Peiper turns north, impact on battle of the bulge?

[Richard Anderson]

A off topic message was deleted. This is a subforum "what if" so dont questioning why someone post a "what if" topic.

//Georg

[stg 44]

I understand as well. You've decided to create a fantasy scenario again.

Yeah it's called a 'what if'. You know since this is the 'what if' forum. If you have a problem with that, why are you here?

The POD is apparently, "because stg 44 wants to discuss the outcome of a decision that never would have been made".

Yeah, that is the point of what ifs. What if something else was decided that was different than what historically happened.

It's like "what if Hitler decided to resign as Chancellor and Führer before attacking Poland?"

:roll:
Right, because a military commander choosing to get a different route is the same as Hitler up and quitting his job.

You can discuss the possible outcomes all you wish, but it still doesn't make any discussion about it worthwhile.

So why are you here other than trolling and derailing?

The commanders on the Rollbahnen had very specific missions and had drummed into them how critical the advance to the Meuse was. Damn the flanks, just go ahead. Given they were already surprised at the strength of the American defense and the presence of a second division, why would Peiper risk getting tangled up in a further advance north into uncharted territory when his advance guard just got annihilated in less than a minute?

What advanced guard? He had a scouting party that got lost. I've already said why he could have: to deal with the surprising strength of the resistance by attacking it by surprise in the rear as he had successfully already done in Honsfeld and Bullingen. He lost tanks in both of those cities too without stopping either.

Ah yes, the invulnerable Panthers show up already. The 644th TD, with about 19 guns in action, knocked out 23 Panthers in K-R.

A lot more than just the 644th:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of ... 7_December

The troops around the villages were assisted by tanks from 741st Tank Battalion, assisted by a company of 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion equipped with M10 tank destroyers, a company of 612th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and a few towed 3-inch guns from the 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion. They were instrumental in helping hold back the German advance in the fighting in and around Rocherath-Krinkelt.[3]

A lot more than three towed 3 inch AT guns at Butgenbach. So tell me again how they'd do against Panthers when your reply is about battalion of M10s supported by a lot more AT assets?

Is what Wirtzfeld or Bütgenbach? I cannot answer when you haven't asked a coherent question.

Where the action happened. Are you so reading impaired as to not be able to figure out the context?

The towed 3" TD at Honsfeld and Büllingen were caught mostly on their prime movers before they could be emplaced. The three at Wirtzfeld, plus the three 57mm of the 1st Bn, 23d Inf (sorry, mistakenly typed 23d before), plus the four M10 of the 1st Plat, C Company, 644th TD, plus the reserve company of the 644th and the reserve company of the 741st Tk Bn that accompanied the infantry in Wirtzfeld. They moved on to stiffen the defense of K-R, but it would probably just take a few moments for Peiper to come to his senses and realize that he was running the risk of Dietrich and Mohnke finally getting tired of his insubordinate antics and shooting his ass.

From Cole's "The Ardennes Campaign":

Honsfeld, well in the rear area of the 99th, was occupied by a variety of troops. The provisional unit raised at the division rest camp seems to have been deployed around the town. Two platoons of the 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion had been sent in by General Lauer to hold the road, and during the night a few towed guns from the 612th Tank Destroyer Battalion were added to the defenses. Honsfeld was in the V Corps antiaircraft defense belt and two battalions of 90-mm antiaircraft guns had been sited thereabout. In addition, Troop A, 32d Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron, had arrived in Honsfeld late in the evening.

Doesn't sound like they were caught before emplacement.
Same with Bulligen:

At 0100 on 17 December the 254th Engineer Battalion had been attached to the 99th Division and ordered to Büllingen, there to prepare positions covering the entrances from the south and southeast. Twice during the dark hours the engineers beat back German infantry attacks; then, a little after 0700, enemy tanks drove into sight. Falling back to the shelter of the buildings, the 254th did what it could to fend off the tanks.
Here, in the town, a reconnaissance platoon of the 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion had just arrived with orders to establish contact with the enemy column, but only one section managed to evade the panzers. The rest of the platoon were killed or captured. Upon receipt of orders from the division, the engineers, who had clung stubbornly to houses in the west edge, withdrew and dug in on higher ground 1,000 yards to the northwest so as to block the road to Butgenbach. There the two companies of the 254th still intact were joined by men hastily assembled from the 99th Division headquarters, the antiaircraft artillery units in the vicinity, and four guns from the 612th Tank Destroyer Battalion.

We're gonna play this game again?

Sorry you feel it's a game to source your statements which contradict already cited sources from the US official history of the Battle of the Bulge campaign. Just shows what a troll you really are.

Sure, the AAR of the 26th Infantry, entry for 16 and 17 December 1944.

"16 December 1944

At 1145 hours the combat team (less tanks and tank destroyers) was placed on a six hour alert. All leaves, furloughs and passes were cancelled, but those already on leave were not to be recalled. At 2115 hours the unit was placed under a one hour alert. An enemy attack between the 5th and 8th Corps had developed into a twelve division drive. Five minutes later the Regimental S-6 and S~3 were ordered to report to V Corps Headquarters.

