I don't see any specific cite to the 40% opinion poll in your posts. Can you please provide it again?History Learner wrote: ↑17 Mar 2021 20:54
I would highly encourage you to re-read the post instead of providing meme answers that suggest you did not so in the first place. Beyond the fact the citation specifically notes a secret mailing list of 8 million American First members had been retained, polling conducted by Gallup found that 40% of Americans supported a peace deal with Germany and the Roosevelt Administration considered this a grave political and strategic threat.
American Popular Opinion and the War Against Germany: The Issue of Negotiated Peace, 1942 by Richard W. Steele:
Even against the hated Japanese, by 1945 war exhaustion had likewise set in and the JCS was getting very concerned about it. To quote from Michael D. Pearlman's "Unconditional Surrender, Demobilization and the Atomic Bomb":By mid-February the shallowness of public commitment to the war had become a subject of national public discussion. To those who enthusiastically supported the administration's view of the war-and this included most of the nation's publicists and opinion leaders-America seemed indifferent.7 The consensus was that after the initial shock of Pearl Harbor had worn off, the public had lapsed into complacency. Public officials, reporters, and other "informed observers" described Americans as "smug," "slothful," and "asleep." According to Time, while people did what they were called upon to do, "they showed little excitement about the war."8 Poor morale generated the most intense public discussion early in 1942, but the problem remained a matter of official concern throughout the year.
For example, in September OWI reported that "few citizens are fully supporting the war effort. Most are content with the same comfortable ruts." The report said that not many Americans were convinced the military situation was critical or doubted eventual victory. Moreover, although most expected the war to last several years, few thought the struggle would entail great sacrifices. This and other analyses of morale noted a popular disposition to concentrate on the advantages accruing to various sectors of the populace and to conclude that others were exploiting the war for selfish advantage.
A Germany in control of Europe to the A-A Line or the Urals is one that has the capacity to inflict millions of casualties upon the Anglo-Americans, with its strategic position affording it the ability to last until the late 1940s at the least even if the willpower is there on the part of the Allies to endure that much sacrifice. In such a scenario, I find it highly likely that public support for the war will give out long before Germany is crushed underfoot. Whether or not Churchill or FDR hate Hitler is irrelevant in the face of public opinion, given the former two are, after all, in charge of Democracies. Said public opinion was also not universally behind the war in the way we view today, but was in fact much more fickle and this directly shaped Allied operational planning as a result."Leahy admitted however, that there was "little prospect of obtaining unconditional surrender" in 1945, Admiral Ernest J. King, Chief of Naval Operations, would write that the Navy "in the course of time would have starved the Japanese into submission" (Italics mine). Time, however, was a waning asset, especially to Marshall, who would later say that American "political and economic institutions melted out from under us [the U.S. military]". The Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion told the JCS what magazines and newspapers had been printing since late 1944: there was overwhelming public pressure to increase production of consumer goods. I am "afraid of unrest in the country," said Director Fred Vinson. I have never seen "the people in their present frame of mind." Aside from reports about the "national end-of-the-war psychology among [the] citizens" of the United States, the JCS heard from its own military intelligence community. Their best estimate was that total victory through encirclement, blockade, and bombardment might well take "a great many years."5"
That, and the rest of your points, are simply statements of subjective anxieties that are normal for political leaders to feel during a war. Wartime leaders worry that their populations will turn against them, that they need to keep winning in order to keep up morale, etc. This doesn't prove that the American public would have abandoned the war just because Germany reached the Urals.
I asked earlier, and no one has answered: When in history has an anti-war movement successfully caused a country to abandon a war? The only examples I can really think of are Russia in 1917 and Germany in 1918, but both were cases of societies experiencing economic collapse and deplorable living standards. The Russian Revolution wasn't even a true anti-war movement. It was a revolution against the Tsar, but Russia kept fighting until Brest-Litovsk. Germany in 1918 was a case of war exhaustion, blockade and imminent catastrophic defeat on the front line. These situations are in no way comparable to a United States in 1943 that is faced with a gigantic German empire in control of continental Europe, that is marauding the seas with U-boats and bombing civilians in Britain, and is developing long-range bombers and (eventually) ballistic missiles capable of killing Americans at home.
Loss of enthusiasm for the war in 1945 is a different situation: the people wanting to enjoy the fruits of victory. Germany was defeated and Japan was wiped from the Pacific, reduced to hunkering down on its home islands. Of course people are going to be tired of rationing when they can smell the taste of complete victory. Nevertheless, these opinions and murmurings never amounted to anything more than that, and produced no tangible effect on the war effort.