OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

[Terry Duncan]

So far I have yet to see an answer to the question I posed in post #4

The problem with what-ifs concerning the cross channel Assault is that it is hard to see how the operational or strategic results could have been improved in the allies favour. Op Overlord, the lodgment phase of the Allies operations in NW Europe achieved its territorial goal's ahead of schedule and a defeated enemy abandoning France and Belgium. What would an even more successful Op Overlord have looked like?

Any answers?

Maybe one where Mulberry A gets tied together properly and isn't destroyed in the storm making the capture of a functioning port even more important and thus allowing a better supply situation?

[Richard Anderson]

So far I have yet to see an answer to the question I posed in post #4

The problem with what-ifs concerning the cross channel Assault is that it is hard to see how the operational or strategic results could have been improved in the allies favour. Op Overlord, the lodgment phase of the Allies operations in NW Europe achieved its territorial goal's ahead of schedule and a defeated enemy abandoning France and Belgium. What would an even more successful Op Overlord have looked like?

Any answers?

I'm not too sure that it could have been better? Perhaps if ASB intervened? Seriously, suppose the landings went more quickly and the Allies extended south more rapidly...wouldn't they potentially turn west to secure Brest as planned?

[Sheldrake]

Thanks chaps - but where does any part of the discussion on this thread lead to a better outcome for the allies than the historical strategic victory?

Are we suggesting that Anvil simultaneous with Overlord would have won the war in '44?

Or that the allies would have been spared casualties in Italy, that would not have been incurred in an earlier and bloodier Dragoon or allow the Germans who historically became casualties in the fighting in Italy to reinforce the German army in France and make for longer and harder fight in Normandy?

Or are we merely shuffling forces from one side show to another?

[Carl Schwamberger]

Thanks chaps - but where does any part of the discussion on this thread lead to a better outcome for the allies than the historical strategic victory?

Are we suggesting that Anvil simultaneous with Overlord would have won the war in '44?

Or that the allies would have been spared casualties in Italy, that would not have been incurred in an earlier and bloodier Dragoon or allow the Germans who historically became casualties in the fighting in Italy to reinforce the German army in France and make for longer and harder fight in Normandy?

Or are we merely shuffling forces from one side show to another?

The question in the OP looks like this to me:

How would this allocation have affected both operations?

Does that give any clarity?

[daveshoup2MD]

An interesting conops for the Allies after HUSKY would have been to exploit the Italian surrender where practical, but overall, remain on the strategic defensive in the theater in anticipation of the 1944 campaign season. So a reinforced BAYTOWN, rather than BAYTOWN and AVALANCHE; SLAPSTICK but not the Dodecanese; Sardinia and Corsica as "follow them out" types of operations, etc. Presumably that gets the Allies to the Winter Line more or less on schedule, which gains the Naples and Bari port complexes and the Foggia air field area, and then call a halt.

If one is to execute Op ANVIL robust airfields on Sardinia/Corsica are essential. I'd put priority on them & ops against the Italian mainland second. This also puts the shorter ranged B25 & B26 bombers & the P47s in range of the industrial north Italy. So, sooner rather than later for Sardinia. Third it complicates Kesselrings and Rundsteadts calculations since robust air bases there creates the threat of landing ops against a very long littoral. We may see those as impractical, but that pair, and Hitler did not have our perspective, and were deeply influenced by the deception Ops.

Agree; the combination of concentrating on BAYTOWN with (presumably) an Italian surrender/Cassibile armistice would yield Sardinia and Corsica more or less historically (probably to a US landing force, rather than French), and 12th Air Force can start setting up shop on time. Follow-up in the spring of 1944 with a BRASSARD type operation aimed at Elba and the Germans will be, presumably, deceived, as they were historically, and may, in fact, see a need to put their own troops into the coastal defenses on the western coast of Italy...

[Carl Schwamberger]

...
I'm not too sure that it could have been better? Perhaps if ASB intervened? Seriously, suppose the landings went more quickly and the Allies extended south more rapidly...wouldn't they potentially turn west to secure Brest as planned?

That does not solve the the railway problem much faster. Even if Brest or the Bereton port group are captured sooner would the restoration of the railways happen much faster?

[daveshoup2MD]

Thanks chaps - but where does any part of the discussion on this thread lead to a better outcome for the allies than the historical strategic victory?

Are we suggesting that Anvil simultaneous with Overlord would have won the war in '44?

Or that the allies would have been spared casualties in Italy, that would not have been incurred in an earlier and bloodier Dragoon or allow the Germans who historically became casualties in the fighting in Italy to reinforce the German army in France and make for longer and harder fight in Normandy?

Or are we merely shuffling forces from one side show to another?

France was always the main event. Destroying Nazi Germany meant taking Berlin and the Ruhr; taking both from the west was dependent on the French channel pots, Antwerp, the French Mediterranean ports, and Paris and Brussels, which were the transportation and administration centers for the Allies on the continent.

