General Adolf Galland's suggestions are followed

[Juan G. C.]

During 1943-1944 general Adolf Galland made a series of suggestions to improve the performance of the fighter arm of the Luftwaffe:
• In the first place, he suggested "that the fighter forces defending Germany should limit the number of interceptions flown to allow sufficient time for re-grouping and to conserve air strength. Only by conserving its strength and its precious resources—the fighter pilots—could the Luftwaffe hope to inflict damage on the bombers" (from Wikipedia). Perhaps this would hava allowed better training, of which Germany was in dire nerd.
• Secondly, when the fighter escort of the Allies bombers began to escort them deep info Germany, he criticized the order that German fighters ignore the escort and attack only the bombers. He said that this was "taking the second step before the first". He suggested sending all the German fighters against the escort fighters of one attacking force, ignoring the bombers, in order to "stop the advance and the further extension of the fighter escort force" (from his memoirs).
• Thirdly, he asked that the peripheral defence be abandoned and that the fighters be taken back to the Reich, so that they could be massed from the center.
My question is: what would the results have been had Galland's suggestions been heeded and applied, say, in early 1944? What effects would they have had on the war in the air? Thank you very much.

[maltesefalcon]

• . He suggested sending all the German fighters against the escort fighters of one attacking force, ignoring the bombers, in order to "stop the advance and the further extension of the fighter escort force" (from his memoirs)
• Thirdly, he asked that the peripheral defence be abandoned and that the fighters be taken back to the Reich, so that they could be massed from the center.

(Note above edited by me for brevity.)

The Allies anticipated that the Luftwaffe would try to undertake a "fighters first" approach. In fact the Allied fighters were only tied to their bomber force temporarily. Once they were released to attack the enemy fighters, instead of guarding their flock, they had much better success. Also by early 1944,the Western Allies had so many fighters they could send them on large scale fighter only sweeps, to either attack German airfields or swat down the ones who accepted the challenge to fight it out. So the initiative was in Allied hands. Any decision by Galland or his superiors either way, would be moot.

As for retracting the force, it does have certain logistical advantages. But this would be at the cost of abandoning the lands west of the Rhine, to Allied TAC air attacks. Bear in mind the Luftwaffe was seconded to the Army's needs throughout the war. Also, there were a number of high profile targets that would have been ripe targets for Allied bombers, should there be no risk of interdiction. Among these, the Rhine delta, the Channel coast fortifications, French ports used by the DKM and of course the U-Boat pens at St. Nazaire and Lorient.

IRL in 1944, the strategic bombing plan was scaled back, in favour of bombing targets in the invasion area anyway. It was in this critical period of Jan-June that the Luftwaffe lost the battle. Keeping fighters on reserve over the Reich itself would not have solved the issue; as the P-51s would simply fly there instead, to seek them out.

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
As for retracting the force, it does have certain logistical advantages. But this would be at the cost of abandoning the lands west of the Rhine, to Allied TAC air attacks.

& there are many example of the German air forces doing just that. Over Tunisia & the Sicilian Straits Apri 1943, over Sicilly July 1943, & southern Italy in the autumn of 1943. In each of those cases the losses were unsustainable - exceeding the replacement of machines & qualified men. The operations over those locations had to be broken off, leaving the ground forces ineffectively supported. When the VLR fighters of the US became present in sufficient numbers in Dec 1943 it was the de facto end. In the 'Big Week' early 1944 the Luftwaffe had nowhere left to retract & the numbers of operational fighter planes dropped rapidly. The last efforts to lean forward swinging, like Op BODENPLATTE, or over Normandy were notable by their weakness. The operations had to be executed at night to avoid massacre of both the remaining bomber and fighter forces.

[maltesefalcon]

I don't think it is fair to compare the situation in the Mediterranean theatre with that in occupied northwestern Europe. For one thing there were far less strategic bombing targets and resources in the Mediterranean. In contrast, the Reich depended very heavily on the manpower and resources of occupied Europe. North Africa and Sicily were a mere side show by comparison.

In Italy the ground forces held out-in part due to terrain and in part due to their skill and tenacity. But the ground forces in North Africa and Sicily collapsed quite quickly, as their air support shrank back. IMHO this would not be a shining example to offer as an argument to use the same tactic in the airspaces of France, Holland and Belgium.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Depends on what you consider Strategic Bombing. Dolittle & the others focused heavily on the Italian transportation system. Railways, ports, & petroleum storage. They did attack Italian industry, but there was a deliberate selection of the transportation structure as the most important part of the Axis industrial support of its armies in the MTO. I'd call it strategic.

