Channel Dash Goes Badly

[Carl Schwamberger]

Heres a fun summary of Operation Cerubus, the Channel Dash, of the Scharnhorst, Geisneau, Hipper https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QNE0CkSsfJc

Mine strikes were the only damage to the German ships, but those suggest what might have happened had a mine or torpedo done a bit more damage. Specifically incapacitating propulsion or steering. So, pick a ship & estimate what happens nest if a hit leaves it wallowing adrift or with unworkable steering. Obviously the ship is in deep trouble, but the question extends to further losses with the German air force, the RAF, and the RN. As well as different military decisions from the lessons learned.

My first thought is of course the ship is doomed. Despite the efforts of the Luftwaffe & any dispatch of tugs, ect... the RAF & RN now have the initiative. My second is this may tip the pressure on the RAF to attack the German navy. That is more bombers on missions vs the German warships & submarine bases vs German cities. The difference may not be large in gross numbers in the short run. It may damage a few more surface ships, and may lead to more airpower vs the submarine fleet.

[AnchorSteam]

Since the British were prepared for a night-dash rather than a daylight one, I expect that MBTs and whatever else had been primed and ready would swarm the Germans and that would be the end of whichever ship had been stopped.

The RN had predicted the dash, it was the timing that threw them.

[T. A. Gardner]

Let's assume the "twins" are outright sunk. Other than the loss of like 3000+ men, give or take, it has no effect on the outcome of the war.

[Peter89]

Gnisenau only reached the dryblock after the dash. She was constantly paralyzed by air raids. i guess it would be the same.

Prinz Eugen did next to nothing before the dash and approximately the same afterwards.

Scharnhorst sank half a year later, in the meanwhile, she did nothing.

I think the Germans (not the crews) could be better off with all three sunk.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Let's assume the "twins" are outright sunk. Other than the loss of like 3000+ men, give or take, it has no effect on the outcome of the war.

Odds are the losses would be a lot less. Either way 3000 men does not make a strategic difference. My guess is they are dispersed among the coastal defense, training units, and submarine fleet.

If one of these gets grounded instead of sinking it can be a bigger propaganda event. The Brits use it for target practice and publish picture of a burnt pile of scrap steel.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Let's assume the "twins" are outright sunk. Other than the loss of like 3000+ men, give or take, it has no effect on the outcome of the war.

Well of course, the Allies still win.

Regards

Tom

[Carl Schwamberger]

Are you sure Tom? Its there some sort of butterfly effort from 500 tons of bunker fuel not being burned for dock side housekeeping in the next two years?

[Tom from Cornwall]

Are you sure Tom? Its there some sort of butterfly effort from 500 tons of bunker fuel not being burned for dock side housekeeping in the next two years?

By a coincidence I'm currently reading Roskill's The War at Sea 1939-1945 Volume 1 The Defensive and came across this relevant passage:

p.496
It is an old lesson of maritime war that until an enemy ship is totally destroyed it will continue to have at least a deterrent effect on our strategy, and that one ship sunk is worth a good many damaged. Both the enemy battle cruisers, for example, had been torpedoed in the Norwegian campaign of 1940, yet re-emerged in the Atlantic early in 1941. They were damaged again while in French ports and yet, at the end of the year, they were still exerting a considerable influence on our naval dispositions and on the allocation of our air effort. Nor had the end of their story by any means yet been reached. Speculation on what might have occurred if events had taken a different course is not a function of history, but it is interesting to reflect on how great a relief would have been achieved if the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had been sunk in any of the numerous engagements described in this volume instead of being merely damaged. That the Admiralty would then have been able to build-up the Eastern Fleet earlier and with more powerful forces is certainly one possibility.

If either, or both, had been sunk in February 1942 there may have been an opportunity for the RN to reinforce Somerville's Eastern Fleet more heavily, but then that may have simply created more targets for the Japanese Indian Ocean raid in April 1942.

Regards

Tom

[Carl Schwamberger]

By a coincidence I'm currently reading Roskill's The War at Sea 1939-1945 Volume 1 The Defensive and came across this relevant passage:

p.496
It is an old lesson of maritime war that until an enemy ship is totally destroyed it will continue to have at least a deterrent effect on our strategy, and that one ship sunk is worth a good many damaged. Both the enemy battle cruisers, for example, had been torpedoed in the Norwegian campaign of 1940, yet re-emerged in the Atlantic early in 1941. They were damaged again while in French ports and yet, at the end of the year, they were still exerting a considerable influence on our naval dispositions and on the allocation of our air effort. Nor had the end of their story by any means yet been reached. Speculation on what might have occurred if events had taken a different course is not a function of history, but it is interesting to reflect on how great a relief would have been achieved if the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had been sunk in any of the numerous engagements described in this volume instead of being merely damaged. That the Admiralty would then have been able to build-up the Eastern Fleet earlier and with more powerful forces is certainly one possibility.

