How man additional casualties can the US/Britain afford in WW2 without endangering the war effort?

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Re: How man additional casualties can the US/Britain afford in WW2 without endangering the war effort?

#31

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 30 Dec 2020, 19:17

Politician01 wrote:
30 Dec 2020, 13:45
An additional 600 000+ casualties would have led to unsolvable problems.
Maybe it can for to be correct answer in politician1 imagination story but why must for to be on real history ?
Politician01 wrote:
30 Dec 2020, 13:45
Peter89 wrote:
30 Dec 2020, 13:34
The British Armies had Indian, Canadian, ANZAC, South African, etc. personnel, too.
Largely irrelevant to the discussion because the Dominions and colonies cannot/willnot give more than they gave OTL.
Maybe it can for to be correct answer in politician1 imagination story but why must for to be on real history ?

On real history British government was make some choices on how many mens was need on army on navy on airforce.

When problem was become mostest big on infantry was can for to change choices and give less on navy or on airforce.

When problem was become mostest big on all services can for to change choices on Empire manpowers.

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Re: How man additional casualties can the US/Britain afford in WW2 without endangering the war effort?

#32

Post by Peter89 » 30 Dec 2020, 19:41

Politician01 wrote:
30 Dec 2020, 19:00
Peter89 wrote:
30 Dec 2020, 18:39
Whoa. The last time we were talking about 1 million loss. Is it now 2 million?
Whoa you wrote: "600,000+ losses would be serious, but I believe that nothing but a complete destruction and / or occupation of Britain would mean the end of the war."

Now you seem less certain:
Peter89 wrote:
30 Dec 2020, 18:39
If you say that more losses would do no good for the British, I agree. But they could definately sustain some more casualties, although I am not sure of the numbers, as no one is.
My scenario was posted above. The British/Americans have to lauch a Roundup/Sledgehammer style invasion in the summer of 1943, they manage to establish a beachhead in Northern France for horrendous casualties. In the next two years the British/Americans and Germans pump everything they have into France, by the summer of 1945 the Wallies have liberated most of France, but are still several hundred kilometers from the German border. British losses are in excess of 1 Million, American in excess of 1,5 Million. The Soviets are either defeated or reduced to a secondary threat that can be contained with half the original Barbarossa army.
You assume that the Wallies would launch their ground offensive without proper planning and care.
In the light of how casualty-sensitive they were, to assume that they'd sustain 2.5 million extra losses and then throw in the towel is like waiting for a ball to roll uphill a hundred times in succession, even though it's not going to happen by itself even once.

They were not that stupid. First, they would draw the German attention and focus to a far end of their diplomatic and logistical network.

The Germans would attack and try to cling on to untenable positions, because that's what they always did. That would drain their resources faster than they could replace it. Ideally at more places than one.

Then they would systematically torch German cities and destroy their industries.

The thing is that Europe is full of peninsulas with questionable loyalities to Germany, and in general, poor logistical network. On top of that, German rule was generally despised.

The main landing does not have to take place in Normandy first. It is possible that the Wallies would land in Scandinavia, Iberia, Italy or on the Balkans. Also, if the Soviets are not out of the war, they can launch attacks too to pin down German units.

In the end, it all comes down again for the Wallies to make a series of crucial mistakes.
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Re: How man additional casualties can the US/Britain afford in WW2 without endangering the war effort?

#33

Post by Politician01 » 30 Dec 2020, 19:58

Peter89 wrote:
30 Dec 2020, 19:41
In the light of how casualty-sensitive they were,
Ah so additional casualties would perhaps force the Wallies to negotiate and the war could be over without a "complete destruction and / or occupation of Britain".

Which brings me back to the original question: What losses would endanger the war effort to such an extent that it would be preferrable to end the war rather than continue it. For Britain you think that 1 Million + is managable. Are 2 Million managable? 3 Million?

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Re: How man additional casualties can the US/Britain afford in WW2 without endangering the war effort?

