WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by Richard Anderson » 23 Dec 2020 20:25

T. A. Gardner wrote:
23 Dec 2020 17:27
Richard Anderson wrote:
23 Dec 2020 16:48
Nope. Since we are talking the TNDM, it is a numerical ratio, not a force ratio. What is the OLI of a B-17 versus a Bf 109? Maybe you know, but I don't.
A B-17 comes out with an OLI (depending on bombload, range, weight of aircraft, etc.) somewhere between 224392 and 532716. That's rough but a reasonable range using 500 lbs. bombs. Of course, not that knowing that makes any real difference here... :D
That is for air to ground. Anyway it was a trick question; there is no air to air OLI.
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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by T. A. Gardner » 23 Dec 2020 20:48

Richard Anderson wrote:
23 Dec 2020 20:25
T. A. Gardner wrote:
23 Dec 2020 17:27
Richard Anderson wrote:
23 Dec 2020 16:48
Nope. Since we are talking the TNDM, it is a numerical ratio, not a force ratio. What is the OLI of a B-17 versus a Bf 109? Maybe you know, but I don't.
A B-17 comes out with an OLI (depending on bombload, range, weight of aircraft, etc.) somewhere between 224392 and 532716. That's rough but a reasonable range using 500 lbs. bombs. Of course, not that knowing that makes any real difference here... :D
That is for air to ground. Anyway it was a trick question; there is no air to air OLI.
You didn't specify... Maybe in this ATL the Allies, facing massive numbers of aircraft from increased German production of everything from pilots to gasoline along with those airplanes, and the Allies' inability to shift their own production anywhere close to as instantaneously and flexibly as the Germans, shift all their aerial efforts to CAS... :D

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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by Peter89 » 23 Dec 2020 21:21

T. A. Gardner wrote:
23 Dec 2020 20:48
Richard Anderson wrote:
23 Dec 2020 20:25
T. A. Gardner wrote:
23 Dec 2020 17:27
Richard Anderson wrote:
23 Dec 2020 16:48
Nope. Since we are talking the TNDM, it is a numerical ratio, not a force ratio. What is the OLI of a B-17 versus a Bf 109? Maybe you know, but I don't.
A B-17 comes out with an OLI (depending on bombload, range, weight of aircraft, etc.) somewhere between 224392 and 532716. That's rough but a reasonable range using 500 lbs. bombs. Of course, not that knowing that makes any real difference here... :D
That is for air to ground. Anyway it was a trick question; there is no air to air OLI.
You didn't specify... Maybe in this ATL the Allies, facing massive numbers of aircraft from increased German production of everything from pilots to gasoline along with those airplanes, and the Allies' inability to shift their own production anywhere close to as instantaneously and flexibly as the Germans, shift all their aerial efforts to CAS... :D
In that case the Germans will never reach the wunderRatio, so they have to do everything exactly as they did OTL with no reflection on the German changes.
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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by Richard Anderson » 24 Dec 2020 00:25

Sorry, but I had to run out and deal with a few holiday things. :D
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
23 Dec 2020 11:23
In ATL, German aircraft production is >3x OTL, meaning that the conditions of March 8th would be the norm: LW could send up thousands of sorties, largely nullifying the protective screen of escorts who would have their hands full. If 1,000 LW fighters engaged 1,000 W.Allied fighters while another 1,000 LW fighters (or even 300) attacked the bomber stream, there would be a massacre of B-17's/24's.
You keep saying that, but with no real path for how the Germans get there...and, yes, I know, in this ATL the Soviets are defeated somehow and some when. However, that still does not explain how the Germans build a pilot training infrastructure that they happily let run moribund while they kept Experten in action till they were killed and shoveled ill-trained newbies into the fray to get killed as well. Nor does it explain where the additional avgas comes from...and we've been around this before I know too, but the problems still have not been resolved by more than a handwave. The Germans can shift the output of the Bergius synthetic fuel plants to turn out more 87 octane fuel, but to get it to the poor mans avgas they used required TEL, which was also a bottleneck they tried to resolve historically, but could not...and again, sure, no Soviet war means magic ju-ju.