I don't think it is fair to compare the situation in the Mediterranean theatre with that in occupied northwestern Europe.

How is it not 'fair' In both cases the Luftwaffe took unsustainable losses during 1943 where it tried to fight forward. In 1941 the Luftwaffe could maintain its interceptor groups in western France against the RODEO & CIRCUS operations. As the Allied fighters increased their range that was no longer practical. When my fathers bomber group started operations mind 1943 escorts on missions to Rennes, Chartres, Rouen were engaged in the final stages of driving the German fighters out of western France. While the unescorted 8th AF was being savaged in October, enroute to Schwienfurt the 9th AF could attack as far east as Reims or Toyres without seeing a enemy fighter plane. The mass of late model Spitfires & the P47 made it impractical to oppose the Allied air forces inside that fighter envelope.

In Italy the ground forces held out-in part due to terrain and in part due to their skill and tenacity.

& the Germans were unable to effectively oppose operations like STRANGLE. When Kesselring, like Rundsteadt, looked at the reports on the declining capacity of the railways in the late winter of 1944 it was clear that capacity would decline below the ability to sustain the ground forces of their armies from mid year. Dropped bridges, degradation of maintenance facilities, loss of rolling stock contributed to Kesselrings decision to plan for a withdrawal north.

Also Im unsure what you are referring to here?

as an argument to use the same tactic in the airspaces of France, Holland and Belgium.

[Juan G. C.]

Thank for your answers. What about the first of the suggestions: "that the fighter forces defending Germany should limit the number of interceptions flown to allow sufficient time for re-grouping and to conserve air strength"?

The Allies anticipated that the Luftwaffe would try to undertake a "fighters first" approach. In fact the Allied fighters were only tied to their bomber force temporarily. Once they were released to attack the enemy fighters, instead of guarding their flock, they had much better success. Also by early 1944,the Western Allies had so many fighters they could send them on large scale fighter only sweeps, to either attack German airfields or swat down the ones who accepted the challenge to fight it out. So the initiative was in Allied hands. Any decision by Galland or his superiors either way, would be moot.

How many fighters could the Germans have put in the air, and how many Allied fighters would have been escorting one attacking force?

[Peter89]

Thank for your answers. What about the first of the suggestions: "that the fighter forces defending Germany should limit the number of interceptions flown to allow sufficient time for re-grouping and to conserve air strength"?

In my opinion, there was a lot of merit in Galland's words.

The Luftwaffe badly needed to conserve its strength, but that chance was lost during Tunisgrad, I think by 1944 they couldn't do much.

[maltesefalcon]

Also Im unsure what you are referring to here?

as an argument to use the same tactic in the airspaces of France, Holland and Belgium.

I was referring to the OP suggestion that the Luftwaffe fighters withdraw into the Reich, thus abandoning French, Dutch and Belgian airspace to the allies.
As already stated, IMHO it would be a huge tactical error. Just because they had done something similar in other theatres, doesn't mean it was the right thing to do.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Im unsure when Gallands remark was made. By latter 1943N France & eastern Belgium had been effectively abandoned. Some few interceptor squadrons remained, but they were suffering severe losses. With the P47 able to range to the Netherlands & Brussels from East Anglia airfields, and south to Rennes & Paris from Kent or other airfields south of London the Luftwaffe interceptors were largely gone from that region by July 1943. In August 1943 enough drop tanks were available the P47 groups could now range as far as the Ruhr and south east to the Saar. While the air over the Ruhr & Rhine land industry was still contested the air space to the west was largely abandoned as well. The few hundred interceptors there were seeing three and four times their numbers escorting the bomber groups, and roving about hunting. As in Tunisia, Sicilly, and Italy the forward based fighter groups also had to contend with regular bomber raids and fighter sweeps on their airfields. It became increasingly difficult to pick a favorable fight that summer & useful fighter defense ceased in central France and Belgium. The 8th and 9th AF still saw a few before reaching eastern France, however the region was effectively abandoned as the P47 & then the arriving P51 became overwhelming. The first P51 missions into central Germaany came in late 1943 & the Big Week was just a couple months away.

Until the summer of 1943 it makes no sense to withdraw the fighter groups from France of Belgium. Other than a sliver of maritime provinces the Allied fighters (other than the small number of P38) can't contest the air. From the mid summer it gets difficult & in the autumn the defense was unable to fight on favorable terms there. To effectively fight the 8th AF attacks into the Reich the fighters needed to be beyond the US escort range.

[maltesefalcon]

Im unsure when Gallands remark was made. By latter 1943N France & eastern Belgium had been effectively abandoned. Some few interceptor squadrons remained, but they were suffering severe losses.