#34

Post by Peter89 » 30 Dec 2020, 20:15

Politician01 wrote:
30 Dec 2020, 19:58
Peter89 wrote:
30 Dec 2020, 19:41
In the light of how casualty-sensitive they were,
Which brings me back to the original question: What losses would endanger the war effort to such an extent that it would be preferrable to end the war rather than continue it.
In reality, no casualties. Leaving the Germans be was not realistic; the colonial system was over and the British would eventually fall behind in most aspects of war.

The war had to be won.
Politician01 wrote:
30 Dec 2020, 19:58
For Britain you think that 1 Million + is managable. Are 2 Million managable? 3 Million?
Which brings me back to my earlier questions. How and when do these losses happen? It's not egal.

What casualties the Germans suffer in exchange for these Wallied losses?
What casualties did they suffer to subdue the SU?

So if the German defeat is close, Germany is deprived of raw materials and it's being pounded to rubble, the Wallies might not make a compromise peace with 2-3 millions of extra losses. I don't know. Nobody does, because it never happened, and we are about ten major steps from real history.
"Everything remained theory and hypothesis. On paper, in his plans, in his head, he juggled with Geschwaders and Divisions, while in reality there were really only makeshift squadrons at his disposal."

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Re: How man additional casualties can the US/Britain afford in WW2 without endangering the war effort?

#35

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 31 Dec 2020, 02:59

politician01 wrote:How many additional casualties could GB/US afford without having to reduce their labour force/the size of their armies?
In both cases it's basically 0 after the pool of ready replacements ran out - unemployment was statistically irrelevant. That's just basic arithmetic; the more interesting question is your next:
politician01 wrote:How many additional casualties could GB/US have afforded that would have seriously impacted [1] the size of their armed forces/[2]labor force/ [3] public opinion supporting the war?
I numbered the issues for ease of discussion; I'll address them non-sequentially.

Re (2): Combined US/UK/Dominion labor force (non-military and non-agricultural) was ~73mil. viewtopic.php?f=76&t=251476 So even replacing 2mil more permanent casualties would cause only ~3% decline in productive labor. We'd need to see Soviet-level casualties to have even Soviet-level impact on output (prewar SU population similar to W.Allies). Despite SU being weakened by those losses, it still produced an enormous amount of weapons.

Re (1): There's really no feasible set of losses, IMO, that would force a permanent reduction in W.Allied armed force size greater than 5% vs. OTL if their military strategy remained unchanged. I.e. if they maintain small armies and focus on land/sea warfare.

But the issue isn't bleeding the W.Allies white; it's what the path to forcible W.Allied victory looks like. The conventional CBO won't yield victory alone. To invade Europe and stop the Axis somewhere in Eurasia would require at least 10mil more soldiers with the SU hobbled. Given the manpower issues you cite, where do these soldiers come from? Obviously from the economy, which obviously means cuts to W.Allied production. But where? Abandon the CBO? That's gotta be at the top of the list. What next?

Besides lower overall production, more production must go to armies and their logistical support (e.g. shipping). That means further cuts to air/sea warfare - how much is acceptable?

Re (3): As I've documented elsewhere, W.Allied leaders did not believe their publics would abide a bloody WW1 redux against Germany. viewtopic.php?f=11&t=252647 Many on this forum have swallowed postwar propaganda about the Anglo powers being committed to killing Hitler whatever the cost. It's ahistorical fantasy but people love their stories.
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Re: How man additional casualties can the US/Britain afford in WW2 without endangering the war effort?

#36

Post by Richard Anderson » 31 Dec 2020, 03:10

Politician01 wrote:
30 Dec 2020, 19:11
Not possible. The reason why women participation started to decline was because it was maxed out in 1943 and could not have been maintained at this level:

The extent of the mobilization of women which followed was far greater than
that which had taken place in Britain in the first world war, and far exceeded
the use of womanpower in other nations involved in the second world war. By
September I943 some 7,258,ooo women, or 46 per cent of those between the
ages of I4 and 59, were engaged in some form of national service. Virtually
all able-bodied single women between the ages of i8 and 40 (90 per cent), as
well as most of those in this age group who were married but had no children
(8o per cent), were involved in the war effort.47

https://www.jstor.org/stable/2639033?seq=1
Mr. Smith, and you, might want to refer to Sidney E. Rolfe, “Manpower Allocation in Great Britain During World War II.” Industrial and Labor Relations Review, vol. 5, no. 2, 1952, pp. 173–194 for a more nuanced view of the issue. Among other things, the 7,253,000 women workers included an estimated 900,000 part-time workers who were counted as "half units" in the Ministry of Labour and National Service reports sourced. It could as easily be the delta 1943 to 1945 was simply the elimination of many part-time positions.

