Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

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stg 44
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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#31

Post by stg 44 » 17 Nov 2020, 16:38

Gooner1 wrote:
17 Nov 2020, 14:58
stg 44 wrote:
16 Nov 2020, 18:13

7th Armoured lost most of their experienced guys in November. From "Churchill's Desert Rats in Northwest Europe" by Patrick Delaforce in very late November (29th is the closest date mentioned in the text) all the men who had been overseas for 5 years could go home, which removed the most experienced men from just about every combat unit in the division. Queens 1/6th and 1/7th was broken up due to casualties and replaced on December 3rd by the 2nd bat. Devonshire regiment and 9th battalion Durham light infantry. So you're right in that they were replenished, I had thought that happened later in December. Within the combat units the experienced men who returned home were replaced by new drafts and had a fews weeks training in the unit by the 16th of December.
I don't think anyone would call the men of 7th Armoured Division who had 'only' served since Normandy or Italy or Alamein as inexperienced though?

Absolutely not, which is why I didn't say that. Simply that the "OGs" of the division were gone by December 1944 and as far as I can tell sent back to train the next generation of warriors. As noted in the book they were replaced with raw recruits with limited training, though operational training in the unit eventually helped them fully integrate into the veteran unit...just not in time for mid-December 1944, as the offensive operations they were to take part in were at least a month or more out, not including the Ardennes imposed delay on operations.
Gooner1 wrote:
17 Nov 2020, 14:58
Apparently after the 7th of December when the division took over from the Guards Armoured the line from the Meuse to Sittard the '1st RB' (not exactly sure which rifle brigade that was) held a 3000 yard front from Nieustadt to the main road from Maastricht and Sittard to Holtum and in the text were complaining that they did not have enough strength to hold the line and patrol according to Col. Paley their CO. Also apparently the 8th Hussars at one point had to leave their tanks in the rear as act as infantry on the line. Division HQ was at Limbricht with only a small minefield between them and the enemy front lines 3000m yards; eventually, doesn't say which date, they switched with 5th RTR at Geleen.

Doesn't sounds like a great defensive situation.
1st Battalion the Rifle Brigade. the Motor Battalion of 22nd Armoured Brigade. I think most of the tankers in the division took their turn dismounted and manning the frontline as ersatz infantry in that period. It enabled the infantry to take their turn out of the line in comfy billets but no, not a great defensive situation. On the other hand, from the War Diary of M Battery RHA "14 Dec 30 Corps arranged an HB programme on all German guns along the Corps front. The Bty took part. In all 6 Fd Regts, 7 Medium Regts, 2 Heavy Regts, 1 Super heavy Regt and one Heavy AA Regt were engaged and 12000s were fired."
Yes I have found that from another source. From the context it sounded like it was a 'farewell present' from the artillery before it moved out to get ready for Veritable in January, the originally planned date. Certainly had the offensive forces been in place then (which isn't 100% certain given that during the build up to the historical Bulge campaign units were arriving still as late as the 15th of December) and had been identified would have had a bad day. Sounds like, based on what reports I can find of German tactics at the time against British and US forces in the area, that any offensive would be preceded by night infiltration, which apparently had very good success against Wallied forces to the end of the war, that would really have exploited the biggest weakness of 7th AD and might have cracked the front lines before the Panzers or artillery had gotten involved depending on the scale of infiltration. I know I wouldn't want to be a tanker used as infantry in that situation, especially given the weather being what it was and giving good cover for just such a tactic. Given the terrain (woods and plenty of towns/cities), infiltration wouldn't be all that hard and followed up hard by mobile forces the British heavy corps artillery might quickly find itself on the front lines.
Gooner1 wrote:
17 Nov 2020, 14:58
As to the plan for Shears it does sounds like it would have been a decent one had it gone forward as planned, but by the 12th it was cancelled and from what I can piece together units were moving off the line and reshuffling to Veritable and by the 16th were definitely not in a position to defend against an unexpected offensive. 9th AGRA does sound like it was around Sittard and would have been the corps assets, with 5th AGRA somewhere west of the Meuse for Shears at least in early December (no idea exactly where or if it was even still present by the 16th).

If you have any info about that I'd appreciate it.
Guards Armoured Division got an order to move 'in two or three days time' on 16th December. 43rd Division and 34th Tank Brigade started moving away on the 19th. All their planned moves were affected by the Ardennes offensive. 34th Tank Brigade who had their tanks on tank transporters en route to Tilburg were turned around and directed south to Liege for instance.
9th AGRAs didn't move much, its HQ moving from Munstergeleen to Rumpen on the 21st. Don't know about 5th AGRA but given the general lack of urgency in operations it seems unlikely it would have moved before the 16th.
I've found a source on part of the 43rd that said they were off the line on the 16th. So in this what if situation how quickly do you think they could respond and get into action against a surprise attack on the morning of the 16th? Historical response times aren't really all that helpful given that British forces weren't attacked, so they waited until they got requests for help before reacting.
Gooner1 wrote:
17 Nov 2020, 14:58
Every division history I can find from the 43rd division, Guards Armoured, and 7th Armoured lists a shortage of infantry as a major problem. After all the 43rd division had to borrow a brigade from the 52nd for a while in December despite just holding the line.
Well it wasn't such a problem by December as two data points provided should indicate. Nothing unusual in brigades temporarily being detached or coming under command of another formation during lulls in operations.
Sure, but I meant more in the sense of the 52nd division as a reserve then being short of forces needed to stop a breakthrough of 7th AD's lines. Given the proximity of the Meuse crossings and 9th army HQ at Maastricht to the front, there is very little room for error when the corps and divisions in the way are short on infantry.
Gooner1 wrote:
17 Nov 2020, 14:58
Where exactly was 43rd division holding the line? Where exactly was the Guards? What was the deal with the 52nd division once Shears was cancelled on the 12th?
The GAD, as mentioned, were in reserve behind 7AD. Best as I can make out 43rd Division, possibly including one brigade of 52nd Division, were in the line with 34th TB whilst 52nd were behind with 8th AB. 52nd replaced 43rd from the 19th December as the latter division moved.
The 12th Army Group sitmap is probably slightly wrong.
What's your source on that? From what I can find from the 7AD book mentioned earlier GAD was to the east of 7AD after they were relieved between the Meuse and Sittard and it was only before Shears was cancelled that GAD was in reserve. On the 12 AG maps from the 10th-16th of December GAD is shown in reserve, but then from about the 13th on they take over the line from Sittard to the US 84th ID.
Of course you are probably right that 12th AG maps probably lacked the timely fine detail on deployments.

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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#32

Post by stg 44 » 17 Nov 2020, 16:44

I'll respond to the rest later, this part was just galling enough for a separate response, since it shows you aren't even bothering to look at what sources I'm providing and then having the nerve to claim I'm not doing my homework.
Richard Anderson wrote:
16 Nov 2020, 19:02
XIII corps was only made up of Guards Armoured and 43rd division per the 12th AG situation map on December 16th. XIX corps was the 7th armored, 102nd, and 84th divisions. Really trying to pad those artillery numbers.
You're now confusing the British Army with the American Army. I suggest you stop babbling and do some substantive research.

