case, where I replied to:
T. A. Gardner wrote:
18 Oct 2020 02:54
In post #12, TMP mentions:
Germany plans for a two-summer campaign, therefore has better rail logistics in '41.
How does planning for a longer campaign "improve rail logistics" at any point?
I made the remark that TMP evidently does not read the sources he bases his assumptions on. As in this case, where he claims he "addressed" this matter in viewtopic.php?f=11&t=243557&start=390#p2239628

The problem with that is that the source in that TMP reply does nothing of the sort, it does not address the requirements or capabilities of the Germans in planning or executing a rail-based logistical system deep into Soviet territory. The two pages posted from The Most Valuable Asset of the Reich: A History of the German National Railway Volume 2, 1933-1945, detail the efforts by the DRB to execute OTTO and the problems encountered by the DRB in executing a plan to concentrate the forces for BARBAROSSA in territories held by the Reich, without any enemy action disturbing the preparations, such that even with eight months of planning and execution they were unable to complete it in Reich-controlled territory. Note that the Ostbahn initially claimed it would be able to 130 trains daily, but then managed only 80, leading to a proposal to merge the Ostbahn with RBD, which "for political reasons...was impossible". Note then that part of the "solution" created by Gericke, forming railway commands comprised of DRB personnel in uniform, although it "solved" the short-term problem, it also exacerbated the political problem. Next note that while OTTO was eventually completed and sustained the initial concentration of troops and supplies, it was only completed "on a temporary basis, meaning that the lines and stations would be usable but would require more work to enable them to withstand the rigors of the next winter."

None of this addresses the German requirements for or capability to better plan or support rail-based logistics deep into Soviet-held territory in the wake of a German advance. Nor, in the current context of the conversation, does it address the red herring of German "civil engineering capability".

The response to T. A. Gardner appears to be a quickly googled confirmation bias-driven hand-wavium, which is why I remarked he evidently did not read his "sources" too closely.
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Re: US leaders believed Germany would likely have been invulnerable had it defeated SU

Post by glenn239 » 19 Oct 2020 16:45

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
17 Oct 2020 16:44
OTL but not necessarily ATL. Economics of post-SU Grossraum economy differ fundamentally from OTL. LW production would be 3-4x OTL.
Doubtful and it wouldn't have mattered anyways due to lack of fuel. By 1944 the Anglo-Americans were cranking out 125,000+ aircraft per year and the Americans could have increased from there if necessary.
You're assuming the American/British public would tolerate indefinite warfare. There's enough documentation in the historical record that leaders feared they would not, so it's an unjustifiable assumption. I can see arguments for W.Allied long term endurance (e.g. publication of the Holocaust), but there are counterarguments as well.
So we agree the Germans will lose if the American public is ready for a long war. That sets aside any value to Germany in conquering the SU and places the crosshairs straight on American willpower. US will for war depends on casualties. Air wars are very light in casualties for the damage done, so I see no issue with American will for an air war continuing for years past 1945.
Anything with a rail connection to Berlin is out of the question unless W.Allies build an army bigger than Germany's, which would rule out OTL aircraft production. So Iberia, Turkey, Albania, Croatia, and Denmark are out.
The question is not the size of the German army, but how much of the German army can be brought to the battlefield relative to Anglo-American air and naval power. The idea, for example, that Germany could fight in Salonika and win is infeasible, since Allied air power would ravage Balkans rail communications and make any German offensive much south of the Danube impossible to carry through against a dozen or two Anglo-American divisions that their naval power could supply. From Salonika, of course, you can draw a combat radius of about 600 miles to see what the P-51's devastate.
Anything in the Med assumes the Germans don't control Suez and Gibraltar, which again can be argued but shouldn't be assumed.
Doesn't matter either way in the long run whether these fell or remained in British hands. The problem is that once Japan is defeated, US naval logistics and carrier airpower are so overwelming that it would be impossible for Germany to hold the entrance to the Med, or prevent the Allies from reconquering Egypt via the Suez.
Norway/Sweden can secured by invading Sweden or demanding passage rights, which is reasonably easy so long as Germany controls Denmark and the Baltic, which it would unless the W.Allies match Germany's army.
Norway falls first with Sweden neutral, then Sweden joins the Allies one way or another. Denmark's communications would be destroyed from the UK and the Germans could not hold the Belts. P-51's are based in Denmark and Sweden and we draw another 600 mile radius of tactical operations.

