The Soviets retreat from Kiev in early September 1941

[historygeek2021]

This simply isn't true:

To operate the rail lines, the Germans had to regauge rail sidings and marshalling areas and, depending on battle damage, to repair buildings and equipment at the train stations.{14} On the most important rail line in Barbarossa, the tracks from Brest directly toward Moscow, the Germans completed the line from Brest to Oranczyce by 29 June 1941 and began to move German trains on normal-gauge track on 30 June. That day. four supply trains arrived at Oranczyce, 85 km into the Soviet Union, with approximately 2,000 tons of supplies. Meantime, regauging of Russian lines continued with work being completed to Baranovice junction by 2000, I July, and three trains reaching that city, 210 km into the Soviet Union. The Germans continued their impressive pace of building a normal-gauge rail system into White Russia and completed regaug-ing from Brest to the capital, Minsk, at noon on 5 July. Army Group Center ran four supply trains there the same day, more than 330 km into the Soviet Union.{15} By 5 July, the Germans began to develop a great rail head at Minsk, which capably supported the lightning panzer advance to Smolensk that overran the city on 16 July. In a historic performance, the Germans regauged the Russian rail system from Brest to Minsk by early July and extended construction to Smolensk before the end of the same month. Their performance established a logistical system able to support an offensive toward Moscow before the middle of August 1941 and bridge the gap between Smolensk and Moscow in a single offensive, similar in style to the earlier leaps to Minsk and Smolensk.

That generalization derives from the actions of Army Group Center from the middle of July to early August 1941. On 15 July 1941, the quartermaster general reviewed the supply status of, Army Group Center in terms of its capabilities to continue offensive operations. He made it clear that the great rail head for continuing operations lay in the cities of Minsk and Molodecno, no longer on the prewar frontier. The army group then had 45,450 tons of 60-ton truck columns and, deducting one-third as inoperable at any time and in repair, still had approximately 30,700 tons available for continuous operations.{16} In mid-July 1941 the German army transportation chief guaranteed the substantial total of fourteen trains and 6,300 tons of supplies daily for the Minsk-Molodecno base. The quartermaster general averred that, based on the logistical situation of 15 July 1941, Army Group Center could conduct an offensive on Moscow with four panzer, three motorized infantry, and ten infantry divisions with appropriate army reserves, maintaining the remainder of the army group in static fighting around Smolensk. This logistical feat was moderately impressive for the middle of July, with enough trains arriving at the Minsk-Molodecno railroad and more than enough trucks to move a panzer group and an infantry army to Moscow. Meanwhile, the Germans were fighting the battle of Smolensk and would take two more weeks to finish the job and another week to tidy up operationally. The Germans used this time to build up logistic stockpiles at the rail head in the center of White Russia and regauge the main rail line from Minsk through Orsha into Smolensk{17}.

By the second week of August 1941, Army Group Center regained operational freedom of movement. If the army group had been directed by Hitler and OKH at the end of July 1941 to continue operations toward Moscow as soon as possible, it would have eliminated remnants of Soviet forces in the great pocket just north of Smolensk and cleared the communications zone of Panzer Group Guderian to the south. Unhampered by Hitler's stubborn attempt to diffuse the combat strength of Army Group Center about the Russian countryside, and the battle between the Fuhrer and OKH over one decisive objective rather than many indecisive ones. Army Group Center would have entered a period of rest, rehabilitation, and stockpiling on approximately 5 August 1941. Regarding the logistical possibilities for an advance a little over a week later, on 13 August 1941, Army Group Center would receive almost double the number of trains daily it had received a month earher{18} — approximately twenty-four trains rather than fourteen. With time to establish larger stockpiles, and with rail heads advanced to Orsha and Smolensk, Army Group Center obviously had the logistical system to support its advance on Moscow with its entire strength{19}.

14. The additional track would comprise a substantial 15 percent over and above the track constructed among cities. See, for example, the mileages in Gen. d. Eisb. Tr. Aus-schnitte. Stand derStreckenwederherstellung. 1941-1942. U.S. NationalArchives. Records. German Army High Command. Microcopy T-78, Roll 117. Fr. 6041049.

15. Eisenbahntruppen. U.S. National Archives, German Army High Command. Microcopy, T-78. Roll 113, Fr. 6035898. See also Bock. Tagebuchnotizen Osten 1. p. 13.

16. See Halder. Diaries, vol. 6, p. 241.

17. Note the use of the rail system through Orsha. Vitebsk, and Smolensk in the first half of August 1941 in Generalma)or Windisch, Personal Diary of the German 9th Army Supply Officer German Language Copy) (from 1.8.1941-31.1.1942Ë5 February 1954), p. 7. U.S. Army, European Command, Historical Division, MS P-201.

18. See Halder, Diaries, vol. 6, p. 248. in which fourteen trains are noted as available for Army Group Center as of 18 July 1941, and Halder. Diaries, vol. 7. pp. 25. 26, in which twenty-four trains daily are noted as running to supply the center after 7 August 1941.

19. As early as 12 July 1941, the quartermaster general of the German army noted in a telephone call to the chief of staff that Army Group Center had enough supplies to maintain an armored drive to Moscow. He also notes that the infantry had only enough to get to Smolensk. It follows that as early as 12 July, the Germans were close to having logistics under control for a push almost straight through to Moscow. See Halder. Diaries, vol. 6. p. 231.

