How man additional casualties can the US/Britain afford in WW2 without endangering the war effort?

[Politician01]

OTL Britain lost 450 000 dead/missing soldiers/civilians out of a population of 48 Million,the Americans 420 000 out of a population of 135 Million.

These mild losses were enough to cause severe manpower problems for Britain and medium level manpower problems for the US:

Indeed, in the summer of 1943 it became apparent that Great Britain had reached the limits of mobilisation; during the rest of the year recruitment from the non-industrial population would not be sufficient to offset the normal wastage from industry. Before long the labour force would decline. In any case, supplies of labour in the last nine months of 1943 would be less than had been expected.The demands of the Services and industry for the last nine months of 1943 added up to 912,000 men and women; the prospective supply was 429,000. once more ruthless cuts would have to be imposed. The Service demands could not possibly be met in full; Even without battle casualties, the total occupied population of the United Kingdom would fall by about 150,000 in 1944. The manpower was no longer one of closing a gap between demand and supply by subtracting at the demand end and adding at the supply end. Nothing was left to add. The country was fully mobilised and all that remained was to change the distribution of manpower as the strategy of war demanded. In planning for 1944,

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/U ... on-15.html

In 1944, the United Kingdom was facing severe manpower shortages. By May 1944, it was estimated that the British Army's strength in December 1944 would be 100,000, less than it was at the end of 1943. Although casualties in the Normandy Campaign, the main effort of the British Army in 1944, were actually lower than anticipated, losses from all causes were still higher than could be replaced. Two infantry divisions and a brigade (59th and 50th divisions and 70th Brigade) were disbanded to provide replacements for other British divisions in the 21st Army Group and all men being called up to the Army were trained as infantrymen. Furthermore, 35,000 men from the RAF Regiment and the Royal Artillery were transferred to the infantry and were retrained as rifle infantrymen, where the majority of combat casualties fell.[18][19] In addition, in the Eighth Army fighting in the Italian Campaign of the Mediterranean theatre several units, mainly infantry, were also disbanded to provide replacements, including the 1st Armoured Division and several other smaller units, such as the 168th Brigade, had to be reduced to cadre, and several other units had to be amalgamated. For example, the 2nd and 6th battalions of the Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers were merged in August 1944. At the same time, most infantry battalions in Italy had to be reduced from four to three rifle companies

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/British_A ... _World_War

Late in January the theater estimated that the shortage of infantrymen within the armies alone totaled 82,000, of which nearly 50,000 were in riflemen.105 The outlook for the future was hardly encouraging despite the special efforts now being made. Earlier in the month the War Department had again relented somewhat, revising its capabilities upward to 44,000 men for May and 46,000 in June. To achieve these figures, however, it noted that it would have to call upon the Army Air Forces for an additional 15,000 men. These would consist largely of students in training for air crews and of highly trained technicians, and the Army Air Forces warned that their transfer would seriously affect air operations in the European theater. The War Department preferred not to make these withdrawals. ETOUSA manpower officials insisted on the additional replacements, however, pointing out that the theater's conversion capabilities would begin to diminish after June.

https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USA/US ... s2-11.html

How many additional casualties could GB/US afford without having to reduce their labour force/the size of their armies? How many additional casualties could GB/US have afforded that would have seriously impacted the size of their armed forces/labor force/ public opinion supporting the war?

[OpanaPointer]

For reference. https://history.army.mil/books/70-7_15.htm

[History Learner]

Another angle to consider is political: 40% of Americans supported a peace deal with Germany in early 1944. If casualties are higher and strategic success reduced compared to the historical baseline, I find it likely that the aforementioned number would be higher and 1944 is an election year...

[Politician01]

Another angle to consider is political: 40% of Americans supported a peace deal with Germany in early 1944. If casualties are higher and strategic success reduced compared to the historical baseline, I find it likely that the aforementioned number would be higher and 1944 is an election year...

I would propose the following scenario: The Germans do better in 41/42 and avoid their greatest strategic mistakes, as such during the summer offensive of 1943 the USSR is close to collapse. Stalin issues an ultimatum: "Second front NOW or the USSR quits". The Wallies are forced to conduct some form of Roundup/Sledgehammer in the summer of 1943. They manage to gain a foothold in Northern France for horrendous casualties and have to engage a large part of the German Army from July 43 onwards with far less troops than they had avaliable in July 44, leading to increased casualties from July 43 onwards. How much can they take without having to reduce the size of their navies/air forces/labour force? How much can they take after reducing their air force/navy and labour force?