No matter though, since your source, Mr. Smith, doesn't actually say what you claim he says. His view is that it was only the postwar labor crunch that kept women at work in Britain in large numbers. He makes no judgment as to whether or not the female labor force was "maxed out in 1943" or whether or not it could or could not have "been maintained at this level" should the exigencies of wartime losses made it necessary.
Not possible either (at least not large scale) since many subjects did not want to come to Britain and in many cases could not be spared at home.
Why? We have various posters touting the notion that the Colonies and Commonwealth were apparently agrarian paradises with their inhabits neither suitable as military personnel or as industrial workers in their own countries. So what exactly was it at "home" that they could not be spared from?
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Re: How man additional casualties can the US/Britain afford in WW2 without endangering the war effort?

#37

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 31 Dec 2020, 04:23

Richard Anderson wrote:increasing labor manpower imports from the Colonies and Commonwealth.
A persistent AHF fantasy in these threads. An epic handwave of political, cultural, educational reality.

As I've shown elsewhere, the single largest manpower import program was "Bevin's Boys" - sending 2,000 Indians per year to UK for vocational training. Then sending them back! viewtopic.php?f=76&t=251476&start=15#p2291462 This was all the Indians Britain could abide in the dark days of May '41. Yet the AHF fantasy envisions a multicultural ATL WW2 Britain undreamed by the most cosmopolitan of today's Remainers.
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Re: How man additional casualties can the US/Britain afford in WW2 without endangering the war effort?

#38

Post by Richard Anderson » 31 Dec 2020, 09:49

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
31 Dec 2020, 04:23
A persistent AHF fantasy in these threads. An epic handwave of political, cultural, educational reality.
No less than yours old boy. Do you take us for pikers? However, I was not speaking fantasy, since the article I referenced specifically addressed immigrant labor as one factor, albeit they did not give numbers, but simply referred to the relevant annual Ministry of Labor reports... :x not exactly easy to access right now for specifics, but something to sic Tom onto in a few months perhaps.
As I've shown elsewhere, the single largest manpower import program was "Bevin's Boys" - sending 2,000 Indians per year to UK for vocational training. Then sending them back! viewtopic.php?f=76&t=251476&start=15#p2291462 This was all the Indians Britain could abide in the dark days of May '41. Yet the AHF fantasy envisions a multicultural ATL WW2 Britain undreamed by the most cosmopolitan of today's Remainers.
You may be confused? "Bevin Boys" were British youths conscripted to work the coal mines 1943-1948. Nothing to do with Indians that I can see? Nor was Bevin's Indian scheme a labor import plan, it was a training program. Nor given the full employment and the production output at the time in 1941-1942 was there any real incentive to import labor, peak labor utilization in Britain was mid 1943 after all. Measures after that were instituted under the assumption of a won war, so it is difficult to see what the in extremis reaction would be from that.
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Re: How man additional casualties can the US/Britain afford in WW2 without endangering the war effort?

#39

Post by History Learner » 31 Dec 2020, 11:25

Peter89 wrote:
30 Dec 2020, 14:52
History Learner wrote:
30 Dec 2020, 13:55
Peter89 wrote:
30 Dec 2020, 13:00
Partisan activity was one thing, guarding the borders, repairing sabotage damage, maintaining garrisons, etc. required troops, aircrafts, supplies, etc. Even without a single partisan the Germans had to station forces there just as they had to in Norway and in the Balkans. Even more so because now in this ATL about everything depended on the Caucasus oilfields, well in range of the Wallies' bombers.