The source for this quote is a website called "war games directory". :roll:

[History Learner]

The source for this quote is a website called "war games directory". :roll:

Actually, the source for them is R.H.S Stolfi's book Hitler's Panzers East, the website in question is merely posting them on it as excerpts. If you wish to take it a step further, I included the original citations so you can see their origins, which are all drawn from German documentation. If you are going to engage in the logical fallacy of genetics, you would need to start there.

[stg 44]

The source for this quote is a website called "war games directory". :roll:

It's a quote from a book with sources. Why do you care if it is posted on another website? Other than to dismiss what it says without having to actually engage with the material that is.

Glantz is the foremost English speaking expert on the Red Army during WW2. It would be nice if people listened to his conclusions instead of conjuring fantasies about the Soviet Union collapsing into nothingness if only Germany had done X, Y or Z ...

Being able to reproduce data from the Soviet archives doesn't mean you're good at analysis. Especially if you're only getting your original sources from one side of the war. This is classic Appeal to Authority fallacy.

[History Learner]

Without the loss of the Soviet Southwestern Front, AGC's southern flank is vulnerable to counterattack, so its advance east will not be nearly as successful.

Likewise, without diverting Panzer Group 3 north to help AGN, AGC's northern flank will also be vulnerable.

And the Soviet Western and Reserve Fronts facing AGC will be stronger if AGC attacks earlier, not having exhausted themselves in the counterattacks that took place in the OTL.

Or, more likely since the flank operations have been cancelled, AGN halts on the Luga Line and they use 4th Panzer Army to attack East to secure the area around Veliyki Luki to cover AGC's northern flank. Since you brought up Glantz, please explain how you square your perception of a vulnerable Northern flank for AGC compared to his direct statements in his Leningrad book about the poor logistics in the region should the railway connections to Moscow to be cut?

Finally, all those Soviet Fronts have already been exhausted by the time of your proposed withdraw. Even better would be to compare the actual performance of the defensive battles vs what the Germans achieved at Viaz'yma-Briansk in OTL; over 600,000 Soviet losses to about 50,000 German vs about 150,000 Soviet to 50,000 German in the defensive battles of August. Clearly, going on the offensive benefits the Germans decisively.

[Futurist]

This simply isn't true:

To operate the rail lines, the Germans had to regauge rail sidings and marshalling areas and, depending on battle damage, to repair buildings and equipment at the train stations.{14} On the most important rail line in Barbarossa, the tracks from Brest directly toward Moscow, the Germans completed the line from Brest to Oranczyce by 29 June 1941 and began to move German trains on normal-gauge track on 30 June. That day. four supply trains arrived at Oranczyce, 85 km into the Soviet Union, with approximately 2,000 tons of supplies. Meantime, regauging of Russian lines continued with work being completed to Baranovice junction by 2000, I July, and three trains reaching that city, 210 km into the Soviet Union. The Germans continued their impressive pace of building a normal-gauge rail system into White Russia and completed regaug-ing from Brest to the capital, Minsk, at noon on 5 July. Army Group Center ran four supply trains there the same day, more than 330 km into the Soviet Union.{15} By 5 July, the Germans began to develop a great rail head at Minsk, which capably supported the lightning panzer advance to Smolensk that overran the city on 16 July. In a historic performance, the Germans regauged the Russian rail system from Brest to Minsk by early July and extended construction to Smolensk before the end of the same month. Their performance established a logistical system able to support an offensive toward Moscow before the middle of August 1941 and bridge the gap between Smolensk and Moscow in a single offensive, similar in style to the earlier leaps to Minsk and Smolensk.

That generalization derives from the actions of Army Group Center from the middle of July to early August 1941. On 15 July 1941, the quartermaster general reviewed the supply status of, Army Group Center in terms of its capabilities to continue offensive operations. He made it clear that the great rail head for continuing operations lay in the cities of Minsk and Molodecno, no longer on the prewar frontier. The army group then had 45,450 tons of 60-ton truck columns and, deducting one-third as inoperable at any time and in repair, still had approximately 30,700 tons available for continuous operations.{16} In mid-July 1941 the German army transportation chief guaranteed the substantial total of fourteen trains and 6,300 tons of supplies daily for the Minsk-Molodecno base. The quartermaster general averred that, based on the logistical situation of 15 July 1941, Army Group Center could conduct an offensive on Moscow with four panzer, three motorized infantry, and ten infantry divisions with appropriate army reserves, maintaining the remainder of the army group in static fighting around Smolensk. This logistical feat was moderately impressive for the middle of July, with enough trains arriving at the Minsk-Molodecno railroad and more than enough trucks to move a panzer group and an infantry army to Moscow. Meanwhile, the Germans were fighting the battle of Smolensk and would take two more weeks to finish the job and another week to tidy up operationally. The Germans used this time to build up logistic stockpiles at the rail head in the center of White Russia and regauge the main rail line from Minsk through Orsha into Smolensk{17}.