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Re: US leaders believed Germany would likely have been invulnerable had it defeated SU

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Re: US leaders believed Germany would likely have been invulnerable had it defeated SU

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 19 Oct 2020 21:51

Glenn239 wrote:Doubtful and it wouldn't have mattered anyways due to lack of fuel. By 1944 the Anglo-Americans were cranking out 125,000+ aircraft per year and the Americans could have increased from there if necessary.
Well it's a big topic and I won't convince you of anything here in a brief reply. But based on the fundamentals outlined in other posts (e.g. viewtopic.php?f=76&t=251476#p2288097) I see overall German production being twice OTL. From there, a shift of resources from Heer to LW gets you 3x OTL LW production. At historical peak production rates, Germany could easily produce 10,000 AC/month, thereby matching the W.Allies OTL levels. Then there's Japan and all the aircraft demands on W.Allies that don't apply to Germany (e.g. ASW).

Fuel comes from the Caucasus and MidEast.
So we agree the Germans will lose if the American public is ready for a long war.
America loses if the public isn't ready for indefinite siege warfare; the inverse doesn't follow.
Glenn239 wrote:Norway falls first with Sweden neutral, then Sweden joins the Allies one way or another.
Not if Germany invades Sweden. I mean she joins the Allies but only for a couple weeks.
Richard Anderson wrote:The two pages posted from The Most Valuable Asset of the Reich: A History of the German National Railway Volume 2, 1933-1945
I trust intelligent readers will read the post rather than credit Anderson's misrepresentation of it. viewtopic.php?f=11&t=243557&start=390#p2239628

Besides the two excerpted pages it has 6 point cites to MVAR and cites three additional sources. The source that most extensively discusses the failing of Barbarossa is H.G.W. Davie's article "The Influence of Railways..."
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Re: US leaders believed Germany would likely have been invulnerable had it defeated SU

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 19 Oct 2020 22:30

the Joint Chiefs discussed JCS 85. Leahy labeled it ‘‘an excellent
statement of policy,’’ but Arnold, who on the previous day had insisted that the
danger of Russian collapse required continuation of Germany-first and an air
offensive from England to protect the British Isles from the increased danger of
German invasion
, countered that the Pacific shift recommended in JCS 85 would
require England to defend itself without U.S. assistance.
As discussed in my OP, JCS 85 was the document pessimistically evaluating the chances of defeating Germany, should the SU fall in '42.

Arnold's comment regarding the danger of German invasion - which Leahy endorsed for further consideration - is what I'd like to focus on.

What are the minimum conditions for a German invasion of Britain in the ATL that JCS 85 contemplated?

