OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

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Richard Anderson
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#106

Post by Richard Anderson » 12 Apr 2021, 17:03

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
12 Apr 2021, 17:02
Richard Anderson wrote:
12 Apr 2021, 16:58
not the sour grapes surrounding it.
I suspect even "sour" grapes were rationed!

Regards

Tom
:lol:
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#107

Post by Tom from Cornwall » 12 Apr 2021, 17:03

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
12 Apr 2021, 15:54
I am thinking in terms of the numbers , particularly how many cargo ships there were and where they were being used on key dates of periods.
Carl,

I'll look through what I have from COS and see if anything leaps out at me.

Have a look in CAB80/66/4 - COS (42) Paper 476 of 25th December 1942: Shipping Implications of Future Strategy (Six months December, 1942/May, 1943).

https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov. ... /r/C387289

There is a long discussion (with numbers) that sums up the Allied world shipping situation at that point.

Regards

Tom


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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#108

Post by Sheldrake » 12 Apr 2021, 20:24

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
12 Apr 2021, 13:29
Sheldrake wrote:
12 Apr 2021, 11:04
... Do I need to go on?
No. I've been seeing Brooke referred to, cited, quoted, for over fifty years. Currently picking through his diary as presented by Bryant. Unfortunately I seldom see any organized (or disorganized for that matter) effort to show how Brooke was correct, by presenting the numbers for the resources he referred to. I can understand why Brooke could not put any of that in his diary, but these endless citations, without analysis of what he was actually referring to & why he argued this item or that was inadequate, have the appearance of a endless loop. I've hd a strong sense of deja vu reading Bryants cover of Brookes diary, but no enlightenment about what was behind Brookes judgement.
I doubt it would be possible to prove that Brooke was right of wrong. The relevance to this thread is that Brooke's experience of working with King as part of the Joint Chiefs team was that his impression was that he was solely interested in the Pacific and strongly resisted any calls for resources to be diverted from that theatre. Any discussion of US shipping had to take into account. His starting point was no, and remained so. Of course all of these senior officers fought their corner, but King was not commander in chief PTO, but the senior US Naval officer in service.

One interesting point might be to compare exactly what proportion of US resources were committed to the Pacific. Was it more or less than the 30% King offered. Though that would bog down in definitions and is outside this thread.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#109

Post by rcocean » 13 Apr 2021, 01:01

King wanted 30% of Allied (Not just USA but UK and USA) resources allocated to the Pacific. Looking at the just the USA Divisions/Aircraft/etc. shows about a 60-40 split between ETO/MTO and the Pacific as of 12-31-43. With the British it must have been 80/20 or even 90/10.

Just as aside, all 16 US armored divisions, 4 of the 5 airborne divisions, and almost all the 100 or so Tank/TD battalions were used in Europe. MacArthur's SWPA theater received just 15% of the Cargo and Troops shipped overseas from May 1942 to Dec 1943. Not mention that the of the 12,000 B-17s over 90% were used in Europe. No new B-17s were sent to the Pacific after November 1942.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#110

Post by daveshoup2MD » 13 Apr 2021, 07:28

Sheldrake wrote:
12 Apr 2021, 11:04
daveshoup2MD wrote:
12 Apr 2021, 06:44
Sheldrake wrote:
11 Apr 2021, 14:46
He was in no position to thump the table if the Royal or US Navy claimed that shipping simply wasn't available. The arguments about shipping were all bound up with the inter service rivalry in the US and Admiral King ignoring the Germany First policy. I suspect more US ships were assigned to the invasion of Saipan in June 1944 than for Op Overlord. Nor were the US planners above using shipping as a leverage over the British, not just over preferred military operations, but also over e.g. how much food should Britain be allowed to stockpile. Only a senior American was going to be able to cut through this to expand the lift by an additional 60%.
Two requests:

1) Provide an example of Adm. King "ignoring the Germany First policy."