(snip tiresome nonsense from someone who apparently cannot be bothered to do the basic research to support his claims)
Since you apparently refuse to look at the link I've posted repeatedly about the 12th AG situation map for December 16th, here is a screen shot of the area north of Aachen from the Meuse to 9th army:
Screen Shot 2020-11-17 at 8.42.59 AM.png
Screen Shot 2020-11-17 at 8.42.59 AM.png (636 KiB) Viewed 966 times
Corps compositions are exactly what I said above.
XIII corps was an American corps:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XIII_Corp ... ed_States)
It was first activated...as a subordinate unit to Ninth U.S. Army, it under the command of the Allied 21st Army Group. In November 1944, the XIII Corps pierced the Siegfried Line and pushed to the Roer River. On 23 February 1945, the corps routed Third Reich forces in the Cologne Plain and made a dash for the Rhine on 31 March of that year.
The British XIII corps was in Italy at the time:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XIII_Corp ... _World_War
On 17 August 1944, XIII Corps was transferred to the U.S. Fifth Army to become its right wing.[8] Under the Fifth Army, XIII Corps, with British 6th Armoured Division, 6th South African Armoured Division, 8th Indian Infantry Division, British 1st Infantry Division and 1st Canadian Armoured Brigade under command, fought in the Apennine Mountains to break the Gothic Line.

On 18 January 1945, XIII Corps returned to the Eighth Army.[8] XIII Corps, commanded now by John Harding, was the left wing of Eighth Army in the Spring 1945 offensive in Italy, which ended in May 1945 with the surrender of Axis forces in Italy. 2nd New Zealand Division, operating with the corps, confronted Yugoslav troops at Trieste, entering and capturing the city.[9] The Corps restored order in the strife-ridden city and enforced the Morgan Line from May 1945 to mid-1946.
And yet you say I am the one not doing his homework. :lol:


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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#33

Post by Richard Anderson » 17 Nov 2020, 18:32

Avalancheon wrote:
17 Nov 2020, 14:45
Thats a piss poor response, Richard, and you know it.
No, it is not, and you know it. A request was made for details on what artillery was present. It was given, It was followed by a request for sources. It was given. The next request was to ask where the units in those sources were, along with the belief expressed that the units in those sources did not actually exist. I chose not to respond to the more egregious misunderstandings, misreadings, and silliness displayed in that response and that are now doubled-down on by the poster in subsequent posts.

I am not required to respond to nonsense posts and I am not your or Stg44's research assistant.
Last edited by Richard Anderson on 18 Nov 2020, 09:13, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#34

Post by Richard Anderson » 17 Nov 2020, 19:59

stg 44 wrote:
17 Nov 2020, 16:44
I'll respond to the rest later, this part was just galling enough for a separate response, since it shows you aren't even bothering to look at what sources I'm providing and then having the nerve to claim I'm not doing my homework.
No, I have looked at your Wiki source and the maps you posted, which you have difficulty understanding.
XIII corps was only made up of Guards Armoured and 43rd division per the 12th AG situation map on December 16th. XIX corps was the 7th armored, 102nd, and 84th divisions. Really trying to pad those artillery numbers.

Since you apparently refuse to look at the link I've posted repeatedly about the 12th AG situation map for December 16th, here is a screen shot of the area north of Aachen from the Meuse to 9th army:
Yes, I know those maps very well indeed. The divisional symbols represent, more or less, the center of mass of the divisions, but are not specific location statements, which are impossible at the scale used. Note also the corps and army headquarters symbols have a "tail", which actually locates where that headquarters was located. In this case, the headquarters location of XIII U.S. Corps was in the British zone. However, that has nothing to do with the assignment of that headquarters or the units attached to it. It was there because the space was crowded and their was no suitable headquarters location in the even more crowded NUSA zone on the other side of the inter-army group boundary.

You are making nonsensical assumptions based on a single source. If you want more or less accurate assignment and attachment data for units you need to do some work and dig. For American forces that would be Office of the Theater Historian, Order of Battle of the United States Army, World War II, European Theater of Operations, Divisions, Paris, France: December 1945. It details, with some minor inaccuracies, the attachments and detachments of divisions to corps and armies. For the British, the equivalent sources is H.F. Joslen, Orders of Battle - Second World War 1939-45, London, Naval & Military Press Ltd, 2003 [reprint].

A good single source for the chronology of these events is Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Chronology, December 1944, Washington, D.C.: War Department, 1944.
Corps compositions are exactly what I said above.
XIII corps was an American corps:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/XIII_Corp ... ed_States)
It was first activated...as a subordinate unit to Ninth U.S. Army, it under the command of the Allied 21st Army Group. In November 1944, the XIII Corps pierced the Siegfried Line and pushed to the Roer River. On 23 February 1945, the corps routed Third Reich forces in the Cologne Plain and made a dash for the Rhine on 31 March of that year.
Sigh...Wiki. Again. XIII U.S. Corps was a component of the Rhode Island Organized Reserve, constituted I October 1933 as Headquarters, XIII Army Corps; redesignated 1 January 1942 as Headquarters, XIII Corps; activated and organized 7 December 1942 at Providence, Rhode Island; became operational 8 November 1944 in Holland; inactivated 25 September 1945 at Camp Cooke, California. XIII Corps was assigned to NUSA and remained assigned to NUSA throughout this period. NUSA was assigned to 12th Army Group, but on 20 December was attached to 21st Army Group (it had been previously attached to 21st Army Group for CLIPPER from 11-23 November).
And yet you say I am the one not doing his homework. :lol:
Google searches and Wiki are not "homework". On 16 December, British XII Corps held the line from the left corps boundary to the right corps boundary, which was also the inter-army and inter-army group boundary, having taken over the position from XXX Corps, which was withdrawn with corps troops into 2 British Army and 21st Army Group reserve to prepare for further operations. As of 16 December, XII British Corps consisted of 53 Division (attached 9 November, relieved from attachment 17 December), 7 Armoured Division (attached 12 December, relieved 5 February), Guards Armoured Division (attached 13 December, relieved 20 December), 43 Division (attached 13 December, relieved 20 December), and 52 Division (attached 13 December, relieved 4 February). None of these were American units and none of them were under American command. On 17 December, 53 Division was attached to XXX Corps and on 20 December, Guards Armoured and 43 Division followed, creating the defensive force along the Meuse.

As of 16 December, the Ninth U.S. Army consisted of XIII Corps with the 7th Armd Div, 29th Inf Div, and 102d Inf Div. The XIX Corps consisted of the 2d Armd Div, 84th Inf Div and 102d Inf Div. The 30th Inf Div was in NUSA reserve in the XIX Corps zone.

