Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

[stg 44]

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Herbstnebel

Herbstnebel was created as an alternative to Wacht am Rhein, Adolf Hitler's plan to seize Antwerp and bottle up all Allied forces in Belgium and the Netherlands. Model, along with all the other senior commanders involved, believed this was unachievable given Germany's limited resources at the time. Thus he devised a less ambitious scenario that would not cross the Meuse, but still deliver a sharp defeat to the Allies. Like Wacht am Rhein, Model's attack would be launched in the Ardennes sector, but would then turn north instead of continuing west and northwest.[1]

Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt commanding OB West, had come up with a similar plan, Fall Martin ("Case Martin"). Von Rundstedt's plan called for a two-pronged attack instead of a single thrust, but in both plans the area of operations remained east of the Meuse. Model and von Rundstedt combined their plans to present a joint solution to Hitler, called by Model the "small solution". Hitler rejected it in favour of his "big solution", which formed the basis for the Battle of the Bulge.

In reading about the details of Rundstedt's proposal for an offensive in late 1944 as an alternative to Hitler's insane Antwerp offensive, it seems like it would have worked; the flanks of the Aachen bulge were pretty weak and attacking from two different areas would have the advantage of reducing the logistical burden on any one of the areas and allow for the simultaneous use of all available forces rather than the staggered deployment in the Ardennes that choked the supply routes of existing forces at the front.

Additionally the short distances to the Meuse from the Roermond triangle in the north and from the Losheim/Monschau area in the south could well see German forces reach their objectives late on the 16th or early on the 17th depending on how the attack is weighted. That would mean the capture of a number of corps and army HQs, the pocketing of 16-20 exhausted Allied divisions, and the capture of the massive series of supply dumps in the Liege-Verviers-Spa region. If those supply dumps and rail lines are lost early on in the operation, the US 1st and 9th armies would only have about 2-3 days of supplies in their corps areas around Aachen, so would rapidly be forced to surrender when their ammo is gone. If the campaign is started on the 16th, the supply dumps are lost by the 18th, that would mean before the weather clears enough for air supply drops (23rd of December) the trapped divisions would be out of supplies and ammo and probably rather rapidly overrun thereafter.

By my rough estimate including the British corps south of Roermond and 1st and 9th armies the Allies stood to lose at a minimum 500,000 men in the pocket including a number of their best infantry and armored divisions. Plus if worked likely Bradley and Eisenhower are fired and Monty becomes commander of ground forces in Europe, which would be a diplomatic disaster (historically at the suggestion of Monty being ground forces commander for longer than Normandy both Patton and Bradley threatened to quit). I wouldn't be surprised too if FDR's stroke comes a few months early and prior to Yalta he dies, leaving the US command structure in a right mess.

So would it be possible to pull off and would the fallout be as dire as suggested above? If so what impact does that have on the rest of the war and the willingness of the Wallied publics to keep fighting? 500k casualties would more than double US casualties suffered against the European Axis since the start of the war. Would unconditional surrender be out the window once Churchill starts working on Truman and without the Yalta agreement to guide policy?

[Futurist]

Just how far in the West would the German military have advanced in such a scenario after its victory in such an offensive?

[stg 44]

Just how far in the West would the German military have advanced in such a scenario after its victory in such an offensive?

To the Meuse, mostly just from Liege north.
The below map isn't quite right, but is mostly accurate. The problem is the map has the 7th Army advancing too far west (IIRC it was Huy that they would advance to and cover the flank) compared to what was actually planned. 5th Panzer army would be attacking out of the area where OTL 6th Panzer army was. The Antwerp part of the plan was a sop to Hitler "if the conditions existed to carry it out" after the Aachen pocket was dealt with (the conditions wouldn't have existed):

[Kingfish]

The problem with this option is it directs the panzer spearheads towards what was arguably the most concentrated grouping of American forces at that time -and- the worst terrain. Recall that in the OTL the Germans made very little headway in this sector, whereas the 5th Pz army had better success further south against the overstretched US 28th infantry division.

In addition, in the OTL the German 7th army barely made it to just south of Bastogne before enemy opposition forced a halt. Expecting it to cover the southern flank all the way to Namur is highly unrealistic to say the least.

[stg 44]

The problem with this option is it directs the panzer spearheads towards what was arguably the most concentrated grouping of American forces at that time -and- the worst terrain. Recall that in the OTL the Germans made very little headway in this sector, whereas the 5th Pz army had better success further south against the overstretched US 28th infantry division.

Not exactly. The historical offensive around Monschau-Ketternich and Elsenborn turned out so badly because of it not being weighted in those directions and severe bungling by 6th Panzer Army's command structure. Turns out the SS were a bunch of incompetents and botched a ton of things all around. Of course loading up the Ardennes with the entire invasion force screwed up deployments too, as trying to cram all those divisions and their logistics in one region was a traffic jam waiting to happen.

5th Panzer army did much better due to better planning and conduct of operations. They actually had worse terrain and arguably a tougher enemy to face, but were able to overcome it through better planning despite having some pretty bad divisions in the initial assault (62nd VG made up of Polish and Czech conscripts many of whom deserted or surrendered at the first chance).