Again, look at the historical increase in size of the Jagdwaffe. A 48% increase in production 1941-1942 did not result in a commensurate increase in Jagdwaffe strength. It resulted in a 12% increase in average strength year-to-year. A 49% production increase 1942-1943 resulted in a 19% increase in Jagdwaffe strength. And a 59% production increase 1943-1944 resulted in a 24% increase in Jagdwaffe strength.
Other options would have been available to deal with escorts. LW could, for example, maintain units in the Netherlands specifically tasked with engaging the fuel-laden escorts on their outward legs. This would compel either dropping tanks to avoid a heavy performance penalty or accepting battle on unfavorable terms and falling behind the bomber stream, leaving gaps in coverage.
That stopped working when the Americans began using their own version of Freijagd. The real problem for the Germans was that since they needed two types of fighters, the heavy fighter required to take down the bombers was extremely vulnerable to fighters. So if the leading wave of escorts got engaged by fighters on the periphery, there were no German escort fighters to protect the heavy fighters from being cut to ribbons. That is the consequence of marginal superiorities - the Soviets exploited the same in the ground war.
If the German fighters can maintain a 1:1 loss ratio against the bomber stream then they have immense latitude to suffer disproportionate losses in fighter:fighter combat while maintaining a favorable economic and personnel attrition ratio.
And if wishes were horses, then beggars would ride. For example, at Schweinfurt, the Germans sortied 882 aircraft against what they believed were 240 bombers (there were actually 228). They claimed 121 and 51 probable (actually 60) and lost themselves 31/3/2. That is probably the best circumstances the Germans ever had, nearly a four to one numerical ratio in their favor...and the loss ratio was not even two to one.
For example, let's suppose Germany loses 4 fighters for each American fighter shot down and 1 LW fighter for each HB shot down. That's 5 German fighters traded against an enemy fighter and HB.

(snip cost accounting)
The problem, for the Germans, was that the Americans could afford it. Peak HB production was achieved in March 1944, at which point output began to decrease as planning cutbacks began to take effect. Peak fighter production was August 1944, then scaled back.
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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 24 Dec 2020 01:27

Richard Anderson wrote:
22 Dec 2020 19:34
...
Nice claim. You have the figures to back that up? My admittedly old analysis based upon the monthly Flugzeugbestand und Bewegungsmeldungen from March 1942 through December 1944 indicated that the breakdown (Westfront and Reich/Ostfront) was:

1942
1E Ftr 536/707
2E Ftr 61/178
N Ftr 83/0
GA 169/457
Bmb 690/957

1943
1E Ftr 2,359/1,135
2E Ftr 182/132
N Ftr 274/23
GA 518/905
Bmb 1,164/933

1944
1E Ftr 6,818/972
2E Ftr 275/185
N Ftr 1,063/94
GA 345/1,237
Bmb 1,217/425

Overall, it appears that about 77.5% of the 1E Ftr loss, 51.1% of the 2E Ftr loss, 92.4% of the N Ftr loss, and 57% of the Bmb loss was in the West and in defense of the Reich. Only GA were lost disproportionately in the East, about 71.6% of them.
Ooo data.
Is there a Zamansky-like study that gives LW losses by theater/month after '43?
Have a summary from a old book. For some reason the graph/png file won't upload to here. Copying the numbers heres a simple version. This for single engine fighters & reflects combat losses, operating losses not included, tho there are estimates that noncombat losses 1844 fluctuated between 40% & 50% pf all losses.

......................All Fronts.....West/MTO.......East
First Qtr 1944......3091............2130............952

2d Qtr...............4080............3057...........1023

3d Qtr...............4936............4043............893

4th Qtr..............4050............3500 ?..........550 ?