The 7th Armd Div was relieved from attachment to XIII Corps, NUSA in the late evening of 16 December and attached to VIII Corps, FUSA, beginning its movement south in the early morning hours of 17 December. XIII Corps remained in place and reverted to the defensive. The 30th Inf Div was attached to V Corps, FUSA 17 December and began movement south at 1625. The 2d Armd Div was relieved from attachment to XIX Corps on 22 December and attached to VII Corps. As part of these movements, NUSA took over the zone previously occupied by VII Corps, FUSA and the 8th Inf Div was relieved from attachment to VII Corps and attached to XIX Corps 20 December and the 78th Inf Div was relieved from attachment to VII Corps and attached to XIX Corps 22 December, both changes of attachment occuring in place.

The artillery dispositions and plans of NUSA during this period are covered in detail in Chapter 10 of the General Board Report No. 61, Field Artillery Operations. I am more than a bit curious why you accept that 12 corps battalions fired in support of the 84th Division on 16 December, but then disbelieve that those 12 corps battalions and others existed? I am also curious where you get the rather pre-20th century idea that artillery must be in the line and able to see the enemy from its firing positions. There is this thing called indirect fire. It enables great flexibility in the fires of field artillery. For example, 6th Field Regiment RA of 3 AGRA at Grathem (https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2people ... 7220.shtml) under command of XII Corps, in support of the 53 Division positions along the Maas (Meuse), could fire some 12,000 meters southeast, interdicting the road from Roermond to Echt, among other things. The medium regiments of 3 AGRA disposed along the Maas from Roermon to Venlo, could reach up to 16,500 meters into the German lines of approach. The 20,000 meter range of the 8" guns at Amstenrade would carry to beyond Heinsberg.

BTW, the locations of the 9 AGRA regiments are pretty well detailed in The History of 9 Army Group Royal Artillery, ND: NP [1945]:

9th Medium Regiment RA – at Grotenrath c. 5 December, attached to 5 AGRA (History of the 9th Medium Regiment (8th Buffs), NP:ND [1945].
11th Medium Regiment RA – 2 miles NE of Brunssum, attached to 5 AGRA
107th Medium Regiment RA – at Geelen
165th Heavy Anti-Aircraft Regiment RA – at Geelen with 421st HAA Btry, 108th HAA Regt RA under command, by 22 December moved to vic. between Grotenrath-Brunssum
51st Heavy Regiment RA – vic. between Grotenrath-Brunssum
3rd Super Heavy Regiment RA – at Amstenrade

From that history it may be inferred that the regiments of 5 AGRA were disposed in the same area. Again, I am curious why you are so disbelieving of the strength and dispositions of the British artillery and American artillery. You asked for details, were given them, and now simply disbelieve the evidence. Why?
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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#35

Post by Richard Anderson » 18 Nov 2020, 09:54

Lets move on to the unit locations. 7 Armoured Division was on the line Maaseik-Sittard having moved there in the first week of December, according to MG Verney in The Desert Rats. It can be determined from the SHAEF operations maps that Guards Armoured Division extended the line to Geilenkirchen. The 43 (Wessex) Division was still at Geilenkirchen on 16 December, backing up Guards, and was there until relieved by 52 Division.
52 (Lowland) Infantry Division moved to Stein on 7 December and then to west of Geilenkirchen on 17 December, covering the southern face of the Heinsberg salient and relieving 43 Division. See Second World War Memoirs of Joe Brown. The tie-in to NUSA and XIII Corps Artillery is made clear in Chapter 10 of the General Board Report No. 61, Field Artillery Operations.

Strengths of Allied units are from multiple sources, including the 12th and 21st Army Group Daily G-1 SITREPS. However, a most useful single source for this purpose is "British & American Troops Located Within a 100-Mile Radius of Brussels", found in NARA II< RG 331, SHAEF G-1 Admin Section 1944-45, 322.8 to 331.3. The strengths are as of 14 December and exclude "Air Forces of other Allied Contingents, such as Czechs, Belgians & Dutch. From that we find 795,531 troops of 21 Army Group, including 8,163 in 12 Corps Troops, 17,611 in 43 Inf Div, 18,652 in 52 Inf Div, 17,444 in 53 Inf Div, 14,276 in Guards Armd Div, 13,476 in 7 Armd Div, 4,676 in 3 AGRA, 4,735 in 5 AGRA, and 3,801 in 9 AGRA, and 4,723 in 8 Armoured Brigade.

For NUSA, it was Army HQ 107,430, XIII Corps Troops 2,137, 7th Armd Div 10,659, 29th Inf Div 13,609, 102d Inf Div 12,994, XIX Corps Troops 2,308, 2d Armd Div 14,611, 84th Inf Div 13,000, and the 104th Inf Div 13,170.

Any German attack from the Heinsberg salient on the Allied line from the Maas to Geilenkirchen is going advance across relatively flat, partially inundated terrain, with relatively little cover or concealment, against an Allied defense in depth, with plenty of artillery and armor, defending a front little more than 18 miles wide with effectively five divisions, instead of the 50 miles of rolling, forested country defended by a cordon of three divisions.
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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#36

Post by Kingfish » 18 Nov 2020, 11:41

Richard Anderson wrote:
17 Nov 2020, 19:59
I am also curious where you get the rather pre-20th century idea that artillery must be in the line and able to see the enemy from its firing positions. There is this thing called indirect fire. It enables great flexibility in the fires of field artillery. For example, 6th Field Regiment RA of 3 AGRA at Grathem (https://www.bbc.co.uk/history/ww2people ... 7220.shtml) under command of XII Corps, in support of the 53 Division positions along the Maas (Meuse), could fire some 12,000 meters southeast, interdicting the road from Roermond to Echt, among other things. The medium regiments of 3 AGRA disposed along the Maas from Roermon to Venlo, could reach up to 16,500 meters into the German lines of approach. The 20,000 meter range of the 8" guns at Amstenrade would carry to beyond Heinsberg.
But Rich, the Germans are moving so fast that whatever IF is sent their way would fall harmlessly behind them.

Like the Persian archers firing on the Greek Hoplites at Marathon.
The gods do not deduct from a man's allotted span the hours spent in fishing.
~Babylonian Proverb

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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#37

Post by stg 44 » 18 Nov 2020, 16:15

Kingfish wrote:
18 Nov 2020, 11:41
But Rich, the Germans are moving so fast that whatever IF is sent their way would fall harmlessly behind them.

