The Germans withdraw from Italy in early 1944

Discussions on alternate history, including events up to 20 years before today. Hosted by Terry Duncan.
Juan G. C.
Member
Posts: 196
Joined: 18 Aug 2017, 17:57
Location: Madrid, España

Re: The Germans withdraw from Italy in early 1944

#16

Post by Juan G. C. » 15 Mar 2021, 20:20

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
15 Mar 2021, 19:19
Well, the Alps cant be operationally flanked by amphibious operations. Confronted by that defense position a astute Allied leader is going to send a hefty portion of Alexanders Army Group elsewhere. Churchill would favor the Balkans. Marshal back in the US and Morgan at the COSSAC offices in London would be thinking of earlier operations into France. Theres a lot of pros and cons to all that, but the Allied leaders were not prone to sit idle.

One of the things that struck me is how Rundsteadt shorted the defense of southern France between the autumn of 1943 & the summer of 1944. He might have larger numbers of good quality mobile corps were Italy abandoned, but his track record for attention to the south littoral is weak. My bet would be any savings sent to him from the former Italian front would be deployed in NW Europe, with a infantry crops sent to the Alps along the French/Italian border.
Which of these options was more probable for the Allied leaders to take? I presume that in this scenario ANVIL wouldn't have been cancelled. Or were there other factors in its cancellation?

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10055
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: The Germans withdraw from Italy in early 1944

#17

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 15 Mar 2021, 20:27

I could not say. My opinion, based on some incomplete gaming, is the Marsaille option creates the greater long term problem for the defense team.

ANVILS cancelation, or more accurately postponement had to do with only the draw down of amphib lift in the MTO. Eisenhower wanted it badly & kept staff officers on two front trying to make it work. it was not completely canceled for April/May until early March 1944. I have examined a January operation into S France, using the resources of Op SHINGLE. Success is dependent of German reactions.


Juan G. C.
Member
Posts: 196
Joined: 18 Aug 2017, 17:57
Location: Madrid, España

Re: The Germans withdraw from Italy in early 1944

#18

Post by Juan G. C. » 15 Mar 2021, 22:00

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
15 Mar 2021, 20:27
ANVILS cancelation, or more accurately postponement had to do with only the draw down of amphib lift in the MTO. Eisenhower wanted it badly & kept staff officers on two front trying to make it work. it was not completely canceled for April/May until early March 1944. I have examined a January operation into S France, using the resources of Op SHINGLE. Success is dependent of German reactions.
And what was the cause of the drawdown of amphib lift in the Mediterranean?

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10055
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: The Germans withdraw from Italy in early 1944

#19

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 15 Mar 2021, 22:59

Expansion of the OVERLORD or NEPTUNE operation from three corps/beacheads to four robust beach heads.

That decision sealed in January 1944 meant the MTO would have amphib lift for only a single weak division by April, & a weak build up capacity. Ike did not like it, but preferred one big assault over two smaller ones. He also understood the amphib fleet could be shifted back to the MTO once the primary lodgment of OVERLORD was established. . The capture of a major port (Cherbourg) was the key event in that. So Ike knew he could still get the secondary operation, just not when originally planned.

Note: The small residual amphib lift remained in the MTO. Partially to support the beached at Anzio, & partially to leave Alexander a token capability in case the enemy left a port unguarded or something.

Note: The ANVIL operation was included in COSSACs 1943 overall concept for OVERLORD. It hit the Germans with a 1-2 punch, and it accommodated the fact that COSSAC could not predict the positioning of the amphib fleets for 1944. Morgan built the early OVERLORD plans around what was available in the UK & the MTO. When the Joint Chiefs created SHAEF they gave Ike the power to take what he needed from the MTO. COSSAC was strictly a planning staff & never could assume the power to make anything actually happen.

