WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

[TheMarcksPlan]

Geilenberg Program launched in June 1944:

Geilenberg was a response to having lost the air war; its construction difficulties were in large part a result of such loss.

As the ATL is about whether Germany loses the air war...

[Richard Anderson]

Geilenberg was a response to having lost the air war; its construction difficulties were in large part a result of such loss.

As the ATL is about whether Germany loses the air war...

To not lose the air war requires more aircraft, more pilots, more training, and more fuel. The last drives the first three. To get more of the aviation fuel they would need means more hydrogenation plants. The Geilenburg plan expected to produce 82% of requirements 20 months after enacting the plan, with the halfway point 12 months in. Say the Germans read the tea leaves correctly, enact the Geilenberg plan 1 January 1943, after the defeat of the USSR. As of 1 January 1944, they've increased their production of B-4 and C-3 by about 18,000 tons per month. So, roughly a 14% increase in fuel, permitting a 14% increase in training and combat operations...at a point where they are roughly two months away from losing the air war. No Normandy means the concentration on the oil campaign isn't interrupted, and by mid-summer at latest the original hydrogenation plants start to fall like dominoes. Worse, the destruction of the German rail transportation system means the Geilenberg plan plants cannot get the raw materials in or the finished product out to where it is required.

In the end, what changes? It would stretch out the time before Germany loses the air war, perhaps by 14% as well, but they would still lose the air war.

The only real recourse the Germans had was to start by building all their synthetic plant underground and dispersed from the get go. That runs into problems with the greater cost of the project, which was already straining German capacity in the 1930s. It also requires an even greater tea leaf reading ability on the part of the Germans in the early 1930s and does not solve the rail transportation dependence problem.

[TheMarcksPlan]

To get more of the aviation fuel they would need means more hydrogenation plants.

No, Germany used only ~half of its Bergius capacity for avgas. Even you wouldn't dispute that Germany gets mogas, diesel, etc. from Russian oil, so Russian oil allows a doubling of Bergius avgas production via substitution.

Then there's the issue of avgas from Russian oil, which is one of the issues in dispute.

Say the Germans read the tea leaves correctly, enact the Geilenberg plan 1 January 1943,

You're pretending that building underground factories is the same as building more normal plant.

That's why the Geilenberg plan is a consequence of having already lost the air war.

[KDF33]

IMO, to successfully defend against the Allied air offensive, the Germans need to refocus their effort in the course of 1943 at the latest.

They need the foresight to anticipate the critical danger posed by strategic bombing, and consequently make the creation and operation of a gigantic fighter cover their main effort, as much as the Eastern Front was historically.

Therefore, they need to:

• Release military personnel to increase coal production, railway/rolling stock capacity, aircraft production and expand the synthetic fuel industry.

• Scale-up synthetic fuel production on a larger scale and shorter schedule than the Geilenberg program provided for.

They also immediately need to:

• Discontinue bomber and attack aircraft production in favor of day and night fighters, and reallocate current fuel capacity to a massively expanded training program.

• Any thought of engaging in a renewed strategic bombing campaign of the United Kingdom must be discarded, at least until German-controlled European airspace can be secured.

I question whether the historical German leadership would have had the foresight to do this, in the event of a successful conclusion of the Russian campaign. I do, however, believe the resources would have been available in the event they made it their absolute priority.

[TheMarcksPlan]

IMO, to successfully defend against the Allied air offensive, the Germans need to refocus their effort in the course of 1943 at the latest.

Agreed. But Germany understood the Russian war's persistence as impediment to its intended course of refocusing against W.Allies.

They need the foresight to anticipate the critical danger posed by strategic bombing, and consequently make the creation and operation of a gigantic fighter cover their main effort, as much as the Eastern Front was historically.

The foresight issue is already hindsight in '43, with German cities having been burned and serious production problems already caused by bombing.

Therefore, they need to:

• Release military personnel to increase coal production, railway/rolling stock capacity, aircraft production and expand the synthetic fuel industry.

• Scale-up synthetic fuel production on a larger scale and shorter schedule than the Geilenberg program provided for.

The release of military personnel for production was always a part of German plans after defeating SU. Aside from more manpower, more productivity would result - especially in mining - from the improved food position, post-SU. This is not just a matter of stealing more Ukrainian food: Germany's nitrogen fertilizer output would go into the soil instead of shells once the SU falls.

