OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

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Richard Anderson
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 May 2021 21:33

Juan G. C. wrote:
02 May 2021 20:37
I mean, the British were saying: "We need so much landing craft, and the only form of having It is cancelling ANVIL, so se must cancel ANVIL and use the landing craft allocated to It for NEPTUNE". And the Americans were saying: "We don't need so much landing craft, we can do well with what we have with [higher serviceability, overloading, new American production]". And the British say OK, we don't need 7 LST and 30 LCI (L). But there is still a deficit of 15 LST. How can we make it up?" And the Americans say: "[higher serviceability, overloading, new American production]". 8O It makes no sense to me.
Think of it as a conversation on Axis History Forum, with most of the participants talking past each other and taking offense to both real and imagined slights and you should understand it well. :thumbsup: :milwink:
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 02 May 2021 21:34

Richard Anderson wrote:
02 May 2021 17:52
daveshoup2MD wrote:
02 May 2021 17:29
And, it was actually six assault divisions afloat for NEPTUNE - US 1st, 4th, 29th; British 3rd, 50th; Canadian 3rd.

So, I'd suggest avoiding passive aggressive comments, and engage factually with the discussion or drop out.

Carry on.
Given the assault elements of the 29th Inf Div were attached to the 1st Inf Div and the 29th Inf Div was actually considered a follow-on division as part of FORCE B, the same advice may apply?

Meanwhile, technically the divisions "afloat" (including the "preloaded" divisions) for NEPTUNE were actually the 1st, 2d, 4th, 29th, and 90th US, the 3d, 7th Armoured, 50th, and 51st British, and 2d Canadian..
Are troops "afloat" in anything (in X-APs, APs, USATs, APcs, AKs, etc. and their US WSA and British Merchant Navy and Allied equivalents, much less aboard freighters and landing barges) the same as troops in "assault" (APAs, AKAs, LSIs (of whatever subtype you wish), LSDs, LSTs, LCIs, LCTs, etc.) shipping? Discuss amongst yourselves.

I appreciate the point of the statement about pedantry in your sig line.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 02 May 2021 21:41

Richard Anderson wrote:
02 May 2021 18:20
daveshoup2MD wrote:
02 May 2021 17:54
Richard Anderson wrote:
02 May 2021 15:34
daveshoup2MD wrote:
27 Apr 2021 06:24
And HUSKY was successful in sustaining an army group-sized expeditionary force over the beach... and in 1943.
Um, Syracuse was captured at 2100 10 July, the port operating party entered before noon on 11 July, and the first 12 ships planned to unload there D+3 were departing the port after unloading by 1800 on 13 July. Augusta was abandoned at 0500 on 12 July, but the harbor was shelled and it was not secured until just before noon on 13 July and the usable quay found was in operation by that evening. Gela was more problematic, since the pier was demolished by the Italians before they evacuated, so the American forces, a rump army, were supplied over the beaches until the capture of Palermo.
Eight Allied divisions landed on July 10, under two army headquarters, and fought, correct? Or did they all stop shooting until 1800 on 13 July?
Pretty close, and they were supported "over the beaches" exclusively for those first three days, because a lot of those LST and LCT were hauling supplies, rather than combat-loaded troops. However, the campaign lasted for a few more than those three days, so stating it was "successful in sustaining an army group-sized expeditionary force over the beach... and in 1943" is a stretch. More like the Seventh US Army was supported for the first two of six weeks over the beaches and the British Eighth Army was supported for the first three days of six weeks over the beaches.
Fair response; thank you. Given the significance of the reality that an Allied army group-sized force could be sustained over the beach in the summer of 1943, however, I'd say it's not a stretch, especially compared to some of the concepts various and sundry boffins thought were necessary...

Given I'm not writing something for Proceedings or Parameters at the moment, I'll plead it really is too nice a day. Waves are breaking, palm trees are swaying, and there's a cold frosty one with my name on it on the lenai...

But let's continue the conversation. It's more entertaining than spending the morning trying to get ahead of Monday's deliverables.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 02 May 2021 21:48

Richard Anderson wrote:
02 May 2021 18:37
daveshoup2MD wrote:
02 May 2021 18:00
The OP question was could an OVERLORD equivalent and an ANVIL/DRAGOON equivalent been mounted simultaneously or at least closer in time; the answer yes, and one way to have
helped
make it possible was not diverting landing craft from amphibious lift assignments to NGS assignments.
It was only possible to do it simultaneously by curtailing all operations using LST and LCT in Italy, which would have eliminated the execution of DIADEM and the possibility of annihilating 10. Armee (and, yes, of course Clark screwed that up to, but hindsight...)

