WW2 Air war in Europe with a defeated USSR?

[TheMarcksPlan]

So what exactly is nonsense?

In general I don't think it's wise or productive to call other countries' armies a joke. The Soviets were certainly inefficient, I wouldn't call their army a joke. The Filipino army was inefficient; I wouldn't call it a joke and would take offense on behalf of some family members who died fighting with it. That's probably how a lot of people feel here.

Conversely, nobody should take offense to pointing out that British ground combat effectiveness was lower than German (and American).

Was it Trevor Dupuy who calculared that a German division was the equivalent of 1.25 Allied ones?

Dupuy institute studies - after Trevor's death - generally saw 1.2-1.3 German ratio against Americans and ~1.5 against British. http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/pdf/e-5humanfactors.pdf

Richard Anderson may have additional details.

[Michael Kenny]

By the summer of 1940 Britain got its ass whooped, was hiding behind the ocean...........

'Hiding'? I think you are deluded. The UK have invested heavily in its Navy. In order to invade German would have to cross the channel. Germany 'lost' its surface fleet in Norway when its destroyer fleet was comprehensively defeated (as in 'sunk') at Narvik. Thus they needed the Luftwaffe to counter the RN. The Luftwaffe failed and it too was defeated. In your world that means that the Kriegsmarine 'hid' after it 'got its ass whooped ' in Norway and the Luftwaffe 'got its ass whooped' over the fields of Kent.

Oh one final point -I am Irish.

[Michael Kenny]

The Wallies fought a tiny fraction of the German Army and as John Ellis demonstrates, their armies were inneficent, wasteful and only won because they massively outnumbered this tiny fraction.

Refer to my earlier map.

EPSOM c 26-6-44 BBB.jpg

from left to right:

2nd SS
10th SS
9th SS
2nd Pz Div
Pz Lehr
1st SS
12th SS
21 Pz Div.

Frontage is c 10 km.

Where can I find such a concentration of force in Russia?

[antwony]

the Anglos

As a native speaker of Australian English, I'd like to apologies to the rest of the English speaking community for that phrase. Along with rising intontation (you're welcome), which tends to get misused, Anglos is another of our gifts to the English language. Its use by some eurotrash Wehraboo is more confusing than offensive, but yeah... it's not a great

In general I don't think it's wise or productive to call other countries' armies a joke... That's probably how a lot of people feel here.

In general, most of the people here who disagree with you, and the forum's Wehraboos/ Neo Nazi's, tend to be mentally competant, responsible adults and don't get offended by sweary 14 year old boys.

I'd say it's more disappointment with you and Politician01, etc... going with (at best) a History Channel view of German exceptionalism. Makes me hunger for fondue, Duck a l'orange and other 1970's nonsense

Think you're being a bit of a sociopath which fits with your Dead great white man view of history.

Dupuy institute studies - after Trevor's death - generally saw 1.2-1.3 German ratio against Americans and ~1.5 against British. http://www.dupuyinstitute.org/pdf/e-5humanfactors.pdf

Intectually interesting, theoretical research of little utility used as a crutch to support nonsense.

[Politician01]

In general I don't think it's wise or productive to call other countries' armies a joke.

I was copying Kenny´s style and I was hyberbole. Ofc British/American armies were no joke - after the German armies they were probably the best in the world - however to claim that they were better/stronger because they won over a tiny fraction of the German army whos main focus was in the East was such a show of Anglo Chauvinism that I had to choose radical words.

[Politician01]

Where can I find such a concentration of force in Russia?

Try Kursk for example. The amount of soldiers and equipment used in this battle alone was probably greater than ALL the equipment and soldiers the Germans had in ALL of France.

[danebrog]

In the whole discussion I miss two important factors: the obvious lack of rational thinking of the top German leadership and the equally pronounced lack of resources, especially fuel.

The catastrophic failures of planning, development and training in the Luftwaffe alone are worth a thread in themselves.

The Nazis were obsessed with the offensive almost to the end: Even at the end of 1943, an absolutely necessary increase in fighter production was only allowed if it was not at the expense of bomber production - for which neither fuel nor qualified personnel were sufficiently available.
Subsequently, attempts were made (in all three branches) to compensate for the lack of training with modern weapon systems. This turned out to be nonsense, because the personnel were no longer able to exploit the constructive advantages.
This resulted in an almost criminal waste of irreplaceable personnel on all fronts.

When bomber offensives were finally impossible, enormous resources were wasted in the construction and development of the V-1 and V-2. Psychologically, they were certainly extremely effective, but strategically they were completely useless.

Many developments in air armament were only started when one's back was literally against the wall. In addition, they allowed themselves the luxury of developing countless projects that could not be realised at all - as late as April 45, they were planning jet bombers that existed only as sketches.

