Geilenberg was a response to having lost the air war; its construction difficulties were in large part a result of such loss.KDF33 wrote:Geilenberg Program launched in June 1944:
As the ATL is about whether Germany loses the air war...
Geilenberg was a response to having lost the air war; its construction difficulties were in large part a result of such loss.KDF33 wrote:Geilenberg Program launched in June 1944:
To not lose the air war requires more aircraft, more pilots, more training, and more fuel. The last drives the first three. To get more of the aviation fuel they would need means more hydrogenation plants. The Geilenburg plan expected to produce 82% of requirements 20 months after enacting the plan, with the halfway point 12 months in. Say the Germans read the tea leaves correctly, enact the Geilenberg plan 1 January 1943, after the defeat of the USSR. As of 1 January 1944, they've increased their production of B-4 and C-3 by about 18,000 tons per month. So, roughly a 14% increase in fuel, permitting a 14% increase in training and combat operations...at a point where they are roughly two months away from losing the air war. No Normandy means the concentration on the oil campaign isn't interrupted, and by mid-summer at latest the original hydrogenation plants start to fall like dominoes. Worse, the destruction of the German rail transportation system means the Geilenberg plan plants cannot get the raw materials in or the finished product out to where it is required.
No, Germany used only ~half of its Bergius capacity for avgas. Even you wouldn't dispute that Germany gets mogas, diesel, etc. from Russian oil, so Russian oil allows a doubling of Bergius avgas production via substitution.Richard Anderson wrote:To get more of the aviation fuel they would need means more hydrogenation plants.
You're pretending that building underground factories is the same as building more normal plant.Richard Anderson wrote:Say the Germans read the tea leaves correctly, enact the Geilenberg plan 1 January 1943,
Agreed. But Germany understood the Russian war's persistence as impediment to its intended course of refocusing against W.Allies.
The foresight issue is already hindsight in '43, with German cities having been burned and serious production problems already caused by bombing.
They need the foresight to anticipate the critical danger posed by strategic bombing, and consequently make the creation and operation of a gigantic fighter cover their main effort, as much as the Eastern Front was historically.
The release of military personnel for production was always a part of German plans after defeating SU. Aside from more manpower, more productivity would result - especially in mining - from the improved food position, post-SU. This is not just a matter of stealing more Ukrainian food: Germany's nitrogen fertilizer output would go into the soil instead of shells once the SU falls.
Therefore, they need to:
- Release military personnel to increase coal production, railway/rolling stock capacity, aircraft production and expand the synthetic fuel industry.
- Scale-up synthetic fuel production on a larger scale and shorter schedule than the Geilenberg program provided for.
Whether the Germans need to adopt a mid-'44-style exclusive focus on fighters is a matter of the relative resource balance in the ATL ETO.They also immediately need to:
- Discontinue bomber and attack aircraft production in favor of day and night fighters, and reallocate current fuel capacity to a massively expanded training program.
- Any thought of engaging in a renewed strategic bombing campaign of the United Kingdom must be discarded, at least until German-controlled European airspace can be secured.
If LW production is 3x OTL, there's no need for clairvoyant focus on defense to foresee the CBO being soundly defeated. Combined with the absence of Eastern Front, we have ~4x the total LW forces facing the W.Allies by early '44.I question whether the historical German leadership would have had the foresight to do this, in the event of a successful conclusion of the Russian campaign. I do, however, believe the resources would have been available.
Not exactly. The production of C-3 avgas required a feedstock comprised of 85% of an aromatized base stock produced by hydroforming types of operation on coal and coal tar hydrogenation gasoline. Notice Table 8 on page 21 of the USSBS Oil Division Final Report? Notice that when avgas is produced mogas is not produced? Its because it was a two-stage process.
What avgas from Russian oil? Russian 60-70 octane gasoline could be boosted to B-4 quality by the addition of TEL. Again, there seems to be some circularity in your argument.Then there's the issue of avgas from Russian oil, which is one of the issues in dispute.
I'm not "pretending" anything, especially like pretending that Russian oil was avgas.You're pretending that building underground factories is the same as building more normal plant.
That's why the Geilenberg plan is a consequence of having already lost the air war.
Yes, moving 40 or so guns to Tarifa requires infinite resources.Richard Anderson wrote:Okay, sure, Germany has infinite resources to move infinite places to do infinite things.
