Andy H wrote: ↑24 Nov 2020, 22:20
Hi stg44
As per the WI guidelines could you please give us your POV on how things may have varied, before others wade in?
Regards
Andy H
Ok. So per Bergstrom:
Such a maneuver also would have enabled the two panzer divisions of the I. SS-Panzerkorps to carry out a pincer movement to surround and annihilate both U.S. 2nd and 99th Infantry divisions. This in turn would probably have resulted in a total collapse for the U.S. defenses in the sector assigned to the 6. SS- Panzerarmee, possibly allowing Sepp Dietrich’s troops to reach the Meuse within a couple of days. Moreover, von der Heydte’s paratroopers could have been relieved.
Assuming this plays out as he says and catches that forward regiment of the 1st division, the 26th IR, as it was deploying to the area as well, then V Corps' front is collapsed and on the 18th the I SS Panzer corps would flow through and cause some serious damage. The 47th IR of the 9th infantry had deployed around Monschau on the 17th IIRC to help blunt further attacks from the 326th VG and would be vulnerable as well having been flanked from behind.
Unfortunately there isn't a good situation map that just shows the 17th, which would have helpful, but here is a US army map of the area:
Not only would the artillery of the 99th and 2nd divisions be wiped out, but a lot of V Corps heavy artillery and AAA would be trapped in this area, which was the heart of the local AAA belt. Butgenbach was also a significant supply dump, so the SS would capture a bunch of supplies and fuel as well. The rollbahns of the 1st and 12th SS would run through Spa, so if the 1st army HQ didn't evacuate quickly they'd be overrun, but as it was I doubt they'd be able to remove the necessary supply depots and various facilities set up in the region, which would be bad news for the Allied forces. Since 30th division was moving down via Eupen the night of the 17th and bedded down for the night in that area I'd imagine they'd establish a blocking position to defend corps HQ at Eupen and tighten up the flank of the 78th division to the east in conjunction with surviving forces around Monschau. The rest of the 1st division would also show up to their west I'd think. That unfortunately leaves the SS corps then to push west without much in their way and with the use of paved highways to move both their combat units and supplies:
Effectively that would mean overrunning the supply areas of the Spa-Vervier-Liege triangle, which would be a disaster for the Allies:
https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/7-8/7-8_11.htm
roughly in the triangle formed by the cities of Liège, Verviers, and Spa, lay the supply installations built up through the autumn to support the advance toward the Rhine. At Spa, which had served the German Emperor as headquarters in World War I, the First Army had established its command post surrounded on every side by service installations, supply dumps, and depots. Liège, twenty miles northwest of Spa, was one of the greatest American supply centers on the Continent. Verviers, an important and densely stocked railhead lay eleven miles north of Spa.
...
Although both Malmédy and Stavelot were administrative centers of importance (Stavelot contained the First Army map depot with some 2,500,000 maps), the most important item hereabouts was the great store of gasoline, over two million gallons, in dumps just north of the two towns.
https://mikesresearch.com/2019/12/29/malmedy-1944/
Liege was the largest Allied supply dump on the continent which provided most of the supplies for both the British and US Armies.
https://history.army.mil/books/wwii/7-8/7-8_25.htm
Certainly there was some danger involved in the maintenance of the great supply depots so close to the uncertain battle line. Brig. Gen. Robert M. Littlejohn was ordered on three occasions to evacuate the big depots at Liège, but instead simply brought in more supplies.
....
The proximity fuze, a tightly guarded American secret design for detonating projectiles by external influence in the close vicinity of a target, without explosion by contact, got its first battle test in a ground role during the Ardennes. This fuze, also known as the VT or POZIT fuze, had been prepared for some 210,000 rounds of artillery ammunition on the Continent in December. Most of this stock was antiaircraft artillery ammunition, and the 12th Army Group had proposed to try it out in the so-called Liège River Belt, the cordon of antiaircraft gun battalions which was organized to shoot down the V-weapons in flight to Liège.
https://history.army.mil/html/books/010 ... _10-15.pdf
Liège and Verdun, handling Class I and III supplies, and Reims, responsible for Classes II and IV, formed a strategic triangle to provide advance support for the 12th Army Group. This was the heart of Littlejohn's organization to back up the main combat effort in the ETO. He had proposed this plan to the COMZ G-4 as early as mid-September, but at that time neither supplies nor Quartermaster operating units were available.
Liège Depot was commanded by Col. Mortlock Petit. In December, its mission was expanded and redefined as 40 days' rations and 13 days' POL for 925,000 men of First and Ninth Armies.