This alternate scenario is kind of tough to explain without getting into gruesome detail about the entire plan and comparing and contrasting it to what happened historically. Basically the short version is the US forces were actually extremely weak in a key sector at Monschau, with two reinforced battalions, one infantry from the 99th division and one a cavalry squadron, holding 8 miles by themselves. Historically they were supposed to have been attacked by a fresh, heavily reinforced (including by Jagdtigers) VG division, but due to a bunch of screw ups and bad luck the attacking division had none of it's non-artillery attachments and only 2.5 battalions, so was actually weaker than the defending forces; not only that, but they botched the timing, so that the attacks against each US battalion went off at different times, which allowed US artillery to concentrate against each staggered attack in turn with predictable results. Plus for some reason they attacks went in against the US strong points instead of against their relatively open flanks (holding 8 miles means there are going to be gaps that could have been exploited by infiltration at night much like around the Schnee Eifel), which is a characteristically stupid SS failing.

In this alternate scenario the 5th Panzer Army would conduct the offensive in this region instead and use their better planning and tactics (especially infiltration at night as they did at Schnee Eifel in the Ardennes historically instead of un-preregistered artillery bombardment without prior patrolling to figure out the US defensive layout as the SS did historically in this area) with a better VG division (I'm thinking the 26th VG division, the best in the Ardennes campaign) supported by a Panzer division for exploitation (I'm thinking 116th since Panzer Lehr had just been removed from the fighting in Lorraine) would be able to breakthrough with ease and exploit to Eupen by the late morning...which would net them V Corps HQ and cut the Main Supply Route to 2nd and 99th divisions at Elsenborn Ridge, which would mean they are knocked out of the fight extremely quickly as their artillery would run out of ammo on the 16th or 17th. Historically the 99th was short on artillery ammo on the 16th and it was resupply in subsequent days that saved them, as artillery was their best weapon against the attacks. The loss of V Corps HQ would also paralyze command of the entire corps at the critical moment. 1st division in R&R wouldn't likely be activated for a while and exploitation Panzer units then might even catch them unprepared in their rest area north of Eupen. Also since Eupen was the MSR into the Aachen area as it was the highway from the supply dumps around Vervier-Liege, it would also cut off the forces needed to counterattack from their supplies and command.

So the historical run of the Elsenborn ridge saga would be entirely changed from the very start of the offensive. Not only that, but so would everything else with US reinforcements to the region, as the attack out of the Roermond Triangle would mean 7th armored and 30th division aren't able to be sent into the Ardennes and Elsenborn areas, they'd be locked down defending against the attack on their flanks. Furthermore 9th armored's combat command that was sent to St. Vith was actually with 2nd infantry division around Elsenborn on the 16th, so would get sucked into the fighting around Monschau after that was already decided, so wouldn't be able to redeploy, nor able to retake Monschau given the forces that would be taking and holding it I mentioned above and would get pocketed along with 99th and 2nd infantry divisions. So the historical forces that saved St. Vith wouldn't be there in this scenario and even with the incompetent 6th Panzer army's SS leadership they should be able to break through the 106th division more quickly than historically as a result, which means full exploitation on the 17th by the SS panzer corps to the Meuse as there would be nothing standing in their way unlike historically.

To make matters even worse for the US forces the area around the Losheim gap would be run by professional army instead of the SS, which means if they did their historical tactics, night infiltration to clear out weakly held gaps before the main offensive at day break, the Lanzerath area would be cleaned out by morning on the 16th and rather than try to push into Losheimergraben the 5th Panzer army would send a panzer division through the Losheim Gap and Peiper's historical route a full day earlier. That would be 2nd Panzer division, arguably the best panzer division used in the Ardennes given the level of experience the troops in the division had since it had an unusual number of veterans left. If they get through on the morning of the 16th then the US forces are really screwed because then there is really nothing between them and Spa, which was 1st Army HQ. If they are able to take that through surprise on the 16th then US defenses are basically finished, as they'd have no coordinating HQ for days thereafter. Plus the vast supply dumps built up over months for the invasion of the Rhineland, the largest the US had in Europe per the US official history of the Ardennes offensive, would be captured intact. If they make it that far Liege falls late on the 16th or the morning of the 17th, which is fatal to the Allied armies in the region, as their supplies are gone (the rail line from Antwerp terminated at Liege) and reinforcements from the British are blocked.

So rather than being able to anchor US positions on the Northern Shoulder of the bulge offensive the Elsenborn ridge defense line effectively collapses on day 1 of the offensive when cut off from HQ and supply as well as all the historical reinforcements being sucked into battles in different areas or paralyzed due to their command being knocked out very early in the offensive. If that all happens on the 16th-18th, with the Roermond triangle forces (2 panzer divisions and 1 panzergrenadier division, the outer wing of the northern pincer) being able to take Maastricht on day 1 (it was only 30km from their jump off points and only the British 7th Armoured was partially on line to stop them with part of 52nd division in reserve) then they'd also knock out or disrupt the 9th army HQ plus cut off supplies and reinforcements to 9th army and the British divisions east of the Meuse in the southern Netherlands. That would effectively render the entire US 1st and 9th armies supply and command -less within the first day or two of the offensive staring along with several British divisions in the region too. If the attack against the 12th AG HQ (detailed below) also happens on the 18th and successfully disrupts them or even captures them, which also blocks 3rd Army reinforcements north using their historical route, then the US forces are in huge trouble. 3rd Army of course could route around Luxembourg, but that would be a pretty long, costly detour and I don't see Patton not attacking the Germans in Luxembourg if they're right there. If he lets his forces bog down in Luxembourg then they're not helping in the bulge, which is bad news for 1st army.