User avatar
TheMarcksPlan
Banned
Posts: 3255
Joined: 15 Jan 2019, 23:32
Location: USA

Re: The Germans withdraw from Italy in early 1944

#20

Post by TheMarcksPlan » 15 Mar 2021, 23:41

Same question addressed by Manstein, only he's CinC South:

"We should withdraw to the Romanian/Hungarian border in the East and reinforce Italy with all available forces."
https://twitter.com/themarcksplan
https://www.reddit.com/r/AxisHistoryForum/
https://medium.com/counterfactualww2
"The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians." - FDR, June 1942

daveshoup2MD
Member
Posts: 1541
Joined: 01 Feb 2020, 19:10
Location: Coral and brass

Re: The Germans withdraw from Italy in early 1944

#21

Post by daveshoup2MD » 16 Mar 2021, 07:43

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
15 Mar 2021, 19:19
Well, the Alps cant be operationally flanked by amphibious operations. Confronted by that defense position a astute Allied leader is going to send a hefty portion of Alexanders Army Group elsewhere. Churchill would favor the Balkans. Marshal back in the US and Morgan at the COSSAC offices in London would be thinking of earlier operations into France. Theres a lot of pros and cons to all that, but the Allied leaders were not prone to sit idle.

One of the things that struck me is how Rundsteadt shorted the defense of southern France between the autumn of 1943 & the summer of 1944. He might have larger numbers of good quality mobile corps were Italy abandoned, but his track record for attention to the south littoral is weak. My bet would be any savings sent to him from the former Italian front would be deployed in NW Europe, with a infantry crops sent to the Alps along the French/Italian border.
There's a case to be made the Foggia air base complex was the most significant military asset Italy offered the Allies in 1943-45, and it's reasonable to suggest that once the area was secured in the autumn of 1943, the best strategy for the Allies in Italy would have been to dig in along (essentially) the southern banks of the Volturno and Biterno rivers (essentially, the southernmost element of the German "Winter Line" complex) and reduce the Allied force commensurately; presumably the US 5th Army (one armored, one mountain, and five US infantry divisions, and the Brazilian division, at the high point) is eventually withdrawn and goes into southern France after the 7th Army, giving 6th Army Group two US armies and one French army, with various British, Commonwealth, and possibly Allied elements to follow in a "larger" version of GOLDFLAKE in the winter of 1944-45.

Presumably 8th Army could have held easily with 3-4 corps headquarters, and a dozen or so divisions; based on what was in theater, historically, that could be the British V, X, and XIII corps, the British 1st, 4th, 46th, 56th, and 78th infantry divisions, the 4th, 8th, and 10th Indian divisions, and the 2nd New Zealand Division, as well as various separate armored/tank and infantry brigades; presumably the Co-Belligerent Army would be raised, so that's the equivalent of 1-3 more "British" type (3 brigade) divisions (or 2-4 "light" divisions, with two brigade equivalents each), which gets to ~12 by 1944-45; if there's a shortfall, Italy would be an obvious place for the 52nd Division. The South African 6th Armoured Division could serve as a mobile reserve in Italy or go to NW Europe and help beef up 21st Army Group.

The Polish II Corps is an interesting question; it began the campaign with two light divisions and an armored brigade and ended it with two 3-brigade divisions (six brigades total) and most of an armoured division; certainly could be useful in NW Europe, for a variety of tasks.

Formations available to follow the Americans and the Canadian I Corps and the British 5th Infantry Division to to NW Europe in 1944-45 (and as the Italians were built up) would include the British 1st and 6th armoured divisions, which would certainly help keep 2nd Army up up to strength (replacing 50th and 59th divisions), although without the heavy casualties incurred in the 1943-44 and 1944-45 battles in Italy, the British might be able to maintain the 1943 order of battle.

This is less certain, but absent the requirements for logistics troops that having a US field army fighting in Italy, the 2nd Cavalry Division might not be broken up in North Africa and might see active duty in the ETO in 1944-45, as well.