[Richard Anderson]

OTL Britain lost 450 000 dead/missing soldiers/civilians out of a population of 48 Million,the Americans 420 000 out of a population of 135 Million.

These mild losses were enough to cause severe manpower problems for Britain and medium level manpower problems for the US:

A major part of the U.S. manpower problem was self-inflicted rather than caused by casualties. The U.S., in comparison to the other major nations, was under-mobilized. Under 10% of its manpower was mobilized, slightly less than Great Britain, while Germany, with a population of roughly 96-million mobilized about the same manpower and ended with closer to 11% utilized. The U.S. could have put at least 1.3-million more in uniform, but there were more deferments for health and other reasons. Plus, industry had a major claim on manpower. In Germany, at peak in 1943, 14.2% of the working population were in Group I industries and 23.4% were in the Wehrmacht. In the U.S. in the same year, there were 19.0 in Group I industries and 16.4% in the Armed Forces. That is a major reason for the German dependence initially on Gastarbeiter ("guest" workers) and later outright slave labor.

As I mentioned in another thread, the initial American peacetime draft excluded over 50% of those drafted just for medical reasons...flat feet being the biggest. Overall, 30 to 40% of American draftees were excluded from service just for medical reasons. Family deferments were also liberal, as were industrial manpower needs. The failure to then adequately account for replacement manpower in the Army was a major oversight that resulted in units still in training being stripped of personnel as replacements for deployed units, which slowed deployment of new divisions, which placed greater combat requirements on the early divisions deployed, which then added to the replacement problem; a vicious cycle. The problem was exacerbated by the greater American requirement for logistical troops and then amplified by the Commander of Army Service Forces inveterate empire-building as he sought even more service troops than were actually required. Add too the early emphasis on antiaircraft defenses and the problem again was magnified. Finally, add in the poor utilization of African-American manpower and the result was the shortages that became critical in winter 1944/1945.

[AnchorSteam]

I would propose the following scenario: The Germans do better in 41/42 and avoid their greatest strategic mistakes, as such during the summer offensive of 1943 the USSR is close to collapse. Stalin issues an ultimatum: "Second front NOW or the USSR quits". ...

Why would Stalin quit, humanitarian considerations? :roll:

While that may have seemed like a concern at the time (and the reason we have the Venona transcripts) it just isn't in the cards. Stalin would not have thrown in the towel until the last able-bodied zek had died fighting for him and the guy revving his get-away plane said "Its time to go".
And as long as he was in the fight, the W. Allies had to stay in as well.
It wasn't just Germany, after all. We still had China and the Free French, and those are powerful emotional ties just in those two.

And speaking of China, this is a world war, how does this tie in with Japan and the vast conflict in the Orient?

[T. A. Gardner]

As a indication of just how much manpower went into US industry, the US suffered more deaths and injuries from industrial / work related accidents / causes than on battlefields in WW 2. There were about 7 million serious injuries in the US related to industrial effort. In 1942 and 43, 37,600 people died in industrial accidents, fatalities averaging about 17,000 per year. 250,000 were permanently disabled and another 4.5 million had temporary disabilities.
(Home Front, USA A. A. Hoehling)

[History Learner]

Why would Stalin quit, humanitarian considerations? :roll:

While that may have seemed like a concern at the time (and the reason we have the Venona transcripts) it just isn't in the cards. Stalin would not have thrown in the towel until the last able-bodied zek had died fighting for him and the guy revving his get-away plane said "Its time to go".
And as long as he was in the fight, the W. Allies had to stay in as well.
It wasn't just Germany, after all. We still had China and the Free French, and those are powerful emotional ties just in those two.

And speaking of China, this is a world war, how does this tie in with Japan and the vast conflict in the Orient?

See the following:
Stalin and the Prospects of a Separate Peace in World War II
The Spectre of a Separate Peace in the East: Russo-German 'Peace Feelers', 1942-44

Besides the linked articles, A World At Arms by Gerhard L. Weinberg (1994) and Hitler's War by Heinz Magenheimer (1998) support it. I don't have access to Magenheimer, but I do have Weinberg and I'll quote from that.