By the second week of August 1941, Army Group Center regained operational freedom of movement. If the army group had been directed by Hitler and OKH at the end of July 1941 to continue operations toward Moscow as soon as possible, it would have eliminated remnants of Soviet forces in the great pocket just north of Smolensk and cleared the communications zone of Panzer Group Guderian to the south. Unhampered by Hitler's stubborn attempt to diffuse the combat strength of Army Group Center about the Russian countryside, and the battle between the Fuhrer and OKH over one decisive objective rather than many indecisive ones. Army Group Center would have entered a period of rest, rehabilitation, and stockpiling on approximately 5 August 1941. Regarding the logistical possibilities for an advance a little over a week later, on 13 August 1941, Army Group Center would receive almost double the number of trains daily it had received a month earher{18} — approximately twenty-four trains rather than fourteen. With time to establish larger stockpiles, and with rail heads advanced to Orsha and Smolensk, Army Group Center obviously had the logistical system to support its advance on Moscow with its entire strength{19}.

14. The additional track would comprise a substantial 15 percent over and above the track constructed among cities. See, for example, the mileages in Gen. d. Eisb. Tr. Aus-schnitte. Stand derStreckenwederherstellung. 1941-1942. U.S. NationalArchives. Records. German Army High Command. Microcopy T-78, Roll 117. Fr. 6041049.

15. Eisenbahntruppen. U.S. National Archives, German Army High Command. Microcopy, T-78. Roll 113, Fr. 6035898. See also Bock. Tagebuchnotizen Osten 1. p. 13.

16. See Halder. Diaries, vol. 6, p. 241.

17. Note the use of the rail system through Orsha. Vitebsk, and Smolensk in the first half of August 1941 in Generalma)or Windisch, Personal Diary of the German 9th Army Supply Officer German Language Copy) (from 1.8.1941-31.1.1942Ë5 February 1954), p. 7. U.S. Army, European Command, Historical Division, MS P-201.

18. See Halder, Diaries, vol. 6, p. 248. in which fourteen trains are noted as available for Army Group Center as of 18 July 1941, and Halder. Diaries, vol. 7. pp. 25. 26, in which twenty-four trains daily are noted as running to supply the center after 7 August 1941.

19. As early as 12 July 1941, the quartermaster general of the German army noted in a telephone call to the chief of staff that Army Group Center had enough supplies to maintain an armored drive to Moscow. He also notes that the infantry had only enough to get to Smolensk. It follows that as early as 12 July, the Germans were close to having logistics under control for a push almost straight through to Moscow. See Halder. Diaries, vol. 6. p. 231.

The source for this quote is a website called "war games directory". :roll:

What exactly is objectionable about that website?

[stg 44]

Without the loss of the Soviet Southwestern Front, AGC's southern flank is vulnerable to counterattack, so its advance east will not be nearly as successful.

Likewise, without diverting Panzer Group 3 north to help AGN, AGC's northern flank will also be vulnerable.

And the Soviet Western and Reserve Fronts facing AGC will be stronger if AGC attacks earlier, not having exhausted themselves in the counterattacks that took place in the OTL.

Or, more likely since the flank operations have been cancelled, AGN halts on the Luga Line and they use 4th Panzer Army to attack East to secure the area around Veliyki Luki to cover AGC's northern flank. Since you brought up Glantz, please explain how you square your perception of a vulnerable Northern flank for AGC compared to his direct statements in his Leningrad book about the poor logistics in the region should the railway connections to Moscow to be cut?

Finally, all those Soviet Fronts have already been exhausted by the time of your proposed withdraw. Even better would be to compare the actual performance of the defensive battles vs what the Germans achieved at Viaz'yma-Briansk in OTL; over 600,000 Soviet losses to about 50,000 German vs about 150,000 Soviet to 50,000 German in the defensive battles of August. Clearly, going on the offensive benefits the Germans decisively.

Glantz and a Russian historian (forget his name offhand) as well as several people on this forum have both stated Vyazma-Bryansk resulted in 1 million Soviet casualties.

[History Learner]

Without the loss of the Soviet Southwestern Front, AGC's southern flank is vulnerable to counterattack, so its advance east will not be nearly as successful.

Likewise, without diverting Panzer Group 3 north to help AGN, AGC's northern flank will also be vulnerable.

And the Soviet Western and Reserve Fronts facing AGC will be stronger if AGC attacks earlier, not having exhausted themselves in the counterattacks that took place in the OTL.

Or, more likely since the flank operations have been cancelled, AGN halts on the Luga Line and they use 4th Panzer Army to attack East to secure the area around Veliyki Luki to cover AGC's northern flank. Since you brought up Glantz, please explain how you square your perception of a vulnerable Northern flank for AGC compared to his direct statements in his Leningrad book about the poor logistics in the region should the railway connections to Moscow to be cut?

Finally, all those Soviet Fronts have already been exhausted by the time of your proposed withdraw. Even better would be to compare the actual performance of the defensive battles vs what the Germans achieved at Viaz'yma-Briansk in OTL; over 600,000 Soviet losses to about 50,000 German vs about 150,000 Soviet to 50,000 German in the defensive battles of August. Clearly, going on the offensive benefits the Germans decisively.

Glantz and a Russian historian (forget his name offhand) as well as several people on this forum have both stated Vyazma-Bryansk resulted in 1 million Soviet casualties.

Thanks for the correction, for some reason I was thinking it was 670,000 off the top of my head. Are you referring to Lopukhovsky?

[stg 44]

Without the loss of the Soviet Southwestern Front, AGC's southern flank is vulnerable to counterattack, so its advance east will not be nearly as successful.

Likewise, without diverting Panzer Group 3 north to help AGN, AGC's northern flank will also be vulnerable.

And the Soviet Western and Reserve Fronts facing AGC will be stronger if AGC attacks earlier, not having exhausted themselves in the counterattacks that took place in the OTL.

