KDF33 wrote: ↑
04 Apr 2021 03:44
At some point in August, yes.
Glad we are in agreement here.
Tell me where the mobile formations of Heeresgruppe Mitte were on August 19th then on October 2nd, and you'll realize how wrong that statement is.
2nd Panzer Army is near Starodub, with no real effective opposition to them and in between the collapsing Central Front and Reserve Front, in an open flank from which they merely need turn East to exploit. 3rd Panzer might be slower to launch off, but it's definitely within its capabilities to do such soon.
I don't want the citations for chapter 10. I want the specific sources from which he derives his operational ratios.
...which is why I gave you all of the citations for Chapter 10, from which the citation was drawn from.
The late August / early September series is the only data I have that shows operational readiness among all the Panzer formations.
Jentz only provides the full series on operational numbers (not %) for two of HGM's nine Panzer divisions, the 10. and the 12. For the relevant dates, data shows:
10. Panzer: 176 on 21.6, 88 on 1.8, 125 on 11.8, 150 on 21.8, 152 on 1.10
12. Panzer: 234 on 21.6, 95 on 1.8, 98 on 11.8, 94 on 21.8, 74 on 1.10 (the last date with HGN)
Note that 10. Panzer had 175 tanks in total (operational + repair) on September 4, whereas 12. Panzer had 131 on August 26.
The point is that Panzer formations were at 90% to almost 100% readiness on June 22. The mobile units that destroyed 5 Soviet armies at Vyazma were at a similar rate of readiness. None of the Panzer formations of Heeresgruppe Mitte were close to that level in mid-August, and would have required some R&R time to get there.
Which I will grant, by saying five to six days of rest, same as occurred in early August before 2nd and 3rd Panzer Armies went on continuous offensive action for six weeks. Likewise, we have to consider the position of the Soviets at this point; Glantz shows they only had around 350 operational tanks at this point in Reserve and Western Fronts.
The important figure is the readiness rate, not total numbers.
I'd rather have 1,000 total tanks with only 40% operational rate than 350 tanks with a 100% operational rate.
That's your assumption. In the OTL, the Panzer formations involved in the Vyazma encirclement were either fresh formations (2., 5.) or had 15-20 days of R&R (1., 6., 7., 10., 11., 20.). The one formation with less than 2 weeks of R&R (19.) was kept in reserve at the beginning of Taifun.
No, it's what AGC achieved in early August and based off Nigel Askey showing roughly 26% of their tanks were in field workshops, which generally had a turn around of less than a week depending on the conditions present; given AGC was fairly static outside of its mobile arms and thus had a stable rear area situation, conditions were good in August.
Further, I have absolutely no idea where you are getting 15-20 days of rest, given the Kiev encirclement wasn't even achieved until September 16th and Typhoon jumped off October 2nd, meaning at absolute maximum they would have 16 days of rest. Even that did not occur given, among other things, the need to travel back to Army Group Center so not much rest or refitting there, but actually more wear and tear.
Those figures are for the whole front, not just for Heeresgruppe Mitte.
And you were citing multiple Panzer Divisions not even attached to AGC, so I fail to see your point?
Incorrect. I'll explain it step-by-step:
1. STAVKA asks Fronts and independent Armies for personnel strength reports.
2. Fronts and independent Armies proceed with a head count.
3. STAVKA receives the individual reports.
4. STAVKA combines them to arrive at an overall figure for the operational army.
5. On that basis, STAVKA sets rations for the next month.
There are no estimates here.
Which, as Per70 has already pointed out, has quite a few flaws in it as evidenced to the ration reports not matching reported strengths by almost 100%.
I did no such thing.
You did here:
KDF33 wrote: ↑
31 Mar 2021 05:45
What you propose is jumping off, almost immediately, from your positions in front of Smolensk, without a pause to build-up supplies or restore operational numbers. Besides, in August the entire HGM amounts to 55 divisions, including your units that will hold against Central Front.