Given the above, the NW Europe campaign was never a sideshow. Stronger Allied forces would suggest an earlier OVERLORD-NEPTUNE equivalent (perhaps May) which may, in turn, get the Allies to the Rhine before the winter of 1944-45, rather than the spring of 1945. That is a positive achievement.

[Carl Schwamberger]

Agree; the combination of concentrating on BAYTOWN with (presumably) an Italian surrender/Cassibile armistice would yield Sardinia and Corsica more or less historically (probably to a US landing force, rather than French), and 12th Air Force can start setting up shop on time. Follow-up in the spring of 1944 with a BRASSARD type operation aimed at Elba and the Germans will be, presumably, deceived, as they were historically, and may, in fact, see a need to put their own troops into the coastal defenses on the western coast of Italy...

We could also speculate that with reduced fighting in Italy Hitler withdraws substantial mobile forces & orders Keselring to put the main defense in the northern Appinnes, fearing any substantial defense in the south will be cut off by one of those deception ops. Hitlers decisions were predictable only in that he often tried to have it both ways.

[Carl Schwamberger]

An important question here is how would the proposed allocation of landing craft and the measures to obviate the shortage (overloading the APAs, carrying vehicles in the APAs, the use of AKAs in the initial lift in ANVIL, relying in increased serviceability, etc.) have affected OVERLORD and ANVIL? As the sources I quoted above say, the compromise was criticized by planners of 21 Army Group and the British Chiefs of Staff. They said that "both OVERLORD and ANVIL are skimped".

The most interesting aspect of all this is that the NEPTUNE landing ships and craft serviceability estimates were actually much lower than what was experienced. In fact, overall serviceability was around 98%, rather than the 80%-90% ranges COSSAC and later planning used. In the end, many of the assault convoys, especially on the British beaches, were able to take advantage of additional LCT loading, without having to overload the LCT. They may be found with LTIN where an "a" is appended.

So if the planners in February were perfectly prescient - I know, its a "what if", so of course they were - and had known what the actual serviceability rates and production and deployments of new ships and craft would be, then of course NEPTUNE and ANVIL probably could have been executed simultaneously.

It looks like there were similar estimate exceeding things going on on the US side in the logistics effort. But, as we have discussed more than once port capacity is not the larger problem, internal transportation is. It is possible the only way to get that resolved sooner is to get into France sooner.

[daveshoup2MD]

Agree; the combination of concentrating on BAYTOWN with (presumably) an Italian surrender/Cassibile armistice would yield Sardinia and Corsica more or less historically (probably to a US landing force, rather than French), and 12th Air Force can start setting up shop on time. Follow-up in the spring of 1944 with a BRASSARD type operation aimed at Elba and the Germans will be, presumably, deceived, as they were historically, and may, in fact, see a need to put their own troops into the coastal defenses on the western coast of Italy...

We could also speculate that with reduced fighting in Italy Hitler withdraws substantial mobile forces & orders Keselring to put the main defense in the northern Appinnes, fearing any substantial defense in the south will be cut off by one of those deception ops. Hitlers decisions were predictable only in that he often tried to have it both ways.

True, but given that historically, AH bet on Kesselring and not Rommel, seems like he made the "hold as far south as possible" decision even before AVALANCHE; Rommel was sent to France in November, so I don't really see the Germans surrendering Rome without a fight, and to hold Rome, they needed to defend somewhere - the Winter Line(s) position is obvious.

[Kingfish]

That still leaves the 8th Army with (at least) three British corps after GOLDFLAKE and the Polish II Corps, with the British 1st and 6th armoured, SA 6th Armoured; British 1st, 4th, 46th, 56th, and 78th divisions, the 4th, 8th, and 10th Indian divisions, and the Polish 3rd and 5th divisions, plus from 1-3 Italian division equivalents, which should be enough to keep the Germans occupied, and ready to follow up on any German withdrawal northwards...

Add the 2nd NZ division to that basket.

[Gooner1]

To be born in mind if sacrificing operations in Italy for an earlier Anvil/Dragoon

c.4th June 1944
"Kesselring had lost the men of about four divisions, the artillery of five divisions, and the armour of about two panzer regiments. Moreover, very happily for the Allies' purpose of containing German forces in Italy and of drawing into Italy forces which might have been used to oppose 'Overlord', Hitler decided to reinforce the Italian campaign. Between the middle of May and the end of the first week in June four infantry divisions were ordered to Italy from other countries, as well as the equivalent of the infantry of three divisions if we reckon two three-battalion regiments to a division. In addition Kesselring committed two divisions from the Adriatic front and brought down three from northern Italy."
TMAME Vol. VI

[Juan G. C.]

