How would Operation Barbarossa have fared had France held out until 1941, thus making Barbarossa start in 1942?

[TheMarcksPlan]

Only thing I can think of that would work out better for the Germans is if the Soviets assume an offensive posture by early 1942, and thus are mostly deployed into the frontier regions with the associated poor logistics. The Germans could thus achieve their 1941 goal of destroying the Red Army in the first 400 km or so.

Depends on force ratio. The Ostheer had difficulty breaking into operational freedom when sufficiently outnumbered- see AGS in border battles. If the whole front is like SW Front in ATL '42, and unless the Germans are significantly stronger, pulling off Minsk/Smolensk is considerably more difficult.

[History Learner]

Only thing I can think of that would work out better for the Germans is if the Soviets assume an offensive posture by early 1942, and thus are mostly deployed into the frontier regions with the associated poor logistics. The Germans could thus achieve their 1941 goal of destroying the Red Army in the first 400 km or so.

Depends on force ratio. The Ostheer had difficulty breaking into operational freedom when sufficiently outnumbered- see AGS in border battles. If the whole front is like SW Front in ATL '42, and unless the Germans are significantly stronger, pulling off Minsk/Smolensk is considerably more difficult.

A good point, although I think the logistical situation could be more determinant than just force ratios. To quote from When Titans Clashed by David Glantz:

On paper, a 1941 field army was supposed to have three rifle corps, each with five divisions, plus a mechanized corps and several separate artillery and engineer regiments. In practice, many of these armies had only six to ten divisions in two rifle corps with an incomplete mechanized corps and little maintenance or fire support. The logistical support base for these field armies was even weaker. 43 The General Staff was responsible for “rear services” of this type, but it failed to establish an effective organization in the newly acquired regions. This meant not only that the forward units received poor support but also that there was no mechanism to evacuate the existing supplies before the Germans overran the area.

Maybe by early 1942 the situation will be better but, if not, force ratios won't save them when they run out of munitions and fuel.

[Futurist]

RKKA could have been much, much stronger in this ATL than in OTL '41. Could have been twice as strong easily.

If that's the case then ATL '42 Barbarossa goes not quite as well as OTL Blau: Germans advance but casualty ratio is not nearly so lopsided. Germans would have trouble reaching the Dniepr/Dvina line and would be deeply damaged by the time they get there. They're possibly smashed by the Soviet counteroffensive that would then follow. At least critically wounded, meaning no further advance past D-D line. With SU retaining left-bank Ukraine and the entire Smolensk-Moscow region, it's significantly stronger in '43 and is probably on the Vistula by year's end.

The reason I say could instead of would have been significantly stronger is that some of SU's pre-Barbarossa "quiet mobilization" owed to Germany's defeat of France. How do things look to SU in ATL 40/41, i.e. how much notice do they have of the impending German threat?

Regardless of ATL facts, the RKKA's strength will have increased over ATL '41 by more than would the German strength - especially given higher casualties in France.

Regardless of ATL facts, the SU would have continued to benefit disproportionately from M-R trade, especially machine tools that made Soviet production more efficient.

There's also the issue of what happens in Romania: Is Germany strong enough to guarantee her after Stalin's Bessarabia move if that move occurs before France's fall? Seems doubtful. Absent German presence in Romania, SU might move against Ploesti with British blessing. Or, threatened with such move, Romania may sell all its oil to Britain/SU.

Too many balls in the air to answer this hypo in any specific manner.

But in general, time was not on Germany's side vis a vis SU.

Only thing I can think of that would work out better for the Germans is if the Soviets assume an offensive posture by early 1942, and thus are mostly deployed into the frontier regions with the associated poor logistics. The Germans could thus achieve their 1941 goal of destroying the Red Army in the first 400 km or so.

Would that actually be enough to win the war, though? Or could the Soviets simply recruit and build a new army or two or more while having their vast space be used to temporarily protect their core territories?

[History Learner]

Would that actually be enough to win the war, though? Or could the Soviets simply recruit and build a new army or two or more while having their vast space be used to temporarily protect their core territories?