Or, more likely since the flank operations have been cancelled, AGN halts on the Luga Line and they use 4th Panzer Army to attack East to secure the area around Veliyki Luki to cover AGC's northern flank. Since you brought up Glantz, please explain how you square your perception of a vulnerable Northern flank for AGC compared to his direct statements in his Leningrad book about the poor logistics in the region should the railway connections to Moscow to be cut?

Finally, all those Soviet Fronts have already been exhausted by the time of your proposed withdraw. Even better would be to compare the actual performance of the defensive battles vs what the Germans achieved at Viaz'yma-Briansk in OTL; over 600,000 Soviet losses to about 50,000 German vs about 150,000 Soviet to 50,000 German in the defensive battles of August. Clearly, going on the offensive benefits the Germans decisively.

Glantz and a Russian historian (forget his name offhand) as well as several people on this forum have both stated Vyazma-Bryansk resulted in 1 million Soviet casualties.

Thanks for the correction, for some reason I was thinking it was 670,000 off the top of my head. Are you referring to Lopukhovsky?

The 600,000+ number was just PoWs. The total casualties was 1 million. Yes that is the historian.

[History Learner]

Without the loss of the Soviet Southwestern Front, AGC's southern flank is vulnerable to counterattack, so its advance east will not be nearly as successful.

Likewise, without diverting Panzer Group 3 north to help AGN, AGC's northern flank will also be vulnerable.

And the Soviet Western and Reserve Fronts facing AGC will be stronger if AGC attacks earlier, not having exhausted themselves in the counterattacks that took place in the OTL.

Or, more likely since the flank operations have been cancelled, AGN halts on the Luga Line and they use 4th Panzer Army to attack East to secure the area around Veliyki Luki to cover AGC's northern flank. Since you brought up Glantz, please explain how you square your perception of a vulnerable Northern flank for AGC compared to his direct statements in his Leningrad book about the poor logistics in the region should the railway connections to Moscow to be cut?

Finally, all those Soviet Fronts have already been exhausted by the time of your proposed withdraw. Even better would be to compare the actual performance of the defensive battles vs what the Germans achieved at Viaz'yma-Briansk in OTL; over 600,000 Soviet losses to about 50,000 German vs about 150,000 Soviet to 50,000 German in the defensive battles of August. Clearly, going on the offensive benefits the Germans decisively.

Glantz and a Russian historian (forget his name offhand) as well as several people on this forum have both stated Vyazma-Bryansk resulted in 1 million Soviet casualties.

Thanks for the correction, for some reason I was thinking it was 670,000 off the top of my head. Are you referring to Lopukhovsky?

The 600,000+ number was just PoWs. The total casualties was 1 million. Yes that is the historian.

That may have been what got me confused and funnily enough this thread made me get his book today lol.

[KDF33]

If you are also referring to the supply situation, the logistical network was ready for such by mid to late August; maybe sooner, I'd have to double check.

This is what I was referring to. I say late August, you say mid-to-late August. It seems we largely agree, give or take a week.

We know Guderian was angling for the exact same operation axis of attack and we saw how well that worked out historically for them. As for force totals, again, we need to examine and compare the two sides, in which case, we find the Soviets are also weaker than they would be later on; September was actually the lowest month for force creation after the German invasion.

The Germans are weaker on the central axis in late August / early September than in late September / early October. The Soviets are also slightly stronger on the former date.

Here's a comparison of the manpower of the relevant Soviet Fronts between early September and early October:

West + Reserve: 1,002,000 / 920,000
Bryansk: 294,000 / 294,000

Total: 1,296,000 / 1,214,000

The Germans had 55 divisions (incl. 9 Panzer) with Heeresgruppe Mitte in late August, compared to 72 (incl. 14 Panzer) for Taifun. That's almost a quarter less overall, and over a third less for the armored formations.

Given the Soviets would have nothing to stop the Germans with after this August V-B, I don't see why Moscow wouldn't fall.

Given the aforementioned balance-of-force, I don't think it's a given that a victory on the scale of Vyazma is in the cards. IMO, the most likely scenario is a repeat of the Smolensk operation.

Also, the Soviets sent 20 divisions to the active Fronts in September:

From Arkhangelsk Military District:
-286th rifle division, to Leningrad Front

From Moscow Military District:
-27th cavalry division, to 4th Army

From Orel Military District:
-294th rifle division, to Leningrad Front
-29th cavalry division, to Reserve Front
-31st cavalry division, to Reserve Front

From Kharkov Military District:
-393rd rifle division, to Southern Front
-411th rifle division, to Southern Front

From North Caucasus Military District:
-157th rifle division, to Separate Coastal Army
-38th cavalry division, to Southern Front

From Transcaucasian Front:
-4th rifle division, to Southern Front
-136th rifle division, to Southern Front
-47th mountain rifle division, to Southwestern Front
-76th mountain rifle division, to Southwestern Front

From Volga Military District:
-46th cavalry division, to Northwestern Front

From Ural Military District:
-313th rifle division, to 7th Army

From Siberian Military District:
-49th cavalry division, to Southern Front

From Transbaikal Military District:
-114th rifle division, to 7th Army

From Far Eastern Front:
-21st rifle division, to 7th Army
-26th rifle division, to Northwestern Front
-32nd rifle division, to 4th Army

Specifically as it pertains to Leningrad though, said alternative route significantly extends out the time to send supplies as well as has a lower capacity limit.