What you write about the industry behind the A-A line is simply not true. With the LL shipments, the Soviets would be able to maintain a significant and motorized army and airforce, somewhere between 50 and 100 divisions. The Germans had little to no capacity to fight a successful war against that force on the far edge of their logistical network. Besides, any of these claims suppose that the Soviets would be unable to retreat with their armies into the East, and launch a counteroffensive from there. How much more successful the Germans should have been in order to push the Soviets behind the A-A line while in reality, they had problems to take Leningrad and Moscow in 1941? The German forces were simply inadequate for this task, and the final and utter destruction of Soviet resistance with L-L support was not really likely to be achieved.

But the theoretical German overperformance was one thing, not sufficient on its own anyhow.
In order to achieve this, the Soviets had to underperform, too. In fact, I can argue that the outcome of the whole German-Soviet war was depending so much more on the Soviet errors than the German brilliance.

If the Soviets could choose from multiple options how to defeat the Germans or stall their invasion, while the Germans did not have the same room for mistakes. The Soviets were gradually erasing their mistakes and learn from them; also, they had a very effective high command. The victories around Leningrad and the gigantic successes of the winter offensives of 1941/1942 and 1942/1943 did not happen by chance.

If the Soviets do not make serious mistakes, the German invasion would be halted at some point. But even if the Germans reach the A-A line, and the Soviets escape with a sizeable chunk of their armies, then they will counterattack some time, and the war in the East is not over.

I also doubt it very much that the Germans would be able to take Leningrad, Moscow and the Caucasus in one stroke, because they couldn't even take Stalingrad, and they paid a very heavy price for taking Sevastopol. Both Leningrad and Moscow are multiple times bigger cities, and taking them alone would require a major effort of an army group. The Caucasus was ideal to pin down dozens of divisions too.

If the Soviets are alive east of the A-A line, and the Wallies are about to crush Germany, why do you think they'd open a front in France with an amphibitious assault of the beaches in Normandy? Again they still have ample of options to choose from, and again, it was not as much the German overperformance but the Wallies' underperformance that would decide the outcome of the war.
In which case, again, the Germans were well prepared to deal with such given they had more than sufficient force in the Ostheer as of early 1942 to both maintain a stable occupation in the conquered areas as well as keep a further 800,000 men on the A-A Line just in case. See how rear service area units were able to thereafter-despite ongoing major conventional operations-to lay down tens of thousands of miles of new railway track or how Germany used Ukraine's resources to double its munitions production in 1942. You speak of Allied bombers; where were they, their bases and all the associated infrastructure in the Middle East in 1941-1942? Why would they be any better attacking the Caucasus then they were attacking Polesti? Why would the Germans not protect them the same as they did with their own facilities in 1943?

As for Lend Lease, the more accurate question here is what Lend Lease:

1941: 360,778t, of which 13,502t Persian Gulf, 193,229t Soviet Far East, 153,977t North Russia.

1942: 2,453,097t of which 705,259t Persian Gulf, 734,020 Soviet Far East, 949,711 North Russia, 64,107 Soviet Artic.

1943: 4,794,545t of which 1,606,979 Persian Gulf, 2,388,577 Soviet Far East, 681,043 North Russia, 117,946 Soviet Artic.

1944: 6,217,622t of which 1,788,864 Persian Gulf, 2,848,181 Soviet Far East, 1,452,775 North Russia, 127,802 Soviet Artic.

1945: 3,673,819t (last shipments 20 Sept) of which: 44,513 Persian Gulf, 2,079,320 Soviet Far East, 726,725 North Russia, 680,723 Black Sea, 142,538 Soviet Artic.

Murmansk and Archangelsk are behind the A-A Line, as is Astrakhan. Thus, remove both the Persian Gulf and North Russia has routes of supply. Per agreements with the Japanese, the Pacific Route could only be used for non-offensive supplies and the Soviets really don't need to make the Japanese angry. The Kwantung Army continued offensive planning against the Soviet Far East as late as 1944 and in late 1941 the Japanese had come to the conclusion that, if Moscow fell and the Red Army appeared to be weakened, they would jump into the conflict regardless of the situation elsewhere vis-a-vis the Western Allies.
The Pacific route was open for non-military imports and the Persian corridor was open to military imports. Or did the Germans take the Caucasus, too? Then the route has to be redirected to the other side of the Caspian sea, which was totally doable. The importance of the Murmansk / Arkhangelsk route was particularly significant in 1942. 70% of the L-L shipments arrived through the two largely unaffected routes. Also, the Northern Russian route was the least safe of all.