Basically, it's the same issue as 1941; can the Germans destroy enough of the Red Army in the first 400 km or so that they can then overrun most of the economically critical areas before the Soviet force regeneration can make up for it? In OTL Barbarossa, the Germans managed to overrun Ukraine, encircle Leningrad and nearly reach Moscow before the Soviet reserve system (in addition to the weather) was able to stall out their attack. Here, the Soviets are overall in a better military condition vis-a-vis 1941 but one critical issue between then and 1942 is that their posture will no longer be defensive, in that they will have adopted an offensive one.

While rejecting the Icebreaker Hypothesis for 1941, David Glantz does concede eventual action by Stalin was likely. From When Titans Clashed again:

There is no question that Soviet dogma had long spoken of “liberating” capitalist Europe by an offensive that would inspire the workers to revolt against their masters. In all probability, Stalin intended to enter the war at some future date when Germany was so overstretched that a Marxist revolution appeared possible. 54 It is equally true, as described earlier, that the Red Army had a theoretical and organizational bias in favor of offensive action, if only to ensure that future wars were fought on foreign soil rather than that of the Soviet Union. This bias may have made Stalin and his generals overconfident until Zhukov recognized the imminent German threat in May (see below).55 Having said this, there is little convincing evidence that either the Germans or the Soviets thought the latter could initiate such a conflict in 1941. On the contrary, as this chapter has documented, both sides were acutely aware of the weakness and unpreparedness of the Red Army and VVS. If anything, the German success against France and Britain caught Stalin by surprise, forcing him to confront his ideological foe long before he had expected Hitler to defeat the West. Moreover, the Germans had been preparing their invasion since mid-1940, long before there were any indicators of Soviet preparations to attack.

And for citation 54, for greater context:

54. The Timoshenko reforms were supposed to be completed in the summer of 1942.

Thus, instead of a layered Soviet defense as occurred in 1941, they could be over-deployed towards the frontier, meaning once the Germans defeat them in that area, they'd have free reign to deal the decisive blow before the Soviets can recover with fresh forces. Perhaps even worse here would be that, because of their over-confidence and force dispositions, the Germans can overrun much of their industrial base before they can evacuate it.

[TheMarcksPlan]

Would that actually be enough to win the war, though? Or could the Soviets simply recruit and build a new army or two or more while having their vast space be used to temporarily protect their core territories?

No, it wouldn't be enough. Destroying the pre-invasion Soviet armies was never going to be enough to secure German victory; this is the fundamental strategic error that cost Germany WW2.

In Barbarossa, SU lost ~6mil on the battlefield and ~60mil to occupation. Battlefield attrition was a small portion of the strategic picture; to win Germany had to conquer more Soviet territory. Germany probably had to take at the Central Urals to force a peace amenable to Hitler (though Stalin's peace conditions probably lay farther west).

The central analytical issue that evades most Barbarossa analysis: It is true that destroying Soviet armies was the most important task for the German army; it is not true that accomplishing that task ensured victory (necessary vs. sufficient). The German army needed strategic direction that Hitler didn't provide and of which its leadership was incapable. To translate the necessary army destruction into strategic conditions sufficient for victory required (1) taking the correct territories and (2) understanding that the army-destruction task needed to be repeated. (2) did not happen because Hitler and Halder assumed that the SU would politically collapse, thereby obviating ability to generate new forces. It was understandable for a political leader and military amateur like Hitler so to err; it was rank incompetence for Halder.

[History Learner]

Would that actually be enough to win the war, though? Or could the Soviets simply recruit and build a new army or two or more while having their vast space be used to temporarily protect their core territories?

No, it wouldn't be enough. Destroying the pre-invasion Soviet armies was never going to be enough to secure German victory; this is the fundamental strategic error that cost Germany WW2.

In Barbarossa, SU lost ~6mil on the battlefield and ~60mil to occupation. Battlefield attrition was a small portion of the strategic picture; to win Germany had to conquer more Soviet territory. Germany probably had to take at the Central Urals to force a peace amenable to Hitler (though Stalin's peace conditions probably lay farther west).

The central analytical issue that evades most Barbarossa analysis: It is true that destroying Soviet armies was the most important task for the German army; it is not true that accomplishing that task ensured victory (necessary vs. sufficient). The German army needed strategic direction that Hitler didn't provide and of which its leadership was incapable. To translate the necessary army destruction into strategic conditions sufficient for victory required (1) taking the correct territories and (2) understanding that the army-destruction task needed to be repeated. (2) did not happen because Hitler and Halder assumed that the SU would politically collapse, thereby obviating ability to generate new forces. It was understandable for a political leader and military amateur like Hitler so to err; it was rank incompetence for Halder.