In addition, in the OTL the German 7th army barely made it to just south of Bastogne before enemy opposition forced a halt. Expecting it to cover the southern flank all the way to Namur is highly unrealistic to say the least.

In this alternate plan 7th army wouldn't even go for Bastogne, they'd be directed north of it to cover the flank that would turn further north than the historical offensive. As I said in the post with the map the map itself is inaccurate; 7th army in Rundstedt's proposal wouldn't even try to go that far west to Namur. Also in this alternate layout they'd likely be reinforced with 2nd SS Panzer division, perhaps 17th SS, both Fuehrer brigades, and maybe some more VG divisions. I've seen one proposal that they incorporate the Trier alternative as part of 7th Army's scheme of action too, so in this scenario 2nd SS and several other units like the Fuehrer brigades would attack a couple of days after the offensive started out of Trier against Luxembourg city to take out the radio transmitter there, the most powerful in Europe, and 12th AG HQ as well as block/disrupt the transfer of 3rd Army divisions north against the flank of 7th army.

Looking at the 12th AG situation maps from December 10th-31st if they attacked by the 18th (when the Fuehrer Brigades should be ready to go) they'd be facing quite weak opposition, as historically the Bulge had sucked in what divisions were detailed to defend Luxembourg and 3rd Army's was still organizing to send the bulk of its divisions northeast. Also Bradley wouldn't be at his command post, but meeting with Ike in Verdun, so 12th AG HQ would be without its commander.

[Kingfish]

Of course loading up the Ardennes with the entire invasion force screwed up deployments too, as trying to cram all those divisions and their logistics in one region was a traffic jam waiting to happen.

Which is essentially the same thing as what you're suggesting here.

5th Panzer army did much better due to better planning and conduct of operations. They actually had worse terrain and arguably a tougher enemy to face, but were able to overcome it through better planning despite having some pretty bad divisions in the initial assault (62nd VG made up of Polish and Czech conscripts many of whom deserted or surrendered at the first chance).

No amount of planning and execution is going to make muddy roads through impenetrable forests magically disappear. It's worth noting the intended goal of this WI is also the same ground that the US 1st army bled heavily to capture in the preceding 3 months. Now we are to expect the Germans to push through as though on a Sunday drive?

In this alternate scenario the 5th Panzer Army would conduct the offensive in this region instead and use their better planning and tactics (especially infiltration at night as they did at Schnee Eifel in the Ardennes historically instead of un-preregistered artillery bombardment without prior patrolling to figure out the US defensive layout as the SS did historically in this area) with a better VG division (I'm thinking the 26th VG division, the best in the Ardennes campaign) supported by a Panzer division for exploitation (I'm thinking 116th since Panzer Lehr had just been removed from the fighting in Lorraine) would be able to breakthrough with ease and exploit to Eupen by the late morning

Just thought this would be a good time to point out the route these guys are slogging through would also be the same route their supply trucks would take - and the Germans are to be at Eupen by late morning?

[stg 44]

Of course loading up the Ardennes with the entire invasion force screwed up deployments too, as trying to cram all those divisions and their logistics in one region was a traffic jam waiting to happen.

Which is essentially the same thing as what you're suggesting here.

Not really, given that 6 divisions that were used in the Ardennes historically, 4 panzer + 2 panzergrenadier, would be attacking from north of Aachen around Sittard and Geilskirchen in this scenario.

5th Panzer army did much better due to better planning and conduct of operations. They actually had worse terrain and arguably a tougher enemy to face, but were able to overcome it through better planning despite having some pretty bad divisions in the initial assault (62nd VG made up of Polish and Czech conscripts many of whom deserted or surrendered at the first chance).

No amount of planning and execution is going to make muddy roads through impenetrable forests magically disappear. It's worth noting the intended goal of this WI is also the same ground that the US 1st army bled heavily to capture in the preceding 3 months. Now we are to expect the Germans to push through as though on a Sunday drive?

No, but better planning and fewer forces using the same roads can ameliorate the problems. Same with fewer US divisions able to reinforce the Ardennes thanks to the Roermond Triangle attack. The US 1st army was strategically surprised, badly worn down from the preceding 3 months (the replacement crisis, which had been brewing since June 1944, was reaching it's apex), and strung out badly over a huge frontage with the bulk of it's combat power in the Aachen bulge rather than the flanks where the attack would fall. Very different situation vs. October or November. In fact November did more than anything to set up the situation that left the US forces highly vulnerable on the flanks of the Aachen bulge. Historically US forces recovered quickly and exploited the mistakes the Germans made, but this offensive would prevent their ability to exploit said mistakes given that the Roermond attack would pin most of the vital reinforcements that saved the situation in the Ardennes. Like 7th armored being trapped around Geilskirchen here instead of being available to blunt the St. Vith push.

In this alternate scenario the 5th Panzer Army would conduct the offensive in this region instead and use their better planning and tactics (especially infiltration at night as they did at Schnee Eifel in the Ardennes historically instead of un-preregistered artillery bombardment without prior patrolling to figure out the US defensive layout as the SS did historically in this area) with a better VG division (I'm thinking the 26th VG division, the best in the Ardennes campaign) supported by a Panzer division for exploitation (I'm thinking 116th since Panzer Lehr had just been removed from the fighting in Lorraine) would be able to breakthrough with ease and exploit to Eupen by the late morning

Just thought this would be a good time to point out the route these guys are slogging through would also be the same route their supply trucks would take - and the Germans are to be at Eupen by late morning?