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10055
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: The Germans withdraw from Italy in early 1944

#22

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 16 Mar 2021, 13:21

daveshoup2MD wrote:
16 Mar 2021, 07:43
There's a case to be made the Foggia air base complex was the most significant military asset Italy offered the Allies in 1943-45, and it's reasonable to suggest that once the area was secured in the autumn of 1943, the best strategy for the Allies in Italy would have been to dig in along (essentially) the southern banks of the Volturno and Biterno rivers (essentially, the southernmost element of the German "Winter Line" complex) and reduce the Allied force commensurately;
I've never seriously considered Genoa as a entry point, to lever the defense out of the industrial north. The adjacent mountain ranges are a obstacle. If you can't logistically support the 'extra army in France then maybe Genoaas a second tier operation?

Juan G. C.
Member
Posts: 196
Joined: 18 Aug 2017, 17:57
Location: Madrid, España

Re: The Germans withdraw from Italy in early 1944

#23

Post by Juan G. C. » 16 Mar 2021, 14:32

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
15 Mar 2021, 22:59
Expansion of the OVERLORD or NEPTUNE operation from three corps/beacheads to four robust beach heads.

That decision sealed in January 1944 meant the MTO would have amphib lift for only a single weak division by April, & a weak build up capacity. Ike did not like it, but preferred one big assault over two smaller ones. He also understood the amphib fleet could be shifted back to the MTO once the primary lodgment of OVERLORD was established. . The capture of a major port (Cherbourg) was the key event in that. So Ike knew he could still get the secondary operation, just not when originally planned.

Note: The small residual amphib lift remained in the MTO. Partially to support the beached at Anzio, & partially to leave Alexander a token capability in case the enemy left a port unguarded or something.

Note: The ANVIL operation was included in COSSACs 1943 overall concept for OVERLORD. It hit the Germans with a 1-2 punch, and it accommodated the fact that COSSAC could not predict the positioning of the amphib fleets for 1944. Morgan built the early OVERLORD plans around what was available in the UK & the MTO. When the Joint Chiefs created SHAEF they gave Ike the power to take what he needed from the MTO. COSSAC was strictly a planning staff & never could assume the power to make anything actually happen.
Then the Anzio landings were not a factor in the cancelación/postponement of ANVIL? I have always thought it was.

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10055
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: The Germans withdraw from Italy in early 1944

#24

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 16 Mar 2021, 18:15

I'd heard that too. But, Pogues biography of Marshal has a paragraph on the ANVIL decision, Atkinsons Guns at Last Light, and the bio of Eisenhower on my shelf also discuss it & make no reference to the Anzio enclave. or Op SHINGLE. Everything seems to revolve around the necessity to get the amphib fleet off to the UK for the expected 1 May target for Op NEPTUNE.

The Anzio bridgehead was one of the reasons a token amphib group remained in the Med. Some landing craft were still required to lighter material to the beach from the supply ship, or Naples with the larger like the LST. Other resources refer to the idea Alexander needed a 'one division lift' for unexpected opportunities.

Air support does not seem to have been a problem. By early january 1944 Corsica had slightly over 1000 French and US bombers, fighters, and a few ASW aircraft. P47 & P51 groups based in S Italy & Sicilly could also range the Riviera and Marseilles.

Juan G. C.
Member
Posts: 196
Joined: 18 Aug 2017, 17:57
Location: Madrid, España

Re: The Germans withdraw from Italy in early 1944

#25

Post by Juan G. C. » 16 Mar 2021, 20:33

I think I have found out how SHINGLE was related to the cancelation or postponement of ANVIL. In United States Army in World War II.: Cross-channel attack it is said:

"The British, in asking the cancellation of ANVIL, were thinking at least as much of the need for additional resources with which to prosecute the Italian campaign as they were of diverting landing craft to strengthen OVERLORD. On 22 January, U.S. VI Corps units had landed at Anzio. The landing behind the enemy lines facing the Fifth Army was designed to force the Germans to pull out and leave the road to Rome open. Instead of pulling out, the Germans held the Fifth Army attack at the Gustav Line and counterattacked the beachhead. The beachhead was successfully defended but it soon became apparent that no quick link-up with the main armies was going to be possible.36 The British had concluded'; early in February that the Germans meant to fight it out in central Italy and they saw this development as altering the Allied strategic decisions made at Tehran. They thought General Alexander, commander of 15 Army Group, controlling the ground forces in Italy, would need a least some of the troops earmarked for ANVIL and that the amphibious lift for one division should be reserved for his use for possible new operations similar to the Anzio "end run." The British Chiefs of Staff declared: "Germany . . . is now apparently playing our game [of tying up German forces in the Mediterranean] and we must do all we can to pin down her forces and commit them still further.... We have no choice but to prosecute the Italian Campaign with vigor....""

Then, had the Germans withdrawn from Italy or even only to the Northern Appenines, perhaps the British would not have pressed so much for the cancelation of ANVIL. Perhaps it could have been kept at the expense of OVERLORD. On February 19 Field Marshal Alan Brooke wrote in his diary: "We had a very long COS. First of all Eisenhower, Bedell Smith, Tedder and Cooke etc all came in representing American Chiefs of Staff to discuss desirability of having an amphibious attack against South of France to coincide with Cross Channel operations. Luckily I had discovered last night from Monty that he and Bertie Ramsay had foolishly agreed to curtail the cross Channel operation to allow for a South of France operation. If they had had any sense they would have realized that the situation in Italy now makes such an operation impossible. They had agreed to please Eisenhower, who was pressing for it to please Marshall!!! What a way to run a war! I had a little difficulty with Eisenhower, but not much to make him see sense, as all he required was a little pressure to go back to the plan that he really liked best now that he had shown some attampt to support Marshall's foolish idea! I think the matter is now all right".

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10055
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: The Germans withdraw from Italy in early 1944

#26

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 17 Mar 2021, 02:36

Wow
Juan G. C. wrote:
16 Mar 2021, 20:33
I think I have found out how SHINGLE was related to the cancelation or postponement of ANVIL. In United States Army in World War II.: Cross-channel attack it is said:

"The British, in asking the cancellation of ANVIL, were thinking at least as much of the need for additional resources with which to prosecute the Italian campaign as they were of diverting landing craft to strengthen OVERLORD.
The Brits, or at least Churchll had been up to the Terhan conference in November asking for the postponement of OVERLORD as well. Churchill had argued for postponement for a year, to take advantage of opportunities in the Balkans. Returning from Terhan Churchill stopped off to confer with Alexander & Wilson. He was adamant about executing op SHINGLE & lectured on about the opportunities that would open up and the strategic options pertaining to capturing the "Lubjana Gap".

The British had concluded'; early in February that the Germans meant to fight it out in central Italy
Clark had predicted this in December when he first saw the SHINGLE plan. He also pointed out then the amphib lift remaining then was inadequate to execute the SHINGLE plan as originally conceived. Alexander seems to have understood this as well, but he had what amounted to a direct order from Churchill & turned down Clarks recommendation to cancel the operation.
... and they saw this development as altering the Allied strategic decisions made at Tehran. They thought General Alexander, commander of 15 Army Group, controlling the ground forces in Italy, would need a least some of the troops earmarked for ANVIL and that the amphibious lift for one division should be reserved for his use for possible new operations similar to the Anzio "end run." The British Chiefs of Staff declared: "Germany . . . is now apparently playing our game [of tying up German forces in the Mediterranean] and we must do all we can to pin down her forces and commit them still further.... We have no choice but to prosecute the Italian Campaign with vigor....""
Sounds like the excerpts quoted from Churchills memos and conferences, verbatim. I've not figured out what Alexander or Wilson, really thought. Brooke in my limited reading seems to have agreed with Churchill. He was long in giving up on his Balkans ideas, which pertains to his happiness over the cancellation of Op AMVIL & his chagrin at its reemergence in Op DRAGOON.
Then, had the Germans withdrawn from Italy or even only to the Northern Appenines, perhaps the British would not have pressed so much for the cancelation of ANVIL. Perhaps it could have been kept at the expense of OVERLORD. On February 19 Field Marshal Alan Brooke wrote in his diary: "We had a very long COS. First of all Eisenhower, Bedell Smith, Tedder and Cooke etc all came in representing American Chiefs of Staff to discuss desirability of having an amphibious attack against South of France to coincide with Cross Channel operations. Luckily I had discovered last night from Monty that he and Bertie Ramsay had foolishly agreed to curtail the cross Channel operation to allow for a South of France operation. If they had had any sense they would have realized that the situation in Italy now makes such an operation impossible. They had agreed to please Eisenhower, who was pressing for it to please Marshall!!! What a way to run a war! I had a little difficulty with Eisenhower, but not much to make him see sense, as all he required was a little pressure to go back to the plan that he really liked best now that he had shown some attampt to support Marshall's foolish idea! I think the matter is now all right".
Thats Brookes version. Three month earlier he had been supporting Churchill in arguing against invading France in 1944. Others have contradictory ideas. In any case Ike never reduced the NEPTUNE op from the January plan Monty presented and approved delaying it from May to June to allow a fifth corps/beachead to be added.