IMO at least the following, with brief discussion:
  • 1. Ability to provide at least air parity above the invasion fleet.
    • Given overall 2x OTL German production in '44, a shift towards LW gets 3x LW production.
    • Such production implies defeat of the CBO, which implies even greater LW production - perhaps 4x.
    • Given the enormous Flak firepower of the invasion fleet (discussed below), total air supremacy is not a requirement.
  • 2. Ability to establish naval dominance in the Channel via light surface and air forces.
    • Resources also shifted towards KM. Summary of OTL/ATL production shift here: viewtopic.php?f=11&t=252647#p2297160.
    • KM could build a "Channel Fleet" with hundreds/thousands of E/S-Boote, scores of Fleet Torpedo boats, destroyers, and well-armed minesweepers.
    • Shipyard capacity in Baltic, Med, and Black Seas would be used. Shipyard capacity could also be enhanced by investment.
    • As the Channel Fleet could launch thousands of torpedoes, engaging it with heavy fleet units would involve potentially catastrophic losses
    • then there's the LW: thousands of Fw190's etc carrying bombs/torpedoes. France is the functional equivalent of infinite aircraft carriers.
  • 3. Production of sufficient landing craft to put >15 divisions on shore on first day, to sustain and reinforce them.
    • OTL the US spent ~2.5bn on landing craft. In RM terms that's slightly more than one month of OTL Wehrmacht munitions production and less than one month of ATL production.
    • 5% of ATL production seems adequate to match OTL US output of landing craft.
    • Germany would concentrate all its LC's in the Channel, whereas W.Allies had to disperse theirs globally.
    • German LC investment could be 100% in more efficient shore-shore craft, whereas W.Allies had to produce less efficient ship-shore.
  • 4. Provision of adequate fire support.
    • Germany could build purpose-built monitors carrying naval guns and heavy artillery.





The threat of German invasion is at least credible, thereby accomplishing the following:
  • Force the W.Allies to raise armies bigger than OTL, as a successful German lodgment in England - even if judged unlikely - would be war-losing if only OTL W.Allied ground forces were available.
  • Larger armies imply:
    • Decreased overall W.Allied production due to loss of workers.
    • Decreased proportional W.Allied air/sea production to equip larger armies.
    • Combing the foregoing, significantly smaller W.Allied air/sea forces compared to OTL.
  • The tying-down of W.Allied forces in Britain removes them peripheral ops against Germany and from Japan entirely, perhaps precluding final victory over Japan until after final victory over - or peace with - Germany.
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Re: US leaders believed Germany would likely have been invulnerable had it defeated SU

Post by T. A. Gardner » 19 Oct 2020 23:13

Cult Icon wrote:
19 Oct 2020 11:11
T. A. Gardner wrote:
19 Oct 2020 06:31
So, I get ad hominem instead of rebuttal... How nice.
how about provide research papers, books, sources etc. for these and other fanciful claims of yours. You posted these and many other specious arguments CONSTANTLY on ACG 10 + years ago.

eg. I have never seen a historian advance this argument of horrible German engineering and how they should have used a time machine to copy late war US practices- usually it's about their logistics.
The most common German construction battalions, companies, etc., a basically an organized mass of men with hand tools to work with. They are nearly or completely unmechanized. That's an immutable fact and I don't need necessarily to provide some mass of academic proof to state it. The argument isn't "specious" either. It should be obvious that mechanization of construction greatly increases productivity per man.

The reason you see little or nothing of this in histories is historians are rarely engineers and technical types. They are liberal arts background and focus on less technical topics.

So, back to German civil engineering. In terms of end product, they were as good as anyone else. The problem isn't the finished product, be it a concrete bunker, a railroad, an airfield, or anything else. The problem is the amount of manpower and time needed to complete the project. This is where the Germans with a better appreciation of the importance of rapidly completing engineering projects would benefit exponentially. By application of even small amounts of mechanization would gain huge benefits from it.

Take a typical German construction battalion. This unit has about 1500 men in 4 companies with 3 or 4 platoons per company and a light supply column (horse drawn). It has no mechanization, no trucks (it'd be lucky to have even a few if it did), nothing like that. It likely would have a few chain saws and other basic power tools much of the time, but that's about it. Otherwise, it's shovels and picks, hammers and wrenches...

But, if you gave each company just one 2 to 3 ton dump truck with trailer, one small bulldozer, a towed roller, and either a loader or excavator, these few machines do the work of an entire company (approximately 150 men) or more every day. Add in a battalion portable small sawmill and a couple of horse drawn logging trailers you get it self-sufficient on lumber for construction.
So, you eliminate a company of men. That's fewer you have to feed and supply. It frees those men up to do something else even if it's more construction elsewhere.