Don't know, don't care. If Spain's in the war, Germany's an ally. German guns can close the straits. Unless you concede that point, your questions about Spanish guns are just a means of obfuscation.Richard Anderson wrote:my query was regarding the actual Spanish resources actually in place to actually close the straits.
Anybody who's read the Oil Report knows this; you're not "enlightening" me.Richard Anderson wrote:German "avgas" as produced in World War II was primarily synthetic 87-89 octane and designated B-4. A smaller fraction was produced at 95 octane and designated C-3. Both were produced through the Bergius process.
Seems contradictory to say "no avgas from crude" and "crude-derived avgas limited to B-4 avgas."Richard Anderson wrote:additional crude production would not result in additional avgas. Their crude stock and refinery technology limited them to produce at best an 87-octane avgas that was no better than synthetic B-4.
Source for the notion that synthetic avgas was perceived as cheaper than oil-derived?The Germans painted themselves into a corner with synthetic fuel. It seemed the easy way to get high-octane aviation fuel,
Once again this assumes that Germany can't/wouldn't increase its TEL or other adjunct plant.which were needed to boost the octane levels of the best fraction of the synthetic distillate in order to get C-3 avgas. In other words, yes, they can produce more B-4 avgas naturally, by sacrificing the output of C-3.
No Germany began construction of a new plant that wasn't finished before the war.Germany did not produce more TEL or the plants to produce more TEL after 1939
Richard Anderson wrote:until March 1944, when consumption began to exceed production.
Once more your argument relies on assuming the incompetence of the German chemical industry. Might the supply/consumption picture of TEL have influenced the pace of new plant initiation and completion? No of course not, in your world the Germans - including the chemical industry in which they were world leaders - only bungle.Richard Anderson wrote:However, as you've repeatedly said, of course the Germans could build more TEL and ethylene dibromide plant...except they didn't apparently ever think it necessary for the ethylene dibromide plant, possibly because they never managed to get the two additional TEL plants they tried to build into operation. The underground one is understandable, but the plant begun in 1942 was not operational by the end of the war.
An odd complaint...Considering your argument relies on assuming the incompetence of the Wallies. Might the outrageously overproduction of German fighters influence the pace and production of new and more fighter designs and their increased production at the expense of building more bombers. Or even the Wallies change in bomber tactics to an all night bomber offensive - leaving all those tens of thousands of single engine day fighters just so much scrap.TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑31 Dec 2020 23:42Once more your argument relies on assuming the incompetence of the German chemical industry. Might the supply/consumption picture of TEL have influenced the pace of new plant initiation and completion? No of course not, in your world the Germans - including the chemical industry in which they were world leaders - only bungle.
In your imagination there is not a single officer or air specialist in the US or Britain who'd point out - "Hey guys, we need more fighters or to change our tactics."
Again and again you use these strategies to portray the Wallies as complete dolts, so utterly incompetent, that the do not notice this massive increase in German fighter production. Then, just as improbably, do nothing about it, and continue to produce more and more bombers.
You read a lot of imagination into what you think another persons argument is. Could you please point out where I said or even implied bungling?TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑31 Dec 2020 23:42Once more your argument relies on assuming the incompetence of the German chemical industry. Might the supply/consumption picture of TEL have influenced the pace of new plant initiation and completion? No of course not, in your world the Germans - including the chemical industry in which they were world leaders - only bungle.
Again, where is my "imagination" so evident? I simply pointed out reality. The Germans did "point out" they needed more TEL and began the construction of two additional plants to produce such. I made no inference or implication that the result was due to bungling. I would note that TEL plant construction prewar was proprietary and expensive, construction during the war remained expensive and production of TEL was expensive and dangerous.In your imagination there is not a single chemist or industry-rep in Germany who'd point out - "hey guys we need more TEL (and ethylene dibromide) if we want to use all this oil and plant we have."
Now that notion appears to only exist in your imagination.Again and again you have to use these strategies to avoid the fact that German resources would have far exceeded those required to defend Europe in a post-Soviet ATL. A fact that all contemporary W.Allied leaders recognized.
Here's how I read your argument so far, correct me where I've the wrong impression:Richard Anderson wrote:Could you please point out where I said or even implied bungling?