I agree that destroying the Soviet armies at the border in of itself doesn't win the war but here it is a means to an end. To quote Glantz again:

DP-41 called for 171 divisions to be arrayed in three successive belts or operational echelons along the new frontier.51 The first echelon was intended as a covering force, and each of its 57 rifle divisions had up to 70 kilometers (44 miles) of frontier to defend. The next two echelons contained much greater concentrations of troops, with 52 and 62 rifle divisions, respectively, and most of the 20 mechanized corps in European Russia. These formations belonged in peacetime to the various military districts of the western Soviet Union; in the event of war, these districts would transform into five army group, or front, headquarters. Because the fronts were based on peacetime administrative borders, they did not correspond directly to the three German army groups. Thus, for example, the Leningrad Military District became the Northern Front, with defense responsibilities both northward toward Finland and (unexpectedly) westward toward German Army Group North.

Behind the five forward fronts with their three defensive belts, a separate group of five field armies was in the process of forming a second strategic echelon (see the discussion that follows on the covert mobilization Stalin began in April 1941). This future reserve front began concentrating along the line of the Dnepr and Western Dvina Rivers in June 1941 but was woefully incomplete when the war began. As a practical matter, the scarcity of rails and roads meant that these armies could not easily support the forward fronts. This structure was typical of the Soviet principle of echeloning forces in great depths; it was virtually invisible to German intelligence prior to the start of hostilities. These reserve armies, as well as significant elements of forward units, had only begun to deploy in late April. Thus, just as the German attack caught the Soviets in transition to new organizations, leaders, equipment, and doctrine, it also found them shifting troop concentrations.

Presuming there is sufficient logistics on hand to support the forward movement of these reserve fronts in 1942, once the Germans win the frontier battles it's wide open for them to advance deep into the USSR due to lack of opposition.

[History Learner]

How would Operation Barbarossa have fared had France held out until 1941, thus necessitating the start of Operation Barbarossa in 1942 instead? You can personally decide how France manages to avoid falling in 1940 but not in 1941, but the key here is to give the Soviet Union an extra year of breathing room so that it could develop its military and industries further by the time that it will have to fight Nazi Germany. An extra year of fighting on the Western Front would, of course, weaken and exhaust the Nazi German military to a much greater extent than in real life, which would also help the Soviet Union.

I suppose that some additional questions for this scenario might be whether France would be willing to continue the fight from abroad if it would have already fought for another year as opposed to quickly losing the war in 1-2 months and whether FDR would still be willing to run for a third term as US President if France's position and situation still appears to be pretty good in mid- and late-1940 (as opposed to in 1941). If not, it would be extremely interesting to see who exactly is going to replace FDR as US President in 1941 in this scenario and what effects this is going to have on US policy in regards to World War II from that point onward--including in regards to massive Lend-Lease aid for both Britain and the Soviet Union (and of course for France as well if it will decide to continue the fight against Nazi Germany from abroad).

Some additional interesting questions for this scenario is just how much less World War II casualties is the Soviet Union going to suffer in World War II in this scenario in comparison to real life and whether D-Day is going to occur a year later in this scenario in comparison to real life (due to Operation Barbarossa and the Soviet Union's entry into World War II occurring a year later in this scenario in comparison to real life). Anyway, all of these are certainly very interesting questions.

What are your thoughts on all of this?

Only thing I can think of is France not surrendering in June, requiring the Germans to have to clear them out the hard way on the mainland and then the former fighting on from the colonies. One irony, though, is that this might be sufficient to keep Italy out...but drag Spain in. Franco was seriously interested in joining the conflict in 1940 when the situation appeared favorable but Hitler wouldn't guarantee the needed territorial gains at the expense of the Vichy French which, combined with the inevitable Anglo-American economic response, made it unprofitable for Franco to join.

[Futurist]

If Spain enters the war, does Gibraltar subsequently fall to the Axis Powers?

Also, do you think that Italy's monarchy survives up to the present-day if Italy doesn't enter World War II and the Allies still win this war?