Like the Persian archers firing on the Greek Hoplites at Marathon.
Gee, thanks for the helpful strawman :roll:

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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#38

Post by stg 44 » 18 Nov 2020, 16:50

I don't have a lot of time to respond today, so the replies will have to be in stages. Please give me the courtesy of responding in full before responding to my responses.
Richard Anderson wrote:
18 Nov 2020, 09:54
Lets move on to the unit locations. 7 Armoured Division was on the line Maaseik-Sittard having moved there in the first week of December, according to MG Verney in The Desert Rats. It can be determined from the SHAEF operations maps that Guards Armoured Division extended the line to Geilenkirchen. The 43 (Wessex) Division was still at Geilenkirchen on 16 December, backing up Guards, and was there until relieved by 52 Division.
52 (Lowland) Infantry Division moved to Stein on 7 December and then to west of Geilenkirchen on 17 December, covering the southern face of the Heinsberg salient and relieving 43 Division. See Second World War Memoirs of Joe Brown.
7AD we've already established was there in earlier posts. GAD was also established. 52nd division in Stein per the 12th AG map is attested to by your source, so no argument there.

43rd however is rather more murky in it's location. The last reference to their location I can find is December 7th in Tripsrath where the 1st Bat. Worcestershires were located, but on the 16th there is mention of them moving off the line to Aalbeek and Tilburg in the wake of the cancellation of SHEARS on the 12th:
http://www.worcestershireregiment.com/w ... _tripsrath
On the 16th December Worcesters were ordered to send a recce party to Aalbeek, no one ever knew quite why. The party was recalled almost before it arrived there and was dispatched on the following day (17th December) to Tilburg.

Private Thomas Scully (now moved to �D� Company with Captain Percy Huxter) remembers being a member of this Recce Party to Tilburg where he arranged billets in the local house of Hobbemastraat and Jozef Isra�lsstraat, for 16, 17 and 18 Platoon of �D� Company. He learnt to use the following Dutch phrase �Wilt U geven biljets voor soldaten, hoeveel� translated meant �Will you provide billets for soldiers, how many�.

It was not generally known until long afterwards that the object of this move was to allow the Worcestershire Battalion a period of special training prior to committing it as part of the force to make the assault on the Siegfried Line on 9th January 1945. The Recce Party procured billets in Tilburg and the Battalion moved off from Brunssum to occupy them at 09.00 hours on the 18th December.
If you've got a source for their exact location I'm all ears. Your John Brown memoir mentions nothing of the 52nd division relieving the 43rd on line on the 17th.

Thing is the 12th AG map is right about the location of the 52nd, GAD, and 7AD on the 16th of December, so I'm inclined to accept that the 43rd is roughly where shown on the map:
https://www.lawlerbrown.com/page-18.html
The Division now under command of the Second Army moved on 7 December 1944 to Stein, north of Maastricht. The German's Ardennes Offensive began on the 16 December and on the 17th the Battalion moved to Gillrath just three miles north of Geilenkirchen and now within the frontiers of the Reich (the first battalion of The Royal Scots on German soil). The 52nd Lowland Division was now positioned to the south of the Heinsberg salient which had to be held to prevent an 'Ardennes type' of assault which could threaten the British Second Army. The Battalion had been hurriedly moved forward to take over this sector of the line manned by a make-shift battalion of troops formed from drivers, cooks and administrative personnel. During the first few nights, enemy patrols penetrated through all our positions right up to battalion headquarters but we quickly organised ourselves to counter this aggressive patrolling with fighting patrols. It was here that we first used our two patrol dogs and whilst they would ignore dead bodies they quickly picked up other human scent and this alerted the patrol leader to take cover until he could determine whether friend or foe, giving him time to decide to intercept or not.
Sounds like that sector would have been ripe for an infantry infiltration on the morning of the 16th and torn the front open.

Where everyone was on the 17th is immaterial to this scenario as actions on the morning of the 16th would change all of that.
Richard Anderson wrote:
18 Nov 2020, 09:54
The tie-in to NUSA and XIII Corps Artillery is made clear in Chapter 10 of the General Board Report No. 61, Field Artillery Operations.
Only starting on the 23rd of December per your source:
https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/f ... to-061.pdf
This is study of the field artillery pOrt.02 the defense Of the Roer River sector, in Rhineland; Germany, from 23 December 1944 TO 16 January 1945
by Ninth Army.

This operation was one of the few purely defensive situations undertaken by US forces on the continent. Although the ammunition was closely rationed ] it gives an excellent picture of the effective employment of field artillery to support such a defense.
It mentions that the artillery was not set up for defense before the 23rd and they were rationing shells. Not really fitting the narrative you present of a well prepared army just waiting to smash any offensive at the drop of a hat with unlimited amounts of supporting fires.

The details of their defensive schemes aren't really relevant to the situation on the 16th, since due to all the reorganization and transfers to 1st army mentioned in the study later on it wasn't until the 23rd that the schemes you're referencing were even set up.

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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#39

Post by Gooner1 » 18 Nov 2020, 17:10

stg 44 wrote:
17 Nov 2020, 16:38
Absolutely not, which is why I didn't say that. Simply that the "OGs" of the division were gone by December 1944 and as far as I can tell sent back to train the next generation of warriors. As noted in the book they were replaced with raw recruits with limited training, though operational training in the unit eventually helped them fully integrate into the veteran unit...just not in time for mid-December 1944, as the offensive operations they were to take part in were at least a month or more out, not including the Ardennes imposed delay on operations.
Checking the history of the 8th DLI the number of old guys who got to go home permanently was less than 20. 5th RTR still had a lot of desert veterans in their units, some who had been battling Panzers since April 1941. Manpower wise probably the biggest effect of the Python and LILOP schemes was that the British couldn't just focus on turning out infantry and RAC reinforcements as everyone who had served abroad for the requisite length of time, regardless of risk endured, was entitled to join.
Yes I have found that from another source. From the context it sounded like it was a 'farewell present' from the artillery before it moved out to get ready for Veritable in January, the originally planned date. Certainly had the offensive forces been in place then (which isn't 100% certain given that during the build up to the historical Bulge campaign units were arriving still as late as the 15th of December) and had been identified would have had a bad day. Sounds like, based on what reports I can find of German tactics at the time against British and US forces in the area, that any offensive would be preceded by night infiltration, which apparently had very good success against Wallied forces to the end of the war, that would really have exploited the biggest weakness of 7th AD and might have cracked the front lines before the Panzers or artillery had gotten involved depending on the scale of infiltration. I know I wouldn't want to be a tanker used as infantry in that situation, especially given the weather being what it was and giving good cover for just such a tactic. Given the terrain (woods and plenty of towns/cities), infiltration wouldn't be all that hard and followed up hard by mobile forces the British heavy corps artillery might quickly find itself on the front lines.
The only formation whose location we are unsure of on 16th December is 5 AGRA. Very good success at night infiltration? Sure they had their successes at patrolling and in counter-attacks, sometimes, but in an attack on a large scale that wouldn't altogether be unexpected?
From The Story of the Guards Armoured Division from their time manning the line
" During the whole period at Sittard activity was limited to patrolling and desultory shelling; tedious though it was at the time, the experience gained both by the infantry and the gunners was to prove exceedingly valuable later on. The Germans opposite were of mediocre quality and, though perhaps rather more numerous than ourselves, far less well furnished with supporting arms and ammunition. Like us they held widely separated strong-points sited for all-round defence and entirely surrounded by mines and booby-traps. This rendered the capture of prisoners a matter of great difficulty but enabled us very rapidly to form a reasonably accurate picture of the defence line. We found that the Americans had mapped this out very well and moreover that it changed very little during our stay, except that the smaller positions were sometimes occupied and sometimes not. Once the positions were located we confined ourselves to ensuring by patrolling that the line was still held and to attempts to capture an occasional prisoner."
I doubt things were much different when 7AD took their place. Sure, if the German build-up is not detected by patrolling or by the extensive Photo-Recce that took place for Operation Shears, they might be able to infiltrate past the strongpoints, but what happens when day breaks?