An important question here is how would the proposed allocation of landing craft and the measures to obviate the shortage (overloading the APAs, carrying vehicles in the APAs, the use of AKAs in the initial lift in ANVIL, relying in increased serviceability, etc.) have affected OVERLORD and ANVIL? As the sources I quoted above say, the compromise was criticized by planners of 21 Army Group and the British Chiefs of Staff. They said that "both OVERLORD and ANVIL are skimped".

The most interesting aspect of all this is that the NEPTUNE landing ships and craft serviceability estimates were actually much lower than what was experienced. In fact, overall serviceability was around 98%, rather than the 80%-90% ranges COSSAC and later planning used. In the end, many of the assault convoys, especially on the British beaches, were able to take advantage of additional LCT loading, without having to overload the LCT. They may be found with LTIN where an "a" is appended.

So if the planners in February were perfectly prescient - I know, its a "what if", so of course they were - and had known what the actual serviceability rates and production and deployments of new ships and craft would be, then of course NEPTUNE and ANVIL probably could have been executed simultaneously.

Thanks!

The question in the OP looks like this to me:

How would this allocation have affected both operations?

Does that give any clarity?

Exactly, that's what I meant. It is indifferent if it would have been better or worse for the Allies.

[Carl Schwamberger]

To be born in mind if sacrificing operations in Italy for an earlier Anvil/Dragoon

c.4th June 1944
"Kesselring had lost the men of about four divisions, the artillery of five divisions, and the armour of about two panzer regiments. Moreover, very happily for the Allies' purpose of containing German forces in Italy and of drawing into Italy forces which might have been used to oppose 'Overlord', Hitler decided to reinforce the Italian campaign. Between the middle of May and the end of the first week in June four infantry divisions were ordered to Italy from other countries, as well as the equivalent of the infantry of three divisions if we reckon two three-battalion regiments to a division. In addition Kesselring committed two divisions from the Adriatic front and brought down three from northern Italy."
TMAME Vol. VI

No, it would have been a bad idea to leave the 'Italian Front' inactive. There still must be diversionary operations. Conversely committing to a series of bloody attacks into a prepared defense on a narrow front is a error at the opposite end. Churchill insisted on a short flanking operation, its correct that could have levered the defense out of the Gustav line & other positions south of Rome, but up sizing the SHINGLE operation to where it can succeed means delaying/reducing OVERLORD. Is that really the better trade off? Does capturing Rome get you to the final goal quicker, or does capturing Paris? You choose.

[maltesefalcon]

A good analysis above. Both Overlord and Anvil/Dragoon achieved their primary objectives. That is to say the liberation occurred somewhat ahead of schedule, despite early setbacks in bocage country.

But one area could perhaps have improved? On both campaigns, enough German troops managed to retreat back into the Reich to stabilize the front, as the Allies began to outrun their supply system.

IMHO this was somewhat due to tactical errors, inexperience and the desire for the Western armies to do the job; while keeping both their own casualties and civilian collateral casualties to a minimum.

Not sure that doing both campaigns at the same time would have fared any better in this regard.

I can recommend Rueckzug: The German Retreat from France, 1944 (Foreign Military Studies) Paperback – June 27, 2017 by Ludwicg trans Zabecki. Ludwig's argues that the Allies lost sight of the Clauswitzian objective of destroying the enemy army in favour of geographical objectives - whether narrow front argued by Montgomery or the broad front pursued by Eisenhower. In his opinion the Germans could not have created a defensive front on the West Wall without the successful withdrawal of the Fifteenth Army along the coast and Army Group G from the south of France. Montgomery's objective should have been to pin Antwerp and North while Patton should have been aiming for the Swiss Border not the moselle route to the Rhine.

To be sure there were oversights and errors on the Allied part.

That being said, one cannot simply use Clausewitz' methods as the template for success. For one thing, his principles were conceived at a time when large scale movements of troops and equipment was much more difficult. As were long duration concentrations of troops in one area, for fear of using up their limited provisions. Campaigns and even wars could be decided in one or two major battles. Once the enemy troops were neutralized, any lands thereon would be at the mercy or discretion of the winner.

100 years later war was three dimensional. Troops and equipment could be not only moved quickly, they could receive regular and reliable supply and reinforcement all year round. Thus campaigns could last many months. Not only that, the local population would be engaged in factories, farms and transportation of goods to aid the war effort.

It was just as important in 1944 to reduce the enemy's military element, but also their ability to reinforce and supply it. As such, populations and urban centres became legitimate targets, therefore goals to be recaptured. The high number of civilian deaths in WW2 was a direct cause and effect relationship of that reality.

There was also the political aspect. Democratic nations needed to have the support of public opinion to survive. People needed to see success, not in attrition, but on the map. There were enough people who remembered hundreds of thousands who fell in the battles of the Great War, merely to move the front a mile or two at a time.

Finally from the Allied point of view this was a war of liberation, not conquest. Bringing long suffering peoples of France, Belgium and Holland back into the Allied camp improved morale. This was of particular importance to the Free French serving in the Allied force.