Given that historically the Monschau-Eupen highway was not taken by the Germans I don't know where you got that photo. It ain't the route you claim because there were no Germans on it in December. That's likely a road in the Ardennes, not the Monschau forest with its paved highway and was used as the MSR from V Corps to the 2nd and 99th divisions. But nice try.

[Richard Anderson]

Not really, given that 6 divisions that were used in the Ardennes historically, 4 panzer + 2 panzergrenadier, would be attacking from north of Aachen around Sittard and Geilskirchen in this scenario.

Actually, they would be attacking from north to south from the line Sittard-Geilenkirchen, across terrain that was as close to the proverbial "flat as a pancake" that you can get this side of Kansas, against British XII Corps with Guards and 7 Armoured, 43d and 52d Infantry. Preparations for that size of an attack would be impossible to conceal in those conditions.

Worse, given that 15. Armee only had 9. Panzer and 15. Panzergrenadier to work with, they have to draw three Panzer and one Panzergrenadier division from somewhere to create that mass of forces making the attack. So 5. Panzerarmee shifts north to take over the attack? Realistically that means 7. Armee is unlikely to make any progress against the VIII Corps, which gives free rein for TUSA to motor its reserves, III Corps, 4th Armd, 26th Inf, and 80th Inf, north to strike 6. Panzerarmee in reverse.

No, but better planning and fewer forces using the same roads can ameliorate the problems. Same with fewer US divisions able to reinforce the Ardennes thanks to the Roermond Triangle attack.

The Roermond Triangle attack is likely to collapse in its first hours.

The US 1st army was strategically surprised, badly worn down from the preceding 3 months (the replacement crisis, which had been brewing since June 1944, was reaching it's apex), and strung out badly over a huge frontage with the bulk of it's combat power in the Aachen bulge rather than the flanks where the attack would fall.

Yes, FUSA suffered an operational surprise, but it was only the VIII Corps that was "strung out badly" over an extended front. Otherwise, FUSA was concentrated on a line from Düren to Simmerath with VII Corps on the left having closed up to the Ruhr and three of its six divisions ready for immediate movement. Those divisions, 1st and 9th Inf Div and 3d Armd Div were understrength by a few hundred men.

Very different situation vs. October or November. In fact November did more than anything to set up the situation that left the US forces highly vulnerable on the flanks of the Aachen bulge. Historically US forces recovered quickly and exploited the mistakes the Germans made, but this offensive would prevent their ability to exploit said mistakes given that the Roermond attack would pin most of the vital reinforcements that saved the situation in the Ardennes. Like 7th armored being trapped around Geilskirchen here instead of being available to blunt the St. Vith push.

Given that NUSA had six divisions concentrated along a dozen miles of front and a massive concentration of artillery in support, it is more likely that any support the British might require would be from the American artillery and possibly by the infantry extending its front west to take pressure off the British...if they would even need that. The 2d and 7th Armd Div roles probably wouldn't change under this scenario.

Given that historically the Monschau-Eupen highway was not taken by the Germans I don't know where you got that photo. It ain't the route you claim because there were no Germans on it in December. That's likely a road in the Ardennes, not the Monschau forest with its paved highway and was used as the MSR from V Corps to the 2nd and 99th divisions. But nice try.

The problem, for the Germans, was that the 2d Inf Div attack threatened their MSR from Schleiden to Monschau...the attack on Monschau was as much affected by that as by "SS incompetence". I'm not sure how that factored in anyway, since the botched attack was planned by the LXVII AK and 326. VGD, not by the SS?

Anyway, the main problem with this plan, aside from the inability to conceal the assembly and preparations by 15. Armee, was that it was effectively directed against the concentration of allied strength, rather at it weak point.

[Carl Schwamberger]

It takes maybe five minutes of studying Plan Martin on the game board to see its not going to work there. War games and map exercises have their limits, but when you see the same conclusion from multiple independently designed games you have to wonder if there might be some connection to reality.

Leaving aside the question of surprise, the US/Allied dispositions of mid December don't favor a Aachen envelopment on the game board. A skilled attacking player can hammer back the defense some, but the attrition is bad & disfavors follow on operations. As Rich wrote the density of the defense makes the envelopment problematic.

Returning to the question of surprise. Over the years I've acquired a idea there was a something wrong with the First Army G2. That is the surprise was not a given, that it was the product of a local condition likely would not be reproduced within the US 9th Army or British. 2d Army. A couple days preparation to receive a large scale attack makes that attack yet more difficult. Returning to the game board. Allowing the defense player a reasonable reposition of the 1st Armies forward line and reserves will usually stuff the attack in a few days. A look at the map suggests the same for the adjacent armies.

[stg 44]

It takes maybe five minutes of studying Plan Martin on the game board to see its not going to work there. War games and map exercises have their limits, but when you see the same conclusion from multiple independently designed games you have to wonder if there might be some connection to reality.

Not sure what board you're looking at, but I'm going off of the 12th Army Group situation map and it looks quite achievable.
What games are you operating off of that came to the conclusion that Op. Martin was unworkable? I can't find any and have been looking.