A good example is radar: in 1939, they still had a certain head start in development, but after that they neglected the subject. Centimetre-wave radar was only introduced after such a device had been recovered from the wreckage of an RAF bomber.
Chaff was also known early on - but Göring ordered this knowledge to be locked away in a safe. When this simple jamming device was then used by the RAF in 1943, German air defences were completely unaware and unprepared....
And so on, and so forth - the list could be extended indefinitely.

Even in the case of a conquest of the Caucasus with its oil deposits, it would have taken at least a year, rather longer, according to estimates at the time, to put the production facilities back into operation. And then they would have faced exactly the same problem as in 1918: There was no way to transport the extracted oil to Germany.
Even if one now optimistically assumes that it would have been possible to solve these problems by 1944/45, one would have to reckon with air attacks on Baku by the Allies.

Here, too, the deficits in planning and execution could be extended indefinitely.

[Politician01]

In the whole discussion I miss two important factors: the obvious lack of rational thinking of the top German leadership and the equally pronounced lack of resources, especially fuel.

Absent an active Eastern Front, the resource and fuel situation dramatically improves - regardless of what German leadership does: During the two weeks of exclusively Kursk the LW flew some 30 000 sorties this tranlates to what? Some 20 000 tons of aviation fuel consumed in just two weeks. This does not happen ATL. Nor does the Stalingrad air lift, nor all the other air battles of the spring 43 to summer 45 period.

So even without one single gram of additional fuel from the occupied territories, the Germans save Millions of tons of aviation and ground warfare fuel by simply not having to fight the Red Army.

The catastrophic failures of planning, development and training in the Luftwaffe alone are worth a thread in themselves.

Many of these insufficiencies were at least partially caused or aggravated by the requirements of the Eastern Front - absent ATL.

Even at the end of 1943, an absolutely necessary increase in fighter production was only allowed if it was not at the expense of bomber production - for which neither fuel nor qualified personnel were sufficiently available.

The bombers were needed in the East - ATL they are not. As for fuel see above - as for personnel - se below

Many developments in air armament were only started when one's back was literally against the wall.

This was because of the manpower requirements of the Eastern Front. Countles specialists were draftet because the Germans needed the manpower - in this ATL most specialists are released by the summer of 43.

The important factor I miss in these discussions: People seem to be unable to comprehend that this is NOT OTL this is an ATL. So one has to substract all the resources the Germans used/produced/lost in/for the East. Most people here continue to argue with the OTL parameters which is baffling considered that this is an ATL.

[Michael Kenny]

Where can I find such a concentration of force in Russia?

Try Kursk for example. The amount of soldiers and equipment used in this battle alone was probably greater than ALL the equipment and soldiers the Germans had in ALL of France.

Please try and pay more attention. I asked about the EPSOM operation and to be more specific the disastrous failed II SS Pz Korps attack which was the main German counter-attack designed to reach the beaches and eject the Allies from France. This (II SS Pz Korps attack) took place in a 12km x 12 km area but the 'Kursk' you mention was two separate attacks (with 150 km between the two German pincers. If you mean one of the two pincers then the northern one was of a 40 km wide front and the southern one 60 km wide. There is no comparison.

[Tom from Cornwall]

The important factor I miss in these discussions: People seem to be unable to comprehend that this is NOT OTL this is an ATL. So one has to substract all the resources the Germans used/produced/lost in/for the East. Most people here continue to argue with the OTL parameters which is baffling considered that this is an ATL.

In that case you might want to reevaluate all comments about Allied plans and programmes in the whole thread. Obviously “one has to subtract” all the resources the Allies used/produced/lost in/for the East once the USSR accepted peace terms. Also, of course, the Allies would have reevaluated all their strategic plans given significant changes to events on the Eastern Front. At least one other supporter of the thread’s premise commented about the Morgenthau Plan which might well have not been written in this fantasy/one-sided ATL.

Regards

Tom

[historygeek2021]

I have now addressed all of your points, twice. Can you please show me the same courtesy and address mine

I believe I have: Your point of view is that the Wallies would never surrender and that the war could go on for decades. I have demonstrated that this is not possible. Mutual exhaustion would have forced a compromise for both sides by 1947 at the absolute latest. Because Britain was running out of manpower by 1943, India wont keep still and even the US was facing problems of its own. Points you handwaved away.

No, you haven't. Addressing my points would mean that you acknowledge each one and explain why you disagree with it. Bringing up other points (e.g., British manpower, India, etc.) does not count as responding to my points.

[histan]

Why do I allow myself to get sucked into this nonsense.