The significantly lower losses in the east may reflect first the operating strength was below 2000 aircraft (possibly as low as 1200 ac), and second the Germans were engaging only when they had a clear advantage.

Heres one that will upload, for 1943. IIRC its from Price
German Fighter Losses 1943.png

This one has to do with rates of growth. It also has some data on US AAF growth, and on the percent of GAF fighters between the east and west fronts Unfortunately I did not capture the text to help interpret it, as its difficult to read.
OB rate of Growth.png
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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by Richard Anderson » 25 Dec 2020 00:02

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
24 Dec 2020 18:40
Nope. RKKA.
I'm sorry, but what relevance does the effectiveness of the Red Army have in this discussion? I thought you were arguing the effectiveness of air forces?
Not talking about any specific model, just the general principle. Numerical ratio is fine, point is the same.

In fact one of the studies to which your name is attached uses numerical ratios as force ratios, for reasons of time and economy:
To be exact, time, economy, and no one was paying us to model force ratios using the TNDM. :lol: It was also five years after we/I last worked with Trevor. Anyway, the real issue I was referring to with regards to Trevor Dupuy/TNDM was that we never developed or validated a model for an air-to-air TNDM, so never developed a methodology for developing OLI (force) calculations for aircraft other than as a ground attack delivery system.
B*****t. Your reliance on the "handwave" allegation deserves to be called out for the annoying and profoundly unserious tactic that it is.

I've specifically proven your assertions wrong on these issues. You claimed, for example, that Russian oil couldn't produce avgas. I've provided a CIA study that specifically disproves that contention: https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom ... 258834.pdf
Sorry, but that is BS, or perhaps faux outrage, on your part, since I've never claimed anything of the sort. I pointed out the problems with German crude, the problems with Germany essentially abandoning refinery development for the synthetic industry, but otherwise speculated regarding the quality of Romanian and Soviet Caucasus crude. Of course the Soviets could produce low-octane gasoline, which like the Germans, they attempted to boost using TEL and iso-octanes into a poor-mans avgas, but it was lower quality than Allied 100/130 avgas. Note please the CIA report remarks on the shortage of plants producing TEL and iso-octanes, also similar to the wartime German situation. That is why so much hi-octane avgas was supplied to them.

Their refinery capability for producing very high-octane avgas was also limited to non-existent, since their refining technology was based on thermal-cracking, as was the German and Rumanian. If you note, your 1950 CIA source addresses mainly postwar progress in the Soviet oil industry, noting the shortfall - 1.5-million MT per year - the Soviets still had to requirements -2.5-million tons for the first year in war - at that time. The only Houdry-process catalytic cracking refinery equipment they had in 1950 was that supplied by the U.S. at the end of the war as part of Lend-Lease.
More b******t. I've specifically cited the USSBS report stating that Germany was constructing another TEL plant. You've never shown a shred of evidence that TEL was the operative constraint on German avgas production.
Bad language again? :D

You might want to review the Oil Division report again. TEL "with all production prior to 1939 centered in one plant, was too scarce and concentrated for comfort. A second plant was built, coming into operation in July 1939, a French plant was captured, and a third German unit was scheduled for completion in 1945." (page 2) Yet a fourth, underground, plant was also planned in May 1944 for completion in early 1945, but although the material was accumulated, no construction was begun by the end of the war. The equipment was also "very vulnerable and difficult to replace" (page 43).