I've found a source on part of the 43rd that said they were off the line on the 16th. So in this what if situation how quickly do you think they could respond and get into action against a surprise attack on the morning of the 16th? Historical response times aren't really all that helpful given that British forces weren't attacked, so they waited until they got requests for help before reacting.
Part of the 43rd Div probably was out of the line. As to how long it would take their experienced units to stage a counter-attack, probably only hours.
What's your source on that? From what I can find from the 7AD book mentioned earlier GAD was to the east of 7AD after they were relieved between the Meuse and Sittard and it was only before Shears was cancelled that GAD was in reserve. On the 12 AG maps from the 10th-16th of December GAD is shown in reserve, but then from about the 13th on they take over the line from Sittard to the US 84th ID.
Of course you are probably right that 12th AG maps probably lacked the timely fine detail on deployments.
The History of the Guards Armoured Division by the Earl of Rosse and quoted above. Going pretty cheap on Kindle.

"Thus was conceived Operation “Shears”, and we were cast for the leading role. With this in view the 7th Armoured Division, which had just completed refitting after the Scheldt estuary campaign, was brought down to take over the line; we were to attack through them and the whole division was taken back into reserve positions at Geleen and elsewhere behind the Dutch frontier towards the second week in December. The country over which the operation was to take place was low-lying in many parts and thickly forested in others; these factors coupled with the time of year, rather than the degree of opposition expected from the enemy, led us to make unusually detailed plans, which were studied carefully for days in advance. Units were provided with air photographs, going maps and defence over-prints of the area to be occupied and the advance was to consist of five phases in which the various battle-groups were to leap-frog to their objectives. Special command posts were dug for the various Headquarters in the forward area to provide against possible heavy shelling once our intentions were realised. Gun-pits were dug for the artillery and considerable quantities of ammunition were dumped."

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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#40

Post by Richard Anderson » 18 Nov 2020, 18:52

stg 44 wrote:
18 Nov 2020, 16:50
I don't have a lot of time to respond today, so the replies will have to be in stages. Please give me the courtesy of responding in full before responding to my responses.
Sorry, but why? I would prefer to respond to your errors as you make them, since my time is limited too and I have little or no interest in spending too much more time on this nonsense.
7AD we've already established was there in earlier posts. GAD was also established. 52nd division in Stein per the 12th AG map is attested to by your source, so no argument there.

43rd however is rather more murky in it's location. The last reference to their location I can find is December 7th in Tripsrath where the 1st Bat. Worcestershires were located, but on the 16th there is mention of them moving off the line to Aalbeek and Tilburg in the wake of the cancellation of SHEARS on the 12th:
http://www.worcestershireregiment.com/w ... _tripsrath
On the 16th December Worcesters were ordered to send a recce party to Aalbeek, no one ever knew quite why. The party was recalled almost before it arrived there and was dispatched on the following day (17th December) to Tilburg.
Are you unaware that the LOC SHAEF map series are daily? It is pretty easy to track the movements of the divisions in response to the German attack through them. You could also consult Victory in the West or The Ardennes, Battle of the Bulge or HLG for the answer.
If you've got a source for their exact location I'm all ears. Your John Brown memoir mentions nothing of the 52nd division relieving the 43rd on line on the 17th.

Thing is the 12th AG map is right about the location of the 52nd, GAD, and 7AD on the 16th of December, so I'm inclined to accept that the 43rd is roughly where shown on the map:
How good of you.
Sounds like that sector would have been ripe for an infantry infiltration on the morning of the 16th and torn the front open.
You really have no clue what was going on. On 17 December 52 Division began executing a relief in place of 43 Division.
Where everyone was on the 17th is immaterial to this scenario as actions on the morning of the 16th would change all of that.
Sorry, but it is highly relevant. Where was 43 Division on 17 December? Where was it 20 December and what was its mission? Ditto Guards Armored.
It mentions that the artillery was not set up for defense before the 23rd and they were rationing shells. Not really fitting the narrative you present of a well prepared army just waiting to smash any offensive at the drop of a hat with unlimited amounts of supporting fires.
FUSA was "rationing shells" too when the German offensive began. They stopped rationing shells afterwards. Why do you imagine it would be different on the NUSA than the FUSA front?
The details of their defensive schemes aren't really relevant to the situation on the 16th, since due to all the reorganization and transfers to 1st army mentioned in the study later on it wasn't until the 23rd that the schemes you're referencing were even set up.
So you missed the significance of "This organization did not become operative" on page 64 when referencing the proposed defensive scheme for XIII Corps? Because the 43 Division was no longer there. Did you also miss page 68? "Close liaison was maintained between XIII Corps Artillery and the artillery headquarters of the 12. Corps (British) to assist ., in coordination of fires. Overlapping defensive fires were arranged and coordinated across the boundary; this permitted either Corps to call for prearranged fires to reinforce its defensive fires in the event of an attack near the boundary."
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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#41

Post by stg 44 » 18 Nov 2020, 23:40

Richard Anderson wrote:
18 Nov 2020, 18:52
stg 44 wrote:
18 Nov 2020, 16:50
I don't have a lot of time to respond today, so the replies will have to be in stages. Please give me the courtesy of responding in full before responding to my responses.
Sorry, but why?
Because I asked you politely so I can respond to your responses in full rather than letting things go unanswered when we get into the next round of replies. Normal people usually don't have to ask why when someone requests something minor like 'please let me finish my replies before you respond'.
Richard Anderson wrote:
18 Nov 2020, 18:52
I would prefer to respond to your errors as you make them, since my time is limited too and I have little or no interest in spending too much more time on this nonsense.
Considering you're only piling on more incorrect info, that's not helping. For someone with such limited time and interest you sure are responding a lot.
Richard Anderson wrote:
18 Nov 2020, 18:52
7AD we've already established was there in earlier posts. GAD was also established. 52nd division in Stein per the 12th AG map is attested to by your source, so no argument there.