The plan was also to continue scaling up synthfuel production, though at a lower rate had the SU been beat. As we've been discussing, Russian oil would at least have freed ~half of hydrogenation plant output from non-avgas production, thereby doubling LW's fuel budget without any further investment in plants.

They also immediately need to:

• Discontinue bomber and attack aircraft production in favor of day and night fighters, and reallocate current fuel capacity to a massively expanded training program.

• Any thought of engaging in a renewed strategic bombing campaign of the United Kingdom must be discarded, at least until German-controlled European airspace can be secured.

Whether the Germans need to adopt a mid-'44-style exclusive focus on fighters is a matter of the relative resource balance in the ATL ETO.

Most here believe that W.Allied resources so far outstripped German that only an optimal strategy would have defended European skies.

This is a belief subject to interrogation via economic analysis, examples of which I have tried to add: viewtopic.php?f=76&t=251476

Victory on the Eastern Front would predictably double overall German war production; the greater ATL emphasis on LW production would predict at least 3x OTL LW production.

These projections are generally seen as fantastical by AHF but only on grounds of gut feeling and never with quantitative engagement. Most WW2 analysis - AHF or not - fails properly to centralize (1) that Germany's productive manpower resources were in the army to a far greater extent than W.Allies and (2) that Germany had a mechanism for using non-German manpower productively that was largely absent for the W.Allies.

I question whether the historical German leadership would have had the foresight to do this, in the event of a successful conclusion of the Russian campaign. I do, however, believe the resources would have been available.

If LW production is 3x OTL, there's no need for clairvoyant focus on defense to foresee the CBO being soundly defeated. Combined with the absence of Eastern Front, we have ~4x the total LW forces facing the W.Allies by early '44.

[Richard Anderson]

No, Germany used only ~half of its Bergius capacity for avgas. Even you wouldn't dispute that Germany gets mogas, diesel, etc. from Russian oil, so Russian oil allows a doubling of Bergius avgas production via substitution.

Not exactly. The production of C-3 avgas required a feedstock comprised of 85% of an aromatized base stock produced by hydroforming types of operation on coal and coal tar hydrogenation gasoline. Notice Table 8 on page 21 of the USSBS Oil Division Final Report? Notice that when avgas is produced mogas is not produced? Its because it was a two-stage process.

The remaining 15-odd percent of C-3 were synthetic isoparaffins (alkylates and isooctanes), while, like B-4, 4.35+ cc's of tetraethyl lead per gallon were added, so 0.115-0.120% of TEL in B-4 and C-3. Not much, except when you are producing, say, 1,788,000 tons of B-4 and C-3 in 1943, which was a minimum of 2056 tons. Germany's two TEL plants turned out a theoretically comfortable 4,800 tons per year from 1939 on. Capel, built in 1936 near Berlin, courtesy of GM and Esso, produced 100 tons per month, Frose, completed in 1938 near Magdeburg, produced 300 tons per month. Other than that there was the French plant at Paimboeuf, beginning in March 1942, which produced an additional 52 tons per month until c. August 1944, so around 1,508 tons. As of 1 September 1939, the Germans had 1.8 months of production stockpiled, 720 tons, and a small backlog of stock - increasing to a 6-month supply - was maintained until March 1944, when consumption began to exceed production. It also helped that the U.S. agreed to ship 500 tons of TEL to Germany in August 1938, which built up the initial stockpile. There were also two Italian plants producing 65 tons per month, but I am not sure how much was available to the Germans.

Then there was the single ethylene dibromide plant located in Tornesch, near Hamburg, which produced the precursor for making TEL. Accelerating B-4 and C-3 production from 1 January 1943 increases the TEL (and ethylene dibromide) requirement, which accelerates the March 1944 cross-over point.

However, as you've repeatedly said, of course the Germans could build more TEL and ethylene dibromide plant...except they didn't apparently ever think it necessary for the ethylene dibromide plant, possibly because they never managed to get the two additional TEL plants they tried to build into operation. The underground one is understandable, but the plant begun in 1942 was not operational by the end of the war.

Then there's the issue of avgas from Russian oil, which is one of the issues in dispute.

What avgas from Russian oil? Russian 60-70 octane gasoline could be boosted to B-4 quality by the addition of TEL. Again, there seems to be some circularity in your argument.

You're pretending that building underground factories is the same as building more normal plant.

That's why the Geilenberg plan is a consequence of having already lost the air war.