2) Define "US ships"... ocean-going USN warships? Or commissioned USN vessels, capable of crossing the English Channel in the summer? Or commissioned US vessels (USN & USCG)? Or all the above, as well as US-flag and US-owned but foreign flag vessels managed by the WSA?

Thanks
The British CIGS Alanbrooke was one of the Chiefs of staff committee that ran the war. His diary has plenty of references to King's demands obstructing some aspect of the Germany First strategy. The continual pressure for resources for the PTO arguably influenced the US Army's pressure for an early cross channel assault.

15 April 1942 He (Marshal) has found that King is proving more and more of as drain on his military resources, calling for land forces to capture and hold bases. On the other hand MacArthur constitutes another threat.......To counter these moves Marshall has started the European offensive plan and is going 100% all out on it!

15 July 1942 We received news today that Marshall, King and Harry Hopkins are on their way to discuss operations. It will be a queer party as Harry Hopkins is for operating in Africa, Marshall wants to operate in Europe and King is determined to strike in the Pacific!

21 July 1942 We went on arguing for two hours, during which King with a face like a sphinx, and only one idea, to transfer operations to the Pacific.

14 Jan 1943 it became clear that his (Admiral King) idea was an all out war against Japan instead of a holding operation.

18 Jan 1943 King still evidently wrapped up in the war of the Pacific at the expense of everything else!

20 Jan 1943 His vision is limited to the Pacific and any operation calculated to distract from the force available in the Pacific does not receive his support or approval. Although he pays lip service to the fundamental policy that we must first defeat Germany then turn on Japan, he fails to apply it in any problems connected with the war.

Do I need to go on?

RE shipping -the reference is merchant shipping.Here is an extract
The most serious threat to the British food supply in 1942– 43 was not the submarines but the American decision not to honour the promise to replace Australian meat supplies, combined with the US military’s determination to prioritize military shipments over British civilian food cargoes. In May 1943 when, at 28 ounces a week, the newly introduced American meat ration was double that of the British, Somervell’s Chief of Transportation C. P. Gross asserted that the British ‘were still living “soft” and could easily stand further reductions’. The British food officials in Washington usually won the arguments and managed to secure shipping space and cargoes but they never managed to convince the Americans that their requirements were legitimate.
Collingham, Lizzie. The Taste of War (Kindle Locations 2249-2255). Penguin Books Ltd. Kindle Edition.
None of what you've posted above is evidence of anything but Brooke being Brooke.

King and Marshall were responsible for fighting a global war against (among other challenges) the third strongest maritime power in the world; Brooke's responsibilities for the Pacific were essentially non-existent.

Perhaps you should read Thomas Buell's Master of Seapower; Marshall and King were in complete agreement on Germany First throughout the war.

What does US merchant shipping dedicated to sustaining the British civilian economy (or lack thereof) have to do with your statement that "I suspect more US ships were assigned to the invasion of Saipan in June 1944 than for Op Overlord"?

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#111

Post by daveshoup2MD » 13 Apr 2021, 07:40

rcocean wrote:
12 Apr 2021, 16:16

Great quotes. I love Alanbrooke but he always seemed to think the Pacific war was some sort of sideshow, and the only war that counted was the European one. His quotes in Jan '43 relate to Casablanca conference where King was trying to get 30% of the allied effort to fight Japan. Hardly as Alanbrooke claims "All out war" :lol: King always agreed to the primacy of the German war, but felt that we needed to keep the pressure on Japan in 1942-1944. Given that we weren't doing anything decisive in 42 or 43, that is invading France, but "closing the ring" it made no sense to take great risks in the Pacific, or sit on our butts and let Japan do what the want. Alanbrooke felt differently. I think at one point he thought that a Japanese attack on Australia wouldn't be a bad thing, since it would teach those Aussies a lesson!
Europe? The Med and Africa, maybe ... and even then it's questionable. He had to be dragged to the idea that liberating France was the quickest road to the Ruhr and Germany's defeat.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#112