43rd however is rather more murky in it's location. The last reference to their location I can find is December 7th in Tripsrath where the 1st Bat. Worcestershires were located, but on the 16th there is mention of them moving off the line to Aalbeek and Tilburg in the wake of the cancellation of SHEARS on the 12th:
http://www.worcestershireregiment.com/w ... _tripsrath
On the 16th December Worcesters were ordered to send a recce party to Aalbeek, no one ever knew quite why. The party was recalled almost before it arrived there and was dispatched on the following day (17th December) to Tilburg.
Are you unaware that the LOC SHAEF map series are daily? It is pretty easy to track the movements of the divisions in response to the German attack through them. You could also consult Victory in the West or The Ardennes, Battle of the Bulge or HLG for the answer.
I take it you're unaware that I've already mentioned exactly that fact in a reply to Gooner1 and cited that specifically as the reason that it doesn't look like 43rd division is on the line as of the 15th of December, certainly isn't there by the 16th, and like your source on the 52nd division shows that the 52nd is on line between the 7AD and GAD on the 17th by mid-day.

So it sounds like you're agreeing that the 43rd wasn't on the line on the 16th leaving British forces highly vulnerable with more than 15 miles of front covered by two armored division, with the infantry divisions reshuffling behind the lines.
Richard Anderson wrote:
18 Nov 2020, 18:52
If you've got a source for their exact location I'm all ears. Your John Brown memoir mentions nothing of the 52nd division relieving the 43rd on line on the 17th.

Thing is the 12th AG map is right about the location of the 52nd, GAD, and 7AD on the 16th of December, so I'm inclined to accept that the 43rd is roughly where shown on the map:
How good of you.
Right, so you agree.
Richard Anderson wrote:
18 Nov 2020, 18:52
Sounds like that sector would have been ripe for an infantry infiltration on the morning of the 16th and torn the front open.
You really have no clue what was going on. On 17 December 52 Division began executing a relief in place of 43 Division.
Where everyone was on the 17th is immaterial to this scenario as actions on the morning of the 16th would change all of that.
Sorry, but it is highly relevant. Where was 43 Division on 17 December? Where was it 20 December and what was its mission? Ditto Guards Armored.
December 17th doesn't matter to an attack on the morning of December 16th. The front lines that day were thinly held by two armored division and it wasn't until mid-day on the 17th that the 52nd took the burden off of them by moving into the middle.
Once the German offensive starts it's a question of what was on line and in position to act, because divisions behind the lines already moving around and not set up to defend or even attack aren't going to be of much help to prevent the armored divisions on line from being overrun or stop the breakthrough of the front.
Richard Anderson wrote:
18 Nov 2020, 18:52
It mentions that the artillery was not set up for defense before the 23rd and they were rationing shells. Not really fitting the narrative you present of a well prepared army just waiting to smash any offensive at the drop of a hat with unlimited amounts of supporting fires.
FUSA was "rationing shells" too when the German offensive began. They stopped rationing shells afterwards. Why do you imagine it would be different on the NUSA than the FUSA front?
The first 24 hours are the critical ones. If they don't have enough shells able to be fired to stop the two British divisions on line from being overrun and stop a quick seizure of Maastricht on the 16th, then supply lines are cut to 9th army, 9th army HQ is overrun, the Maastricht airfields are overrun with the tac air group supporting 9th army, and so is the HQ in Maastricht. How well do you think 9th army corps and divisions are going to do without supply or its army HQ?

Richard Anderson wrote:
18 Nov 2020, 18:52
The details of their defensive schemes aren't really relevant to the situation on the 16th, since due to all the reorganization and transfers to 1st army mentioned in the study later on it wasn't until the 23rd that the schemes you're referencing were even set up.
So you missed the significance of "This organization did not become operative" on page 64 when referencing the proposed defensive scheme for XIII Corps? Because the 43 Division was no longer there. Did you also miss page 68? "Close liaison was maintained between XIII Corps Artillery and the artillery headquarters of the 12. Corps (British) to assist ., in coordination of fires. Overlapping defensive fires were arranged and coordinated across the boundary; this permitted either Corps to call for prearranged fires to reinforce its defensive fires in the event of an attack near the boundary."
Why would I concern myself with happened on the 23rd or later when the POD is on the 16th as would be all the decisive action? If there wasn't a defensive artillery scheme set up by then then it would be too late when 7AD and GAD are overrun on the 16th. BTW looking at German attack frontages (max 5500 yards per the US 1943 manual on the German army) 15 miles is enough for at least 5 mobile divisions on line to concentrate. Even with corps artillery that's way too many for 2 divisions to handle, especially when multiple sources already mention how porous and overstretched the front was by mid-December and given that the Germans would have their own corps artillery, two corps' worth in fact, plus 15th army's resources/super heavy artillery and potentially OKW's reserve rail artillery of 240mm and above. When not starved of shells, which they weren't at least on the 16th, German artillery was no less capable than British and American and more than capable of counter battery fire.

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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#42