Leaving aside the question of surprise, the US/Allied dispositions of mid December don't favor a Aachen envelopment on the game board. A skilled attacking player can hammer back the defense some, but the attrition is bad & disfavors follow on operations. As Rich wrote the density of the defense makes the envelopment problematic.

How so? What density did the Brits have around Roermond at the time? They were worn down from Operation Clipper and were in the process of a handoff to get the Guards armoured division off the line after 5 weeks on the line and an infantry shortage. British 7th armoured was holding the Sittard region basically by itself. As to the rest of the US forces in the Aachen area they were pretty emeshed with German forces and were in the process of still attacking at the time the BotB started, so weren't able to rapidly redeploy. Same with the Brits west of the Meuse.

So I have no idea what sort of 'density of defense' you are referring to. There were huge gaps on the flank of the Aachen bulge, even per the rather high level 12th AG situation maps, which only get worse with the further down you go with unit situation maps, specifically at the Sittard area and around Monschau and even the Kesternich battleground after the 272nd VG division wiped out a US battalion on the 15th of December leaving the 78th division with only 5 battalions left able to fight (1 regiment had been detached to help out 8th division attacking in Hurtgen and wouldn't have been available for at least 24 hours or more).

Returning to the question of surprise. Over the years I've acquired a idea there was a something wrong with the First Army G2. That is the surprise was not a given, that it was the product of a local condition likely would not be reproduced within the US 9th Army or British. 2d Army. A couple days preparation to receive a large scale attack makes that attack yet more difficult. Returning to the game board. Allowing the defense player a reasonable reposition of the 1st Armies forward line and reserves will usually stuff the attack in a few days. A look at the map suggests the same for the adjacent armies.

It wasn't simply 1st army, but just about every level of command up to Eisenhower, who was still convinced that the Germans might surrender before Christmas. Patton's G2 though was very worried about it and the reason 3rd army moved so quickly to help 1st was due to contingency operational planning in the days before the German offensive. Bradly and his G2 dismissed everything, thinking 6th Panzer army was simply a defensive operational reserve; that means 9th army is likely to be just as flatfooted as 1st army, especially given that they had been pressing very hard in early December and thought the Germans were more worn down than they were after Clipper. Even the Brits considered the Germans done based on their official history of the last campaigns of the war; in fact they considered the weather a reprieve that allowed them to rotate out units for a rest, which weakened their line opposite the Roermond Triangle from the Meuse to 9th army's 84th division.

You might want to look at the histories of the units involved rather than game boards and assuming rational actions based on hindsight empowered game players. Historical operators messed up pretty badly. Several campaign histories are not complementary about Allied intelligence behavior leading up to the BotB.

[stg 44]

Not really, given that 6 divisions that were used in the Ardennes historically, 4 panzer + 2 panzergrenadier, would be attacking from north of Aachen around Sittard and Geilskirchen in this scenario.

Actually, they would be attacking from north to south from the line Sittard-Geilenkirchen, across terrain that was as close to the proverbial "flat as a pancake" that you can get this side of Kansas, against British XII Corps with Guards and 7 Armoured, 43d and 52d Infantry. Preparations for that size of an attack would be impossible to conceal in those conditions.

Right, because line of sight is unlimited, weather is perfect (contrary to the historical record) there are no forests and cities in the way, they weren't surprised historically by the appearance of PzGren and Pz divisions during Clipper in December historically(/s if it must be added), and night movement wasn't a thing. Plus like the Americans the Brits assumed the 6th Panzer army was a defensive unit and they were planning to attack the Roermond area in January, so likely would assume it was a build up to counter them and that the weather was too bad to attack in, so were in the process of rotating exhausted Op. Clipper units off the line who were short of infantry and in no position to defend against a major attack.

Worse, given that 15. Armee only had 9. Panzer and 15. Panzergrenadier to work with, they have to draw three Panzer and one Panzergrenadier division from somewhere to create that mass of forces making the attack. So 5. Panzerarmee shifts north to take over the attack? Realistically that means 7. Armee is unlikely to make any progress against the VIII Corps, which gives free rein for TUSA to motor its reserves, III Corps, 4th Armd, 26th Inf, and 80th Inf, north to strike 6. Panzerarmee in reverse.

Well given that we're talking about an alternate history scenario in which the Roermond attack is given the forces planned by Rundstedt they'd have 9th Panzer (rehabbed to 80% of authorized strength by the 16th), 15th PzG, plus 9th and 10th SS Panzer divisions, 3rd PzG, and 2nd SS division (I know I said they'd attack out of Trier, but had mixed up 11th Panzer and 2nd SS in my memory as 11th Panzer wasn't ready on the 16th).

Historically 15th army would technically be in command, but the two attacking corps of 3 divisions each (each corps having 2 Panzer and 1 PzG division) would be run by an army detachment command under 15th army.

5th and 6th Panzer armies would still be in the Ardennes, but would not have as many divisions, specifically those mentioned above being sent north, as the roads couldn't sustain them all anyway.

No, but better planning and fewer forces using the same roads can ameliorate the problems. Same with fewer US divisions able to reinforce the Ardennes thanks to the Roermond Triangle attack.

The Roermond Triangle attack is likely to collapse in its first hours.

Based on nothing but your wishful thinking it sounds like.