Hmm. I'm beginning to wonder on that date myself. I did a little digging and it seems you are correct that much of the German fighter force was withdrawn already by early 1944. There would be little point in Galland making such a moot request. Perhaps the OP can add more exact data re timing?

That being said, the Luftwaffe lost the equivalent of 3x its average frontline strength in fighters over the skies of western Europe during the period January-June 1944. They would have had to withdraw their fighters east of Berlin to keep the out of range of the P-51s which were shredding them.

[Sheldrake]

During 1943-1944 general Adolf Galland made a series of suggestions to improve the performance of the fighter arm of the Luftwaffe:
• In the first place, he suggested "that the fighter forces defending Germany should limit the number of interceptions flown to allow sufficient time for re-grouping and to conserve air strength......
• Secondly, when the fighter escort of the Allies bombers began to escort them deep info Germany, he criticized the order that German fighters ignore the escort and attack only the bombers. He said that this was "taking the second step before the first". He suggested sending all the German fighters against the escort fighters of one attacking force, ignoring the bombers, in order to "stop the advance and the further extension of the fighter escort force" (from his memoirs).
• Thirdly, he asked that the peripheral defence be abandoned and that the fighters be taken back to the Reich, so that they could be massed from the center.
My question is: what would the results have been had Galland's suggestions been heeded and applied, say, in early 1944? What effects would they have had on the war in the air? Thank you very much.

The Germans followed the last as fighters were withdrawn to defend the Reich.

Galland was allowed to try a concentrated blow at one point in 1944 - maybe September(?). IRRC the results were good, but not on the scale of the 1943 Schweinfurt/Regensburg raids, and cost the luftwaffe dearly.

Engaging fighters rather than bombers rather played into the hands of the escorts. Their mission was to enable the bombers to reach their targets. by 1944 the US escort fighters were capable of looking after themselves. The P47 and P51 were very fast and could break combat and evade pursuit.,
.

[Juan G. C.]

Im unsure when Gallands remark was made. By latter 1943N France & eastern Belgium had been effectively abandoned. Some few interceptor squadrons remained, but they were suffering severe losses.

Hmm. I'm beginning to wonder on that date myself. I did a little digging and it seems you are correct that much of the German fighter force was withdrawn already by early 1944. There would be little point in Galland making such a moot request. Perhaps the OP can add more exact data re timing?

That being said, the Luftwaffe lost the equivalent of 3x its average frontline strength in fighters over the skies of western Europe during the period January-June 1944. They would have had to withdraw their fighters east of Berlin to keep the out of range of the P-51s which were shredding them.

The proposals were made at different moments during the period 1943-1944. From what can be inferred from his autobiography, It seems this one was made during autumn 1943.

[maltesefalcon]

Im unsure when Gallands remark was made. By latter 1943N France & eastern Belgium had been effectively abandoned. Some few interceptor squadrons remained, but they were suffering severe losses.

Hmm. I'm beginning to wonder on that date myself. I did a little digging and it seems you are correct that much of the German fighter force was withdrawn already by early 1944. There would be little point in Galland making such a moot request. Perhaps the OP can add more exact data re timing?

That being said, the Luftwaffe lost the equivalent of 3x its average frontline strength in fighters over the skies of western Europe during the period January-June 1944. They would have had to withdraw their fighters east of Berlin to keep the out of range of the P-51s which were shredding them.

The proposals were made at different moments during the period 1943-1944. From what can be inferred from his autobiography, It seems this one was made during autumn 1943.

Well since the fighters were effectively withdrawn shortly thereafter, would it be fair to say that this suggestion of his was adopted?

[danebrog]

From Galland´s book:
1. to bring at least 2,000 fighters in 11 combat units of the I. Jagd-Korps close to the incoming bomber group during the first mission;
2. to deploy a further 150 fighters of the Lw.-Kdo. West on the approach and departure;
3. in the second mission to bring another 500 fighters to the enemy;
4. to screen against Switzerland and Sweden with about 100 night fighters in order to intercept shot down and splintered individual bombers;
5. to shoot down a total of 400-500 four-engined bombers with an own loss of about 400 aircraft and 100-150 pilots;

[maltesefalcon]

From Galland´s book:
1. to bring at least 2,000 fighters in 11 combat units of the I. Jagd-Korps close to the incoming bomber group during the first mission;
2. to deploy a further 150 fighters of the Lw.-Kdo. West on the approach and departure;

I'm pretty sure the Luftwaffe did actually not have 2150 fighters to deploy at this time, no matter what tactics were preferred.