History Learner wrote: ↑30 Dec 2020, 13:55
Peter89 wrote: ↑30 Dec 2020, 13:00
Partisan activity was one thing, guarding the borders, repairing sabotage damage, maintaining garrisons, etc. required troops, aircrafts, supplies, etc. Even without a single partisan the Germans had to station forces there just as they had to in Norway and in the Balkans. Even more so because now in this ATL about everything depended on the Caucasus oilfields, well in range of the Wallies' bombers.
What you write about the industry behind the A-A line is simply not true. With the LL shipments, the Soviets would be able to maintain a significant and motorized army and airforce, somewhere between 50 and 100 divisions. The Germans had little to no capacity to fight a successful war against that force on the far edge of their logistical network. Besides, any of these claims suppose that the Soviets would be unable to retreat with their armies into the East, and launch a counteroffensive from there. How much more successful the Germans should have been in order to push the Soviets behind the A-A line while in reality, they had problems to take Leningrad and Moscow in 1941? The German forces were simply inadequate for this task, and the final and utter destruction of Soviet resistance with L-L support was not really likely to be achieved.
But the theoretical German overperformance was one thing, not sufficient on its own anyhow.
In order to achieve this, the Soviets had to underperform, too. In fact, I can argue that the outcome of the whole German-Soviet war was depending so much more on the Soviet errors than the German brilliance.
If the Soviets could choose from multiple options how to defeat the Germans or stall their invasion, while the Germans did not have the same room for mistakes. The Soviets were gradually erasing their mistakes and learn from them; also, they had a very effective high command. The victories around Leningrad and the gigantic successes of the winter offensives of 1941/1942 and 1942/1943 did not happen by chance.
If the Soviets do not make serious mistakes, the German invasion would be halted at some point. But even if the Germans reach the A-A line, and the Soviets escape with a sizeable chunk of their armies, then they will counterattack some time, and the war in the East is not over.
I also doubt it very much that the Germans would be able to take Leningrad, Moscow and the Caucasus in one stroke, because they couldn't even take Stalingrad, and they paid a very heavy price for taking Sevastopol. Both Leningrad and Moscow are multiple times bigger cities, and taking them alone would require a major effort of an army group. The Caucasus was ideal to pin down dozens of divisions too.
If the Soviets are alive east of the A-A line, and the Wallies are about to crush Germany, why do you think they'd open a front in France with an amphibitious assault of the beaches in Normandy? Again they still have ample of options to choose from, and again, it was not as much the German overperformance but the Wallies' underperformance that would decide the outcome of the war.
In which case, again, the Germans were well prepared to deal with such given they had more than sufficient force in the
Ostheer as of early 1942 to both maintain a stable occupation in the conquered areas as well as keep a further 800,000 men on the A-A Line just in case. See how rear service area units were able to thereafter-despite ongoing major conventional operations-to lay down tens of thousands of miles of new railway track or how Germany used Ukraine's resources to double its munitions production in 1942. You speak of Allied bombers; where were they, their bases and all the associated infrastructure in the Middle East in 1941-1942? Why would they be any better attacking the Caucasus then they were attacking Polesti? Why would the Germans not protect them the same as they did with their own facilities in 1943?
As for Lend Lease, the more accurate question here is what Lend Lease:
1941: 360,778t, of which 13,502t Persian Gulf, 193,229t Soviet Far East, 153,977t North Russia.
1942: 2,453,097t of which 705,259t Persian Gulf, 734,020 Soviet Far East, 949,711 North Russia, 64,107 Soviet Artic.
1943: 4,794,545t of which 1,606,979 Persian Gulf, 2,388,577 Soviet Far East, 681,043 North Russia, 117,946 Soviet Artic.
1944: 6,217,622t of which 1,788,864 Persian Gulf, 2,848,181 Soviet Far East, 1,452,775 North Russia, 127,802 Soviet Artic.
1945: 3,673,819t (last shipments 20 Sept) of which: 44,513 Persian Gulf, 2,079,320 Soviet Far East, 726,725 North Russia, 680,723 Black Sea, 142,538 Soviet Artic.
Murmansk and Archangelsk are behind the A-A Line, as is Astrakhan. Thus, remove both the Persian Gulf and North Russia has routes of supply. Per agreements with the Japanese, the Pacific Route could only be used for non-offensive supplies and the Soviets really don't need to make the Japanese angry. The Kwantung Army continued offensive planning against the Soviet Far East as late as 1944 and in late 1941 the Japanese had come to the conclusion that, if Moscow fell and the Red Army appeared to be weakened, they would jump into the conflict regardless of the situation elsewhere vis-a-vis the Western Allies.