Post by EwenS » 13 Apr 2021, 09:28

rcocean wrote:
13 Apr 2021, 01:01
Not mention that the of the 12,000 B-17s over 90% were used in Europe. No new B-17s were sent to the Pacific after November 1942.
And that was because it was realised that the B-24 was more suited to the theatre due to its better range. The B-17 equipped BGs already in theatre converted to B-24 during 1943 eg 43rd BG. From late 1942 the new heavy bomber groups deployed to the Pacific theatre were B-24 equipped from the outset. IIRC the first to deploy to Australia was the 90th BG in Nov 1942.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#113

Post by Sheldrake » 13 Apr 2021, 10:48

rcocean wrote:
13 Apr 2021, 01:01
King wanted 30% of Allied (Not just USA but UK and USA) resources allocated to the Pacific. Looking at the just the USA Divisions/Aircraft/etc. shows about a 60-40 split between ETO/MTO and the Pacific as of 12-31-43. With the British it must have been 80/20 or even 90/10.
True the British were more focused on the much closer threat of Germany and most RAF and RN resources were in the Atlantic and Europe. However, the British Empire and commonwealth land forces were much more evenly split.

Most of the C 40 British divisions served in Europe. The 2nd, 18th, 36th and 70th served against the Japanese. British soldiers also formed part of most of the 36 Indian Divisions of which at any one time no more than six were anywhere other than facing a Japanese threat.

All Australian land forces were assigned to the PTO after the Japanese entered the war. Five for expeditionary war and ten for home defence.

Four out of five New Zealand divisions served in PTO

Most Canadian forces were deployed in Europe, five divisions but a further one served in the Pacific.

Four divisions raised n Africa served in Burma and India.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#114

Post by rcocean » 13 Apr 2021, 16:09

How many NZ divisions saw combat in the pacific? what were their losses? I'd guess 90% of NZ's losses in ww 2 occurred in Europe. IRC, total British KIA in Burma was 5,000. I cant' remember the total off the top of my head but Indian troops/others were probably 15,000. The RAF in Burma/India was fairly small, and used quite a few American aircraft. As for the RN, it did most its fighting in the Med/Europe till 1944-45. Notice I said MOST and not NONE.

If you toss out the losses in 1942, including those who died later as POW, British losses against Japan were rather small when compared to the German/Italians. Maybe 10-15 thousand out of over 200,000-300,000 for the whole war. I just don't seem more than 20% of British Empire's total effort going against Japan before 1945.

Change of topic: One thing people don't do when they compute the USA effort Japan vs. Germany is Lend lease. A significant amount of shipping in 1942-1944, was tied down shipping lend lease supplies to Russia and the UK almost all of which was used against German. Its not just that almost all the 12,000 B-17s were used against Germany, we supplied the UK with almost 3,000 B-24's which were mostly used by Coastal Command. We supplied the Russians with 15,000 aircraft. we provided the UK and USSR with thousands of tanks, almost all of which were used against Germany. I think it'd be fair to say, that when you factor in lend-lease, 90-95% of American tanks and armored vehicles were used against Italy/Germany.

Anyway, looks like I got carried away. Thanks for the response.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#115

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 14 Apr 2021, 04:33

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
12 Apr 2021, 17:03
Have a look in CAB80/66/4 - COS (42) Paper 476 of 25th December 1942: Shipping Implications of Future Strategy (Six months December, 1942/May, 1943).

https://discovery.nationalarchives.gov. ... /r/C387289

There is a long discussion (with numbers) that sums up the Allied world shipping situation at that point.
Thanks. Lots to digest there.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#116

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 14 Apr 2021, 17:24

The only comprehensive estimate I've seen of the US global effort. covering industrial output, uniformed men, civilian contractors, cargo ships, war ships, fuel, ammunition, food & everything else averaged out to 20% Pacific, 70-80 % Europe/MTO & a small percent to China/Asia. The proportion for any date varies wildly. In the first quarter of 1942 possibly 90% leaving the US was headed to the Pacific theatre, or maybe 25% of total output. The rest produced was sitting in the US awaiting completion/training/organization. With a few percent to Europe/Africa, or Persia & USSR. Through 1942 & 1943 the proportion of output to the Pacific declined, tho in tonnage or headcount increased. In the last quarter of 1944 the percentage trend would be reversed & the proportion to the Pacific grew back to the majority.

