Let's look at this with a hypothetical example:Peter89 wrote: ↑20 Oct 2020 19:53The German war economy was ran inefficiently, that's for sure.
However, Germany never had the resources to build rapidly and properly. If they allocate more resources there, other key areas would suffer as a result.
In my understanding, it was something like the tank maintenance system: constant improvements and modifications, plus the high variety of ammunition and AFVs made logistics complicated, the lack of spare parts made repair difficult, and the absence of communication between field personnel and development teams ensured that a low operational readiness rate. At sometimes, the net result of an improvement has been reduced to zero on the field.
So you either improve your tanks constantly and utilize multiple factories to produce them or you produce the maximum number of new tanks. You either build with mechanized building batallions to improve logistics to the front (and thus diminish the supply to the front) or you push through more supply to the front (and thus diminish the logistics). Like the egg and the chicken. This problem simply cannot be solved, although better solutions did exist, as you mentioned.
But it wasn't even their goal. Their goal was to conquer rapidly and pillage the land - not just in the case of the SU, but in the case of the Western Europe as well. A quote from Göring:
Basically, I consider all of occupied France as a conquered country. It seems to me that in earlier times the thing was simpler. In earlier times, you pillaged. He who had conquered a country disposed of the riches of that country. At present, things are done in a more humane way. As for myself, I still think of pillage comprehensively.
The Germans in Russia are losing say 5,000 trucks on supply lines a month to wearing out from the poor road conditions, etc. Another 5,000 are breaking down and requiring days of shop time to get them returned to service. The actual number isn't important here, it's the concept.
Now, you give the German construction troops building roads more equipment and the means to improve roads significantly. Let's say this results in a 5% decrease in trucks lost to being worn out beyond repair, in maintenance, and a 5% increase in their road speed. Again, the exact number isn't critical for our discussion purposes.
That's 250 trucks that last a month (or more) longer, 250 that don't require long out-of-service times for repairs, and the equivalent of 5% more trucks being assigned to carry supplies due to the faster movement speed. Giving the construction troops a total of say, 300 vehicles of various sorts to improve their efficiency results in a a net gain in motor transport because of the improved road conditions. It also doesn't require a huge amount of improvement to make a significant return on investment because the number of supply trucks is huge in itself.
The "quick war" and pillage method was marginally acceptable, and worked in Western Europe. It couldn't work in a continental sized country like Russia. The distances were just too vast. But the Wehrmacht lacked the necessary experience with that sort of huge campaign to fully grasp its needs. This is one way the US had an advantage in this area. The US military was used to dealing with vast distances and fighting far from bases.