Realistically though, 2nd Army under Weichs is already collapsing them by August 20th, so no real need to change this.
They're not. Personnel strength reports are not derived by subtracting casualties and adding reinforcements; they're just a head count.
Evidently not, as noted by Per70. Beyond that though, it doesn't refute the claim; if you are failing to record casualties properly, you're not getting an accurate headcount.
That's one way to frame it. Another would be that unsupported mobile formations racing ahead of their infantry tend to make shoddy pockets.
An odd claim to make, specifically in 1941 given Kiev and then the V-B encirclement.
How am I counting Central Front? None of the data I've presented includes Central Front, which was dissolved on August 26.
Again, you did here:
KDF33 wrote: ↑
30 Mar 2021 05:21
Here's a comparison of the manpower of the relevant Soviet Fronts between early September and early October:
West + Reserve: 1,002,000 / 920,000
Bryansk: 294,000 / 294,000
Total: 1,296,000 / 1,214,000
A lot of Bryansk Front's strength was from formations from the defeated Central Front.
It's your scenario. When do you pull it out?
Let's say August 23-25th, shall we?
HGM reserve: ~100 tanks
Panzergruppe 3: ~500 tanks
Panzergruppe 4: ~800 tanks
Panzergruppe 2: ~700 tanks
For a total of ~2,100 tanks, which is virtually identical to what Heeresgruppe Mitte had on June 22. Note that this stands for total figures, not operational numbers.
Okay, thank you. AGC (which didn't have Panzer Army 4 in June) entered combat with 1,780 AFVs in June, 4th Panzer at the same time had around 600 tanks in June, for a combined total of 2,380 tanks. If you want to fact in operational rates, let's say 75% for ATL August and 90%, as you've stated, for October which comes out to 1,785 for the former and 1,890 for October, a difference of about 100 AFVs.
Where do you assemble the mobile units? What are your groupings?
Then you should look up where those places are on Google Map. And also contrast that distribution with that of Taifun.
4th Panzer providing flank security, 3rd Panzer Army mobilizing at its historical jump off point, and 2nd Panzer Army going east from Starodub. Infantry armies keeping the Soviets pinned in the center.
Panzergruppe 2 is not even facing Western and Reserve Fronts at the time.
Exactly, which is excellent because attacking the enemy head on in their lines is not only against German doctrine it's also incredibly incompetents in general. Rather, as STAVKA noted this meant there was a gaping hole in Soviet lines which Guderian could exploit in a flanking attack, allowing him to move around Reserve Front and thus conduct a proper encirclement while 3rd Panzer Army supported by 4th Panzer Army seeks to do the same to the North.
XXXIX. Armeekorps (mot.) had time to recuperate. Guderian was pushing against Bryansk Front, which had less than a third of the strength of the forces arrayed on the Moscow axis, for a similar frontage.
Good, see above; this means Guderian can easily get into the rear area of Reserve Front.
You are reading far too much into a throwaway line by Glantz.
I conclude that you have no evidence to provide.
Besides citing the premier Western expert on the Soviet side of the Eastern Front directly saying what I am, a point you previously agreed with openly? Of the two of us, I'm the only one with a citation, you're just dismissing with no evidence in counter.
Southwestern Front wouldn't be retreating for months. Besides, in 1941 the Germans had such limited replacements that they grew ever-weaker simply by virtue of being in combat, whether on the offensive or the defensive. Without the destruction of Southwestern Front in September, Heeresgruppe Süd will continue to weaken without destroying as many Soviet formations nor capturing as much territory as in the OTL.
How do you know they won't be? Beyond that, as StG 44 has pointed out, the claim the Germans weakened over 1941 just isn't supported by the documentation; OKH had reasonably predicted losses up to December of 1941 and had replacements for about 80-90% of losses sustained on hand for such. Further, how exactly is AGS being weakened if its opponents are retreating? How are they weaker if they have a more condensed, less over extended front?
What are you talking about? What is a "central mobilization point"? Look at this map
. Why would the Soviets be unable to form a solid front on the Moscow axis?