If you were trying to use just one metric the tonnage of material sent in cargo ships would likely be closest. Better than counting division HQ or aircraft. ie: Not considering the massive infrastructure material sent, for ports, warehousing, transportation, barracks, airfields, ect.. ect.. & just counting combat units skews things depending on the dates & locations.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#117

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 14 Apr 2021, 17:28

daveshoup2MD wrote:
13 Apr 2021, 07:28
None of what you've posted above is evidence of anything but Brooke being Brooke.
Brooke had to argue with Churchill daily. Ill give him a pass on about anything.

Im recalling the Europe First strategy originated with the Plan Dog Memo from Admiral Stark, long before anyone had accomplished anything on reconciling the possible simultaneous execution of WP ORANGE & the long negelected WP BLACK. Neither was it anticipated until February or March 1942 just how badly things would go in a Pacific war. If the US ramped up its effort in the Pacific from 15% to 30% it largely because the Japanese exceeded expectations by 300% in the first six months of Pacific war. Circumstance changes plans.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#118

Post by Sheldrake » 15 Apr 2021, 11:55

Aha. I know jhave the answer to the question implicit in this thread.

See this thread that wonders how many panzer divisions would need to be in Normandy behind the D Day beaches to throw them into the sea?
viewtopic.php?f=11&t=256976&p=2337567#p2337567

The answer would be to launch Op Anvil/Dragoon first and draw reserves to the South of France.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#119

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 15 Apr 2021, 13:09

Sheldrake wrote:
15 Apr 2021, 11:55
...
The answer would be to launch Op Anvil/Dragoon first and draw reserves to the South of France.
That idea appears in the earlier proposals in the COSSAC planning. It works on the game board. -leaves the defender with difficult choices on where to use the reserves & in what portion. Theres not enough to ensure defeating one invasion and still have a solid defence against a second attack.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#120

Post by daveshoup2MD » 16 Apr 2021, 05:45

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
14 Apr 2021, 17:28
daveshoup2MD wrote:
13 Apr 2021, 07:28
None of what you've posted above is evidence of anything but Brooke being Brooke.
Brooke had to argue with Churchill daily. Ill give him a pass on about anything.

Im recalling the Europe First strategy originated with the Plan Dog Memo from Admiral Stark, long before anyone had accomplished anything on reconciling the possible simultaneous execution of WP ORANGE & the long negelected WP BLACK. Neither was it anticipated until February or March 1942 just how badly things would go in a Pacific war. If the US ramped up its effort in the Pacific from 15% to 30% it largely because the Japanese exceeded expectations by 300% in the first six months of Pacific war. Circumstance changes plans.
Indeed. It's worth remembering that when Wedemeyer and company were trying to figure out (in 1941) what would be needed (in 1943), the basic concept was the Japanese would stay out of the war; based on that, the target for 1943 in the 1941 VICTORY plan (which laid out a variety of potential roles and missions, and the forces required to achieve them) was total Army manpower of 8.8 million men; not exactly what as mobilized, but quite close.

How closely that tracked with actual combat forces (eventually) deployed overseas – ground and air – was less exact; the VICTORY plan envisioned several separate expeditionary forces to be ready for active service by July, 1943; in total, they came out to 39 infantry (straightleg and motorized), 11 specialized infantry (seven airborne and four mountain), eight armored, and two cavalry, for a total of 60 Army ground force divisions, organized and equipped for expeditionary warfare.

It’s worth noting the above was envisioned in terms of a conflict with the Axis in Europe and Africa; the strategic assessment for the Pacific was Japan would remain a non-belligerent.

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