No, but it does require significant resources, which were not infinite. So, forty or so guns? Which ones? What type?
Okay, so then you realize the Spanish resources are insufficient. Do you understand what the Germans would need to provide? Heeres-Küsten-Artillerie won't work, since they were designed and organized for coast defense, not to interdict sea lanes. That leaves the 100-odd KM Marine-Artillerie-Abteilungen, but many of those were organized to man existing fixed installations and were not "mobile". The bulk of the batteries were 7.5cm and 10.5cm batteries, but most battalions had one or two batteries of 15cm guns, typically the 5 cm/45 SK L/45 or 15 cm/45 Ubts and Tbts KL/45, but at least 9 miles was within their extreme range. Oh, and all of those were already deployed to defend Germany, Denmark, the Low Countries, German-occupied France, and Norway.Don't know, don't care. If Spain's in the war, Germany's an ally. German guns can close the straits. Unless you concede that point, your questions about Spanish guns are just a means of obfuscation.
Yeah, that's nice. It was the following sentences you continue to ignore.Anybody who's read the Oil Report knows this; you're not "enlightening" me.
Oh, forgive me, I should have been more specific. Under 3,500 tons per year from German refineries were B-4 and A-2 (low-octane unleaded training fuel). Out of annual refinery output of 1,400,000 to 1,750,000 tons. So avgas from crude ended up being about 0.2% of refinery output.Seems contradictory to say "no avgas from crude" and "crude-derived avgas limited to B-4 avgas."
I'm not so sure about that...But we're making progress...
B-4 was an operational leaded fuel. The only "training" it would have been used in was operational conversion. A-2, the c. 70 octane unleaded "avgas" was used in primary trainers.Ok so Germany only gets B-4 from Russian crude (for argument's sake). For what percentage of training duties would B-4 be adequate? Must have been a high percentage - only at the end of the performance/altitude envelopes are the limit outputs of engines required. For everything else B-4 is adequate.
Um, training was always >50% of LW fuel budget...that was the problem rather than a solution. Best estimate for consumption in 1942 was 20% was for training, 60% was for operations, the remainder was for transport and aircraft ferrying operations.As training would be >50% of LW fuel budget in a post-SU ATL, that's a massive improvement in LW's fuel situation.
The Germans cannot "sub'd" crude for Bergius avgas output without a massive increase in their refinery capacity.Combined with a doubling of Bergius output from existing plants (crude sub'd for other Bergius output), we have LW fuel supply approaching 3x OTL already.
Ah, so you do know that B-4 was an operational fuel. How does "LW fuel supply moves further beyond 3x OTL"? Doubling Bergius plant output requires doubling plant. Getting the remaining 1X requires a massive increase in German refinery output...and yes, I am including Romania, who supplied around 130,000 tons annually. 3X production means about 3.3-million tons per year on average and 5.1-million tons per year at peak.In addition, use of MW generally occurred in combination with B-4 instead of C-3. So LW fuel supply moves further beyond 3x OTL even on your own assumptions.
Well, since the decision was for autarky despite the cost, they must have thought synthetic production of all types, including aviation fuel, was the better choice? I inferred since there seemed to be little real debate on the subject that the decision was also easier, but that may be a poor choice of words.Source for the notion that synthetic avgas was perceived as cheaper than oil-derived?
No, it doesn't assume anything of the sort. They did decide to increase TEL production. Can't and wouldn't aren't the issue. It simply didn't happen even though they wanted to.Once again this assumes that Germany can't/wouldn't increase its TEL or other adjunct plant.
Yet again, I made no such assumption, I simply described the reality of the Geilenberg program and what it was planned to cost.Like the assumption that any amplification of Bergius plant would be exactly like the OTL Geilenberg program, it's an assumption that war-losing Germany behaves exactly the same as a war-winning Germany.
Since I've mentioned that fact a half dozen times or so, I'm not sure who you're planning on enlightening with that statement? The pilot TEL plant took something like a year to complete with the assistance of GM and Esso. The second plant took about two years to complete. The underground plant was simply started too late. Why the plant started in 1942 took more than two years and still wasn't complete is anyone's guess. Probably competing requirements getting lost in the shuffle during wartime.No Germany began construction of a new plant that wasn't finished before the war.