US Army engineers building a pontoon bridge:
Image

There's a whole thread of German bridge building here:
viewtopic.php?f=20&t=168276

What you don't see with the Germans is any sort of mechanization. They use masses of manpower to do the job. It is both inefficient and labor intensive. By providing even small amounts of mechanization (say, a truck with a crane, or even a portable crane) the work goes faster and fewer men are needed. That makes the surplus men available for other uses.

Instead, Germany ended almost all tractor production (both wheeled and tracked) by 1941 and most of it earlier.

The US Army study I pointed out earlier states that the poor Russian roads wore vehicles out at about double the expected rate. Again, by paying attention to this issue from the start, the Germans could have given road construction troops the means to oil and gravel these roads making them far more resilient to poor weather. Most established Russian dirt roads were hard packed already, had some drainage, and just needed an all-weather surface applied, even if it was used motor oil and gravel or the like. You don't need asphalt necessarily.

If you were to improve the most important roads this way you could cut down massively on the wastage of motor vehicles being prematurely worn out. That in turn means you need fewer replacement vehicles, fewer spare parts used, less maintenance time per vehicle, and the whole system becomes far more efficient. If vehicle speeds are raised even by just a few kilometers an hour, that too increases the efficiency of the whole system.

What you don't want to be doing is fixing roads this way...

Image

In War on the Eastern Front 1941 - 42, The German Soldier in Russia James Lucas, one chapter describes the 88th Division building an ice block railway bridge across the Dnieper River in the winter of 41 - 42. The division assigned 300 troops and rounded up 800 civilian locals to do the work. Horse drawn transport was the only kind available. A sawmill was set up to provide lumber to reinforce the ice blocks to be used.
15,640 ice blocks were cut, 1600 meters of track laid, 6,200 meters of lumber milled including 2,465 sleepers, and 13,500 cubic meters of snow removed. Work ran continuously in three shifts and the construction took twelve days. The bridge lasted in service for a little over a month before the spring thaw made it unsafe.

The question is, why did they bother? Why not build a more permanent structure over the river and be done with it? Why waste all that effort on a bridge that lasted barely a month in service? Again, some mechanization would have certainly allowed for a better solution than the one the Germans chose.

This goes across the board. If the Germans had pre-fabricated buildings available, they could build depots, shelters, and whatever faster and more efficiently using fewer men. The results are less wastage of material and supplies left out in the weather. Pre-fabricated construction techniques were known prior to WW 2, so the question is why didn't they make use of these? The US and Britain certainly did to their benefit. Germany could have also but didn't.

Bottom line: Any way you cut it, the German military and Germany in general just wasn't all that good at civil engineering. It wasn't that they built poorly, but rather that it took far more time and manpower than it should have.

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Re: US leaders believed Germany would likely have been invulnerable had it defeated SU

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 20 Oct 2020 00:03

T.A. Gardner wrote:So, back to German civil engineering. In terms of end product, they were as good as anyone else.
Thanks for clarifying.
T.A. Gardner wrote:The reason you see little or nothing of this in histories is historians are rarely engineers and technical types. They are liberal arts background and focus on less technical topics.
What distinguishes liberal arts analyses from technical analyses is data and quantitative analysis. Relevant parameters would include productivity and costs, just to start. As I said above, you're not providing little data and no quantitative analysis of cost vs. benefit (the latter measured in productivity or some other variable).
T.A. Gardner wrote:The division assigned 300 troops and rounded up 800 civilian locals to do the work. Horse drawn transport was the only kind available.
This is an example where cost v. benefit analysis and data would help.

What would be the cost of additional mechanization in RM terms? What would be the cost in military terms of withdrawing mechanized support from the bleeding edge of battle?