The US 1st army was strategically surprised, badly worn down from the preceding 3 months (the replacement crisis, which had been brewing since June 1944, was reaching it's apex), and strung out badly over a huge frontage with the bulk of it's combat power in the Aachen bulge rather than the flanks where the attack would fall.

Yes, FUSA suffered an operational surprise, but it was only the VIII Corps that was "strung out badly" over an extended front. Otherwise, FUSA was concentrated on a line from Düren to Simmerath with VII Corps on the left having closed up to the Ruhr and three of its six divisions ready for immediate movement. Those divisions, 1st and 9th Inf Div and 3d Armd Div were understrength by a few hundred men.

The Brits around Roermond were pretty strung out per the 12th Army Group's situation map on the week of the offensive (10th-17th) and per the various division histories were badly worn down due to infantry shortages the Brits were experiencing in general (resulting in division disbandment to get all division up to strength, which hadn't happened fully yet by the 16th) and had been on line for weeks including during Operation Clipper; 43rd division had to borrow 1 brigade from 52nd division just to be only somewhat short of infantry rather than catastrophically short.

1st division was only 1 week off the line after getting ground down to a nub in Hurtgen and historically only one regiment was able to move out by the early morning of the 17th. 9th division was engaged in a defensive around Duren and only got their 47th regiment moving on the morning of the 17th while the rest of the division took longer to extract and move. 3rd armored was recovering in reserve from Hurtgen but still had combat commands helping 8th infantry among others continue to attack. It was both worn down and not fully in reserve. At best it moves to counter at thrust from Kesternich in this scenario. I don't doubt the Americans can blunt the inner ring from closing, but in doing so they leave nothing but 1st division able to be a reserve to counter the outer ring from closing. Once that does then Allied forces in the pocket are utterly fucked because they are cut off from supplies and given that Allied division were extremely hungry for supplies, especially fuel and ammo, they will be reduced to corps level dumps which will likely be out in 2-3 days of heavy fighting trying to keep the inner ring from being closed. What happens when they run out of fuel and ammo?

Very different situation vs. October or November. In fact November did more than anything to set up the situation that left the US forces highly vulnerable on the flanks of the Aachen bulge. Historically US forces recovered quickly and exploited the mistakes the Germans made, but this offensive would prevent their ability to exploit said mistakes given that the Roermond attack would pin most of the vital reinforcements that saved the situation in the Ardennes. Like 7th armored being trapped around Geilskirchen here instead of being available to blunt the St. Vith push.

Given that NUSA had six divisions concentrated along a dozen miles of front and a massive concentration of artillery in support, it is more likely that any support the British might require would be from the American artillery and possibly by the infantry extending its front west to take pressure off the British...if they would even need that. The 2d and 7th Armd Div roles probably wouldn't change under this scenario.

As if all the rest of 15th army wouldn't matter to US dispositions. 2nd and 7th armored can counter the inner panzer corps from overrunning the British Guards Armoured and 43rd division, but that's no help to 7th Armoured at Sittard or the reduced 52nd division in reserve behind them facing 2 panzer and 1 PzG divisions given how worn down the Brits were. 9th army HQ and its Tac Air HQ at Maastricht were only 30km from the frontline around Sittard, so even one a 1 for 1 basis the Brits can only check 2/3rds of the German divisions, assuming they could, leaving 1 to rush to Maastricht and close the outer ring and disrupt the command structure vital to keeping the Allied corps operating as well as cutting their supply lines.

Given that historically the Monschau-Eupen highway was not taken by the Germans I don't know where you got that photo. It ain't the route you claim because there were no Germans on it in December. That's likely a road in the Ardennes, not the Monschau forest with its paved highway and was used as the MSR from V Corps to the 2nd and 99th divisions. But nice try.

The problem, for the Germans, was that the 2d Inf Div attack threatened their MSR from Schleiden to Monschau...the attack on Monschau was as much affected by that as by "SS incompetence". I'm not sure how that factored in anyway, since the botched attack was planned by the LXVII AK and 326. VGD, not by the SS?

It wouldn't really given that it would be needed to prevent the 99th division from imploding. If they ahistorically moved to seal off the Monschau breakthrough it would guarantee that the 99th division imploded and they'd be rolled up all over their front from Losheim to the Heartbreak Crossroads. So same effect in the end, just via a different course of action.

Dietrich ran the army and demanded that that particular corps follow Hitler's tactical instructions to the letter (which included not doing any recon, no infiltration at night, or preregistering artillery which then fired largely blindly in the initial bombardment); 5th Pz Army decided not to follow said instructions and rolled up the 14th Cav Group and 106th division quickly as a result. Plus given that IOTL the 'Monschau Korps' did not get what it was promised thanks to SS army level incompetence they ended up attacking with a weaker assault force than the meager defenders!

Anyway, the main problem with this plan, aside from the inability to conceal the assembly and preparations by 15. Armee, was that it was effectively directed against the concentration of allied strength, rather at it weak point.

You keep repeating that without demonstrating that to be true.

[Avalancheon]

Just how far in the West would the German military have advanced in such a scenario after its victory in such an offensive?

