Heinkel had capped production of the He 177 to 200 aircraft and developed a four-engine bomber

[Carl Schwamberger]

I'm more or less on board with above. My last comment was poorly phrased. What I was really trying to convey was that the Germans could not blame their bomber design for failure to subdue the British by air attack.

This touches on the over focus on specific hardware items & not examining operational systems. The Luftwaffe was built 1934-1940 as a one shot system for brief operations. If the campaign lasted more than a few weeks its ability to continue operations degraded rapidly. The effort to change this was never successful enough. Lacking focus the haphazard 'improvements' of 1941-1943 failed to keep pace with Allied capability.

In 1968 out numbered and antiquated Sherman tanks of the Israli Defense Force defeated modern T54 & T62 equipped armies. Doctrine, training, logistics, command and control, all were combined in a better 'System' for the Israelis . It was much the same for the Luftwaffe in 1941-1944. Goering & company created a system that could not cope with the conditions of sustained campaigns. The Ju88 was thought to be a wonder weapon in 1939-1940. Which would take the bomber arm further to single blow capability. That effort was rendered moot by the same one shot operating system that cut short the other air offensives of the German air force.

[T. A. Gardner]

Carl, you have to add that the German aircraft industry was simply no match for Allied production too. While it was capable of turning out large numbers of single engine fighters, it could barely match twin engine production, if at all, and with four engine planes German industry was hopelessly outmatched.
So, if the Luftwaffe switched to four engine bombers, production of single engine and twin planes would have to fall to give capacity up for the four engine production. That in turn would leave the Luftwaffe short of every type rather than see them with a larger air force or more bombing capacity.

[Sheldrake]

One figure that illustrates the cost of developing a heavy bomber force is that one million people were employed building maintaining and operating Avro Lancaster bombers, just one of the British heavy bombers. That works out around 2% of the population - 5% of the population available for work. It may have been one of the reasons why the British contribution to land forces in the Liberation of Europe was much smaller than in WW1

[thaddeus_c]

This touches on the over focus on specific hardware items & not examining operational systems. The Luftwaffe was built 1934-1940 as a one shot system for brief operations. If the campaign lasted more than a few weeks its ability to continue operations degraded rapidly. The effort to change this was never successful enough. Lacking focus the haphazard 'improvements' of 1941-1943 failed to keep pace with Allied capability.

what (if any) changes to their aircraft development programs and production would have improved their performance? or conversely what hampered improvements?

[Peter89]

Focke-Wulf proposed a replacement for the Fw 200, the Fw 300, which had a larger wingspan and bigger fuselage. The He 177B (confused in pre-recent books in WW2 German aircraft with the He 277 intercontinental bomber project) was meant to remedy the engine problems with the baseline He 177 by replacing coupled piston engines with four separate engines. The book Luftwaffe Secret Projects: Strategic Bombers 1935-1945 mentions on page 45 a proposed bomber variant of the He 111Z glider tug, the He 111Z-3. It's possible that Heinkel considered the He 111Z-3 as an alternative to the He 177 because the engines for the He 111Z-3 were not bedeviled by technical problems. If Heinkel had chosen to stop production of the Heinkel He 177 in early 1941 due to engine fires, it could have opted to create He 111Z-3s by joining together several shot-down or crashed He 111s with a new wing center section, that way the He 177B would never have existed.

they could build the HE 111Z-3 as an interim project, to return to the HE 274 in the future?

the FW 200 was denied an evolutionary addition of fifth engine, have seen some speculation that version and the 111Z could cruise on 3 engines for fuel savings?

whatever their faults those two planes would at least have been available

Can you help me to locate that source for the Fw-200?

To the best of my knowledge, Fw-200 was already too weak at the fuselage part, it frequently broke during landings. In the technical sheets,the maximum landing weight was given as 19.2t. Adding another engine, with at least 500kg, but rather much more than that, would only downscale the performance in other aspects.

The Fw-200 was designed as a lightweight, long-range commercial transport. Unlike the Ju-90, which was actually derived from the Ju-89 project.

[Carl Schwamberger]

This touches on the over focus on specific hardware items & not examining operational systems. The Luftwaffe was built 1934-1940 as a one shot system for brief operations. If the campaign lasted more than a few weeks its ability to continue operations degraded rapidly. The effort to change this was never successful enough. Lacking focus the haphazard 'improvements' of 1941-1943 failed to keep pace with Allied capability.

what (if any) changes to their aircraft development programs and production would have improved their performance? or conversely what hampered improvements?

Im not the expert here.

One question is how badly industry was crippled by the induction of skilled engineers & tradesmen into the military. In a effort to maximize front line strength 1939-1941 to much skilled industrial labor was conscripted. How badly that hurt development & production is a useful question.

A second question is how many development and production lines were superfluous and inefficient. How much can be gained by eliminating or consolidating models in development and production?

One can go with these items, but they swiftly lead to the question of how far back the PoD needs to be to create change, & then the question of why the 'swift victory' model was chosen. After all there was no guarantee it would work & many military and industrial leaders were skeptical of it all along. Yet another question is how much the German AF gains if there is a better long term plan in place in 1939> ? In 1942 it could no longer cover all the playing field, and in 1943 it was clear they were losing in strategic and operational terms. Does a substantial improvement in long term ability just give the GAF another six months of parity, twelve, or eighteen? Even a 50% increase in a critical item like aircraft engines still leaves Germany in the dust come 1944.

Then there are a few absolute show stopping limits. Even with better allocation of Aluminum there just was too little for long term requirements. Or for better mobilizing occupied aircraft industry.

So yes the Luftwaffe can do better, but it does not look like a war winning better. That the US and Britain were reducing aircraft production below planned in 1944 says a lot about the disparity.