Page 609:

Until access to Soviet archives enables scholars to see more clearly into these murky episodes, this author will remain convinced that it was the shock of German military revival so soon after the great Soviet victory at Stalingrad which reinforced Stalin's inclinations during 1943 to contemplate the possibility of either a separate peace with Hitler's Germany or with some alternative German government. With the road to Berlin so obviously a difficult one, the temptation to sound possible alternatives was enormous. Surely by now the Germans must realize that their hopes of defeating the Soviet Union were illusory. The German government had had sense enough in 1939 to work out an accommodation with the Soviet Union on terms both sides had found advantageous; the same people were still in charge in Berlin. In the winter of 1940-41 they had refused to reply to the Soviet proposals for Russia to join the Tripartite Pact, but instead had insisted on attacking her; perhaps in the interim they had learned better in the hard school of war. As for the Soviet Union, she had demonstrated conclusively that she could defend herself, but this defense had been immensely costly.

A new agreement with Germany would provide a breathing space for reconstruction and recovery, would remove German occupation without either further Red Army casualties or economic destruction, and would leave the Soviet Union dominant in all of Eastern Europe, especially in Poland where a Soviet puppet government would replace the pre-war regime. It may have been known to the Soviet government that there were elements in the German government and military apparatus who wanted an agreement with Moscow, and it was certainly known that Japan was very strongly in favor of a German-Soviet peace.

Pg 610:

On the Soviet side, the position appears to have been that Germany must evacuate all the occupied territory, certainly to the 1941 border, possibly later on, after the Soviet victory in July 1943, back to the 1914 border (thus turning over central Poland to the Soviet Union). German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop appears to have been at least slightly interested in some compromise peace; he saw himself as the architect of the 1939 pact with the Soviet Union and had always given priority to the war against Great Britain. Joseph Goebbels, the Minister of Propaganda, favored negotiations with Stalin and so advised Hitler, almost certainly much more strongly than von Ribbentrop. Hitler, however, was unwilling to have any negotiations with the Soviet Union. Some of the sources make a great deal out of his suspicions about a key intermediary in Stockholm being Jewish, but Hitler's explanations to Goebbels and Oshima go to the core of the issue: he wanted to keep territory, especially the Ukraine, which he was certain Stalin would not give up; and on this point, if no other, his assessment of the Soviet Union was certainly correct. While Stalin might have been willing to negotiate about territory to the west of the 1941 border of the country, he was certainly not about to leave the Germans in occupation of portions of it, least of all the rich agricultural and industrial areas of the Ukraine. The latter would, if necessary, be retaken in battle, and in the fall of 1943 and the winter of 1943-44 that is exactly what the Red Army did.

I would propose the following scenario: The Germans do better in 41/42 and avoid their greatest strategic mistakes, as such during the summer offensive of 1943 the USSR is close to collapse. Stalin issues an ultimatum: "Second front NOW or the USSR quits". The Wallies are forced to conduct some form of Roundup/Sledgehammer in the summer of 1943. They manage to gain a foothold in Northern France for horrendous casualties and have to engage a large part of the German Army from July 43 onwards with far less troops than they had avaliable in July 44, leading to increased casualties from July 43 onwards. How much can they take without having to reduce the size of their navies/air forces/labour force? How much can they take after reducing their air force/navy and labour force?

If the PoD window is 1941-1942, by 1943 the USSR could be collapsed and the Germans sitting on the A-A Line. In that context, especially given the reasons why Roundup was cancelled in early 1943 (North Africa went on to long), a landing would basically be a Second Dieppe but with vastly higher casualties.

[OpanaPointer]

Operation Downfall was expected to produce Allied casualties in six figures. Tough sledding was almost certain.

[History Learner]

Operation Downfall was expected to produce Allied casualties in six figures. Tough sledding was almost certain.

Hell to Pay by DM Giangreco covers that point in detail and is a great read on the subject overall as a general note. Basically, the War Department had increased conscription to the highest level they thought feasible and were already having quite a bit of political pushback on it; on the military level, it was expected casualties would come close to exceeding their replacement rates too...

[Peter89]

If the PoD window is 1941-1942, by 1943 the USSR could be collapsed and the Germans sitting on the A-A Line. In that context, especially given the reasons why Roundup was cancelled in early 1943 (North Africa went on to long), a landing would basically be a Second Dieppe but with vastly higher casualties.