On the benefit side, look at the labor saved: what is the cost to Wehrmacht of those 800 "local civilians"? They were either forced to work or "volunteered" for a few pieces of bread given prevailing economic conditions in Ukraine at that time. The labor-saving benefit of a hypothetical mechanization is likely infinitesimal in cost terms - whether measured by RM, strategic concerns, or military opportunity cost.

I'm all for analyzing how Germany could have better prepared Barbarossa's logistics. If you can demonstrate clear and feasible missed opportunities with hard data and quantitative analysis, great. I will agree with you, and the extent OTL failure related to expectations of quick victory, I will even incorporate it into my ATL's.

But so far I see no analytical or data-driven opportunity even to guesstimate the costs and benefits of fixing your anecdotal examples.
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Re: US leaders believed Germany would likely have been invulnerable had it defeated SU

Post by T. A. Gardner » 20 Oct 2020 02:12

Well, doing a cost-benefit analysis won't be easy. Let's look at the ice bridge scenario. 300 troops (two companies give or take) were pulled off military duties to fill engineering ones. It wasn't clear if they were from the pioneer battalion or elsewhere in the division. The civilians had to be at least fed, and that was made clear in the book that a mess hall was set up and the workers got rations.

Let's say for sake of argument that providing just a small amount of mechanization for the 12 day period of construction would have reduced manpower by 25%. That is, 225 troops and 600 laborers. That's a reduction of 275 men, 200 of which don't have to be given German military rations. That's 7200 rations that don't go to civilian labor alone. If that represents one rail car load of rations, then that load goes to German troops rather than impressed civilians. That's a big savings for 12 days work...

You have road construction troops who are faced with say a road that's on chernozem soil. If one dump truck load of sand just sand from a river bank or dry streambed will cover say 20 meters of that road and you can deliver one load every 30 minutes, you get two kilometers of road bulldozed and sanded, then compacted a day with a unit having one dump truck, one excavator, and one bulldozer towing a roller. The sand modifies the soil into a sandy loam that holds far less water and compacts better. It makes the road passable to light traffic versus being a quagmire nothing can get through.
How valuable is that?

In the worst parts you use corduroy road (tree trunks laid to form a solid bed) hauled by horse drawn wagons cut down by chain saws) to fill the road. The bulldozer scrapes a layer of sand and soil on top and then compacts it to form a relatively smooth surface. Much more efficient than all hand labor would be. Fewer stuck vehicles, faster speeds, and less wear and tear. This is valuable.

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Re: US leaders believed Germany would likely have been invulnerable had it defeated SU

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 20 Oct 2020 02:39

T.A. Gardner wrote:That's a big savings for 12 days work...
"Big savings" sounds like liberal arts analysis. And you haven't said anything about where the mechanization comes from - i.e. the cost side of cost-benefit analysis. Which combat units are demobilized? If not combat units, maybe it comes from supply services? In which case you're just shuffling horses and laborers between Peter's supply columns and Paul's bridge-building.

Especially in the context of what is clearly an emergency building program. Consider the operational/strategic context: AGS is stranded across the Dniepr, getting very little in supplies and facing the Soviet winter offensive.
T.A. Gardner wrote:How valuable is that?
That's what we need you to say. It's your thesis, after all.

Not just that, which tells us the benefit side, but also the cost side. How many trucks are scratched to get an excavator, a bulldozer, and a dump truck? Are you building a road for the dumptruck to access the river bank? Probably should - how much does that cost as a proportion of our enhanced productivity? How often do you have build dumptruck access roads? Can't have the dumptruck doing 50mile roundtrips or the enhanced productivity is minimal.

How many divisions would have to be demechanized - or GTR columns disbanded - to provide for the required equipment? What impact on the operational plan?

Then step back and consider the broader picture of Barbarossa logistics generally: what decisive battles were prevented or lost by road logistics? Can you identify a case in which supplies were piling up at railheads due to lack of truck/horse lift or were the rails not getting supplies forward sufficiently? IMJ the latter was the limiting case. The only exception is probably AGS's drive east of the Dniepr but your proposal to strip supply and combat trucks from AGS for bridge-building doesn't help its plight - only saves some rations.