I'm not "pretending" anything, especially like pretending that Russian oil was avgas.

Of course you could build more above-ground Bergius plant, which would have had the same cost (plus inflation) and timescales (and delays) as the original plants. And would have been just as vulnerable to bombing, would have had the same issues with transportation, would have required even more TEL to increase avgas production, and so on. You could even build them in even more remote areas of the Reich, but that then adds to the transportation issue, for construction as well as supplying the raw materials to the finished plant.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Okay, sure, Germany has infinite resources to move infinite places to do infinite things.

Yes, moving 40 or so guns to Tarifa requires infinite resources.

my query was regarding the actual Spanish resources actually in place to actually close the straits.

Don't know, don't care. If Spain's in the war, Germany's an ally. German guns can close the straits. Unless you concede that point, your questions about Spanish guns are just a means of obfuscation.

German "avgas" as produced in World War II was primarily synthetic 87-89 octane and designated B-4. A smaller fraction was produced at 95 octane and designated C-3. Both were produced through the Bergius process.

Anybody who's read the Oil Report knows this; you're not "enlightening" me.

additional crude production would not result in additional avgas. Their crude stock and refinery technology limited them to produce at best an 87-octane avgas that was no better than synthetic B-4.

Seems contradictory to say "no avgas from crude" and "crude-derived avgas limited to B-4 avgas."

But we're making progress...

Ok so Germany only gets B-4 from Russian crude (for argument's sake). For what percentage of training duties would B-4 be adequate? Must have been a high percentage - only at the end of the performance/altitude envelopes are the limit outputs of engines required. For everything else B-4 is adequate.

As training would be >50% of LW fuel budget in a post-SU ATL, that's a massive improvement in LW's fuel situation.

Combined with a doubling of Bergius output from existing plants (crude sub'd for other Bergius output), we have LW fuel supply approaching 3x OTL already.

In addition, use of MW generally occurred in combination with B-4 instead of C-3. So LW fuel supply moves further beyond 3x OTL even on your own assumptions.

The Germans painted themselves into a corner with synthetic fuel. It seemed the easy way to get high-octane aviation fuel,

Source for the notion that synthetic avgas was perceived as cheaper than oil-derived?

which were needed to boost the octane levels of the best fraction of the synthetic distillate in order to get C-3 avgas. In other words, yes, they can produce more B-4 avgas naturally, by sacrificing the output of C-3.

Once again this assumes that Germany can't/wouldn't increase its TEL or other adjunct plant.

Like the assumption that any amplification of Bergius plant would be exactly like the OTL Geilenberg program, it's an assumption that war-losing Germany behaves exactly the same as a war-winning Germany.

Germany did not produce more TEL or the plants to produce more TEL after 1939

No Germany began construction of a new plant that wasn't finished before the war.

Basically your argument relies centrally on a German inability to produce more TEL. There is no suggestion in any of the literature of such inability.

[TheMarcksPlan]

until March 1944, when consumption began to exceed production.

However, as you've repeatedly said, of course the Germans could build more TEL and ethylene dibromide plant...except they didn't apparently ever think it necessary for the ethylene dibromide plant, possibly because they never managed to get the two additional TEL plants they tried to build into operation. The underground one is understandable, but the plant begun in 1942 was not operational by the end of the war.

Once more your argument relies on assuming the incompetence of the German chemical industry. Might the supply/consumption picture of TEL have influenced the pace of new plant initiation and completion? No of course not, in your world the Germans - including the chemical industry in which they were world leaders - only bungle.

In your imagination there is not a single chemist or industry-rep in Germany who'd point out - "hey guys we need more TEL (and ethylene dibromide) if we want to use all this oil and plant we have."

Again and again you have to use these strategies to avoid the fact that German resources would have far exceeded those required to defend Europe in a post-Soviet ATL. A fact that all contemporary W.Allied leaders recognized.

[Takao]

Once more your argument relies on assuming the incompetence of the German chemical industry. Might the supply/consumption picture of TEL have influenced the pace of new plant initiation and completion? No of course not, in your world the Germans - including the chemical industry in which they were world leaders - only bungle.

An odd complaint...Considering your argument relies on assuming the incompetence of the Wallies. Might the outrageously overproduction of German fighters influence the pace and production of new and more fighter designs and their increased production at the expense of building more bombers. Or even the Wallies change in bomber tactics to an all night bomber offensive - leaving all those tens of thousands of single engine day fighters just so much scrap.