Post by stg 44 » 19 Nov 2020, 02:43

Gooner1 wrote:
18 Nov 2020, 17:10
stg 44 wrote:
17 Nov 2020, 16:38
Absolutely not, which is why I didn't say that. Simply that the "OGs" of the division were gone by December 1944 and as far as I can tell sent back to train the next generation of warriors. As noted in the book they were replaced with raw recruits with limited training, though operational training in the unit eventually helped them fully integrate into the veteran unit...just not in time for mid-December 1944, as the offensive operations they were to take part in were at least a month or more out, not including the Ardennes imposed delay on operations.
Checking the history of the 8th DLI the number of old guys who got to go home permanently was less than 20. 5th RTR still had a lot of desert veterans in their units, some who had been battling Panzers since April 1941. Manpower wise probably the biggest effect of the Python and LILOP schemes was that the British couldn't just focus on turning out infantry and RAC reinforcements as everyone who had served abroad for the requisite length of time, regardless of risk endured, was entitled to join.
Thanks for looking into it. Yeah that doesn't sound like all that much, but then guys who survived 5 years would be pretty rare anyway. Of course as desert vets they weren't necessarily ready for combat conditions in mid-December Holland. And long service vets tend to be worn out; several memoirs or statements I've come across by British vets repeatedly talk about how the older service guys tended to avoid combat when possible after Normandy and tended to hit their limit and become psychological casualties much easier. "Tank Action" actually covers the 8th armored at Geilskirchen and talks about the desert vets cracking up and having to be removed from the war.
Gooner1 wrote:
18 Nov 2020, 17:10
Yes I have found that from another source. From the context it sounded like it was a 'farewell present' from the artillery before it moved out to get ready for Veritable in January, the originally planned date. Certainly had the offensive forces been in place then (which isn't 100% certain given that during the build up to the historical Bulge campaign units were arriving still as late as the 15th of December) and had been identified would have had a bad day. Sounds like, based on what reports I can find of German tactics at the time against British and US forces in the area, that any offensive would be preceded by night infiltration, which apparently had very good success against Wallied forces to the end of the war, that would really have exploited the biggest weakness of 7th AD and might have cracked the front lines before the Panzers or artillery had gotten involved depending on the scale of infiltration. I know I wouldn't want to be a tanker used as infantry in that situation, especially given the weather being what it was and giving good cover for just such a tactic. Given the terrain (woods and plenty of towns/cities), infiltration wouldn't be all that hard and followed up hard by mobile forces the British heavy corps artillery might quickly find itself on the front lines.
The only formation whose location we are unsure of on 16th December is 5 AGRA. Very good success at night infiltration? Sure they had their successes at patrolling and in counter-attacks, sometimes, but in an attack on a large scale that wouldn't altogether be unexpected?
From The Story of the Guards Armoured Division from their time manning the line
" During the whole period at Sittard activity was limited to patrolling and desultory shelling; tedious though it was at the time, the experience gained both by the infantry and the gunners was to prove exceedingly valuable later on. The Germans opposite were of mediocre quality and, though perhaps rather more numerous than ourselves, far less well furnished with supporting arms and ammunition. Like us they held widely separated strong-points sited for all-round defence and entirely surrounded by mines and booby-traps. This rendered the capture of prisoners a matter of great difficulty but enabled us very rapidly to form a reasonably accurate picture of the defence line. We found that the Americans had mapped this out very well and moreover that it changed very little during our stay, except that the smaller positions were sometimes occupied and sometimes not. Once the positions were located we confined ourselves to ensuring by patrolling that the line was still held and to attempts to capture an occasional prisoner."
I doubt things were much different when 7AD took their place. Sure, if the German build-up is not detected by patrolling or by the extensive Photo-Recce that took place for Operation Shears, they might be able to infiltrate past the strongpoints, but what happens when day breaks?
So far there is no indication that 5 AGRA was even present in this area at the time. And we don't know what the composition of 3 AGRA was either other than the 6th field regiment, RA, which had 24x 25 pounders and was well away from where the action would be and mostly unable to intervene given their lack of spotting ability (weather conditions and lack of ability to fly artillery spotting aircraft) and no indication that they were set up to cross communicate with 7AD or 9th AGRA. In fact by indication the 9th AGRA was the only one set up to support 7AD/XII corps east of the Meuse.

Given that the front lines were so porous that a weak volksgrenadier division would routinely infiltrate 7AD lines during this period, including getting as deep as the artillery line, is not a great indication that they'd be able to cope with a mass pre-dawn infantry infiltration of the 7 mile long division front preceding a surprise artillery bombardment and assault by a panzer corps.

As your own quote points out the British and German lines were held by widely separate strong points that were easily circumvented. Given that on the Eastern Front such defensive tactics got the Germans lines routinely penetrated by infiltrators who then wreaked havoc behind the lines and attacked strong points from unexpected angles and the Germans learned from and copied such tactics in the West from 1944-45 (I even have a document in German ordering such tactics from this time period due to how lax US and British security was at night) it would probably work as well as it did in the Ardennes historically and as it did on the Eastern Front.

I'm also not sure that photo recon was done leading up to Shears, it sounds like it was older photographs from when the US mapped it since as your quote says the German positions hadn't changed much. The reason I'm concluding that is because the weather in late November and through December was bad, so bad in fact that Shears was cancelled on the 12th, which would be before the attacking units would go into line if the Ardennes build up is our model for this scenario. So both the mass bombardment on the 14th from the 9th AGRA and detection of the offensive build up is unlikely to be really noticed if the Germans hold to their build up deception/concealment techniques used in the Ardennes (only at night, covered during the day, horses had straw shoes to muffle their noise, tracks from any wheeled vehicle including horse carts was swept away by trailing troops, artillery did harassing fire to muffle vehicle engines, etc.).

If they can successfully mask their build up and infiltrate on the morning of the 16th then they can cut off the front lines and attack artillery and command posts, which then mean the armor breaks through quite easily against the overstretched lines mostly held by infantry and dismounted tankers without organization and support from the rear. Plus if the Germans have corps artillery as well as their division guns, something that has been ignored so far in this discussion, they'd be able to suppress or destroy the bypassed front positions. British troops in this area were not set up to deal with a massed armored attack as they had only faced, as noted in your quote, 'mediocre, poorly equipped infantry'. Plus the initial artillery bombardment would cut telephone lines and given the weather related issues that impacted radio comms (a big problem for US troops in the Ardennes historically) then artillery support is going to be pretty poor if they survive infiltration attacks since they'd lack forward observation in most places and they couldn't fly spotting aircraft in the weather. Also there is the further problem of the weather potentially screwing up counterbattery fire from the 9th AGRA, since IIRC the RA mostly still used flash and sound ranging and even counterbattery radar (not sure what was available to the Brits) might be impacted by dirty weather.

Again, most of this is dependent on surprise, which if as good as that achieved by 5th panzer army in the Ardennes then 7AD is in serious trouble.
Gooner1 wrote:
18 Nov 2020, 17:10
I've found a source on part of the 43rd that said they were off the line on the 16th. So in this what if situation how quickly do you think they could respond and get into action against a surprise attack on the morning of the 16th? Historical response times aren't really all that helpful given that British forces weren't attacked, so they waited until they got requests for help before reacting.
Part of the 43rd Div probably was out of the line. As to how long it would take their experienced units to stage a counter-attack, probably only hours.
That's a problem given that Richard provided a source that by the 17th 52nd division was replacing scratch units of rear area personnel on the front lines around Triprath given the lack of infantry to hold the line. So even if 43rd was on the line at that time, which we're not sure they were, they could well get overrun quickly and 43rd units behind the lines are hit before they have a chance to form up, since the distances to the vital areas were so short. If the 43rd is then a model for the 52nd at Stein, south of Geleen, they'd also likely be hit before being able to deploy given that they were something like 10km from the front lines held by 7AD. Depending on how quickly 7AD lines are breached Panzers or at least mechanized infantry could be hitting the unprepared 52nd division (short one brigade on the 15th and 16th of December per the apparently accurate 12th AG map) still in camp on the way to Maastrict.

Though much depends on how clean the breakthrough of 7AD would be depending on surprise, the Germans could be in Maastricht within 1 hour of overrunning any part of 7AD's lines. Since that is were 9th army HQ was it's loss quickly into the start of the German offensive would be quite devastating, as the rest of 9th army would be cut off from supply and it's command link to outside armies/support. If the Germans could then continue further south that same day they'd even be able to hit the US 1st division in it's R&R camp (not prepared to move out it's first regiment until midnight on the 16th-17th historically) or at least severe the MSR to 9th army via Liege.
Gooner1 wrote:
18 Nov 2020, 17:10
What's your source on that? From what I can find from the 7AD book mentioned earlier GAD was to the east of 7AD after they were relieved between the Meuse and Sittard and it was only before Shears was cancelled that GAD was in reserve. On the 12 AG maps from the 10th-16th of December GAD is shown in reserve, but then from about the 13th on they take over the line from Sittard to the US 84th ID.
Of course you are probably right that 12th AG maps probably lacked the timely fine detail on deployments.
The History of the Guards Armoured Division by the Earl of Rosse and quoted above. Going pretty cheap on Kindle.