To the Meuse, mostly just from Liege north.
The below map isn't quite right, but is mostly accurate. The problem is the map has the 7th Army advancing too far west (IIRC it was Huy that they would advance to and cover the flank) compared to what was actually planned. 5th Panzer army would be attacking out of the area where OTL 6th Panzer army was. The Antwerp part of the plan was a sop to Hitler "if the conditions existed to carry it out" after the Aachen pocket was dealt with (the conditions wouldn't have existed):

This is a very interesting scenario. I have heard about the alternate plans for the Ardennes offensive, but I have never seen them explained in such exacting detail. So props to you for doing that.

Operation Herbstnebel was a modest operation in the sense that it only aimed for a shallow penetration up to the Meuse river, instead of a deeper advance beyond it to Antwerp. But despite that, it had the potential to inflict far more damage to the Allied armies than Operation Wacht am Rhein. The specific intent was to execute a double envelopment, and trap the Americans in a large pocket around Aachen. This would be a massive defeat for the Allies, putting them in a weaker position against Germany.

The scary thing is that, on paper at least, it looks like a more achievable plan than the real life Ardennes offensive. If the Heer had pulled off an encirclement of this magnitude, it would give a whole new meaning to the term 'battle of the Bulge.' The Americans would get to experience the trauma of fighting in a kesselschlacht, just as the Russians so often had.


So, from what I can tell by your descriptions and the map: The northern pincer is formed by 15th Army, and the southern pincer is formed by 5th Panzer Army. Meanwhile, 6th Panzer Army and 7th Army are making a separate attack in the south.

The southern pincer will be launched from Losheim: 5th Panzer Army will break through Monschau and advance to Aachen. The northern pincer will be launched from Sittard: 15th Army will break through Maastricht and advance to Aachen.

If the attack is executed successfully, then we can expect the following outcomes. In the north, the Germans would encircle 2nd British Army, along with 9th U.S. Army and 1st U.S. Army. In the south, the Germans would scatter 3rd U.S. Army and prevent them from coming to the rescue.


Thats if everything goes to plan, of course The question we must ask is, did the Heer have a reasonable chance of carrying out an encirclement of Aachen?

Looking at the map, it is entirely possible that 5th Panzer Army can punch through V Corps, and advance all the way to Aachen. There is a question about just how strong the American defenses at Monschau are, and whether or not they will fold on the 1st day.

As for 15th Army, however, they are going to have a much harder time breaking through 2nd British Army. They are facing more divisions on a narrower frontage than 5th Panzer Army is. Moreover, they don't have any panzer divisions to exploit their breakthrough.

Basically the short version is the US forces were actually extremely weak in a key sector at Monschau, with two reinforced battalions, one infantry from the 99th division and one a cavalry squadron, holding 8 miles by themselves. Historically they were supposed to have been attacked by a fresh, heavily reinforced (including by Jagdtigers) VG division, but due to a bunch of screw ups and bad luck the attacking division had none of it's non-artillery attachments and only 2.5 battalions, so was actually weaker than the defending forces; not only that, but they botched the timing, so that the attacks against each US battalion went off at different times, which allowed US artillery to concentrate against each staggered attack in turn with predictable results.

Do you have a source about Monschau only being held by two battalions? Because on other maps, it looks like the Americans were holding it with the 5th armored division and 9th infantry division. The 5th Panzer Army can still break through, but given the terrain constricting how many divisions they can deploy, maybe not on the 1st day.

[Richard Anderson]

Right, because line of sight is unlimited, weather is perfect (contrary to the historical record) there are no forests and cities in the way, they weren't surprised historically by the appearance of PzGren and Pz divisions during Clipper in December historically(/s if it must be added), and night movement wasn't a thing.

Strawman much?

Plus like the Americans the Brits assumed the 6th Panzer army was a defensive unit and they were planning to attack the Roermond area in January, so likely would assume it was a build up to counter them and that the weather was too bad to attack in, so were in the process of rotating exhausted Op. Clipper units off the line who were short of infantry and in no position to defend against a major attack.

All British units, along with many American and German, were short of infantry. That is why the British tracked average battalion strengths in divisions. BTW, CLIPPER ended 22 November.

Well given that we're talking about an alternate history scenario in which the Roermond attack is given the forces planned by Rundstedt they'd have 9th Panzer (rehabbed to 80% of authorized strength by the 16th), 15th PzG, plus 9th and 10th SS Panzer divisions, 3rd PzG, and 2nd SS division (I know I said they'd attack out of Trier, but had mixed up 11th Panzer and 2nd SS in my memory as 11th Panzer wasn't ready on the 16th).

When did 9. and 10. SS get "rehabbed"?

Historically 15th army would technically be in command, but the two attacking corps of 3 divisions each (each corps having 2 Panzer and 1 PzG division) would be run by an army detachment command under 15th army.

5th and 6th Panzer armies would still be in the Ardennes, but would not have as many divisions, specifically those mentioned above being sent north, as the roads couldn't sustain them all anyway.

Okay.

Based on nothing but your wishful thinking it sounds like.

Well, sure, my wishful thinking is at least as good as yours and has a couple of AGRAs to back it up with, along with the rather dense artillery concentration developed by NUSA.

The Brits around Roermond were pretty strung out per the 12th Army Group's situation map on the week of the offensive (10th-17th) and per the various division histories were badly worn down due to infantry shortages the Brits were experiencing in general (resulting in division disbandment to get all division up to strength, which hadn't happened fully yet by the 16th) and had been on line for weeks including during Operation Clipper; 43rd division had to borrow 1 brigade from 52nd division just to be only somewhat short of infantry rather than catastrophically short.