For delays in transit, why? For lower capacity, yes. But then the Soviets supplied close to a million men in the Caucasus with pretty barebones LOCs in 1942, so I remain unconvinced that the Soviet position in the north collapses automatically.

David Glantz certainly pulls no punches on the subject on his book concerning the Siege of Leningrad:

The quoted excerpt is about completely sealing off Leningrad by cutting off Tikhvin. It isn't related to what we are discussing.

You are entitled to your opinion, so that's fine.

I'm not clinging to that opinion. If I'm presented with convincing evidence, I'll change my view.

[historygeek2021]

Actually, the source for them is R.H.S Stolfi's book Hitler's Panzers East, the website in question is merely posting them on it as excerpts. If you wish to take it a step further, I included the original citations so you can see their origins, which are all drawn from German documentation. If you are going to engage in the logical fallacy of genetics, you would need to start there.

Stolfi was writing in 1991, before western historians understood how badly Army Group Center was bludgeoned at Smolensk in July and August, a fact generally not understood in the west until David Glantz published Barbarossa Derailed in 2010:

Making matters worse for Bock, as well as other the other commanders of German army groups, they lacked the reserves necessary to replace their losses. For example, on 2 August Halder informed his diary that Army Group Center had lost 74,500 men and received only 23,000 replacements since the first day of the Barbarossa invasion. As a result, by this time, it was experiencing a manpower deficit of 15,000 men in Ninth Army, 30,000 men in Second Army, 4,000 men in Third Panzer Group. Later still, on 28 August he recorded that the panzer divisions in Army Group Center’s Second and Third Panzer Groups were operating with average daily tank strengths of 45 percent, with 7th Panzer Division the lowest at only 24 percent strength.4 In the case of many of these divisions, they had suffered most of these losses (as well as staggering losses in panzer-grenadiers) in late July and early August, while operating along the outer encirclement ring at Smolensk, in isolation from supporting infantry divisions. If Army Group Center’s panzer divisions and, in particular, their motorized infantry forces, suffered a high proportion of the army group’s casualties during the second half of July, in August it was the turn of the army group’s infantry divisions. Thus, with most of Hoth’s panzers absent, operating toward the north, and most of Second Panzer Group’s panzers driving toward the south, Ninth and Fourth Armies’ infantry divisions ended up defending against Timoshenko’s fierce and persistent assaults east and northeast of Smolensk and against Zhukov’s attacks in the El’nia region. It was here that as many as ten infantry divisions saw their strength dwindle and their combat rating fall from “strong” and “medium strong” to “weak” or even “exhausted.”

Glantz, David M.. Barbarossa Derailed: The Battle for Smolensk 10 July-10 September 1941, Volume 1: The German Advance, The Encirclement Battle, and the First and Second Soviet Counteroffensives, 10 July-24 August 1941 (Kindle Locations 12538-12552). Casemate Publishers. Kindle Edition.

Glantz attributes the Soviet collapse during Operation Typhoon to the casualties the Western, Reserve and Briansk Fronts sustained in their counterattacks against AGC, which did not end until the middle of September:

Finally, on 8 September Shaposhnikov, the Chief of the General Staff, reluctantly ordered the Western Front to go over to the defensive, ending the three weeks of fighting east and northeast of Smolensk and the so-called ‘Dukhovshchina Offensive’.35 Although no official tally has been released, the Western Front suffered heavy casualties in the failed operation. This bloody toll undoubtedly contributed to the front’s rapid collapse in October, when German forces began Operation Typhoon.

Glantz, David M.. Operation Barbarossa: Hitler's Invasion of Russia 1941 . The History Press. Kindle Edition.

As others have pointed out, AGC was heavily reinforced when Operation Typhoon began at the start of October compared to its strength in August. Stolfi's proposal that a weak AGC plunge east in mid-August into heavily reinforced Soviet Western and Reserve Fronts while its flanks were exposed from Gomel in the south to Velikiye Luki in the north, while AGN and AGS were also stalled, would have resulted in the OstHeer stalling out completely and being routed in September 1941 instead of December 1941. The Germans were saved by Stalin's refusal to abandon Kiev and his insistence on ordering counterattacks at Smolensk that weakened his own forces.

[stg 44]

Actually, the source for them is R.H.S Stolfi's book Hitler's Panzers East, the website in question is merely posting them on it as excerpts. If you wish to take it a step further, I included the original citations so you can see their origins, which are all drawn from German documentation. If you are going to engage in the logical fallacy of genetics, you would need to start there.

Stolfi was writing in 1991, before western historians understood how badly Army Group Center was bludgeoned at Smolensk in July and August, a fact generally not understood in the west until David Glantz published Barbarossa Derailed in 2010:

Making matters worse for Bock, as well as other the other commanders of German army groups, they lacked the reserves necessary to replace their losses. For example, on 2 August Halder informed his diary that Army Group Center had lost 74,500 men and received only 23,000 replacements since the first day of the Barbarossa invasion. As a result, by this time, it was experiencing a manpower deficit of 15,000 men in Ninth Army, 30,000 men in Second Army, 4,000 men in Third Panzer Group. Later still, on 28 August he recorded that the panzer divisions in Army Group Center’s Second and Third Panzer Groups were operating with average daily tank strengths of 45 percent, with 7th Panzer Division the lowest at only 24 percent strength.4 In the case of many of these divisions, they had suffered most of these losses (as well as staggering losses in panzer-grenadiers) in late July and early August, while operating along the outer encirclement ring at Smolensk, in isolation from supporting infantry divisions. If Army Group Center’s panzer divisions and, in particular, their motorized infantry forces, suffered a high proportion of the army group’s casualties during the second half of July, in August it was the turn of the army group’s infantry divisions. Thus, with most of Hoth’s panzers absent, operating toward the north, and most of Second Panzer Group’s panzers driving toward the south, Ninth and Fourth Armies’ infantry divisions ended up defending against Timoshenko’s fierce and persistent assaults east and northeast of Smolensk and against Zhukov’s attacks in the El’nia region. It was here that as many as ten infantry divisions saw their strength dwindle and their combat rating fall from “strong” and “medium strong” to “weak” or even “exhausted.”

Glantz, David M.. Barbarossa Derailed: The Battle for Smolensk 10 July-10 September 1941, Volume 1: The German Advance, The Encirclement Battle, and the First and Second Soviet Counteroffensives, 10 July-24 August 1941 (Kindle Locations 12538-12552). Casemate Publishers. Kindle Edition.

Glantz attributes the Soviet collapse during Operation Typhoon to the casualties the Western, Reserve and Briansk Fronts sustained in their counterattacks against AGC, which did not end until the middle of September:

Finally, on 8 September Shaposhnikov, the Chief of the General Staff, reluctantly ordered the Western Front to go over to the defensive, ending the three weeks of fighting east and northeast of Smolensk and the so-called ‘Dukhovshchina Offensive’.35 Although no official tally has been released, the Western Front suffered heavy casualties in the failed operation. This bloody toll undoubtedly contributed to the front’s rapid collapse in October, when German forces began Operation Typhoon.

Glantz, David M.. Operation Barbarossa: Hitler's Invasion of Russia 1941 . The History Press. Kindle Edition.

As others have pointed out, AGC was heavily reinforced when Operation Typhoon began at the start of October compared to its strength in August. Stolfi's proposal that a weak AGC plunge east in mid-August into heavily reinforced Soviet Western and Reserve Fronts while its flanks were exposed from Gomel in the south to Velikiye Luki in the north, while AGN and AGS were also stalled, would have resulted in the OstHeer stalling out completely and being routed in September 1941 instead of December 1941. The Germans were saved by Stalin's refusal to abandon Kiev and his insistence on ordering counterattacks at Smolensk that weakened his own forces.

You shouldn't take Glantz at face value. He gets the German side of the equation VERY wrong. For example 90% of casualties were replaced as we know from work others have done like Liedtke in "Enduring the Whirlwind" and Nigel Askey "Operation Barbarossa", but Glantz for some reason thought that most of those losses weren't replaced. Glantz's archival data about Soviet forces is generally quite excellent with some exceptions, but in regards to the German side his data is badly out of date and largely repeating flawed older sources.

After all if German forces were as weak as Glantz claimed by the end of Soviet offensive actions in September how did they in the first two weeks of October inflict nearly 1 million casualties on the Soviets for only 50,000 casualties? All that after encircling Leningrad, defeating Soviet offensives to recapture Smolensk, and capturing Kiev and taking over 600,000 PoWs there. Something doesn't add up if we accept Glantz as even 75% accurate. More likely he was incredibly wrong, because he only did original research in Soviet archives, only speaks/reads Russian, and just uses secondary if not tertiary sources on the German side.

Glantz can claim it was losses in August-September that led to the Soviet defeat at Vyazma-Bryansk, but as noted Soviet forces got so many replacements in that month that they were nearly as strong in October as early September. 80k men was not a significant enough difference between those months especially if AG-Center was as worn down as Glantz claimed. This is exactly what I mean about Glantz's lack of analytical ability.

AG-Center was not heavily reinforced; 4th panzer group replaced 2nd panzer group, which had moved into Ukraine and was attacking from a very different direction than the rest of AG-Center against forces that were not part of the Western Front and had been badly worn down in the fight for Ukraine. There were two fresh panzer divisions brought in, which was the biggest change.

How do you think Soviet forces in Ukraine could have attacked north against AG-Center when they were being defeated along the Dniepr before Guderian showed up? Central Front was largely smashed by the 2nd week of August and by the end of the month STAVKA finally accepted reality and disbanded the front. After all Guderian had destroyed nearly the entire 28th army by August 8th and had little enemy opposition left east of Roslavl. Bryansk front could have attacked his flank, but they did that historically and were defeated:
https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%A0%D0 ... 0%B8%D1%8F

The only difference heading east instead of south would mean is where pockets would be formed and destroyed; Bryansk Front would attack Guderian's flank like they did historically and fail as they did historically. Central Front might exist a little while longer without Guderian's attacks south after say August 14th, but it was in the process of being smashed by von Weich's 2nd army anyway (see the Gomel pocket) and Southwest Front was struggling to hold the Dniepr, ultimately failing well before Guderian showed up, so wasn't in a position to attack north.

Stalin refusing to abandon Kiev actually saved the USSR because Hitler then wasted vital time cleaning up the flanks and to secure Ukrainian resources rather than striking at the center of Stalin's power.

[History Learner]

This is what I was referring to. I say late August, you say mid-to-late August. It seems we largely agree, give or take a week.

I am not sure if you saw it, but read the Stolfi excerpt I posted. Basically everything was ready by August 8th or so to advance on Moscow.