In your imagination there is not a single chemist or industry-rep in Germany who'd point out - "hey guys we need more TEL (and ethylene dibromide) if we want to use all this oil and plant we have."

In your imagination there is not a single officer or air specialist in the US or Britain who'd point out - "Hey guys, we need more fighters or to change our tactics."

Again and again you have to use these strategies to avoid the fact that German resources would have far exceeded those required to defend Europe in a post-Soviet ATL. A fact that all contemporary W.Allied leaders recognized.

Again and again you use these strategies to portray the Wallies as complete dolts, so utterly incompetent, that the do not notice this massive increase in German fighter production. Then, just as improbably, do nothing about it, and continue to produce more and more bombers.

[Richard Anderson]

Once more your argument relies on assuming the incompetence of the German chemical industry. Might the supply/consumption picture of TEL have influenced the pace of new plant initiation and completion? No of course not, in your world the Germans - including the chemical industry in which they were world leaders - only bungle.

You read a lot of imagination into what you think another persons argument is. Could you please point out where I said or even implied bungling?

Or are you only interested in straw men again?

In your imagination there is not a single chemist or industry-rep in Germany who'd point out - "hey guys we need more TEL (and ethylene dibromide) if we want to use all this oil and plant we have."

Again, where is my "imagination" so evident? I simply pointed out reality. The Germans did "point out" they needed more TEL and began the construction of two additional plants to produce such. I made no inference or implication that the result was due to bungling. I would note that TEL plant construction prewar was proprietary and expensive, construction during the war remained expensive and production of TEL was expensive and dangerous.

Given they did not in fact "point out" to my knowledge the need for additional ethylene dibromide plants and that I never said they did that too is a straw man. Again, I will note that the single plant was also a single point of failure.

Again and again you have to use these strategies to avoid the fact that German resources would have far exceeded those required to defend Europe in a post-Soviet ATL. A fact that all contemporary W.Allied leaders recognized.

Now that notion appears to only exist in your imagination.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Could you please point out where I said or even implied bungling?

Here's how I read your argument so far, correct me where I've the wrong impression:

1. Sure Germany could have increased oil refining and/or expanded synthgas plant.
2. But to translate "more oil refining" and/or "more synthgas plant" into "more avgas" requires more TEL.
3. The Germans were either:
......3a. Incapable of expanding TEL production or
......3b. Ignorant of their need for more TEL

Same impression of your argument goes for ethylene bromide and other adjuncts.

So we have to imagine a scenario in which Germany devoted enormous resources to increasing avgas output but fell on its face because it forgot to increase necessary adjunct output. That seems unlikely unless something has gone wrong - call it bungling or whatever you like.

You seem to infer support for the ATL course in the fact of Germany's low OTL TEL output. Yet the statistics show that German TEL consumption didn't exceed output until March '44 - a time when Germany had another TEL plant under construction and, a few months later, yet another began. That neither of these plants came to fruition seems as likely explainable by Germany's economic collapse in latter '44 as by German inability to increase adjunct output, had that collapse not intervened. In addition, the desultory pace of TEL expansion up to March '44 seems just as likely explainable by the excess of production over consumption. I.e. that Germany's avgas output was not restrained by TEL production well after that crossover point.

[Richard Anderson]

Yes, moving 40 or so guns to Tarifa requires infinite resources.

No, but it does require significant resources, which were not infinite. So, forty or so guns? Which ones? What type?

Don't know, don't care. If Spain's in the war, Germany's an ally. German guns can close the straits. Unless you concede that point, your questions about Spanish guns are just a means of obfuscation.

Okay, so then you realize the Spanish resources are insufficient. Do you understand what the Germans would need to provide? Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie won't work, since they were designed and organized for coast defense, not to interdict sea lanes. That leaves the 100-odd KM Marine-Artillerie-Abteilungen, but many of those were organized to man existing fixed installations and were not "mobile". The bulk of the batteries were 7.5cm and 10.5cm batteries, but most battalions had one or two batteries of 15cm guns, typically the 5 cm/45 SK L/45 or 15 cm/45 Ubts and Tbts KL/45, but at least 9 miles was within their extreme range. Oh, and all of those were already deployed to defend Germany, Denmark, the Low Countries, German-occupied France, and Norway.

Anybody who's read the Oil Report knows this; you're not "enlightening" me.

Yeah, that's nice. It was the following sentences you continue to ignore.