The revival as Op DRAGOON was endorsed by the Joint Chiefs, despite Chuchills adamant opposition. His memos to Ike and arguments in meetings cited proposed the advantages of campaigning in the Danube valley & the terrible bloodbath certain on the Riviera beaches. The Joint Chiefs backed Eisenhower on opening the Marsailles port group and getting the French army into action. Churchill proposed in Eisenhower simply have them sent around to the French Atlantic ports so the amphib fleet could be used for other worthy actions in the Mediterranean. I don't know if Ike had to remind him the Allies did not have the use of those ports and the way things were going were not likely to very soon.

The French had made it known they were done with assisting on other fronts. Eight divisions were ready in the summer of 1944, and two more were nearing readiness. Cadred with veterans and well equipped with new US material. ∂eGualle had made it clear they were going to fight in France & not in British adventures elsewhere. I am guessing Ike saw the logic in that. Securing French Mediterranean ports was the fastest way to get them home and get them busy at something productive.

A alternative is with the Germans withdrawn to the Austrian Alps in 1943 the Joint Chiefs look for other avenues than the Balkans.

daveshoup2MD
Member
Posts: 1541
Joined: 01 Feb 2020, 19:10
Location: Coral and brass

Re: The Germans withdraw from Italy in early 1944

#27

Post by daveshoup2MD » 17 Mar 2021, 04:26

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
16 Mar 2021, 13:21
daveshoup2MD wrote:
16 Mar 2021, 07:43
There's a case to be made the Foggia air base complex was the most significant military asset Italy offered the Allies in 1943-45, and it's reasonable to suggest that once the area was secured in the autumn of 1943, the best strategy for the Allies in Italy would have been to dig in along (essentially) the southern banks of the Volturno and Biterno rivers (essentially, the southernmost element of the German "Winter Line" complex) and reduce the Allied force commensurately;
I've never seriously considered Genoa as a entry point, to lever the defense out of the industrial north. The adjacent mountain ranges are a obstacle. If you can't logistically support the 'extra army in France then maybe Genoaas a second tier operation?
Maybe, but given Marseille and Toulon, pretty certain there was capacity to spare; I like the idea of Devers with two US armies to work with - opens up some possibilities. The French did quite well in 1944-45, honestly, given the handicaps they had to deal with, but having the 5th and 7th gives Devers to resources to move aggressively and the various challenges with the French are a little less challenging.

One option, of course, given the undeniable capabilities of the French in mountain warfare, would have been to use the French 1st Army against northwestern Italy, with an army-sized amphibious assault aimed at Genoa and and an overland operation using a beefed up Army Detachment of the Alps (perhaps with the US 10th and/or British 52nd mountain divisions under command) in the Maritime Alps; catch the Army Liguria between a rock and a hard place.