Yes, you've cited "Germany was constructing another TEL plant", but "was constructing" is the operative phrase - the third one begun (in 1942 IIRC) was never completed nor was the underground plant. Maybe they complete it in this ATL. Maybe they think the French plant and the two they have is enough and never start the third domestic plant or the underground one in this ATL. Maybe the Allies twig to the vulnerability of the bottleneck and pound all the plants into rubble in this ATL.
OTL not ATL.
Why? The U.S. was the least mobilized country in terms of manpower and economic resource utilization of any of the major warring parties. At peak it was 82% of British mobilization and 62% of Soviet and German mobilization at their respective peaks. In an ATL as described, why cannot the U.S. dig deeper to more closely match the others?
I'm sorry but I find your objections profoundly unserious. Your favorite move is to handwave rebuttals of your arguments by calling decisive counter-evidence a handwave. It's a rhetorically inexhaustible move but is intellectually meritless. You continue to favor rhetorical moves over serious intellectual engagement; this appears to be more a matter of fun than of serious discussion.
Could you point out in your latest reply where your "decisive counter-evidence" is? Is your reference to a postwar CIA report from 1950 that doesn't rebut what I said "decisive counter-evidence"? Is your reference to the Oil Division report, which says exactly what I said its says "decisive counter-evidence"? Is your misapprehension of what refinery technology existed where during wartime "decisive counter-evidence"?

I think you need to review and rethink what constitutes "meritless" and "rhetorically inexhaustible" intellectual arguments in this context, especially since I have pointed out the problems WRT refinery technology, avgas octanes, and bottlenecks referencing the Oil Division report before. Mind you, I did not refer to the CIA report, which I had long ago discarded as irrelevant to Soviet wartime capabilities. I am moderately surprised you did not notice the problem with it?

And, no, it isn't "fun" and it is in fact exhausting having to point out these same things over and over again to you.
Merry Christmas, hope you're well.
And to you as well...if you get by Mount Prospect give a shout out to my newborn Granddaughter.

[Edited to remove low forms of speech I left in the quoted text and repeated]
Last edited by Richard Anderson on 25 Dec 2020 04:30, edited 3 times in total.
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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by David Thompson » 25 Dec 2020 04:24

A post from TheMarcksPlan, employing low forms of speech on several occasions, was removed pursuant to the forum rules:
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We have intelligent readers here, so low forms of speech are unwelcome. We're trying to move past the lavatory wall stage in discussing historical problems. Noncomplying posts are subject to deletion after warning, and in extreme cases, to deletion with no warning at all.
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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by Richard Anderson » 25 Dec 2020 04:35

David Thompson wrote:
25 Dec 2020 04:24
A post from TheMarcksPlan, employing low forms of speech on several occasions, was removed pursuant to the forum rules:
I almost hesitate to suggest it, but since the removal of TMP's post now makes my reply partly unintelligible due to lack of context, wouldn't it have been as easy simply to edit the low forms of speech as I did rather than deleting the post entirely?
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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by David Thompson » 25 Dec 2020 06:26

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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 31 Dec 2020 06:35

Had to take a break from this topic, lest more low language result...

It reminded me of the last time I broke from this topic. On a diversionary sub-topic re Germany controlling Iberia, somebody demanded proof that Spain possessed sufficient coastal artillery to close the Med at Tarifa:
Richard Anderson wrote:
22 Nov 2020 09:47
I suspect you don't know as much as you think you do about the Spanish coast artillery and its capability.
The retort is so obvious that writing it feels like a physically painful reminder that internet arguments are not always a good use of one's time:

[in this ATL] SPAIN HAS AN ALLY CALLED GERMANY (o Alemania).

...and Germany has a few guns of its own. And the world contains things called railroads. And roads. And ships. Guns born in Germany can leave their home towns. Halder's diary lists dispatching guns to Tarifa as one of the first tasks attendant to Operation Felix. If anyone seriously questions that Germany planned to move guns to Tarifa, I can go back and find the page/quote.

-----------------------

...returning to another eternal and non-productive argument, which I am doing only out of respect for other productive arguments with Richard:
Richard Anderson wrote:Their [Soviet] refinery capability for producing very high-octane avgas was also limited to non-existent, since their refining technology was based on thermal-cracking, as was the German and Rumanian.
I say the Germans could have produced more of their OTL aviation gasoline with Russian crude feedstock, you respond by describing the tech level of German/Soviet/Rumanian refining capabilities.