Because the Moscow axis is in German hands? Which meant supplies and mobilized formations from the other cities could assemble at Moscow for one organized location.
His Operation Typhoon book, Page 294.
Nope. At best you've swapped Moscow for Kiev in September. Then October sees the Soviets saving 100,000s of MIAs over the OTL because you have no follow-up.
You get V-B in late August/early September and then can turn Panzer Group 4 back to the North to take Leningrad and eliminate the Soviet forces there for a follow up. Beyond that, though, to focus on the destruction of armies is to make the same mistake the Germans did; destroying Soviet armies without eliminating the economic means of building new ones is a pointless affair. Taking Moscow and Leningrad not only collapses the Soviet infrastructure network, it also eliminates roughly 40% of Soviet industrial capacity in 1940 values at a time when it had already lost 40% historically.
Yes, Southwestern Front has probably survived, at least in 1941. What happens in 1942 after months of low supplies and the inability to source new replacements? With Army Group Center and and Army Group North largely secure and thus enabling a pincer movement from AGS from the West and AGC from the North against it?
1) The Fronts facing HGN/HGS would suffer lower casualties than historically.
In the case of AGS, sure, but that works both ways as I've already noted. On the otherhand, you have yet to submit a compelling argument for AGN's front.
2) Why would they be deprived of reinforcements?
Because you said so yourself when I asked why you posted the divisional list from September of 1941? See here:
History Learner wrote: ↑
30 Mar 2021 18:56
I'm not sure what this is supposed to prove, given only four of these divisions were sent to oppose AGC. Are you proposing they all do?
In which case Army Group North is able to take Leningrad in August/September and Army Group South is going to have an absolute ball of a time in Ukraine.
To which you replied:
KDF33 wrote: ↑
30 Mar 2021 23:00
These divisions were sent where the Germans were attacking in September, in the north and in the south. Had the Germans been attacking in the center, that is where, presumably, they would have been sent.
So which way is it? Do the divisions have their historical deployment zones or not? In which case, AGN is facing a much, much weaker opponent come October, when 4th Panzer Army is rotated back into its sector.
Attack with what? You've transferred Panzergruppe 4 to HGM, and HGS's mobile formations will be completely burned out in the fall. Do you propose hammering away with your infantry, à la Great War?
Okay, first, taking the statement at face value how exactly did AGN go on the offensive IOTL with a "burned" out 4th Panzer Group? Why would Panzer Group 4 be burned out here is an even better question? Further, why can't AGN go on the offensive with a hypothetically burned out 4th Panzer Army, if we take that at face value? We've established they did go on the offensive IOTL, and here the Soviet forces facing them are weaker, if we take your original claim of Soviet force deployment.
Finally, for all the claim of a Great War outcome, it's notable Central Front was destroyed historically by von Weich's with 2nd Army, which was not a Panzer Army mind you.
1) In what world does HGN/HGS take lower losses?
A world where Southwestern Front retreats, from the Kiev bulge in August, meaning no heavy combat for AGS to take its historical losses in; if nobody is shooting at them, how are they taking combat losses? For AGN, if they are sitting on the defensive on the Luga Line, how exactly are they taking more losses, especially if we accept your argument they won't go on the offensive?
2) Why are Soviet forces facing them weaker?
Because, in the case of AGN, you yourself specified they don't' receive reinforcements in September. If you're not replacing losses, you're growing weaker as a force.
The onus of proving your case is on you. You're arguing for the ATL, after all.
Except we're not arguing my case, I am questioning a specific point you made:
KDF33 wrote: ↑
02 Apr 2021 05:47
Not necessarily. For some factories, it is shorter to transit through Kirov than through Moscow.
Can you provide data for this?
Those 20 divisions do not represent the totality of Soviet reinforcements - just the fresh divisions.
Then by all means, do enlighten us; I think you will find Soviet force creation in general was weaker in September than most of 1941.