Why do you assume that the Germans could just "sit on the A-A line"?

Did the Germans stop to sacrifice their soldiers without the hope of victory, subject their civilians to looting, rape and firestormed cities? Or they held out for the last second?

Why does anyone think that a country as vast as the SU and a totalitarian regime about that cruel as the nazi one could simply just throw in the towel and go to fish in Lake Bajkal? Why would they collapse, if they would ever, when the Wallies were supporting them? They were on the winning side.

Also, why does anyone think that the occupation and border control of the SU would mean no drain on the German resources? The Soviet population behind the A-A line was still about half that of Germany, and the relative weight of Wallied help would be substantially bigger.

[History Learner]

If the PoD window is 1941-1942, by 1943 the USSR could be collapsed and the Germans sitting on the A-A Line. In that context, especially given the reasons why Roundup was cancelled in early 1943 (North Africa went on to long), a landing would basically be a Second Dieppe but with vastly higher casualties.

Why do you assume that the Germans could just "sit on the A-A line"?

Did the Germans stop to sacrifice their soldiers without the hope of victory, subject their civilians to looting, rape and firestormed cities? Or they held out for the last second?

Why does anyone think that a country as vast as the SU and a totalitarian regime about that cruel as the nazi one could simply just throw in the towel and go to fish in Lake Bajkal? Why would they collapse, if they would ever, when the Wallies were supporting them? They were on the winning side.

Also, why does anyone think that the occupation and border control of the SU would mean no drain on the German resources? The Soviet population behind the A-A line was still about half that of Germany, and the relative weight of Wallied help would be substantially bigger.

Whether or not the Soviets officially surrender is irrelevant to the material conditions on the ground. If Moscow and Leningrad fall in 1941 or Case Blau is successful in its operational goals in late 1942, the cumulative damage to the Soviet state's capacity to resist is decisive. Behind the A-A Line there is insufficient industry or manpower to maintain a force capable of resisting the Germans or even seriously imperiling the German control of the territories to the West of said line. As for the question of the ability of the Germans to maintain their grip on their conquests, the general rule of thumb is 50:1 in terms of occupying forces. The A-A Line basically would see ~100 Million Soviets to the West of it, and the German Army in the East in 1942 had 2.8 Million men.

Of note, according to Russian sources, about 7,000 German soldiers died due to partisans during the war. Put into context, you see how very little of a drain such a front would be for Germany.

[Politician01]

To get the discussion back on track:

It would seem that the British cannot take more than 50 000 additional casualties in the 39-44 period before they have to reduce their labour force/armies and the loss of an additional 500 000+ soldiers/civilians compared to OTL would have lead to insurmountable problems. So if Britain has 1 Million+ casualties instead of the 450 000 it had OTL, the country cannot cope.

The Americans propably can afford an additional 200 000 casualties before they have to act, an additional 1,5 Million casualties though would push them over their limit. So if the US has 2 Million + casualties instead of the 420 000 it had OTL, the country cannot cope.

[Peter89]

If the PoD window is 1941-1942, by 1943 the USSR could be collapsed and the Germans sitting on the A-A Line. In that context, especially given the reasons why Roundup was cancelled in early 1943 (North Africa went on to long), a landing would basically be a Second Dieppe but with vastly higher casualties.

Why do you assume that the Germans could just "sit on the A-A line"?

Did the Germans stop to sacrifice their soldiers without the hope of victory, subject their civilians to looting, rape and firestormed cities? Or they held out for the last second?

Why does anyone think that a country as vast as the SU and a totalitarian regime about that cruel as the nazi one could simply just throw in the towel and go to fish in Lake Bajkal? Why would they collapse, if they would ever, when the Wallies were supporting them? They were on the winning side.

Also, why does anyone think that the occupation and border control of the SU would mean no drain on the German resources? The Soviet population behind the A-A line was still about half that of Germany, and the relative weight of Wallied help would be substantially bigger.

Whether or not the Soviets officially surrender is irrelevant to the material conditions on the ground. If Moscow and Leningrad fall in 1941 or Case Blau is successful in its operational goals in late 1942, the cumulative damage to the Soviet state's capacity to resist is decisive. Behind the A-A Line there is insufficient industry or manpower to maintain a force capable of resisting the Germans or even seriously imperiling the German control of the territories to the West of said line. As for the question of the ability of the Germans to maintain their grip on their conquests, the general rule of thumb is 50:1 in terms of occupying forces. The A-A Line basically would see ~100 Million Soviets to the West of it, and the German Army in the East in 1942 had 2.8 Million men.