The Kwantung Army and its potential invasion of the SU is very much questionable. The Soviets never failed to deploy proper forces against them. If and when the Soviets draw their forces to the West to oppose the German onslaught (that's a big if), the Japanese might not intervene - they simply couldn't afford to open up a new front or bring a Russian campaign to conclusion.
History Learner wrote:
30 Dec 2020, 13:55
We can expand this analysis further by looking at the manpower situation. See War: 1941-1945. Bulletin of the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation. M., 2010.S. 216-221, which is a declassified report that was presented to Stalin in early 1943 concerning the manpower situation of the USSR:
V. Remaining unused resources:​

a) reserved for employment in the civil economy - 2 781 000​
b) in labor columns - 1 321 000​
c) recruits born in 1925 - 700 000​
d) non-conscripted men fully fit for service in the Central Asian Military District - 600 000​
e) non-conscripted men with limited fitness or in the age above 45 (without Far-East and Transcaucasus) - 500 000 (of them 277 000 in the Central Asia)​
f) non-conscripted men in the Far East, Trasnbaikal and Transcaucasus Fronts 505 000 (including 200 000 with limited fitness and 200 000 in age above 45).​
g) officers of reserve, not conscripted yet - 156 000​
h) expected convalescents from hospitals in 3 nearest months - 350 000​
i) in the penitentiary system - 1 156 000 men in age from 17 to 45.​
What, exactly, out of this is usable? The Central Asians are politically unreliable and (as long as the Japanese don't jump in!) in the Far East you only have 505,000, of whom 200,000 are medically unfit for service and 200,000 are above the age of 60. I think we can look to the Germans in 1945 as illustrative as to what happens when you rely upon old men and young boys as the basis for your defense.

Ah, but you believe the Germans can do no better and its a question of how many mistakes the Soviets can make? I don't agree with that and quite a few historians of note on the Eastern Front don't either. To quote from Robert Forczyk's Moscow 1941: Hitler's First Defeat:
By 15 October, 1st Panzer Division was approaching towards Torshok- i.e. moving away from Moscow! The forces dispatched to Kalinin were insufficient to achieve to achieve a decisive victory on their own, but the diversion seriously weakened the main push on Moscow and forced the Third Panzer Army to devote significant resources to a protracted attritional fight around Kalinin. If XLI Panzer Corps had pushed east towards Volokolamsk, the Germans might have been able to prevent Zhukov from establishing a new line east of Moscow.
These are assumptions that plagued a number of military historians as well as the German High Command. The operational maneuvres, the always attacking Germans might give you the feeling that victory was in their grasp. That they had chance all the time when they attacked. But it would be foolish to think so. There were non-operational, structural problems with the German warmaking that are hard or impossible to quantify or draw on a map, but they existed and did add up. This comes down from maintenance to logistics, production, intelligence, etc.

The Germans were never one big victory away from the total and ultimate victory. They needed like a dozen of them to give them a chance to win the war.

What you do here with the "politically unreliable" Central Asians and others is again symptomatic. You point out the one's potential weakness, push it to the extreme and forget about the other's. The Germans already used to fill up the ranks for 1942 with 18 years old boys. By 1943, they had to lower the standards of conscription and cause problems in their manpower situation, too. Again, it was a win or die war, not a stroll in a park.
History Learner wrote:
30 Dec 2020, 13:55
By the time in question Zhukov had only 90,000 troops spread out over a single defensive line before Moscow, with only limited NKVD security troops in Moscow itself so the city was virtually undefended once the Germans bust through Zhukov's line. The loss of Moscow also makes it impossible for the Soviets to continue to hold Leningrad, with the German offensives in November/December likely cutting the city off completely and it being forced to surrender no later than the Spring of 1942. With the loss of their two main industrial and administrative centers, as well as the associated prestige, it's likely the USSR collapses decisively in 1942.