On 1 January 1943 Bomber Command had 36 Heavy Bomber Squadrons consisting of 684 aircraft (IE + IR) and 16 Medium Bomber Squadrons consisting of 306 aircraft (IE + IR)
On 1 January 1944 Bomber Command had 60 and a half Heavy Bomber Squadrons consisting of 1,359 aircraft (IE + IR)
On 1 January 1945 Bomber Command had 73 Heavy Bomber Squadrons with a UE of 1,650 aircraft.

During 1943 Bomber Command wastage of heavy bombers (to all causes, enemy action or otherwise) was 2,361 aircraft Cat E (written off) and 967 aircraft Cat B and AC (damaged and not repairable on the unit). This includes OTUs, CUs, etc and aircraft operating under Coastal Command.

In 1943 The breakdown of heavy bomber losses was 2,027 missing, 49 Cat E due to enemy action, 226 Cat E non enemy action, 693 damaged Cat B and AC due to enemy action and 313 damaged Cat B and AC non enemy action.

Looking specifically at night operations by heavy bombers over Germany by night:
1943
42,064 aircraft dispatched, 38,149 aircraft attacked. 1,862 aircraft reported missing, 44 Cat E due to enemy action, 185 Cat E non enemy action.
1944
50,839 aircraft dispatched, 47,514 aircraft attacked. 1,636 aircraft reported missing, 49 Cat E due to enemy action, 148 Cat E non enemy action.

In addition in 1944 Bomber Command dispatched 15,090 heavy bombers to attack Germany by day with 15974 attacking. 135 aircraft reported missing, 22 Cat E due to enemy action and 11 Cat E non enemy action.

It should be noted that around a third of the total heavy bomber sorties in 1944 were by day.

These are some of the basic figures.

How do these change in any ATL?

From the German side:
When is the decision made to increase the production of night fighters?
Which factories will be designated to produce them?
Where will the additional electronics be produced?
What is the schedule for the arrival of these aircraft into the front line?
Will the performance of the existing night fighter force be impacted if operational aircrew are transferred to new units?
Will the AE of existing units be increased and new pilots posted in to maintain the aircrew / aircraft ratio and will the performance of these units be impacted by the arrival of newly trained aircrew?
How will the command and control system of the night fighter force be modified to incorporate these additional units and /or aircraft?

Please no hand waving - such as two Infanterie Divisions will capture Malta. The seaborne element of the invasion of Crete was a disaster with the sum total of one bedraggled soldier actually reaching the island. Yet Malta will be a piece of cake.

I will stop now, I am already getting bored.

Regards

John

[Politician01]

No, you haven't. Addressing my points would mean that you acknowledge each one and explain why you disagree with it. Bringing up other points (e.g., British manpower, India, etc.) does not count as responding to my points.

Yes I have: because basically ALL your points boil down to this: The Wallies would never surrender/negotiate because their populations would support war indefinitely and the war can and would continue as long as it would take to defeat Germany, even if it would need decades.

This this I countered: This is not possible because ALL states were experiencing manpower problems/exhaustion that would have FORCED them to abandon the war. And public opinion would sooner or later turn against the war - no public would support a full scale war indefinitely. So yes Britain having manpower problems by 1943, the problem of its disintegrating Empire and India is responding to your points, because they show that your argumentation is bogus.

[historygeek2021]

No, you haven't. Addressing my points would mean that you acknowledge each one and explain why you disagree with it. Bringing up other points (e.g., British manpower, India, etc.) does not count as responding to my points.

Yes I have: because basically ALL your points boil down to this: The Wallies would never surrender/negotiate because their populations would support war indefinitely and the war can and would continue as long as it would take to defeat Germany, even if it would need decades.

This this I countered: This is not possible because ALL states were experiencing manpower problems/exhaustion that would have FORCED them to abandon the war. And public opinion would sooner or later turn against the war - no public would support a full scale war indefinitely. So yes Britain having manpower problems by 1943, the problem of its disintegrating Empire and India is responding to your points, because they show that your argumentation is bogus.

No, I gave substantive reasons why it would not be in America's security and economic interests to make peace with Adolf Hitler. Here they are again. Respond to each one, or you are showing everyone that you are not here to discuss in good faith:

The Allies would never make peace with Adolf Hitler. Hitler broke every treaty he ever signed. He habitually attacked countries he was at peace with. Waging war was the raison d'être of his regime. Making peace with Hitler would only give him time to consolidate his gains, strengthen his military, and launch a surprise attack on Britain and the United States.

Hitler's offensive style of warfare would inflame Allied public opinion against him. He would continue U-boat attacks, bombing civilians, invading other neutral countries and developing terror weapons (V-1, V-2) that would only increase public outrage in western countries who would demand his removal from power.