If either, or both, had been sunk in February 1942 there may have been an opportunity for the RN to reinforce Somerville's Eastern Fleet more heavily, but then that may have simply created more targets for the Japanese Indian Ocean raid in April 1942.

Regards

Tom

Depends on if Sommerville had been reinforced with what he needed, or something other. A big difference between another slow old BB & some miscl cruisers, or a couple more fleet carriers & torpedo groups trained for night ops.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Returning to the grounding scenario. A otherwise functional Scharnhorst grounded off Le Havre probably triggers a extended air battle as the German AF tries to defend it and the RAF tries to destroy it. That could under some circumstance create a air battle that would dwarf the typical CIRCUS & RODEO operations. A sort of super ROADSTEAD or RAMROD operation. I suppose the Brits could ignore the ship & salvage operation & let the Germans expend those resources on it. Maybe attack it with torpedo boats, or attack it later after it was refloated & headed north east.

[EwenS]

By a coincidence I'm currently reading Roskill's The War at Sea 1939-1945 Volume 1 The Defensive and came across this relevant passage:

p.496
It is an old lesson of maritime war that until an enemy ship is totally destroyed it will continue to have at least a deterrent effect on our strategy, and that one ship sunk is worth a good many damaged. Both the enemy battle cruisers, for example, had been torpedoed in the Norwegian campaign of 1940, yet re-emerged in the Atlantic early in 1941. They were damaged again while in French ports and yet, at the end of the year, they were still exerting a considerable influence on our naval dispositions and on the allocation of our air effort. Nor had the end of their story by any means yet been reached. Speculation on what might have occurred if events had taken a different course is not a function of history, but it is interesting to reflect on how great a relief would have been achieved if the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had been sunk in any of the numerous engagements described in this volume instead of being merely damaged. That the Admiralty would then have been able to build-up the Eastern Fleet earlier and with more powerful forces is certainly one possibility.

If either, or both, had been sunk in February 1942 there may have been an opportunity for the RN to reinforce Somerville's Eastern Fleet more heavily, but then that may have simply created more targets for the Japanese Indian Ocean raid in April 1942.

Regards

Tom

Depends on if Sommerville had been reinforced with what he needed, or something other. A big difference between another slow old BB & some miscl cruisers, or a couple more fleet carriers & torpedo groups trained for night ops.

What other carriers?
Courageous, Glorious and Ark Royal sunk by the end of 1941.
Hermes, Formidable & Indomitable all in the Indian Ocean and Illustrious already earmarked to go on completion of refit (departed at the end of March).
Furious in refit in the first half of the year in US and UK.
Eagle & Argus with Force H in the Med ferrying Spits to Malta.

That only leaves Victorious and she is needed in the Home Fleet to cover the Russian convoys and protect against Tirpitz, as she unsuccessfully did in March 1942.

And the US built escort carriers are only just beginning to appear.

[Andy H]

Let's assume the "twins" are outright sunk. Other than the loss of like 3000+ men, give or take, it has no effect on the outcome of the war.

Hi Terry

I think that's a given.
The loss of these ships in this scenario would have allowed the RN more options with its heavier units, in terms of deployment to the Med or Indian theatres. In and off itself that also wouldn't have changed the outcome of the war per-see, but it could have influenced specific encounters or strategy etc

Regards

Andy H

[Von Schadewald]

What were the German chances if they had taken the longer and expected route right round the British Isles? Would they have gone round Ireland, or through the Irish Sea skirting past the Mull of Kintyre?

[Carl Schwamberger]

Either way it can be a bigger battle. Need to review the damage any might have had before leaving port.

[Carl Schwamberger]

A quick skim of a couple descriptions leave me with the impression all the major damage & other problems on these three ships had been cleaned up by January 1942. That does leave questions about if minor mechanical problems were numerous to be a major problem, or not. There is also the question of crew readiness for a battle at sea. The anti aircraft gunners had lots of opportunities for practice, and the ships engineers/damage control responded well to the mine damage that came late in the day. How good the gunnery & ammunition handling was on these three ships I'll leave to experts for the moment. I don't know what their record was during the convoy raids, nor what training they had since.

The Irish Sea is more of a trap than the Channel. IIRC there were two mine barrages the Germans knew little or nothing about and sweeping ahead as they did in the Channel would be problematic. Its also a lot more practical for the RN to move capitol ships and cruiser squadrons to intercept at the Northern Approach or points south than to the east side of the North Sea & the Netherlands coast. And of course German air cover is not practical beyond the Western Approach. It kind of looks like a replay of Tushima or Suriago Straits battles.

One of the advantages of the Channel route is the possibility of still reaching a port with a damaged ship. Odds are a lot less in the North Atlantic & Denmark Strait.