Seems contradictory to say "no avgas from crude" and "crude-derived avgas limited to B-4 avgas."

Oh, forgive me, I should have been more specific. Under 3,500 tons per year from German refineries were B-4 and A-2 (low-octane unleaded training fuel). Out of annual refinery output of 1,400,000 to 1,750,000 tons. So avgas from crude ended up being about 0.2% of refinery output.

But we're making progress...

I'm not so sure about that...

Ok so Germany only gets B-4 from Russian crude (for argument's sake). For what percentage of training duties would B-4 be adequate? Must have been a high percentage - only at the end of the performance/altitude envelopes are the limit outputs of engines required. For everything else B-4 is adequate.

B-4 was an operational leaded fuel. The only "training" it would have been used in was operational conversion. A-2, the c. 70 octane unleaded "avgas" was used in primary trainers.

As training would be >50% of LW fuel budget in a post-SU ATL, that's a massive improvement in LW's fuel situation.

Um, training was always >50% of LW fuel budget...that was the problem rather than a solution. Best estimate for consumption in 1942 was 20% was for training, 60% was for operations, the remainder was for transport and aircraft ferrying operations.

Combined with a doubling of Bergius output from existing plants (crude sub'd for other Bergius output), we have LW fuel supply approaching 3x OTL already.

The Germans cannot "sub'd" crude for Bergius avgas output without a massive increase in their refinery capacity.

In addition, use of MW generally occurred in combination with B-4 instead of C-3. So LW fuel supply moves further beyond 3x OTL even on your own assumptions.

Ah, so you do know that B-4 was an operational fuel. How does "LW fuel supply moves further beyond 3x OTL"? Doubling Bergius plant output requires doubling plant. Getting the remaining 1X requires a massive increase in German refinery output...and yes, I am including Romania, who supplied around 130,000 tons annually. 3X production means about 3.3-million tons per year on average and 5.1-million tons per year at peak.

Source for the notion that synthetic avgas was perceived as cheaper than oil-derived?

Well, since the decision was for autarky despite the cost, they must have thought synthetic production of all types, including aviation fuel, was the better choice? I inferred since there seemed to be little real debate on the subject that the decision was also easier, but that may be a poor choice of words.

Once again this assumes that Germany can't/wouldn't increase its TEL or other adjunct plant.

No, it doesn't assume anything of the sort. They did decide to increase TEL production. Can't and wouldn't aren't the issue. It simply didn't happen even though they wanted to.

Like the assumption that any amplification of Bergius plant would be exactly like the OTL Geilenberg program, it's an assumption that war-losing Germany behaves exactly the same as a war-winning Germany.

Yet again, I made no such assumption, I simply described the reality of the Geilenberg program and what it was planned to cost.

No Germany began construction of a new plant that wasn't finished before the war.

Since I've mentioned that fact a half dozen times or so, I'm not sure who you're planning on enlightening with that statement? The pilot TEL plant took something like a year to complete with the assistance of GM and Esso. The second plant took about two years to complete. The underground plant was simply started too late. Why the plant started in 1942 took more than two years and still wasn't complete is anyone's guess. Probably competing requirements getting lost in the shuffle during wartime.

Basically your argument relies centrally on a German inability to produce more TEL. There is no suggestion in any of the literature of such inability.

No, it relies on the realities of Bergius and crude refining technologies and capabilities in Europe. TEL production was simply the absolute limiter to leaded avgas.

[Richard Anderson]

Here's how I read your argument so far, correct me where I've the wrong impression:

1. Sure Germany could have increased oil refining and/or expanded synthgas plant.

Germany did increase synthetic fuel plant; I'm not sure how "could have" enters into my argument? They did, in extremis, as part of the Geilenberg program plan to build simple (I could be mean and use the USSBS language for them) dispersed refineries to distill small quantities of crude.

2. But to translate "more oil refining" and/or "more synthgas plant" into "more avgas" requires more TEL.

No, translating refined 80+ octane gasoline into more avgas requires more refined 80+ octane gasoline and TEL.

3. The Germans were either:
......3a. Incapable of expanding TEL production or
......3b. Ignorant of their need for more TEL

Those arguments only exist in your imagination. The Germans were incapable of expanding TEL production despite trying to, so they obviously knew of the requirement.

Same impression of your argument goes for ethylene bromide and other adjuncts.

Again, I'm afraid that argument only exists in your imagination. It's ethylene dibromide BTW.