When in history has an anti-war movement succeeded in bringing an end to a war? Vietnam continued for years after mass protests. Public opinion is overwhelmingly against American intervention in the Middle East, but our troops have been there for years. In most anti-war movements, the enemy country poses minimal threat, but Germany posed an existential threat and was actively seeking to destroy western countries. It would be the easiest thing in the world for western governments to keep their people afraid of Hitler and to demand that his regime be crushed.

Business interests would also demand that the war continue. War contractors stood to make incredible profits from the continuation of the war. Allied victory would extend American economic hegemony over most of the planet, creating a world of opportunity for American businesses. Germany was competing with the United States in Latin American markets before the war. America would not allow a continent sized Greater Germany to compete with it in global markets.

Wars can last for decades. America was winning the technology race, as others have shown in this thread. American fighters, bombers and missiles would advance beyond Germany's technological abilities. Hitler would have an area to defend stretching from Norway to Morocco to Persia to the Urals. His forces would be spread thin, and the Allies could chip away at his empire little by little. Eventually it is the German people and their conquered subjects, surrounded and blockaded on all sides, isolated from the rest of the world and subsisting on ever stricter rations who would grow tired of the war and demand its end, just as they did in the First World War.

[Tom from Cornwall]

But since unlike most others you are civil Tom - for you here once again:

“Civil” - that’s the harshest thing anyone has ever said about me on here.

The Wallies can bomb and hope that it amounts to something - or they can invade in the Med since by late 42 all their forces are concentrated in this area - all other changes are counterproductive. If they concentrate on Japan from 42 onwards as one poster suggested, the war in Europe lays dormant and devolves into a Cold War state and would not be restarted again.

You see, I’m more in the middle on all this looking for a fence with as few splinters as possible. Though I fail to understand your, or anyone’s, certainty, in any of these rather peculiar threads.

If by some strange twist of fate’s capriciousness nature the Soviet Union was forced out of the war in late 42/early 43 it follows that the course of the war would be different. What happens then is obviously dependent on a vast range of imponderables - human agency, personality disorders, mass psychology, weather, etc.

Don’t get me wrong, I don’t think there is any harm at all in “what-iffery” of this nature - many of the threads in this section lead off to excellent resources and greater understanding of the real-world limitations that the combatants were struggling with. That’s all fine.

I don’t really get though why people get so dogmatic and defensive about their own ATLs. They are only based on a combination of imagination, pseudo historical analysis and hindsight, all with a little fantasy thrown in. Or is that too harsh? And of course, there is a conservative tendency to see history as pre-ordained and the future as pre-destined. We are all (I’m pretty certain) only human after all.

In this case, then, I absolutely see the Allies trying to continue the CBO. Modifying it as necessary if losses by day or night become excessive, searching for technological solutions, looking for alternative targets if necessary but constantly trying to keep pressure on German economy and population. If strategic bombing was made more difficult would some of Bomber Command’s aircraft be shifted to Coastal Command with earlier impact on German U-boat campaign? Would USAAF convert to night bombing? Would Allied resources in aircraft production shift to more fighters? Would they shift resources to their own rocket/cruise missile programmes? Who knows.

I also see, however, the Nazi state has an excess of land warfare resources in the ATL in this “What-if” scenario- what Hitler decides to do with these is obviously uncertain - off the top of my head, rather than being based on deep primary source research, I guess there are a few options such as: more support to Italy in Mediterranean; attempt to recover Italy’s East African empire; drive down through Caucasus towards Persian Gulf or across Afghanistan to threaten India; all the time with some held in NW Europe as both threat and shield. Not forgetting [x] divisions in the occupied Soviet Union and all those other occupied countries that are slowly starving and being enslaved, so that the Nazis can maintain their own population’s calorie level.

How would the Allies respond to these threats by land? Defensively to start with, I imagine. With what results - anybody’s guess. Does that mean they stop trying to bomb Germany from the UK - probably not. Does that mean they are fighting a much broader air/land/sea war across a huge North African/Middle East/Central Asian front - possibly. What about Logistics, etc? Good point. It would be a struggle - but then, isn’t war “an option of difficulties”? As some British general once said in the middle of another rather lengthy war based on similarly long lines of communication.

What impact does war with Japan have on all this? Probably forces Allies (mainly US) to remain more on the defensive depending on what date we are now talking about. Has Midway happened? Did the British send PoW and Repulse to Singapore? Was the Indian Ocean safe enough to move Australian divisions back home in early 1942? Did British reinforce Burma? Etc, etc...

I hope that helps rather than hinders. Once the butterfly flaps it’s wings who can tell where the golf ball will land, etc...

Regards

Tom