The Germans are weaker on the central axis in late August / early September than in late September / early October. The Soviets are also slightly stronger on the former date.

Here's a comparison of the manpower of the relevant Soviet Fronts between early September and early October:

West + Reserve: 1,002,000 / 920,000
Bryansk: 294,000 / 294,000

Total: 1,296,000 / 1,214,000

The Germans had 55 divisions (incl. 9 Panzer) with Heeresgruppe Mitte in late August, compared to 72 (incl. 14 Panzer) for Taifun. That's almost a quarter less overall, and over a third less for the armored formations.

I have no idea where these numbers come from, but they don't match any other sources I've seen. David Glantz, in Barbarossa Derailed (Pg 530) gives the following breakdown for Western Front on July 31st:

22nd Army: 78,000
Group Maslennikov (29th Army): 45,000
Group Kalinin (24th Army): 50,000
Group Khomoneko (30th Army): 65,000
Group Iartsevo: 50,000
Group Kachalov: 50,000
Cavalry Group: 10,000

In early August, some additions are made:
16th & 19th Army: 15,000
20th Army: 25,000

Total: 388,000

Appendix B also lists Reserve and Central at the start of August 1941 at 466,000 and 284,000 respectively. However, in the first week of August, Reserve Front lost 34th Army, which reduced it by roughly 55,000 men. Thus, in total, in August there are 952,000 men in the Fronts facing off against AGC, which is 300,000 less than what the Germans faced at the start of Operation Typhoon in October.

Where I think you have erred is Glantz accidently double counted in his first volume of Barbarossa Derailed, which is where I am assuming your numbers are coming from.

However, it must be stated that counting Central/Briansk Front (as it later became in August) is a bad idea, because it is outside the proposed encirclement and being effectively screened by 2nd Army. Historically they did try to attack Army Group Center's flanks and were decisively defeated; is there any real reason to assume they could do such here?



So Western and Reserve Front get encircled and destroyed, Central Front exhausts itself as per OTL attacking 2nd Army to no effect. If needed, the Germans can then turn to deal with it before advancing on Moscow, but again, I see no real need to do such, especially with Army Group South soon to be threatening their flank.

Given the aforementioned balance-of-force, I don't think it's a given that a victory on the scale of Vyazma is in the cards. IMO, the most likely scenario is a repeat of the Smolensk operation.

Also, the Soviets sent 20 divisions to the active Fronts in September:

From Arkhangelsk Military District:
-286th rifle division, to Leningrad Front

From Moscow Military District:
-27th cavalry division, to 4th Army

From Orel Military District:
-294th rifle division, to Leningrad Front
-29th cavalry division, to Reserve Front
-31st cavalry division, to Reserve Front

From Kharkov Military District:
-393rd rifle division, to Southern Front
-411th rifle division, to Southern Front

From North Caucasus Military District:
-157th rifle division, to Separate Coastal Army
-38th cavalry division, to Southern Front

From Transcaucasian Front:
-4th rifle division, to Southern Front
-136th rifle division, to Southern Front
-47th mountain rifle division, to Southwestern Front
-76th mountain rifle division, to Southwestern Front

From Volga Military District:
-46th cavalry division, to Northwestern Front

From Ural Military District:
-313th rifle division, to 7th Army

From Siberian Military District:
-49th cavalry division, to Southern Front

From Transbaikal Military District:
-114th rifle division, to 7th Army

From Far Eastern Front:
-21st rifle division, to 7th Army
-26th rifle division, to Northwestern Front
-32nd rifle division, to 4th Army

I'm not sure what this is supposed to prove, given only four of these divisions were sent to oppose AGC. Are you proposing they all do? In which case Army Group North is able to take Leningrad in August/September and Army Group South is going to have an absolute ball of a time in Ukraine.

Also, just to give further context to this, in The Via'zma Catastrophe by Lopukhovsky (Pg 75) it is stated that the fronts on the Western strategic axis received more than 193,000 replacements in the month of September.

For delays in transit, why? For lower capacity, yes. But then the Soviets supplied close to a million men in the Caucasus with pretty barebones LOCs in 1942, so I remain unconvinced that the Soviet position in the north collapses automatically.

Because taking a longer and more circuitous route results in delays in arrivals? To explain directly, say it takes you one week to drop off 100 tons of supplies to Leningrad but with the loss of Moscow, it now takes two weeks. Even leaving outside the lower capacity limits of the railways in question-which automatically means losses in supplies-you've now halved the logistics of your forces even though you're still sending the same amount of supplies, since they are spread out over a longer period of time.

So we have lesser logistics and citing the fact a few scattered armies in the Caucasus doesn't really cut it, given the particulars of that situation; for one, they were rendered incapable of the offensive and were left borderline starved with serious supply shortages. The only reason the Germans couldn't mop them up was the terrain and their own logistical issues, namely fuel. It's just incomparable situations, since we know from AGN's late 1941 actions they most definitely were capable of further action.

The quoted excerpt is about completely sealing off Leningrad by cutting off Tikhvin. It isn't related to what we are discussing.

I don't think you read it then because Glantz directly notes the importance of Tikhvin is related to the fact the railways from Moscow that connect to Leningrad pass through the area; you don't have to worry about going for Tikhvin to cut said railways when you take Moscow in of itself, no? You take the base, not the connections to the base for the same end result.