17 December 1944

Shortly after midnight, billeting parties reported to the CP. The 3rd Battalion was alerted to move at 0230 hours, with the 2nd following, and the 1st Battalion closing out of the Aubel area last.

The 3rd Battalion moved out on the exact moment, and about 0400 hours the battalion column was halted temporarily when word came through that paratroopers were dropping behind our lines. Reports had come through that the 12th SS Division taken Büllingen early that morning. From then on, the convoy traveled without lights and arrived at Camp Elsenborn at about 0700 hours. About 1400 hours the [3d] battalion moved to the town of Bütgenbach and then secured positions northwest of Büllingen. The 2nd Battalion meanwhile had reached the Bütgenbach area and had also jumped off north of the town. "E" Company secured the town, "G" Company took high ground overlooking the town, with "F" Company on "G" Company's right. By 1850 hours both 2nd and 3rd Battalions were reported in on their objectives."

BTW, sunset was 1630, civil twilight 1710, and nautical twilight 1752.

Thanks for sourcing the claim and providing the quote. Assuming you've quoted it accurately and the info is accurate then Cole got some details wrong.

Nevertheless that still doesn't show that they'd be ready at 10:30am to fight Peiper when in this scenario he'd be pushing on Büllingen. If anything they'd be caught on the march or have to deploy around Elsenborn to try and defend it against an armored battlegroup. Also not likely to work out exceptionally well given the short time they had to arrive, orient, and deploy and that the heaviest AT weapons they had were 57mm AT guns:

Plus no mention of artillery coming with them beyond the regimental pack howitzers.

Given that it took from 1400 to 1850 hours to deploy, you're not really talking about a good enough turn around time to deploy either at Elsenborn or Butgenbach in time.

[Richard Anderson]

Thanks for sourcing the claim and providing the quote. Assuming you've quoted it accurately and the info is accurate then Cole got some details wrong.

Yeah, that's pretty much how I thought you would reply, with Wiki and innuendo that I am lying. I'm tired of your nonsense. Back to ignore you go.

[stg 44]

Thanks for sourcing the claim and providing the quote. Assuming you've quoted it accurately and the info is accurate then Cole got some details wrong.

Yeah, that's pretty much how I thought you would reply, with Wiki and innuendo that I am lying. I'm tired of your nonsense. Back to ignore you go.

Bye Bye.

[Richard Anderson]

So here is a question for the moderators of this and other similar what if threads. What is the point of me replying with direct quotes, from the actual records, only to have the response always be that "but Wikipedia says...and anyway you are probably lying"? Just exactly why should I reply to responses like this crap? Seriously. Wikipedia! I'm quoting from the AAR and I get Wikipedia as a response. I was going to quote from the 644th AAR analysis of the German wreckage around K-R after the battle, but why should I, when the response will probably be "well, you have to be lying because Panthers!"?

[Richard Anderson]

Hi stg44

As per the WI guidelines could you please give us your POV on how things may have varied, before others wade in?

Regards

Andy H

I will note, BTW, that the OP has completely ignored this direction from you.

[stg 44]

So here is a question for the moderators of this and other similar what if threads. What is the point of me replying with direct quotes, from the actual records, only to have the response always be that "but Wikipedia says...and anyway you are probably lying"? Just exactly why should I reply to responses like this crap? Seriously. Wikipedia! I'm quoting from the AAR and I get Wikipedia as a response. I was going to quote from the 644th AAR analysis of the German wreckage around K-R after the battle, but why should I, when the response will probably be "well, you have to be lying because Panthers!"?

AARs aren't always accurate.
From Bergstrom:

The true German losses in the Battle of Rocherath and Krinkelt have never been
clarified, since the relevant German documents apparently have been lost. The
participating U.S. troops claimed to have destroyed far more than one hundred German
tanks. This is a huge exaggeration, which probably is due to both an underestimation of
the ruggedness of the German tanks, and that the Americans left the scene after the battle
—which meant that they were not able to verify the German losses, while the Germans
could salvage damaged combat vehicles.

....

Due to historian Michael Reynolds, there are photographs of fifteen different Panthers, a Panzer IV, and two Panzer (Jagdpanzer) IV/70s abandoned in or near the ’twin villages.’97 Taking all these facts into account, it can be assumed that these photographs represent virtually all tanks and tank destroyers lost by the Germans in Rocherath and Krinkelt. Since a large number of damaged tanks and tank destroyers must be added to these figures, it represented a quite strong depletion of the 12. SS-Panzer-Division, and hitherto the largest single German tank losses during the Ardennes Offensive.

