General Adolf Galland's suggestions are followed
Re: General Adolf Galland's suggestions are followed
According to Galland they had
On 12 November 1944, I was able to report the entire fighter force ready for action: 18 fighter squadrons with 3,700 aircraft and pilots, a force the Luftwaffe had never had before. More than 3,000 of them were waiting for the "big blow".
Until the majority was wasted in the Ardennes Offensive......
On 12 November 1944, I was able to report the entire fighter force ready for action: 18 fighter squadrons with 3,700 aircraft and pilots, a force the Luftwaffe had never had before. More than 3,000 of them were waiting for the "big blow".
Until the majority was wasted in the Ardennes Offensive......
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Re: General Adolf Galland's suggestions are followed
Although Galland may have written that, I am calling his memory into question. How is it that the Luftwaffe had that many AI daytime fighters available for Reich defense in late 1944? AFAIK, at that time, the entire Luftwaffe was only 4500-5000 aircraft of all types. Bear in mind that many of the single engine fighter types were actually BF-109s and FW-190s optimized for ground attack missions.danebrog wrote: ↑15 Mar 2021, 04:40According to Galland they had
On 12 November 1944, I was able to report the entire fighter force ready for action: 18 fighter squadrons with 3,700 aircraft and pilots, a force the Luftwaffe had never had before. More than 3,000 of them were waiting for the "big blow".
Until the majority was wasted in the Ardennes Offensive......
Bad weather hampered the use of air power by both sides in the early stages of the Ardennes offensive. But I believe that Germany lost about 500 of all types in the battle prior to Jan 1, 1945. Yet the Luftwaffe was only able to muster 1000ish aircraft for Bodenplatte, so the 3,700 number does not make sense.
Last edited by maltesefalcon on 15 Mar 2021, 16:48, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: General Adolf Galland's suggestions are followed
I'd think they did. Ellis in 'Brute Force' placed the operational strength of the Luftwaffe as fluctuating between 4,800 & 6000 aircraft from 1 January 1943 to late 1944. Since bomber production declined to near nothing we can assume the majority of the flyable aircraft were fighters. As of 1 jan 1944 the distribution was roughly 1,600 of all types in the east. Near 300 of all types in Norway, and the balance of 3600 distributed around Germany, northern Italy, and the Balkans.
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Re: General Adolf Galland's suggestions are followed
Actually the distinction between ground attack & interceptor was ignored. As was that of night fighter. The night fighter groups were required to fly daylight intercepts during this maximum effort. Yes they had heavy losses.maltesefalcon wrote: ↑15 Mar 2021, 06:39Although Galland may have written that, I am calling his memory into question. How is it that the Luftwaffe had that many AI daytime fighters available for Reich defense in late 1944? AFAIK, at that time, the entire Luftwaffe was only 4500-5000 aircraft of all types. Bear in mind that many of the single engine fighter types were actually BF-109s and FW-190s optimized for ground attack missions.
That number for Bodenplatte represents the bombers assigned to it. There were still near 100 bombers in Norway, and some 500 in the east, so 1000 is close to the number of worn out bombers still flying in Germany. Keep in mind that in latter 1944 the Allies could muster well over 20,000 operational aircraft on all fronts. in Europe.Bad weather hampered the use of air power by both sides in the early stages of the Ardennes offensive. But I believe that Germany lost about 500 of all types in the battle prior to Jan 1, 1945. Yet the Luftwaffe was only able tso muster 1000ish aircraft for Bodenplatte, so the 3,700 number does not make sense.
Last edited by Carl Schwamberger on 15 Mar 2021, 14:58, edited 1 time in total.
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Re: General Adolf Galland's suggestions are followed
It is fair.maltesefalcon wrote: ↑15 Mar 2021, 00:41Well since the fighters were effectively withdrawn shortly thereafter, would it be fair to say that this suggestion of his was adopted?Juan G. C. wrote: ↑14 Mar 2021, 23:27The proposals were made at different moments during the period 1943-1944. From what can be inferred from his autobiography, It seems this one was made during autumn 1943.maltesefalcon wrote: ↑14 Mar 2021, 19:39Hmm. I'm beginning to wonder on that date myself. I did a little digging and it seems you are correct that much of the German fighter force was withdrawn already by early 1944. There would be little point in Galland making such a moot request. Perhaps the OP can add more exact data re timing?Carl Schwamberger wrote: ↑13 Mar 2021, 23:59Im unsure when Gallands remark was made. By latter 1943N France & eastern Belgium had been effectively abandoned. Some few interceptor squadrons remained, but they were suffering severe losses.