IRRELEVANT!

The question is not "Who was better at refining - Allies or Axis?"

The question is "Could Germany have produced more avgas from Russian feedstock?"

The unambiguous answer is yes.

The constant diversions to Axis-Allied comparison only muddies the discussion, an entirely unproductive use of everyone's time. I suspect it reflects a reflexive diversion to Wehraboo hunting.
Richard Anderson wrote:I've never claimed anything of the sort.
Context is lost but if you're conceding that Germany would produce more avgas than OTL had it taken Russia's crude then that's good.

If you're not conceding the point I can't imagine on what grounds, except maybe this old saw:
Richard Anderson wrote:TEL "with all production prior to 1939 centered in one plant, was too scarce and concentrated for comfort.
Nothing in that USSBS statement implies that Germany couldn't have produced more TEL or even that TEL was the bottleneck on avgas production. At a textual level, that something is uncomfortably scarce doesn't imply it's a bottleneck. Rather it implies some imprudence - assuming it would be prudent not to have TEL become a bottleneck. At a broader level, USSBS's extensive discussion of the cost of synthgas investments - versus silence on cost of TEL capacity - suggests that Germany was merely imprudent in setting and distributing TEL capacity, thereby leaving an exploitable weakness.

Germany was also imprudent in concentrating its synthgas plants, a fault for which Krauch fell out of favor after the Oil Campaign exposed it. Does German imprudence in the geographical distribution of its overall synthgas production facilities logically relate to a hard limit on synthgas production? Of course not. Neither does it regarding TEL.

Additionally, lead concentration was a bottleneck on the lifespan of aero engines. There was a tradeoff between octane level and lead levels given German refining practice.
Richard Anderson wrote:Why? The U.S. was the least mobilized country in terms of manpower and economic resource utilization of any of the major warring parties. At peak it was 82% of British mobilization and 62% of Soviet and German mobilization at their respective peaks. In an ATL as described, why cannot the U.S. dig deeper to more closely match the others?
82% for UK is way too high - Harrison's Econ of WW2 table says 55%. It's 70% for peak German but that includes 25% imported from occupied territories and debt "financed" so more like 56%. U.S. peaked at 45% per same source.

I have put forward discrete and therefore falsifiable assertions regarding post-SU economic balance, for example: viewtopic.php?f=76&t=251476 So instead of asking "why" as if we're sharing a bong and incapable of quantitative reasoning, try showing "why" in rebuttal to the quantitative arguments I've presented. If they're bad arguments, you'll quickly falsify them. If it's not worth the effort to show why on your end then it's not worth my effort to respond.
Richard Anderson wrote:To be exact, time, economy, and no one was paying us to model force ratios using the TNDM
...context lost...

Okay but am I posting comments on the TDI blog criticizing them/you for saying "force ratio" when it's really a numerical ratio?

Of course not, I'm not that guy.

Please don't be that guy when I say force ratio but mean numerical ratio, and it doesn't matter to the discussion. I have less time than TDI for WW2 and zero government funding for my AHF posts so it's a little ridiculous (unproductive) to divert a thread over "force ratio" vs. "numerical ratio."
Richard Anderson wrote:if you get by Mount Prospect give a shout out to my newborn Granddaughter.
Congrats! No doubt she's an angel but I'll be restricted to a discreet wink/smile. Last month my brother welcomed my angelic new niece but my 4yo nephew - hitherto an only kid and now having some jealousy issues - insists I'm not supposed to talk to her. He's a very intelligent boy and therefore thinks his favorite uncle is the best. Can't imagine the jealousy level if I said hi to a baby that wasn't his sister and if I'm around Mount Prospect he'll be tagging along. Very possible your granddaughter and my niece will be schoolmates.
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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by KDF33 » 31 Dec 2020 07:54

Regarding the conversation about avgas, wouldn't the best option for the Germans, in the event of a closing of the Russian campaign, be to release men for the coal mines / construction and engineering industry, and then scale-up synthetic fuel production through the construction of widely-dispersed underground plants?