If you de-mechanize a bunch of Ostheer divisions, which important Ostheer victories are you willing to forego? Maybe get rid of 4th PzGr and have AGN's ID's bludgeon their way to Leningrad? Even if that works, at what cost in German casualties and how many fewer Soviets are lost in medium-sized encirclements like around Toropets?

We can't analyze these factors except with a view to strategic consequences. That requires simultaneously integrating analysis/tradeoffs involving combat mechanization, supply mechanization, Germany's productive resources, where the bottlenecks lie (i.e. rail or road), and many other factors.

I don't have sufficient data resolution to offer a diagnosis but neither do you, which means we're writing a liberal arts paper instead of illuminating the situation with data and quantitative analysis.
T.A. Gardner wrote:Well, doing a cost-benefit analysis won't be easy.
Yeah exactly.

But if you're going to say "The Germans should have done X" you should put in the work - even if it's not easy - before saying so.
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Re: US leaders believed Germany would likely have been invulnerable had it defeated SU

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 20 Oct 2020 06:03

T.A. Gardner wrote:There's a whole thread of German bridge building here:
viewtopic.php?f=20&t=168276
The thread is on pontoon bridges to be specific but it's an excellent thread, thank you for pointing it out.

Here's an example from the thread of the equipment and manpower TOE of a German bridging column from 1938:

Image

As you can see, there's quite a lot of motor support provided and no horses.

Something I've not pointed out about your arguments, but has been bothering me, is it assumes the Germans were unaware of the benefits of mechanization.

To the extent you're still claiming the Germans were "crappy at civil engineering," we've narrowed the field to means instead of end products.

But as the linked thread demonstrates again and again, the German engineers had many mechanized bridge-building tools/vehicles.

What the Germans had a shortage of - what you don't confront - is that mechanization was a scarce resource for Germany generally.

Given the extensive motorization of bridging columns - just one example - it's impossible to assert that German engineers were unaware of the manpower-saving effects of tools - something the human race has known for nearly all its existence.

Much more likely is that engineering mechanization reflected scarcity - just as did German combat and logistical mechanization.

Rational actors make choices between different resource allocations when confronted with scarcity. Surely there were examples of suboptimal resource allocation here and there between the different branches of the Wehrmacht but that's nowhere near your claims that (1) Germany displayed engineering incompetence or (2) Germany misallocated resources systematically.

Claim (1) assumes that a constraint of ignorance rather than scarcity dictated German choices.

Claim (2) would require your articulation of better resource allocation - the counterfactual cost v. benefit analysis that you haven't provided.
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Michael Kenny
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Re: US leaders believed Germany would likely have been invulnerable had it defeated SU

Post by Michael Kenny » 20 Oct 2020 06:24

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
20 Oct 2020 06:03


As you can see, there's quite a lot of motor support provided and no horses...................



Schiffer, Bridgebuilding Equipment Of The Wehrmacht 1939-45:
ddf 6-20187.jpg
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TheMarcksPlan
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Re: US leaders believed Germany would likely have been invulnerable had it defeated SU

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 20 Oct 2020 06:33

Michael Kenny wrote:
20 Oct 2020 06:24
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
20 Oct 2020 06:03


As you can see, there's quite a lot of motor support provided and no horses...................



Schiffer, Bridgebuilding Equipment Of The Wehrmacht 1939-45:

ddf 6-20187.jpg
Yet again we're having difficulty with the concepts of scarcity and strategic tradeoffs.

Just as not all German divisions were mechanized, so were not all engineering resources.

Did the Germans somehow not notice that a mechanized division had capabilities that a foot-mobile division lacked? Or was the relative frequency of mechanization a resource allocation choice under conditions of scarcity?
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