Seriously? How are you going to push the Soviets back without mobile formations?
Beyond the fact 4th Panzer Army could be returned, again see the situation with von Weich's and his 2nd Army in August historically.
A grand total of 2 divisions: 26th rifle and 46th cavalry.
You are, again, moving the goalposts. To cite your own table:
From Arkhangelsk Military District:
-286th rifle division, to Leningrad Front
From Moscow Military District:
-27th cavalry division, to 4th Army
From Orel Military District:
-294th rifle division, to Leningrad Front
-29th cavalry division, to Reserve Front
-31st cavalry division, to Reserve Front
From Kharkov Military District:
-393rd rifle division, to Southern Front
-411th rifle division, to Southern Front
From North Caucasus Military District:
-157th rifle division, to Separate Coastal Army
-38th cavalry division, to Southern Front
From Transcaucasian Front:
-4th rifle division, to Southern Front
-136th rifle division, to Southern Front
-47th mountain rifle division, to Southwestern Front
-76th mountain rifle division, to Southwestern Front
From Volga Military District:
-46th cavalry division, to Northwestern Front
From Ural Military District:
-313th rifle division, to 7th Army
From Siberian Military District:
-49th cavalry division, to Southern Front
From Transbaikal Military District:
-114th rifle division, to 7th Army
From Far Eastern Front:
-21st rifle division, to 7th Army
-26th rifle division, to Northwestern Front
-32nd rifle division, to 4th Army
That's actually nine divisions, and effectively means 4th Army never gets its second formation which historically occurred in September of 1941. Funnily enough, this was one of the Soviet armies that protected Tikhvin, which again validates my point.
You're again presenting no data. How much supplies did the northern theater consume? What was the capacity of the residual railways? What would be the impact of Leningrad being able to maintain significant production? How much would a static front reduce supply requirements?
Also, what is your timeline for the fall of Moscow?
I am, again, stating what you previously conceded, which was lower capacity for the railways. Do I have the exact data? No, but I do have Glantz saying the loss would be fatal.
This is confused. HGN wouldn't have a manpower advantage over its Soviet counterparts. There's also no reason why they wouldn't receive reinforcements in September. Finally, they would also take lower losses.
You've already established they wouldn't receive September reinforcements. In August of 1941, Soviet force counts around Leningrad (Including 7th Army but not counting 14th Army around Murmansk) constituted roughly 38 divisions to 26 Divisions for Army Group North; adding in the Finns with their seven divisions would thus equal 34 Axis to 38 Soviet. This is OTL totals, for the record, and we've already established no Soviet reinforcements in September but 2nd and 5th Panzer could be added to AGN since Moscow has been taken.
Now you may transfer Panzergruppe 4 back to HGN after Moscow, but again what would be your timeline?
How long do you expect it to take to capture Moscow, anyway?
I will make a post specifically about this.
You do realize all but two of the divisions used to counter the Tikhvin drive came from the northern theater, right? The Germans simply attacked where the Soviets were weak, the latter shuffled in-theater forces to face them, and then the Germans were driven back to their starting lines by superior Soviet forces.
And said Northern theater received at least nine divisions in September before the offensive started that won't happen here, removing the 4th Army that opposed the offensive historically and you've also removed those two divisions that reinforced them historically during the attack; that's a net loss of 11 Soviet divisions
from this combat axis.
You take this snippet: "[Leeb] was to attack through Tikhvin to Lake Ladoga to sever Leningrad's last rail links to Moscow and completely encircle the city."
And from it build a scenario where the Soviets can't stand north of Moscow if the capital falls.
This is reading far too much into a throwaway line that isn't even about the overall northern theater.
An odd claim, and to remind you and the audience what is actually said by Glantz:
Rather than a throwaway line, it is an entire paragraph and you left out the closing statement by Glantz which is the main thrust of my argument: "In either case, Leningrad's fate would then be sealed."
Glantz has no doubts about what would happen and, as I have quoted upthread, previously you conceded such as well.