[thaddeus_c]

they could build the HE 111Z-3 as an interim project, to return to the HE 274 in the future?

the FW 200 was denied an evolutionary addition of fifth engine, have seen some speculation that version and the 111Z could cruise on 3 engines for fuel savings?

whatever their faults those two planes would at least have been available

Can you help me to locate that source for the Fw-200?

To the best of my knowledge, Fw-200 was already too weak at the fuselage part, it frequently broke during landings. In the technical sheets,the maximum landing weight was given as 19.2t. Adding another engine, with at least 500kg, but rather much more than that, would only downscale the performance in other aspects.

The Fw-200 was designed as a lightweight, long-range commercial transport. Unlike the Ju-90, which was actually derived from the Ju-89 project.

Luftwaffe over America by Griehl, my understanding they had (serious) issues when/if the lost both engines on one side, so a centerline engine may have been intended to rectify that as well as improve performance? (mentioned cruising on three engines, that was a suggestion posted previously)

do not think frequent broken fuselage is exactly correct, do not recall any groundings, but certainly you are correct it was a converted airliner with the attendant fragility.

think the real problem was not landings but the maneuvers they tried to employ attacking, that could have been solved by earlier guided munitions, and they could maintain level flight.

[Peter89]

they could build the HE 111Z-3 as an interim project, to return to the HE 274 in the future?

the FW 200 was denied an evolutionary addition of fifth engine, have seen some speculation that version and the 111Z could cruise on 3 engines for fuel savings?

whatever their faults those two planes would at least have been available

Can you help me to locate that source for the Fw-200?

To the best of my knowledge, Fw-200 was already too weak at the fuselage part, it frequently broke during landings. In the technical sheets,the maximum landing weight was given as 19.2t. Adding another engine, with at least 500kg, but rather much more than that, would only downscale the performance in other aspects.

The Fw-200 was designed as a lightweight, long-range commercial transport. Unlike the Ju-90, which was actually derived from the Ju-89 project.

Luftwaffe over America by Griehl, my understanding they had (serious) issues when/if the lost both engines on one side, so a centerline engine may have been intended to rectify that as well as improve performance? (mentioned cruising on three engines, that was a suggestion posted previously)

do not think frequent broken fuselage is exactly correct, do not recall any groundings, but certainly you are correct it was a converted airliner with the attendant fragility.

think the real problem was not landings but the maneuvers they tried to employ attacking, that could have been solved by earlier guided munitions, and they could maintain level flight.

It was actually having a bad rep, and for a good reason.

Over eight known cases were recorded with a broken fuselage, representing over a 10% loss of the maritime recon configurations. I'd call it frequent.

The technical sheets are pretty grim about 2 engine flights. Essentially the Condor had to drop everything, and be on a lower level of fuel to meet the criteria for a 2 engine flight (17.6t, 4km altitude, 210-240km/h). 3 engine flight was way easier to pull off, but I am not yet convinced that it alerted too many pilots, given the Condors were pretty reliable engine-wise from the point where they started to use Bramo 323 R-2s.

[thaddeus_c]

It was actually having a bad rep, and for a good reason.

Over eight known cases were recorded with a broken fuselage, representing over a 10% loss of the maritime recon configurations. I'd call it frequent.

The technical sheets are pretty grim about 2 engine flights. Essentially the Condor had to drop everything, and be on a lower level of fuel to meet the criteria for a 2 engine flight (17.6t, 4km altitude, 210-240km/h). 3 engine flight was way easier to pull off, but I am not yet convinced that it alerted too many pilots, given the Condors were pretty reliable engine-wise from the point where they started to use Bramo 323 R-2s.

what exactly is your point? considering it was a conversion project seems like a fairly successful aircraft.

in my book on the Condor I'm not seeing where they were ever grounded due to problem with fuselage?

[Peter89]

It was actually having a bad rep, and for a good reason.

Over eight known cases were recorded with a broken fuselage, representing over a 10% loss of the maritime recon configurations. I'd call it frequent.

The technical sheets are pretty grim about 2 engine flights. Essentially the Condor had to drop everything, and be on a lower level of fuel to meet the criteria for a 2 engine flight (17.6t, 4km altitude, 210-240km/h). 3 engine flight was way easier to pull off, but I am not yet convinced that it alerted too many pilots, given the Condors were pretty reliable engine-wise from the point where they started to use Bramo 323 R-2s.

what exactly is your point? considering it was a conversion project seems like a fairly successful aircraft.

in my book on the Condor I'm not seeing where they were ever grounded due to problem with fuselage?

My point is that I find it odd that a 5th engine was planned for the Condor. It does not really fit into the picture.

Otherwise, yes, it was a very successful plane, of which the Germans should have built much more.

[Peter89]

in my book on the Condor I'm not seeing where they were ever grounded due to problem with fuselage?

http://www.warbirdsresourcegroup.org/LR ... rg1082.jpg

[thaddeus_c]

in my book on the Condor I'm not seeing where they were ever grounded due to problem with fuselage?

feel better?

have a book on the Condor with the same pictures and already stated that it was a conversion of a commercial aircraft but their alternatives were not too appealing.

that was why my mention of it in this thread, to which you have contributed exactly zero.

[thaddeus_c]

My point is that I find it odd that a 5th engine was planned for the Condor. It does not really fit into the picture.

Otherwise, yes, it was a very successful plane, of which the Germans should have built much more.

they achieved a fairly successful joining of two He 111s adding a fifth engine so maybe that inspired them or maybe their years of experience with nose mounted engines on the JU 52 & planned JU 252? (or the many tri-motor Italian aircraft, which they seemed to favor)

OR the fact the FW 200 was difficult (impossible?) to control if they had a loss of both engines on the same side.

but as I stated in my original post, it was one of the projects cancelled by LW.