You do realize you're talking about a dozen-odd mile front?

1st division was only 1 week off the line after getting ground down to a nub in Hurtgen and historically only one regiment was able to move out by the early morning of the 17th. 9th division was engaged in a defensive around Duren and only got their 47th regiment moving on the morning of the 17th while the rest of the division took longer to extract and move. 3rd armored was recovering in reserve from Hurtgen but still had combat commands helping 8th infantry among others continue to attack. It was both worn down and not fully in reserve. At best it moves to counter at thrust from Kesternich in this scenario. I don't doubt the Americans can blunt the inner ring from closing, but in doing so they leave nothing but 1st division able to be a reserve to counter the outer ring from closing. Once that does then Allied forces in the pocket are utterly fucked because they are cut off from supplies and given that Allied division were extremely hungry for supplies, especially fuel and ammo, they will be reduced to corps level dumps which will likely be out in 2-3 days of heavy fighting trying to keep the inner ring from being closed. What happens when they run out of fuel and ammo?

Funny, I coulda sworn 3d Armd had 259 medium tanks and 144 light tanks at 2200 hours 15 December? What was "worn down"?

As if all the rest of 15th army wouldn't matter to US dispositions. 2nd and 7th armored can counter the inner panzer corps from overrunning the British Guards Armoured and 43rd division, but that's no help to 7th Armoured at Sittard or the reduced 52nd division in reserve behind them facing 2 panzer and 1 PzG divisions given how worn down the Brits were. 9th army HQ and its Tac Air HQ at Maastricht were only 30km from the frontline around Sittard, so even one a 1 for 1 basis the Brits can only check 2/3rds of the German divisions, assuming they could, leaving 1 to rush to Maastricht and close the outer ring and disrupt the command structure vital to keeping the Allied corps operating as well as cutting their supply lines.

All the rest of 15. Armee had just been hammered by FUSA and NUSA. You seriously don't know what kind of firestorm the Germans would be walking into there, do you?

It wouldn't really given that it would be needed to prevent the 99th division from imploding. If they ahistorically moved to seal off the Monschau breakthrough it would guarantee that the 99th division imploded and they'd be rolled up all over their front from Losheim to the Heartbreak Crossroads. So same effect in the end, just via a different course of action.

I think you rather missed the point. There was a very good reason the attacks at Monschau were so weak.

Dietrich ran the army and demanded that that particular corps follow Hitler's tactical instructions to the letter (which included not doing any recon, no infiltration at night, or preregistering artillery which then fired largely blindly in the initial bombardment); 5th Pz Army decided not to follow said instructions and rolled up the 14th Cav Group and 106th division quickly as a result. Plus given that IOTL the 'Monschau Korps' did not get what it was promised thanks to SS army level incompetence they ended up attacking with a weaker assault force than the meager defenders!

Oh, I see. It always fascinates me how everyone always concentrates on what happened in the southern side of the Losheim Gap and the northern end of the Schnee Eifel and then simply assumes it will happen anywhere desired under the right circumstances.

You keep repeating that without demonstrating that to be true.

Um, you want to take the same German force that failed against what was effectively an overextended five division front and throw it against a narrower front, held by a more concentrated defense, and in terrain where it is more difficult to hide the assembly of such a force. And then keep repeating things without demonstrating they are true. My hand wavium is at least as potent as yours in this conversation.

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
Well, sure, my wishful thinking is at least as good as yours and has a couple of AGRAs to back it up with, along with the rather dense artillery concentration developed by NUSA.

Something the US 104th Cavalry Group, 106th ID, and 28th ID seem to have lacked. The density of supporting artillery for those units looks thin. Maybe I missed something, but they seem to have lacked the ready support of a robust corps & army artillery support. I also don't recall much in the way of tank destroyer or independent tank battalions with or near those three units. Counting rifles in the infantry regiments kind of ignores where the combat power of a US or British corps resided.

The effect of weather & terrain on the artillery support seems to be misunderstood here. As a former artillery guy, I can see a big difference in the ability to get fires on target, even with bad weather. Visibility of even 1000 or or 500 meters onto relatively flat and thinly forested terrain is a lot easier than the denser woods and ridges the 106th & 28th ID were defending. Tho I suspect the actual average daylight visibility was closer to 3500 meters. on a overcast/hazy day.

[Richard Anderson]

Something the US 104th Cavalry Group, 106th ID, and 28th ID seem to have lacked. The density of supporting artillery for those units looks thin. Maybe I missed something, but they seem to have lacked the ready support of a robust corps & army artillery support. I also don't recall much in the way of tank destroyer or independent tank battalions with or near those three units. Counting rifles in the infantry regiments kind of ignores where the combat power of a US or British corps resided.

14th Cav Gp. The density was only thin because of how stretched out the VIII Corps was and because of some odd deployment choices. Too much corps artillery was placed too far forward and forced to redeploy, which then led to loss of communications and disorder.

The effect of weather & terrain on the artillery support seems to be misunderstood here. As a former artillery guy, I can see a big difference in the ability to get fires on target, even with bad weather. Visibility of even 1000 or or 5000 meters onto relatively flat and thinly forested terrain is a lot easier than the denser woods and ridges the 106th & 28th ID were defending. Tho I suspect the actual average daylight visibility was closer to 3500 meters. on a overcast/hazy day.

Exactly.