No, it relies on the realities of Bergius and crude refining technologies and capabilities in Europe. TEL production was simply the absolute limiter to leaded avgas.Basically your argument relies centrally on a German inability to produce more TEL. There is no suggestion in any of the literature of such inability.
Germany did increase synthetic fuel plant; I'm not sure how "could have" enters into my argument? They did, in extremis, as part of the Geilenberg program plan to build simple (I could be mean and use the USSBS language for them) dispersed refineries to distill small quantities of crude.
No, translating refined 80+ octane gasoline into more avgas requires more refined 80+ octane gasoline and TEL.2. But to translate "more oil refining" and/or "more synthgas plant" into "more avgas" requires more TEL.
Those arguments only exist in your imagination. The Germans were incapable of expanding TEL production despite trying to, so they obviously knew of the requirement.3. The Germans were either:
......3a. Incapable of expanding TEL production or
......3b. Ignorant of their need for more TEL
Again, I'm afraid that argument only exists in your imagination. It's ethylene dibromide BTW.Same impression of your argument goes for ethylene bromide and other adjuncts.
I don't know if they "bungled" completion of the third TEL plant or not, but I do know that despite needing it, they did not in fact complete it.So we have to imagine a scenario in which Germany devoted enormous resources to increasing avgas output but fell on its face because it forgot to increase necessary adjunct output. That seems unlikely unless something has gone wrong - call it bungling or whatever you like.
Indeed, economic collapse is the answer for the failure to even begin the underground TEL plant planned in 1944, except for some initial excavation. It does not explain the failure to complete the third plant planned two years earlier.You seem to infer support for the ATL course in the fact of Germany's low OTL TEL output. Yet the statistics show that German TEL consumption didn't exceed output until March '44 - a time when Germany had another TEL plant under construction and, a few months later, yet another began. That neither of these plants came to fruition seems as likely explainable by Germany's economic collapse in latter '44 as by German inability to increase adjunct output, had that collapse not intervened. In addition, the desultory pace of TEL expansion up to March '44 seems just as likely explainable by the excess of production over consumption. I.e. that Germany's avgas output was not restrained by TEL production well after that crossover point.
Well that's precisely my point. We don't know why the Germans didn't complete the plant but we know that, until near the period of German economic collapse, there wasn't a TEL-related shortfall in German avgas production - production exceeded consumption until March '44. To suppose that in entirely different economic circumstances the Germans would somehow allow TEL shortfalls to undercut their war effort is a supposition that relies on assuming German incompetence.Richard Anderson wrote:I don't know if they "bungled" completion of the third TEL plant or not, but I do know that despite needing it, they did not in fact complete it.
Inshallah. I am not averse to free libations, will even reciprocate. I have a perhaps naive faith that certain aspects are easier dealt with in conversation than e-typing; it's a faith that may rest on my experience of trials versus briefs.Richard Anderson wrote:maybe late summer we'll be able to and if I get the chance I'll buy you a libation.
And yet isn't it odd that they obviously foresaw a need for additional TEL production, otherwise why go to the expense - and it was a significant expense - to build one, but somehow "bungled" it enough that it never saw completion after two years of work? And that during a period when the Germans were expending every effort to expand the synthetic plant and output of avgas?TheMarcksPlan wrote: ↑01 Jan 2021 05:55Well that's precisely my point. We don't know why the Germans didn't complete the plant but we know that, until near the period of German economic collapse, there wasn't a TEL-related shortfall in German avgas production - production exceeded consumption until March '44. To suppose that in entirely different economic circumstances the Germans would somehow allow TEL shortfalls to undercut their war effort is a supposition that relies on assuming German incompetence.
You have more stamina than we do. I just put my lovely lady and our cat to bed (he has his own bedroom). The inability to hang with friends at our usual New Year's Eve dinner and dance venue dampened our ardor for staying up till midnight, especially when the ball already dropped in New York.Inshallah. I am not averse to free libations, will even reciprocate. I have a perhaps naive faith that certain aspects are easier dealt with in conversation than e-typing; it's a faith that may rest on my experience of trials versus briefs.
Fair warning for tonight - I'm sitting with Grandpa having a few glasses of champagne and talking with scattered friends via interweb. Thus the incomplete replies. Subsequent (and tbh earlier) posts should be graded on a BAC-adjusted basis and may need later correction.