That being said, the Luftwaffe lost the equivalent of 3x its average frontline strength in fighters over the skies of western Europe during the period January-June 1944. They would have had to withdraw their fighters east of Berlin to keep the out of range of the P-51s which were shredding them.
Re: General Adolf Galland's suggestions are followed
I then looked for official strength reports: The reported figures come from the OKL and should be considered reasonably reliable.maltesefalcon wrote: ↑15 Mar 2021, 06:39Although Galland may have written that, I am calling his memory into question.
The text in brackets only limits this because the figures refer to units in action. Unfortunately, I cannot determine the strength of (hypothetical) reserve units from original sources. The considerable discrepancy with Galland's statement is, however, striking!
From the same secondary source I have taken these two sketches showing the fighter distribution during the war source:
Herhudt von Rohden
Die Luftverteidigung des Deutschen Reiches im Weltkrieg 1939-1945 und ihre Lehren : ein strategischer Überblick
published in: Allgemeine schweizerische Militärzeitschrift 1951
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Re: General Adolf Galland's suggestions are followed
Interesting. Flipping through Hollands 'Being Week' I see attributed to Galland in early 1944, that it was unfavorable to send up interceptors during bomber attacks in bad overcast. The non combat losses of planes and crews increaded significantly and the bombers were much less effective in his estimation.
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Re: General Adolf Galland's suggestions are followed
I have to wonder about the reality in 1944 of that solid black line covering Paris and the NW coastal region. In the first five months of 1944 the 9th AF was participating in Op CROSSBOW and the Transportation Plan attacks with very low losses from fighters. They would see them when on missions further east, far past Paris, but seldom around Paris or west.
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Re: General Adolf Galland's suggestions are followed
I crunched the numbers for the helpful chart above. For the date of 29/11/44, you would get 1382 single engine fighters of all types, in all theatres. Plus 777 night fighters.
That total is a far cry from 3700. Also, how many of the Nachtjager would be in fact Ju-88? They were actually light bombers pressed into the night fighter role. Such aircraft would be virtually useless as daytime AI fighters.
And to get the 2000 plus theoretical total above would require denuding the Ostfront of air support for the ground forces.
I'm also wondering why there is a clear distinction between West and Reich at this point? By 11/44 pretty well all of France and much of Belgium were in Allied hands. Did the Luftwaffe still have 600-odd fighters posted in the Netherlands by this point? Not sure. Perhaps the distinction was a command structure designation? Or perhaps different duties? West would be assigned to fly interdiction and ground support over France and Reich would only fly AI over German airspace? Again not sure but maybe someone has insight?
One last comment. I re-read the post at the top of the page quoting Galland's figures. 18 fighter squadrons with 3700 aircraft? Did Germany have squadrons with 200+ aircraft? Perhaps he meant to say "We have a total of 3700 aircraft, part of which are 18 fighter squadrons." Using a figure of 12 per Staffel would yield 216 available for AI work. I would buy that number or anything reasonably close to that.
That total is a far cry from 3700. Also, how many of the Nachtjager would be in fact Ju-88? They were actually light bombers pressed into the night fighter role. Such aircraft would be virtually useless as daytime AI fighters.
And to get the 2000 plus theoretical total above would require denuding the Ostfront of air support for the ground forces.
I'm also wondering why there is a clear distinction between West and Reich at this point? By 11/44 pretty well all of France and much of Belgium were in Allied hands. Did the Luftwaffe still have 600-odd fighters posted in the Netherlands by this point? Not sure. Perhaps the distinction was a command structure designation? Or perhaps different duties? West would be assigned to fly interdiction and ground support over France and Reich would only fly AI over German airspace? Again not sure but maybe someone has insight?
One last comment. I re-read the post at the top of the page quoting Galland's figures. 18 fighter squadrons with 3700 aircraft? Did Germany have squadrons with 200+ aircraft? Perhaps he meant to say "We have a total of 3700 aircraft, part of which are 18 fighter squadrons." Using a figure of 12 per Staffel would yield 216 available for AI work. I would buy that number or anything reasonably close to that.
Last edited by maltesefalcon on 15 Mar 2021, 16:52, edited 2 times in total.