Juan G. C.
Member
Posts: 196
Joined: 18 Aug 2017, 17:57
Location: Madrid, España

Re: The Germans withdraw from Italy in early 1944

#28

Post by Juan G. C. » 17 Mar 2021, 09:10

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
17 Mar 2021, 02:36
Then, had the Germans withdrawn from Italy or even only to the Northern Appenines, perhaps the British would not have pressed so much for the cancelation of ANVIL. Perhaps it could have been kept at the expense of OVERLORD. On February 19 Field Marshal Alan Brooke wrote in his diary: "We had a very long COS. First of all Eisenhower, Bedell Smith, Tedder and Cooke etc all came in representing American Chiefs of Staff to discuss desirability of having an amphibious attack against South of France to coincide with Cross Channel operations. Luckily I had discovered last night from Monty that he and Bertie Ramsay had foolishly agreed to curtail the cross Channel operation to allow for a South of France operation. If they had had any sense they would have realized that the situation in Italy now makes such an operation impossible."
Thats Brookes version. Three month earlier he had been supporting Churchill in arguing against invading France in 1944. Others have contradictory ideas. In any case Ike never reduced the NEPTUNE op from the January plan Monty presented and approved delaying it from May to June to allow a fifth corps/beachead to be added.
Then what Brooke says about Monty and Ramsay agreeing to curtail OVERLORD to allow for ANVIL never happened?

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10055
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: The Germans withdraw from Italy in early 1944

#29

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 17 Mar 2021, 17:05

daveshoup2MD wrote:
17 Mar 2021, 04:26
...
One option, of course, given the undeniable capabilities of the French in mountain warfare, would have been to use the French 1st Army against northwestern Italy, with an army-sized amphibious assault aimed at Genoa and and an overland operation using a beefed up Army Detachment of the Alps (perhaps with the US 10th and/or British 52nd mountain divisions under command) in the Maritime Alps; catch the Army Liguria between a rock and a hard place.
The only option for the French at this point was the liberation of France. They probably would have broken off and gone on their own had the other Allies not cooperated.

Carl Schwamberger
Host - Allied sections
Posts: 10055
Joined: 02 Sep 2006, 21:31
Location: USA

Re: The Germans withdraw from Italy in early 1944

#30

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 17 Mar 2021, 17:06

These things are highly nuanced and the meanings easily distorted. Ive found when you lay out all the memos, meeting minutes, and related documents over the entire arc of planning everyones thinking gets murky and all their post war members look like one solid lie. I'm currently picking through Authur Bryants analysis of Brookes diaries and related wartime documents. All I can conclude at this point is Brooke regarded almost everyone else as a idiot at strategy & saw himself as frequently rescuing the Allied effort from disaster. That may have colored his interpretation.

A few notes on the NEPTUNE operation size. COSSACs 1943 plans worked with what was then available in the UK for amphibious shipping, and combat forces. That limited the assault to three Corp and beaches. Montgomerys January plan proposed four corps, all between Carentan & Caen. The amphib shipping from the MTO enabled that. February war-games confirmed concerns about the 1st Army pivoting north into the Cotientin and capturing Cherbourg in two weeks. The rivers nd marshlands north and west of Carentan made the maneuver difficult. This was resolved by delaying the entire operation a moth so additional landing craft from the US could support a fifth Corps/Beachhead north of Carentan on the Cotientin east coast. Eisenhower endorsed both of these expansions of the assault and follow up plans. Churchill thru all of this still lobbied for attention to the "marvelous" opportunities in the Mediterranean theatre. Brooke seems to have been caught between catering to his PMs desires and supporting the colossal crack doctrine Ike and Monty saw for Op OVERLORD.

Ike remained attached to the ANVIL operation and kept staff officers busy through February trying to make it work somehow. Maybe Monty and Bertie Ramsay were still pondering Ikes desire to execute ANVIL in April. The 19th February date Brooke gives for this incident is close to the date of the decision to expand the Normandy assault to five corps. I don't have the dates for the war-games or decision at hand.

Post Reply

Return to “What if”