How much would such a program cost*, say, to double synthetic fuel production within a year?

*In terms of RM, manpower, steel, coal, etc.

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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by Richard Anderson » 31 Dec 2020 08:07

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
31 Dec 2020 06:35
The retort is so obvious that writing it feels like a physically painful reminder that internet arguments are not always a good use of one's time:

[in this ATL] SPAIN HAS AN ALLY CALLED GERMANY (o Alemania).
They do? So in this ATL Franco concedes and makes no demands of Germany? Or does the defeat of the USSR cause everyone to ally with Germany?
...and Germany has a few guns of its own. And the world contains things called railroads. And roads. And ships. Guns born in Germany can leave their home towns. Halder's diary lists dispatching guns to Tarifa as one of the first tasks attendant to Operation Felix. If anyone seriously questions that Germany planned to move guns to Tarifa, I can go back and find the page/quote.
Okay, sure, Germany has infinite resources to move infinite places to do infinite things.

Meanwhile, my query was regarding the actual Spanish resources actually in place to actually close the straits.
...returning to another eternal and non-productive argument, which I am doing only out of respect for other productive arguments with Richard:
It only seems eternal and non-productive because you refuse to dig into the reality of the situation.
Richard Anderson wrote:Their [Soviet] refinery capability for producing very high-octane avgas was also limited to non-existent, since their refining technology was based on thermal-cracking, as was the German and Rumanian.
I say the Germans could have produced more of their OTL aviation gasoline with Russian crude feedstock, you respond by describing the tech level of German/Soviet/Rumanian refining capabilities.

IRRELEVANT!

The question is not "Who was better at refining - Allies or Axis?"

The question is "Could Germany have produced more avgas from Russian feedstock?"
Since you don't actually seem to know what the question is, no matter how many times and ways I try to enlighten you, I am not sure why I should continue to waste my time. I will make one last attempt though and try to keep it simple.

German "avgas" as produced in World War II was primarily synthetic 87-89 octane and designated B-4. A smaller fraction was produced at 95 octane and designated C-3. Both were produced through the Bergius process. The aromatics in C-3 were limited and additional iso-paraffins were added to increase octane, while TEL was added to both to reduce knock. The iso-paraffins were also a synthetic product, but were only small fractions of overall output, less than 10% of the total (and only in quantity at Leuna, Scholven, and Pölitz). However, neither produced the performance that the Allied 100 octane fuels permitted, especially at lean mixtures where C-3 performed poorly, which led to a steady degradation in the performance of German versus Allied aircraft flying 100 and then 115 octane boosted fuels. The German solution was to use methanol-water (MW-50) and other forms of WEP boost, which was great, except the additional tanks and plumbing added weight, which lowered aircraft performance...and application of WEP by unskilled pilots could seriously damage the engine.
The unambiguous answer is yes.
The unambiguous answer is no, the Germans did not produce either B-4 or C-3 avgas from crude refining, so additional crude production would not result in additional avgas. Their crude stock and refinery technology limited them to produce at best an 87-octane avgas that was no better than synthetic B-4. Instead, they used crude to produce simpler mogas in the 40-60 octane range.
The constant diversions to Axis-Allied comparison only muddies the discussion, an entirely unproductive use of everyone's time. I suspect it reflects a reflexive diversion to Wehraboo hunting.
What "comparison"? I have only been pointing out the differences in technological capabilities. The Germans painted themselves into a corner with synthetic fuel. It seemed the easy way to get high-octane aviation fuel, but in the end it was lacking in performance versus the Allied fuels, which required high quality crude and expensive refining technologies to produce.
Context is lost but if you're conceding that Germany would produce more avgas than OTL had it taken Russia's crude then that's good.
This is going circular at an incredible rate. No, the crude produced from Russia and Romania could only be turned into gasoline by running them through the refinery technology as built, which would mean an 87-octane avgas at best, and that with TEL and iso-octane boosters, which were needed to boost the octane levels of the best fraction of the synthetic distillate in order to get C-3 avgas. In other words, yes, they can produce more B-4 avgas naturally, by sacrificing the output of C-3.