Of note, according to Russian sources, about 7,000 German soldiers died due to partisans during the war. Put into context, you see how very little of a drain such a front would be for Germany.

Partisan activity was one thing, guarding the borders, repairing sabotage damage, maintaining garrisons, etc. required troops, aircrafts, supplies, etc. Even without a single partisan the Germans had to station forces there just as they had to in Norway and in the Balkans. Even more so because now in this ATL about everything depended on the Caucasus oilfields, well in range of the Wallies' bombers.

What you write about the industry behind the A-A line is simply not true. With the LL shipments, the Soviets would be able to maintain a significant and motorized army and airforce, somewhere between 50 and 100 divisions. The Germans had little to no capacity to fight a successful war against that force on the far edge of their logistical network. Besides, any of these claims suppose that the Soviets would be unable to retreat with their armies into the East, and launch a counteroffensive from there. How much more successful the Germans should have been in order to push the Soviets behind the A-A line while in reality, they had problems to take Leningrad and Moscow in 1941? The German forces were simply inadequate for this task, and the final and utter destruction of Soviet resistance with L-L support was not really likely to be achieved.

But the theoretical German overperformance was one thing, not sufficient on its own anyhow.
In order to achieve this, the Soviets had to underperform, too. In fact, I can argue that the outcome of the whole German-Soviet war was depending so much more on the Soviet errors than the German brilliance.

If the Soviets could choose from multiple options how to defeat the Germans or stall their invasion, while the Germans did not have the same room for mistakes. The Soviets were gradually erasing their mistakes and learn from them; also, they had a very effective high command. The victories around Leningrad and the gigantic successes of the winter offensives of 1941/1942 and 1942/1943 did not happen by chance.

If the Soviets do not make serious mistakes, the German invasion would be halted at some point. But even if the Germans reach the A-A line, and the Soviets escape with a sizeable chunk of their armies, then they will counterattack some time, and the war in the East is not over.

I also doubt it very much that the Germans would be able to take Leningrad, Moscow and the Caucasus in one stroke, because they couldn't even take Stalingrad, and they paid a very heavy price for taking Sevastopol. Both Leningrad and Moscow are multiple times bigger cities, and taking them alone would require a major effort of an army group. The Caucasus was ideal to pin down dozens of divisions too.

If the Soviets are alive east of the A-A line, and the Wallies are about to crush Germany, why do you think they'd open a front in France with an amphibitious assault of the beaches in Normandy? Again they still have ample of options to choose from, and again, it was not as much the German overperformance but the Wallies' underperformance that would decide the outcome of the war.

[Peter89]

To get the discussion back on track:

It would seem that the British cannot take more than 50 000 additional casualties in the 39-44 period before they have to reduce their labour force/armies and the loss of an additional 500 000+ soldiers/civilians compared to OTL would have lead to insurmountable problems. So if Britain has 1 Million+ casualties instead of the 450 000 it had OTL, the country cannot cope.

The Americans propably can afford an additional 200 000 casualties before they have to act, an additional 1,5 Million casualties though would push them over their limit. So if the US has 2 Million + casualties instead of the 420 000 it had OTL, the country cannot cope.

I seriously doubt that it would be the case. The British Armies had Indian, Canadian, ANZAC, South African, etc. personnel, too.

The Indian Army deployed over 2 million soldiers, and lost about 200,000 in KIA, MIA and WIA.
The Canadians deployed over 1 million soldiers and lost about 100,000 in KIA, MIA and WIA.
The Australians deployed over 0.7 million soldiers and lost about 40,000 in KIA, MIA and WIA, and way more in noncombat operations.
The South Africans deployed over 330,000 soldiers, and lost about 10,000 in KIA.
The New Zealanders deployed about 140,000 soldiers, and lost about 30,000 in KIA, MIA and WIA.

The British had lost about 1 million men in WW1 in KIA and MIA, and an additional 1.5 million in WIA during the four years.

The British losses of 450,000 (I believe that number does not include the WIA, which was about 350,000 IIRC) during six years would likely not ruin the country if it would rise to 1 million.