Outside of an alternate 1941 campaign, you brought up Stalingrad, so let's also look at that in terms of an alternate 1942 campaign. From David Glantz’s To the Gates of Stalingrad: Soviet-German Combat Operations, April-August 1942 -
In addition to unhinging the right wing of Shumilov's 64th Army, 24th Panzer Division's penetration to Basarguno Station also facilitated a further advance by Sixth Army's LI Corps, which by days end on 31 August had already penetrated 62nd Army's defenses along the Rossoskha River and was about to reach the Kalach-Stalingrad railroad line near Novyi Rogachik. If it did so, it would likely cut off and destroy all off 62nd and 64th Armies forces already half-encircled...If these forces were destroyed, and if LI Corps continued its eastwards march, it was likely the corps would have sufficient forces to penetrate into Stalingrad from the west.
So in essence, 6th Army destroys two armies and then takes Stalingrad off the march while also avoiding months of attrition in urban warfare. Also worth noting Stalingrad was a major industrial hub, in particular for tanks.
Do you think they cared about prestige? They cared about survival, they cared about victory, and the Wallies cared about keeping them on their side, so prestige would mean little to nothing. Taking Moscow and Leningrad was not as easy as you depict, these operations would mean a heavy street fighting, something that the Germans had little to no resources for. Despite all efforts, Leningrad was not starved, shelled and bombed into submission.

Even if these cities would fall, the Soviets would not capitulate. In fact, they were preparing to retreat to the east if necessary.

What actually happened in reality that the Germans could not take or cut off Murmansk, could not fully stop the Soviet lifeline to Leningrad, and Moscow never fell. For all this to happen in an alternate timeline, the Germans had to overperform their real-history selves multiple times. The fall of Moscow does not automatically lead to the fall of Leningrad, Murmansk and the Caucasus, etc. So a domino effect could not be counted upon.

So what can we work with? More and better everything that was German, and fewer and worse everything that was Soviet.
By all means, start another thread and let's continue this so as to not derail this one further. Suffice to say, I do not agree with any of this.

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Re: How man additional casualties can the US/Britain afford in WW2 without endangering the war effort?

#40

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 01 Jan 2021, 16:31

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
31 Dec 2020, 04:23
Richard Anderson wrote:increasing labor manpower imports from the Colonies and Commonwealth.
A persistent AHF fantasy in these threads. An epic handwave of political, cultural, educational reality.
Yes it is wave on hand for to write Britain was not have manpowers problem when have millions of mens on Empire.

But it is most biger wave on hand for to write was can be impossible for to use manpower on Empire. And epic and racist wave on hand to give reason must to be political, cultural, educational reality.

And why was you write persistent ahf fantasy when all tmp imagination storys are fantasy and most what tmp was write was be waves on hand ?

Tmp wave on hand > more manpowers = more tanks > nazi must to win war.
Tmp wave on hand > 700.000 Red army surrenders on southwest front > nazi must to win war.
Tmp wave on hand > capture some black soil > Soviet union must to starve > nazi must to win war.
Tmp wave on hand > fundamental > nazi must to win on 2 tank group pincer > nazi must to win war.

On politician1 imagination story he can for to decide what he want.

On tmp imagination story he can to decide what he want.

Can politician1 and tmp imagination storys to be plausible ? Must to analyse real history datas and evidences.

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Re: How man additional casualties can the US/Britain afford in WW2 without endangering the war effort?

#41

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 01 Jan 2021, 18:36

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
01 Jan 2021, 16:31
TheMarcksPlan wrote:
31 Dec 2020, 04:23
Richard Anderson wrote:increasing labor manpower imports from the Colonies and Commonwealth.
A persistent AHF fantasy in these threads. An epic handwave of political, cultural, educational reality.
And why was you write persistent ahf fantasy when all tmp imagination storys are fantasy and most what tmp was write was be waves on hand ?
Because I am very stupid and a total hypocrite. Happy new year!
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Re: How man additional casualties can the US/Britain afford in WW2 without endangering the war effort?

#42

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 01 Jan 2021, 19:21

Richard Anderson wrote:"Bevin Boys" were British youths conscripted to work the coal mines 1943-1948.
Apparently Bevin had lots of boys. From Asians in Britain by Visram:
it planned to bring ‘a number of Indian manual workers’ to Britain for a
period of six months’ industrial training (later raised to eight) and to
provide them with an ‘appreciation of the British method of industrial
co-operation … and the value of sound trade union principles’.2 Starting
in May 1941, at regular intervals, Indian ‘Bevin Boys’, as the volunteers
were called, began arriving in batches of 50...