"Thus was conceived Operation “Shears”, and we were cast for the leading role. With this in view the 7th Armoured Division, which had just completed refitting after the Scheldt estuary campaign, was brought down to take over the line; we were to attack through them and the whole division was taken back into reserve positions at Geleen and elsewhere behind the Dutch frontier towards the second week in December. The country over which the operation was to take place was low-lying in many parts and thickly forested in others; these factors coupled with the time of year, rather than the degree of opposition expected from the enemy, led us to make unusually detailed plans, which were studied carefully for days in advance. Units were provided with air photographs, going maps and defence over-prints of the area to be occupied and the advance was to consist of five phases in which the various battle-groups were to leap-frog to their objectives. Special command posts were dug for the various Headquarters in the forward area to provide against possible heavy shelling once our intentions were realised. Gun-pits were dug for the artillery and considerable quantities of ammunition were dumped."
Thanks for the recommendation and quote. Still, despite the above it looks like the GAD was holding the Sittard-Geilskirchen line by itself on the 15th-16th after the cancellation of Shears. It took until the 17th for the 52nd to replace it and for 43rd division to move out from it's position behind the GAD to Stein on the Meuse and 12th AG situation map was accurate. It shows GAD behind the 7AD roughly at the dates mentioned above and move east thereafter.

As to the ammo stockpiling...any idea if that was all shot off on the 14th as Shears was cancelled and they decided to do something with their artillery anyway?

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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#43

Post by Richard Anderson » 19 Nov 2020, 03:38

stg 44 wrote:
18 Nov 2020, 23:40
Because I asked you politely so I can respond to your responses in full rather than letting things go unanswered when we get into the next round of replies. Normal people usually don't have to ask why when someone requests something minor like 'please let me finish my replies before you respond'.
I will point out again that when I replied with sources, your response lacked both politeness and good sense, so why should I be any different in turn?
Considering you're only piling on more incorrect info, that's not helping. For someone with such limited time and interest you sure are responding a lot.
Forgive me if I'm having sleepless nights and responding to mindless "history" posts amuse me.
I take it you're unaware that I've already mentioned exactly that fact in a reply to Gooner1 and cited that specifically as the reason that it doesn't look like 43rd division is on the line as of the 15th of December, certainly isn't there by the 16th, and like your source on the 52nd division shows that the 52nd is on line between the 7AD and GAD on the 17th by mid-day.

So it sounds like you're agreeing that the 43rd wasn't on the line on the 16th leaving British forces highly vulnerable with more than 15 miles of front covered by two armored division, with the infantry divisions reshuffling behind the lines.
You're having trouble following breadcrumbs. Guess what? 43 Division was there 22 November. They were there 7 December. They were there 16 December. They started leaving 17 December and were replaced by 52 Division.
Right, so you agree.
That 52 Division executed a relief in place of 43 Division west of Geilenkirchen beginning on 17 December and completed it sometime late that evening so that 43 Division could move to the Meuse backstop position assigned them by FM Montgomery?

Yeah, I "agree" with that since it is what happened.
December 17th doesn't matter to an attack on the morning of December 16th. The front lines that day were thinly held by two armored division and it wasn't until mid-day on the 17th that the 52nd took the burden off of them by moving into the middle.
Once the German offensive starts it's a question of what was on line and in position to act, because divisions behind the lines already moving around and not set up to defend or even attack aren't going to be of much help to prevent the armored divisions on line from being overrun or stop the breakthrough of the front.
You really aren't following the sequence of events are you?
The first 24 hours are the critical ones. If they don't have enough shells able to be fired to stop the two British divisions on line from being overrun and stop a quick seizure of Maastricht on the 16th, then supply lines are cut to 9th army, 9th army HQ is overrun, the Maastricht airfields are overrun with the tac air group supporting 9th army, and so is the HQ in Maastricht. How well do you think 9th army corps and divisions are going to do without supply or its army HQ?
Um, they have "enough shells", because they are rationing them. That is how it works.
Why would I concern myself with happened on the 23rd or later when the POD is on the 16th as would be all the decisive action?
What is it with you congenital what iffers that you so happily remain ignorant of the real events that lead into your what if?
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American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#44

Post by Gooner1 » 19 Nov 2020, 17:05

stg 44 wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 02:43
That's a problem given that Richard provided a source that by the 17th 52nd division was replacing scratch units of rear area personnel on the front lines around Triprath given the lack of infantry to hold the line. So even if 43rd was on the line at that time, which we're not sure they were, they could well get overrun quickly and 43rd units behind the lines are hit before they have a chance to form up, since the distances to the vital areas were so short.
From 'Tank Tracks' by Peter Beale

"The 9th [Royal Tank Regiment] moved slowly through Belgium and Holland and reached the Dutch mining town of Brunssum on 3rd December. After a few days there the battalion moved forward into Germany, passing through the town of Geilenkirchen to take up positions in the villages of Hockheide, Bauchem, Rischden, Niedenheide and Gilrath in support of 43 Div.
On 10 December the CO attended an O group at 214 Brigade at which 43rd Division Operation 'Shears' was outlined, whereby the enemy divisions west of the River Roer between Roermond and Geilenkirchen were to be destroyed. 34 Tank Brigade with 43rd Division were to do the break-out and 52nd Division with 8 Armoured Brigade and Guards Armoured Division the mopping-up. 9 RTR tanks in support of 214 Brigade were to complete the first phase of the break-out.
Following heavy and continual rain the ground provided poor tank going and frequent reports showed no improvement. Nevertheless, thousands of air photos and maps were issued and every plan was complete when the news came that the operation was cancelled.
The battalion remained in position with its role unchanged.
On 16 December news was received of the German counter-offensive against the American First Army front, attacking with the 5th and 6th Panzer Armies"

So 43rd Division, with probably two brigades 'up', was in the line on the 16th, they had a lot of tank support, the locations and layout of the enemy in front of them were well known and the 'going' off road was poor for vehicles.

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Re: Would the 'Small Solution' Wacht am Rhein have worked?

#45

Post by Richard Anderson » 19 Nov 2020, 18:00

Gooner1 wrote:
19 Nov 2020, 17:05
From 'Tank Tracks' by Peter Beale
Good catch and bad on me, I forgot to look at the tank brigades and only focused on the armoured brigades. 31 Tank Brigade was another 4,224 and 150+ tanks. 6th Guards Tank Brigade another 3,611 and 150+ tanks, and 34 Tank Brigade another 3,086 and 150+ tanks were under command XII Corps at this time, although 31 TB was nominally attached to 79 Armoured Division.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

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