Verdun was commanded by Col. Roland T. Fenton; it was to support 450,000 men of Third Army with 40 days' nonperishable rations, 22 days' cold stores, and 16 days' POL. Reims was to provide 40 days Class II for 2,225,000 men. These included the three armies, Ninth Air Force, ADSEC, and some 300,000 non U.S. troops.17
Although true intermediate depots such as Rennes, Le Mans, and Paris had been established, they remained of minor importance. As much transportation as became available was used to concentrate stocks in such forward depots as Nancy, Verdun, and Liège, with the expectation that with continued tactical successes, they would soon become intermediate depots. This is the essential element of the OCQM supply plan published on 1 December 1944.41
Actually, despite optimism all through the autumn, there were no outstanding Allied successes until March 1945, and meanwhile the lack of a supply system echeloned in depth hampered support for the combat forces. The most serious deficiency was at Liège. For lack of a base installation at Antwerp, this site had to function simultaneously as base, intermediate, and advance depot all winter. General Somervell, who visited the ETO in January 1945, pointed out these defects, and laid most of the blame on the system that gave the armies control of transportation.42
At Paris, Charleroi, Mons, Liège, and Verdun, tremendous quantities of quartermaster supplies were stacked in the freight yards. At Liège, eight million gallons of gasoline were lined along the Meuse River for two miles. In the absence of concentrated facilities, every depot became a cluster of subdepots distributed around the various centers.
....
Liège Depot controlled warehouses and open storage scattered across the entire width of Belgium from Herbesthal westward to Givet, France.
....
3,700 tons of balanced B rations, 16,000 tons of operational rations, 31,000 tons of unbalanced B's, 10 million packages of cigarettes, and 5 million gallons of packaged MT80 gasoline, all located in the Liège area
If you'd like to take a look the QM history I'm quoting from linked above on p.413 has a table that lists Liege was the main supply depot for FUSA and NUSA. It falls 1st and 9th armies are logistically castrated.
The wrinkle for the Germans is the Allied reserves from the 9th army and VII corps like 2nd and 3rd armored and 75th division which would all likely show up pretty quickly if Elsenborn ridge falls. Maybe on the 19th or 20th rather than 23rd, just further north than they deployed historically. But to counter them all the German forces historically tied down or constrained by the Elsenborn ridge position would then be able to meet them too, like 3rd Panzergrenadier, 9th and 2nd SS, etc. and they can have a much better supply system thanks to the international highway being available and the ability to use captured US stocks in Spa-Verviers-Liege. Also 9th army and VII corps would suffer from lack of supply if Liege falls and if 1st army HQ gets out of Spa on time then they'd once again have to evacuate from Liege, their historical retreat position, which given how much it disrupted command and control during their previous bugout wouldn't have the situation when they displace again.
Of course that depends on a lot continuing to go right for the I SS corps, but with having avoided the worst of the fighting for Krinkelt and Elsenborn the corps would remain quite powerful and would have the momentum behind them to advance quickly along much better roads than historically. Plus it splits the defenses organized historically along river lines south of the Hohes Venn.
It looks like on the map if the US forces were going to deploy on the hinge of Eupen then the Vesdre river would be their defensive line further west, it's just a question of who can deploy along the Vesdre more quickly and get to Liege first. Given the resulting confusion that would come from Elsenborn falling, which unhinges the northern shoulder of the bulge, the US forces, despite their excellent mobility, might not realize the danger quickly enough and/or face panicked soldiers fleeing and filling to roads. Bergstrom again:
In front of SS-Kampfgruppe Peiper, all American resistance collapsed. By noon on 17 December, news about the powerful German panzer column had caused widespread panic on the American side. Major Donald P. Boyer, operations officer in U.S. 38th Armored Infantry Battalion—part of Combat Command Reserve, 7th Armored Division, which was underway to join the 106th Infantry Division in the Sankt Vith area—describes the sight that met him at around one in the afternoon on 17 December, as he reached the road intersection at Poteau, some ten miles southwest of Büllingen:
’We were hit by a sight that we could not comprehend, at first; a constant stream of traffic hurtling to the rear (to the west) and nothing going to the front (to the east). We realized that this was not a convoy moving to the rear; it was a case of “every dog for himself”; it was a retreat, a rout.
Here would come a two and one-half ton [truck] with only a driver, then another with several men in it (most of them bareheaded and in various stages of undress), next perhaps an engineer crane truck or an armored car, then several artillery prime movers—perhaps one of them towing a gun, command cars with officers in them, one quarter ton [jeep]— anything which would run and which would get the driver and a few others away from the front; it wasn’t a pretty sight—we were seeing American soldiers running away.
About a mile farther up the road at the little town of Petit-Thier, all traffic had stopped. In fact, it was the most perfect traffic jam I had ever seen. We had run into this hopeless mass of vehicles fleeing to the rear on a narrow road which would barely support two-way traffic at slow speeds. Vehicles streaming to the rear had attempted to pass each other in the intervals between the tanks of the 31st Tank Battalion, which was leading CCB, and now no one could move...’64
This was the traffic jam that prevented Combat Command Reserve, 7th Armored
Division and Combat Command B, 9th Armored Division from relieving the 106th
Infantry Division in time. At around two in the afternoon on 17 December, the C.O. of the
latter unit, Brigadier General Bruce Clarke, held a meeting with the 106th Infantry
Division’s C.O., Major General Jones, at the latter’s command post in Sankt Vith, when
suddenly the 14th Cavalry Group’s commander, Colonel Mark Devine burst in, his face red.65 'General,' Devine gasped, 'we've got to run. I was just chased into this building by a Tiger tank, and we all have to get out of here!’66