A majority of the Bevin Trainees were
already skilled workers with technical and workshop experience, some
with engineering degrees.
Altogether, the scheme envisaged bringing
2,000 volunteers to Britain
Richard Anderson wrote:the article I referenced specifically addressed immigrant labor as one factor, albeit they did not give numbers, but simply referred to the relevant annual Ministry of Labor reports... :x not exactly easy to access right now for specifics, but something to sic Tom onto in a few months perhaps.
As I discussed elsewhere, the Indian Bevin boys is the only mention in Asians in Britain of importing Indian labor during the war, besides employing Indians on merchant ships (~50k but records are insufficient to know exactly). The author seems a respectable historian, seems unlikely that Asians in Britain missed some large group of Asians in Britain. https://www.routledge.com/authors/i10996-rozina-visram

I'm sure there was some immigration from Ireland to Britain during the war - there always was. Net flow might have been negative during the war though, given the relative value proposition.
Richard Anderson wrote:Nor given the full employment and the production output at the time in 1941-1942 was there any real incentive to import labor,
What? No incentive for a nation fighting a total war to increase output?
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Re: How man additional casualties can the US/Britain afford in WW2 without endangering the war effort?

#43

Post by Peter89 » 02 Jan 2021, 12:41

I would also not forget about the merchant marines of particurarly the Norwegians, Dutch and Greeks.

30,000+ Norwegians
20,000 Greeks
18,500 Dutchmen

served in the Allied shipping and sustained comprable casualties as the British themselves.
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Re: How man additional casualties can the US/Britain afford in WW2 without endangering the war effort?

#44

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 Jan 2021, 18:37

TheMarcksPlan wrote:
01 Jan 2021, 19:21
Apparently Bevin had lots of boys.
True, he was also the Trade Union leader in opposition to the MOL in Chamberlain's government, but then was MOL in Churchill's government.
As I discussed elsewhere, the Indian Bevin boys is the only mention in Asians in Britain of importing Indian labor during the war, besides employing Indians on merchant ships (~50k but records are insufficient to know exactly). The author seems a respectable historian, seems unlikely that Asians in Britain missed some large group of Asians in Britain. https://www.routledge.com/authors/i10996-rozina-visram

I'm sure there was some immigration from Ireland to Britain during the war - there always was. Net flow might have been negative during the war though, given the relative value proposition.
Perhaps they were non-Asian? Perhaps they were Irish? Perhaps we would need to dig into the MOL records I mentioned to find where they were from? However, we do know they existed because the article I referenced, specifically stated the sources of the additional labor in Britain during the war were, "from three main sources: the absorption of the unemployed, entry into the labor force of men and especially women previously classified as nonindustrial and the use of foreign workers." Roughly 700,000 workers had to come from "recruiting normally nonworking persons into the labor force". The unemployed and men previously classified as nonindustrial contributed about 500,000, thus, although not specifically stated in the study, the remaining 200,000 appear to have been "foreign workers".

So if 200,000 were okay to recruit from foreigners, why not 300,000 or 3 million in extremis?
What? No incentive for a nation fighting a total war to increase output?
Not when the war was perceived as won.
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Re: How man additional casualties can the US/Britain afford in WW2 without endangering the war effort?

#45

Post by Sheldrake » 02 Jan 2021, 21:20

Not sure if any of these points have been mentioned.

1. The Irish Free State was a major source of labour for the construction industry.

Twas the year of 39 and the skies were full of lead
Hitler was heading for Poland and paddy for Holyhead.



Factories, camps, hospitals, airfields and the mulberry harbours. This paper makes interesting reading https://www.arcom.ac.uk/-docs/proceedin ... _Potts.pdf

2. Around 15,000 West Indian volunteers served in the UK - some in the military others in industry.

3. The native population of the British Empire was under recruited. Many black africans could have been mobilised. Indian manpower might have been far better mobilised if a deal had been done on the lines of independence after VJ day.

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