Bergstrom also supports the number and designation of the AT units at the twin villages listed on wikipedia:

Zeiner could report the presence of very strong American forces in Rocherath- Krinkelt. This was also confirmed by the information that the Germans were able to gather from the American POWs. By defying Hodges order to continue the attacks on the Roer dams, the C.O. of U.S. 2nd Infantry Division, Major General Robertson, had been able to concentrate the entire 38th Infantry Regiment and the 1st Battalion of 9th Infantry Regiment to this section. These were supported by the 741st Tank Battalion, the 644th Tank Destroyer Battalion, and elements of 801st Tank Destroyer Battalion, plus a powerful artillery. Additionally, the defenders integrated retreating troops from three of the 99th Infantry Division’s infantry battalions over the course of 17 and 18 December.

Hi stg44

As per the WI guidelines could you please give us your POV on how things may have varied, before others wade in?

Regards

Andy H

I will note, BTW, that the OP has completely ignored this direction from you.

You really don't read do you?
viewtopic.php?p=2304721#p2304721

[Kingfish]

How about for the sake of the discussion we focus on the result rather than nitpick the cause of a decision?

Well, because of...."Peiper turns north, impact on battle of the bulge"

You can't discuss a decision that is placed in a bubble. The decision has to be viewed in context of the operation in which it is made.

[T. A. Gardner]

I doubt it would make much if any difference whatsoever. Eisenborn Ridge and the area behind it was some of the worst tank terrain in the Ardennes. The US Army was much denser in terms of units there too. It wouldn't just be the combat divisions Piper was facing, but also a plethora of smaller units from mechanized cavalry to engineers, separate artillery battalions, etc.

It would also depend on the road net north and south as to whether he could even move his column in that direction.

On the whole, I would expect about the same result. Piper gets bogged down PDQ and that ends that. On the other hand, his turning North would have a negative effect on events in the Loshiem Gap likely as well. Piper is moving away from this area now rather than parallel to it. This would give the US the opportunity to possibly insert units into the northern flank of that advance much sooner.

[stg 44]

I doubt it would make much if any difference whatsoever. Eisenborn Ridge and the area behind it was some of the worst tank terrain in the Ardennes. The US Army was much denser in terms of units there too. It wouldn't just be the combat divisions Piper was facing, but also a plethora of smaller units from mechanized cavalry to engineers, separate artillery battalions, etc.

It would also depend on the road net north and south as to whether he could even move his column in that direction.

On the whole, I would expect about the same result. Piper gets bogged down PDQ and that ends that. On the other hand, his turning North would have a negative effect on events in the Loshiem Gap likely as well. Piper is moving away from this area now rather than parallel to it. This would give the US the opportunity to possibly insert units into the northern flank of that advance much sooner.

How do you figure given that the US stood not just to lose two entire infantry divisions and part of another, plus a bunch of attached corps assets when the division CPs are overrun in Wirtzfeld? Also how is the terrain any worse than that southwest of Elsenborn? Plus there isn't all that much in motion to stop the advance through Elsenborn and cover the rollbahns of the I SS corps. Anything pushed into the areas where 1st SS division historically advanced would leave them outside the decisive zone of advance that would cut off the logistics of the Allied armies based on Liege-Verviers-Spa

[Ружичасти Слон]

Either way, how would the rest of the Battle of the Bulge have played out had Peiper disobeyed orders and attacked into the rear areas of the 99th and 2nd divisions north of Buellingen?

Not change.

[Carl Schwamberger]

So here is a question for the moderators of this and other similar what if threads. What is the point of me replying with direct quotes, from the actual records, only to have the response always be that "but Wikipedia says...and anyway you are probably lying"? ...

Bottom line here Rich is there is a ongoing discussion among the moderators about rules changes. However the owner of the AHF site has final say & is not giving us any guidance I can see. There are health problems, and other impediments. I could rattle on about the nuances but not much point his afternoon.

To digress. Do you have the locations of the 1st & 30th ID components on the 15th/16th? This is not the first time this question has come up in front of me, and the location of the components of those and the 99th ID has something to do with it.

[Richard Anderson]

To digress. Do you have the locations of the 1st & 30th ID components on the 15th/16th? This is not the first time this question has come up in front of me, and the location of the components of those and the 99th ID has something to do with it.

The 1st was with VII Corps, in reserve, as was the 30th with NUSA.

[stg 44]

To digress. Do you have the locations of the 1st & 30th ID components on the 15th/16th? This is not the first time this question has come up in front of me, and the location of the components of those and the 99th ID has something to do with it.

1st division was on R&R for the first time since landing at Normandy northwest of Eupen around the Belgian city of Aubel. IT had only been out of Hurtgen for about a week.

30th was in reserve with VII corps east of Aachen, west of Jülich. Both are represented on the 12th AG situation map for the 16th.

[Richard Anderson]

Sigh...for the 1st Inf Div, the 2d and 3d Bn, 16th Infantry went into reserve on 29 November, the 1st Bn on 5 December. The 18th Infantry went into reserve on 4 December. The 26th Infantry went into reserve on 5 December. For the 30th Inf Div, the 117th Infantry was in reserve from 19 November, the 119th Inf from 29 November, and the 120th Inf also on 29 November.