[KDF33]

I am not sure if you saw it, but read the Stolfi excerpt I posted. Basically everything was ready by August 8th or so to advance on Moscow.

I did. That conclusion is not self-evident.

Also, what was the operational readiness of the mobile formations at the end of the Smolensk operation? The forces employed in Taifun had significant time for R&R, especially those engaged on the decisive Vyazma direction.

I have no idea where these numbers come from, but they don't match any other sources I've seen.

-Source for early September.
-Source for early October.

They are GKO decrees, both signed by Stalin.

David Glantz, in Barbarossa Derailed (Pg 530) gives the following breakdown for Western Front on July 31st:

[...]

Very interesting. It doesn't show that the Soviets were "300,000 men" weaker than at the beginning of Taifun, however. Combined with GKO figures, we can look at Soviet force evolution at the beginning of August / September / October.

Western Front: 388,000* / 511,000 / 510,000
Reserve Front: 466,000 / 491,000 / 410,000
Central/Bryansk Front: 284,000 / 294,000 / 294,000

Total: 1,138,000* / 1,296,000 / 1,214,000

That's a difference of just 76,000 men between early August and early October. Note the asterisk next to the figure of 388,000 for Western Front: that dataset is an Army count, whereas all the other figures are for the Front overall. Thus, it probably misses a few units directly subordinated to Western Front. This suggests that Soviet strength on the Moscow axis in early August was virtually identical to that of October.

As noted previously, the Germans had 55 divisions with Heeresgruppe Mitte in August, against 72 at the time of Taifun. Among the mobile formations, the Germans had in August 9 Panzer and 5 motorized Infanterie divisions. On October 2, they had 14 Panzer and 8 motorized Infanterie divisions.

Those formations had also benefited from R&R in September. Most prominently, their operational tank strength must have been considerably higher than in early August.

To put things into perspective, the two Panzer Groups contained just 26% of Heeresgruppe Mitte's manpower, but suffered 41% of the combat casualties between 22.6 - 31.7.1941.

However, it must be stated that counting Central/Briansk Front (as it later became in August) is a bad idea, because it is outside the proposed encirclement and being effectively screened by 2nd Army. Historically they did try to attack Army Group Center's flanks and were decisively defeated; is there any real reason to assume they could do such here?

They should definitely be counted, given that they faced Heeresgruppe Mitte. Whether or not they could have successfully counterattacked is irrelevant to the issue, which is that they would tie down German divisions regardless.

So Western and Reserve Front get encircled and destroyed

This is the crux of the matter. Can you detail how exactly you suggest the Germans "encircle and destroy" Western and Reserve Fronts, when they previously failed to achieve just that during the Smolensk operation?

Central Front exhausts itself as per OTL attacking 2nd Army to no effect. If needed, the Germans can then turn to deal with it before advancing on Moscow, but again, I see no real need to do such, especially with Army Group South soon to be threatening their flank.

This part is only relevant if the first step can be shown to have been feasible.

I'm not sure what this is supposed to prove, given only four of these divisions were sent to oppose AGC. Are you proposing they all do? In which case Army Group North is able to take Leningrad in August/September and Army Group South is going to have an absolute ball of a time in Ukraine.

These divisions were sent where the Germans were attacking in September, in the north and in the south. Had the Germans been attacking in the center, that is where, presumably, they would have been sent.

Why HGN and HGS would have an easier time, with no help from HGM, is lost on me.

Because taking a longer and more circuitous route results in delays in arrivals?

Not automatically. Soviet production centers were in the rear; using alternate routes instead of Moscow doesn't automatically mean longer transit times.

Look at this map. It wouldn't take longer to send weapons produced at Nizhny Tagil or Chelyabinsk to Tikhvin by transiting through Kirov and Vologda than through Moscow.

So we have lesser logistics and citing the fact a few scattered armies in the Caucasus doesn't really cut it, given the particulars of that situation; for one, they were rendered incapable of the offensive and were left borderline starved with serious supply shortages. The only reason the Germans couldn't mop them up was the terrain and their own logistical issues, namely fuel.

Heh? That's a disputable framing of the Caucasus campaign.

It's just incomparable situations, since we know from AGN's late 1941 actions they most definitely were capable of further action.

The German Tikhvin offensive was a forlorn affair - they pushed along a narrow corridor to the city just to get counterattacked on the flanks and retreat to their starting line.

I don't think you read it then because Glantz directly notes the importance of Tikhvin is related to the fact the railways from Moscow that connect to Leningrad pass through the area; you don't have to worry about going for Tikhvin to cut said railways when you take Moscow in of itself, no? You take the base, not the connections to the base for the same end result.

I know that Glantz mentioned Moscow, but again look at this map. The importance of Tikhvin is not merely that it links to Moscow; with the Finns occupying the Svir river line, it is the last remaining rail link connecting Lake Ladoga to the rest of the USSR.

In other words, capturing and holding Tikhvin means that Leningrad cannot be resupplied from anywhere.

[stg 44]

KDF what's to stop 4th Panzer army from participating in this scenario against Moscow? It cannot attack Leningrad alone, as half of 3rd Panzer army was attached for the operation plus VIII air corps, both of which will be used against Moscow here. So other than the missing 2nd and 5th panzer divisions which didn't show up until October the entire 4th panzer army could and probably would (if Moscow as the strategic objective in August) attack the Soviet forces east of the Luga line and converge on Moscow.