So we have to imagine a scenario in which Germany devoted enormous resources to increasing avgas output but fell on its face because it forgot to increase necessary adjunct output. That seems unlikely unless something has gone wrong - call it bungling or whatever you like.

I don't know if they "bungled" completion of the third TEL plant or not, but I do know that despite needing it, they did not in fact complete it.

You seem to infer support for the ATL course in the fact of Germany's low OTL TEL output. Yet the statistics show that German TEL consumption didn't exceed output until March '44 - a time when Germany had another TEL plant under construction and, a few months later, yet another began. That neither of these plants came to fruition seems as likely explainable by Germany's economic collapse in latter '44 as by German inability to increase adjunct output, had that collapse not intervened. In addition, the desultory pace of TEL expansion up to March '44 seems just as likely explainable by the excess of production over consumption. I.e. that Germany's avgas output was not restrained by TEL production well after that crossover point.

Indeed, economic collapse is the answer for the failure to even begin the underground TEL plant planned in 1944, except for some initial excavation. It does not explain the failure to complete the third plant planned two years earlier.

So now are you trying to say the Germans bungled by not foreseeing that the plant they already had begun was necessary to maintain output.

[TheMarcksPlan]

I don't know if they "bungled" completion of the third TEL plant or not, but I do know that despite needing it, they did not in fact complete it.

Well that's precisely my point. We don't know why the Germans didn't complete the plant but we know that, until near the period of German economic collapse, there wasn't a TEL-related shortfall in German avgas production - production exceeded consumption until March '44. To suppose that in entirely different economic circumstances the Germans would somehow allow TEL shortfalls to undercut their war effort is a supposition that relies on assuming German incompetence.

maybe late summer we'll be able to and if I get the chance I'll buy you a libation.

Inshallah. I am not averse to free libations, will even reciprocate. I have a perhaps naive faith that certain aspects are easier dealt with in conversation than e-typing; it's a faith that may rest on my experience of trials versus briefs.

Fair warning for tonight - I'm sitting with Grandpa having a few glasses of champagne and talking with scattered friends via interweb. Thus the incomplete replies. Subsequent (and tbh earlier) posts should be graded on a BAC-adjusted basis and may need later correction.

[Richard Anderson]

Well that's precisely my point. We don't know why the Germans didn't complete the plant but we know that, until near the period of German economic collapse, there wasn't a TEL-related shortfall in German avgas production - production exceeded consumption until March '44. To suppose that in entirely different economic circumstances the Germans would somehow allow TEL shortfalls to undercut their war effort is a supposition that relies on assuming German incompetence.

And yet isn't it odd that they obviously foresaw a need for additional TEL production, otherwise why go to the expense - and it was a significant expense - to build one, but somehow "bungled" it enough that it never saw completion after two years of work? And that during a period when the Germans were expending every effort to expand the synthetic plant and output of avgas?

Production of Synthetic Aviation/Crude Refining/Benzol
1938 - 60,360/?/? tons
1939 - 218,800/?/? tons
1940 - 612,000/18,000/14,000 tons
1941 - 847,000/11,000/31,000 tons
1942 - 1,349,000/7,000/40,000 tons
1943 - 1,745,000/4,000/35,000 tons
1944 - 996,000/3,000/4,000 tons

In truth, it is not clear exactly why TEL production fell behind requirements in 1944, given it was only 0.115-0.120% of total tonnage as an additive. I suspect they may have used it as an anti-knock additive in some other requirements, but haven't tracked it down yet.

I'm also trying to find consumption figures. What I have found so far for training allowances explains a lot. I suspect that expanding the pilot strength is a major Achilles's Heel in your plan. More as I can suss it out.

Inshallah. I am not averse to free libations, will even reciprocate. I have a perhaps naive faith that certain aspects are easier dealt with in conversation than e-typing; it's a faith that may rest on my experience of trials versus briefs.

Fair warning for tonight - I'm sitting with Grandpa having a few glasses of champagne and talking with scattered friends via interweb. Thus the incomplete replies. Subsequent (and tbh earlier) posts should be graded on a BAC-adjusted basis and may need later correction.

You have more stamina than we do. I just put my lovely lady and our cat to bed (he has his own bedroom). The inability to hang with friends at our usual New Year's Eve dinner and dance venue dampened our ardor for staying up till midnight, especially when the ball already dropped in New York.

Happy New Year!