The alternative would be Germany investing heavily in expensive catalytic cracking technology and using highly-aromatic crude on the quality level of that the U.S. and Britain had access to at Maracaibo as feedstock. As I understand it, the only other source for suitable feedstock at the time was the Dutch East Indies, neither of which were very accessible to the Germans.
Nothing in that USSBS statement implies that Germany couldn't have produced more TEL or even that TEL was the bottleneck on avgas production.
No, it doesn't imply it, it states it. Meanwhile, Germany did not produce more TEL or the plants to produce more TEL after 1939, nor did they produce flying saucers, although some apparently believe the implication that they could have if they wanted to.
82% for UK is way too high - Harrison's Econ of WW2 table says 55%. It's 70% for peak German but that includes 25% imported from occupied territories and debt "financed" so more like 56%. U.S. peaked at 45% per same source.
You need to read more carefully. I never said that the UK mobilization was 82%, I said the U.S. mobilization was 82% of British. Harrison, Resource Mobilization in World War II, p. 184, military spending as share of national product:

Peak UK, 1943, 57
Peak US, 1943-1944, 47

47/57 = 82.45614035087719%
Okay but am I posting comments on the TDI blog criticizing them/you for saying "force ratio" when it's really a numerical ratio?

Of course not, I'm not that guy.

Please don't be that guy when I say force ratio but mean numerical ratio, and it doesn't matter to the discussion. I have less time than TDI for WW2 and zero government funding for my AHF posts so it's a little ridiculous (unproductive) to divert a thread over "force ratio" vs. "numerical ratio."
I don't think I'll apologize for reflexive habit, especially when I'm retired and have zero government funding for my AHF posts.
Congrats! No doubt she's an angel but I'll be restricted to a discreet wink/smile. Last month my brother welcomed my angelic new niece but my 4yo nephew - hitherto an only kid and now having some jealousy issues - insists I'm not supposed to talk to her. He's a very intelligent boy and therefore thinks his favorite uncle is the best. Can't imagine the jealousy level if I said hi to a baby that wasn't his sister and if I'm around Mount Prospect he'll be tagging along. Very possible your granddaughter and my niece will be schoolmates.
She is, but at barely four weeks has already developed askance to a high level. Girl has attitude. I can't wait to meet her, but of course have to wait. All things being equal and with a lot of luck - since the Federal Government don't need no stinking planning - maybe late summer we'll be able to and if I get the chance I'll buy you a libation.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by Richard Anderson » 31 Dec 2020 08:20

KDF33 wrote:
31 Dec 2020 07:54
Regarding the conversation about avgas, wouldn't the best option for the Germans, in the event of a closing of the Russian campaign, be to release men for the coal mines / construction and engineering industry, and then scale-up synthetic fuel production through the construction of widely-dispersed underground plants?

How much would such a program cost*, say, to double synthetic fuel production within a year?

*In terms of RM, manpower, steel, coal, etc.
Cost of the Bergius plant was about 970 RM per metric ton, production cost was about 260-310 RM per ton and required 6.7-7.7 metric tons of coal per ton produced. Time is a factor too, the German Bergius plant at the start of the war had an annual output of about a million tons, by 1944 the capacity increased to 4 million tons.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

KDF33
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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by KDF33 » 31 Dec 2020 08:38

Richard Anderson wrote:
31 Dec 2020 08:20
ost of the Bergius plant was about 970 RM per metric ton, production cost was about 260-310 RM per ton and required 6.7-7.7 metric tons of coal per ton produced. Time is a factor too, the German Bergius plant at the start of the war had an annual output of about a million tons, by 1944 the capacity increased to 4 million tons.
Thanks Richard.