Re: General Adolf Galland's suggestions are followed
Lutflotte 3, June 1944, only fighters opposite the British coast:
4. Jagddivision (I. + III./JG 26; I. and III./NJG 4; I. + III./NJG 5)
5. Jagddivision (I. + II./JG 2; II./NJG 4);
Luftflotte Reich comprised all air forces within the Reich territory. In this respect, I would assume that the aircraft booked under WEST in Holland and Denmark, for example
Or here the Luftwaffenkommando West was meant, which emerged from Luftflotte 3 and was subordinate to Luftflotte Reich
4. Jagddivision (I. + III./JG 26; I. and III./NJG 4; I. + III./NJG 5)
5. Jagddivision (I. + II./JG 2; II./NJG 4);
Luftflotte Reich comprised all air forces within the Reich territory. In this respect, I would assume that the aircraft booked under WEST in Holland and Denmark, for example
Or here the Luftwaffenkommando West was meant, which emerged from Luftflotte 3 and was subordinate to Luftflotte Reich
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Re: General Adolf Galland's suggestions are followed
I suspect part of what we are running into is the difference between aircraft actually flyable on any specific day, and including those on hand, but needing a day or two of repair before they are combat worthy. As 1943 spun out the number of mechanical problems ramped up significantly. As did losses from noncombat causes. So there may have been 3700 fighter with engines that could be started and inflated tires, but there were typically only half that may with repairs of battle damage or mechanical failures completed. The AAF & RAF kept up a huge reserve and replacement stream to keep up their 85% or 90% availability. Given the problems of 1943/44 a 70%, 60% or even 50% availability is not unreasonable. On Guadalcanal the US Navy struggled to keep up better than 50% available. They sometimes flew mixed flights of different types to get a viable fighter or strike force aloft.
Galland may have thinking of a 'Maximum Effort' to get 2000+ machines aloft on the same day.
Galland may have thinking of a 'Maximum Effort' to get 2000+ machines aloft on the same day.
Re: General Adolf Galland's suggestions are followed
Yes, that is a fair approximation: The Luftwaffe was forced to "pump up" the squadrons to compensate for the severe lack of capable command personnel.Did Germany have squadrons with 200+ aircraft?
In 1944 the fighter squadrons (Geschwader) received a 4th Staffel for each group, in many cases also a IV. Group.
This meant that the groups were almost invariably at least 48 aircraft strong, making 192 aircraft with 4 groups per squadron - at least on paper.
For the time of November 1944, however, I have serious doubts as to whether the actual operational strengths came close to this.
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Re: General Adolf Galland's suggestions are followed
I think there is a mixup of terminology and translation here.danebrog wrote: ↑15 Mar 2021, 18:08Yes, that is a fair approximation: The Luftwaffe was forced to "pump up" the squadrons to compensate for the severe lack of capable command personnel.Did Germany have squadrons with 200+ aircraft?
In 1944 the fighter squadrons (Geschwader) received a 4th Staffel for each group, in many cases also a IV. Group.
This meant that the groups were almost invariably at least 48 aircraft strong, making 192 aircraft with 4 groups per squadron - at least on paper.
For the time of November 1944, however, I have serious doubts as to whether the actual operational strengths came close to this.
A squadron translates to a Staffel, not a Geschwader. So anywhere between 12 and 20 operational aircraft depending on type and location.
A Geschwader is the equivalent of a Wing, which itself comprised several Gruppen.
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Re: General Adolf Galland's suggestions are followed
You mention 2000 machines. I assume that means bombers of all types, ground attack and fighters of all types? Also you have mentioned 1943 above, but Galland's quote refers to the situation in Nov/44.Carl Schwamberger wrote: ↑15 Mar 2021, 17:14I suspect part of what we are running into is the difference between aircraft actually flyable on any specific day, and including those on hand, but needing a day or two of repair before they are combat worthy. As 1943 spun out the number of mechanical problems ramped up significantly. As did losses from noncombat causes. So there may have been 3700 fighter with engines that could be started and inflated tires, but there were typically only half that may with repairs of battle damage or mechanical failures completed. The AAF & RAF kept up a huge reserve and replacement stream to keep up their 85% or 90% availability. Given the problems of 1943/44 a 70%, 60% or even 50% availability is not unreasonable. On Guadalcanal the US Navy struggled to keep up better than 50% available. They sometimes flew mixed flights of different types to get a viable fighter or strike force aloft.
Galland may have thinking of a 'Maximum Effort' to get 2000+ machines aloft on the same day.
Re: General Adolf Galland's suggestions are followed
Quoted here in the original wording::
Am 12. November 1944 konnte ich die gesamte Jagdwaffe einsatzbereit melden: 18 Jagdgeschwader mit 3‘700 Flugzeugen und Flugzeugführern.
My bad - translated Geschwader as squadron
Am 12. November 1944 konnte ich die gesamte Jagdwaffe einsatzbereit melden: 18 Jagdgeschwader mit 3‘700 Flugzeugen und Flugzeugführern.
My bad - translated Geschwader as squadron