The Germans withdraw from Italy in early 1944

[Carl Schwamberger]

Is it known why and when was decided that ANVIL could not tales place before OVERLORD? It is annoying, but I could not find It. I thought It was at Teheran, but I cannot find any source.

Pogues biography of Marshal has a few bits on this as it pertains to Marshal. Perrets Eisenhower biography has several pages in each of two chapters outlining Ikes PoV. Atkinsons volume on the last year of the war for the US Army has a paragraph on Eisenhowers actions & the primary influences on him one way or another. Hyperwar has several paragraphs on the subject. If I remember when I return to the desk I'll try to post a essay i turned up.

Still, had It taken place more or less simultaneously, with the compromise on landing craft, how would it have affected the two operations?

What jumps to my mind first is the multiple times I gamed it out. The defense is stuck between several risky choices. It can try to concentrate on one or the other invasion & gamble on destroying it. But that lets the other attack achieve significant success. A more balanced approach trying to defeat one while confining the other has its risks. Drawing on Kesselrings reserves from Italy shifts risk around, which may or may not have a overall benefit.

At this point in the War Hitler usually tried to have things both ways. if you want to talk real world then he'd probably try to deal with the first attack with inadequate measures, while still leaving the other front vulnerable. This problem for the defense player extends past the early stages. The attacker has some choice on where reinforcements enter which the defender has difficulty anticipating. Reinforcing the defense on one front risks the other. & as the game progresses its increasingly difficult for the defense to shift shrinking reserves around.

As far as affecting size of Op NEPTUNE or OVERLORD that would require examination and calculation of numbers I don't have. For modeling purposes I chopped a May NEPTUNE op by 40% & a June op by 20-30 % for different iterations. That is the initial lift. Follow up is more dependent on the capture of Cherbourg & Marseilles and the storm factor with the Mulberry docks.

[Juan G. C.]

Is it known why and when was decided that ANVIL could not tales place before OVERLORD? It is annoying, but I could not find It. I thought It was at Teheran, but I cannot find any source.

Pogues biography of Marshal has a few bits on this as it pertains to Marshal. Perrets Eisenhower biography has several pages in each of two chapters outlining Ikes PoV. Atkinsons volume on the last year of the war for the US Army has a paragraph on Eisenhowers actions & the primary influences on him one way or another. Hyperwar has several paragraphs on the subject. If I remember when I return to the desk I'll try to post a essay i turned up.

Still, had It taken place more or less simultaneously, with the compromise on landing craft, how would it have affected the two operations?

What jumps to my mind first is the multiple times I gamed it out. The defense is stuck between several risky choices. It can try to concentrate on one or the other invasion & gamble on destroying it. But that lets the other attack achieve significant success. A more balanced approach trying to defeat one while confining the other has its risks. Drawing on Kesselrings reserves from Italy shifts risk around, which may or may not have a overall benefit.

At this point in the War Hitler usually tried to have things both ways. if you want to talk real world then he'd probably try to deal with the first attack with inadequate measures, while still leaving the other front vulnerable. This problem for the defense player extends past the early stages. The attacker has some choice on where reinforcements enter which the defender has difficulty anticipating. Reinforcing the defense on one front risks the other. & as the game progresses its increasingly difficult for the defense to shift shrinking reserves around.

As far as affecting size of Op NEPTUNE or OVERLORD that would require examination and calculation of numbers I don't have. For modeling purposes I chopped a May NEPTUNE op by 40% & a June op by 20-30 % for different iterations. That is the initial lift. Follow up is more dependent on the capture of Cherbourg & Marseilles and the storm factor with the Mulberry docks.

I've found that by December 5th the Combined Staff Planners were assuming "that operation Anvil will approximately coincide with Overlord" (https://history.state.gov/historicaldoc ... ehran/d484), so it seems that by then it was ruled out that ANVIL should precede OVERLORD.

I presume that the requirement that they take place simultaneously doesn't mean that both operations must be launched the same day (EDIT: as coordination would have been difficult, because one operation might need postponement, as happened IOTL with Overlord, which was postponed from June 5 to June 6).

[Carl Schwamberger]

The December guidance or directive stated the two operations should have the same target date for planning purposes. Its unlikely tide and weather conditions alone would allow simultaneous attacks. Even in the same week could be problematic when everything else is added in. But, in grand strategic terms a week, or even a month are simultaneous.

Looking over the readiness & arrivals of Rundsteadts forces, the distraction of Op Margarethe, & the stagnation of the Italian front it looks like the earlier a ANVIL op could be executed the better. Unfortunately there is the persistent question of amphib lift.

[Juan G. C.]

The December guidance or directive stated the two operations should have the same target date for planning purposes. Its unlikely tide and weather conditions alone would allow simultaneous attacks. Even in the same week could be problematic when everything else is added in. But, in grand strategic terms a week, or even a month are simultaneous.

Looking over the readiness & arrivals of Rundsteadts forces, the distraction of Op Margarethe, & the stagnation of the Italian front it looks like the earlier a ANVIL op could be executed the better. Unfortunately there is the persistent question of amphib lift.

Thanks! I think I will open a thread specifically about ANVIL and OVERLORD being launched with the shipping and amphib craft allocation of the February compromise.

[Carl Schwamberger]

I suspect we will reidentify the same problems, the question of risk reduction & ensuring Op NEPTUNE is a sledgehammer blow, and the inability to float supporting ops.

[Juan G. C.]

I suspect we will reidentify the same problems, the question of risk reduction & ensuring Op NEPTUNE is a sledgehammer blow, and the inability to float supporting ops.

Yes, but the question is: if launched, would that have affected the final outcome, the success of the Operations?

[Carl Schwamberger]

Its really not obvious to me. So much depends on how far you go in shifting resources from other fronts to enable this. The defense is not a static factor, even with HItlers misjudgments allowed for there is still a reaction to be allowed for. In some ways its a smaller version of the 1943 invasion debate. Both have the problem of concentrating enough amphib lift.

Thanks! I think I will open a thread specifically about ANVIL and OVERLORD being launched with the shipping and amphib craft allocation of the February compromise.

I'm wondering it its been done here before. Unfortunately the Arm Chair General site is gone, so the thread there can't be drawn on.

[Juan G. C.]

I'm wondering it its been done here before. Unfortunately the Arm Chair General site is gone, so the thread there can't be drawn on.

It hasn't AFAIK. There are threads about ANVIL not being canceled/postponed, but none takes into consideration the February compromise on landing craft.

[Carl Schwamberger]

It its a bit obscure. The discussion on ACG was set further forward in January. proposing substituting a early ANVIL op for SHINGLE. When I ran through it on the game board one of the iterations was in February. One thing that did not come up was the effect of the absence of a couple Pz Corps for the Hungarian coup in March. Neither did we discuss the effect of a Jan/Feb invasion on the Hungarian affair, or any shift of units to the east in the first quarter of the year.