To contribute some data to the conversation, USSBS states the following about the Geilenberg Program launched in June 1944:

-Planned completion by end 1945
-7 major underground plants and many more smaller plants, producing altogether 300,000 tons of oil products per month (3,600,000 tons annualized)
-Cost: 1.4 billion RM
-Fischer-Tropsch and crude refining, unclear if also Bergius

-By March 1945, portion realized was producing 52,000 tons per month (624,000 tons annualized)
-Peak number of workers employed on construction sites was 53,000
-382 million RM had actually been spent on the project by the end of the war

-Difficulties of the program: Disruption to rail transport, resources diverted to repairing existing plants, shortages of equipment (esp. compressors)
-"Facilitating" factors: Preexisting damaged plants were cannibalized for equipment.

Richard Anderson
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Re: WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

Post by Richard Anderson » 31 Dec 2020 18:34

KDF33 wrote:
31 Dec 2020 08:38
Thanks Richard.

To contribute some data to the conversation, USSBS states the following about the Geilenberg Program launched in June 1944:

-Planned completion by end 1945
-7 major underground plants and many more smaller plants, producing altogether 300,000 tons of oil products per month (3,600,000 tons annualized)
-Cost: 1.4 billion RM
-Fischer-Tropsch and crude refining, unclear if also Bergius
Indeed, The Oil Division Final Report thoroughly dissects the Geilenberg program.

The seven "major" plants were all Bergius hydrogenation plants and were to be dedicated to producing aviation fuel. They were planned to supply 82% of the January 1944 aviation fuel production, i.e., 133,000 tons per month. However, none, zero, zip, nada were completed or in operation before the end of the war and did not produce one drop of aviation fuel. Three plants never got beyond planning stages, two were cancelled before excavation began, another was switched to production of synthetic nitrogen, and the remaining two were still in the excavation stage at the end of the war.

There were numerous "smaller" dispersed plants planned to produce 25% of the January 1944 motor fuel production, 41,000 tons per month, from crude oil distillation and from synthetic production. Of the anticipated production, 25% would be fed to the aviation fuel plants to augment production of B-4. Of those planned, 41 crude oil distillation plants were completed, 36 were completed in four months and had a capacity of 3,000 tons per month each, but managed to actually produce less than 1,200 each. Five other primitive distilleries were built in wrecked buildings, but their planned and actual output is unknown. Two thermal cracking plants using coal tar feedstock were also rebuilt by relocating equipment from damaged plants (one was the one taken from France earlier in the war). Another 33 small thermal cracking plants were planned, but never completed. Finally, ten small Fischer-Tropsch plants were planned, but also not completed.

Eight lubricating oil plants were planned to produce 50% of the January 1944 output, 38,000 tons per month, including 6,000 tons of aviation lubricants. Only one was "nearly completed" nine months later.

Fifteen diesel plants were planned to produce 88% of the January 1944 output, 159,000 tons per month, but 56,000 tons would be used to power the various cracking and hydrogenation plants with power. One plant was completed at the end of the war.
-By March 1945, portion realized was producing 52,000 tons per month (624,000 tons annualized)
-Peak number of workers employed on construction sites was 53,000
-382 million RM had actually been spent on the project by the end of the war
The output was almost entirely motor gasoline. The planned work requirement to build and run the plants was around 200,000 men.
-Difficulties of the program: Disruption to rail transport, resources diverted to repairing existing plants, shortages of equipment (esp. compressors)
-"Facilitating" factors: Preexisting damaged plants were cannibalized for equipment.
The greatest weakness of the program was its dependence on rail transport for construction and operation.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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