I've already noted the narrow margins WRT LCT. NEPTUNE required 238 LST for the assault and follow-on, DRAGOON 77, while there were 229 in the UK, 25 in the Med, 95 on the US East Coast working up, and 101 in the Pacific. NEPTUNE required 94 LCI(L), DRAGOON 121. There were 245 in the UK, 91 in the Med, 89 on the East Coast, 41 on the West Coast, and 132 in the Pacific.

LST requirements are a none-starter, recall Churchill's famous quote. LCI(L) look better, so you can land more unsupported infantry if you want.
The assumptions are coming from you in all this. You know what those amount to...
Those landing craft were not diverted to NGS assignments, they did not fulfill the role of NGS, they were direct-fire support for the landings, because it was perceived - quite correctly - that NGS was not a panacea. It could not target everything, it was not always available when needed, and communications to it frequently broke down.

You seem to assume yourself the requirement was imaginary? Why? Are you trying to make an ASS out of both U and ME?
Cancelling SHINGLE would have been helpful. I agree.

By your numbers:
LST need (OVERLORD/ANVIL) - 315
LST active (not including any you described as "working up") - 356

LCI need - 215
LCI active (not, presumably, including any in US waters) - 468

No shortfall.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 02 May 2021 21:49

Richard Anderson wrote:
02 May 2021 18:40
daveshoup2MD wrote:
02 May 2021 18:03
No, and please point out where that has been suggested. I'll wait.
Oh, and here I thought the assumptions game was in play? :D
Was there a gradient, however, between "necessity" and "nice to have"?

Yes.
Sorry, but that is your assumption based apparently on the belief that there never was a perceived requirement for landing support craft, when it was actually an integral part of USN and RN amphibious doctrine. However, if you have some proof that they were just a "nice to have" rather than developed to fulfill and actual requirement, I'll be happy to see it.
Carry on
Ditto.
Just on your side, professor...

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 02 May 2021 21:52

Richard Anderson wrote:
02 May 2021 18:43
daveshoup2MD wrote:
02 May 2021 18:05
The joy of asking him to explain how knocking off 5,000 Canadian volunteers was a victory for the Allies.
You are too easily amused. I gave up on he/she/it when the references supplied by he/she/it proved to be doctored and he/she/it refused to acknowledge the forgery.
Simple tastes, on my part.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 02 May 2021 21:55

Sheldrake wrote:
02 May 2021 19:29
daveshoup2MD wrote:
02 May 2021 17:29
So, an appeal to an unnamed authority - "remarks, probably by Mountbatten" .

And, FWIW, the professional heads of the respective American and British services were the Combined Chiefs of Staff ... the CCS. See:

http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/ATO/FRW ... WW2-1.html



#1 The reference wasn't not an unnamed authority, but to a source document linked from post #202 generated by Mountbatten's HQ.

#2 This was a view accepted by the Combined Combined Staffs, the professional heads of the respective American and British services. No one slammed the table at Quadrant and said "Good god if we landed seven divisions in Husky you can land more than three in Overlord!" Nope they built the additional landing craft to land two more divisions.

The constraint was not the number of divisions afloat but the number of beaches that could be assaulted on D Day.


HUSKY assault forces were (depending on how one counts various maneuver elements, of course) seven reinforced infantry divisions (US 1st, 3rd, 45th, British 5th, 50th, 51st; Canadian 1st)'; NEPTUNE was six (US 1st, 4th, 29th, British 3rd, 50th, Canadian 3rd). How many beaches do you need?

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 02 May 2021 21:58

ljadw wrote:
02 May 2021 21:15
daveshoup2MD wrote:
02 May 2021 18:05
Richard Anderson wrote:
02 May 2021 16:22
Peter89 wrote:
29 Apr 2021 08:23
daveshoup2MD wrote:
28 Apr 2021 23:54


Ne ego si iterum eodem modo vicero, sine ullo milite Epirum revertar.
Except there wasn't even an Allied victory at Dieppe : D

If we want to twist words beyond their meaning, the Germans have lost the Battle of France, because it was nothing more than just a stepstone in their way towards defeat, and the BEF got valuable experience how to evacuate. Also it wasn't a battle, but a campaign, and it wasn't in France, because it was also fought in the Low Countries. But those are not really the Low Countries, because the key movements took place in the Ardennes. But that wasn't the key movement, because the key movement was taking place in Berlin. But in fact the key wasn't what the Germans were doing, but what the Allies were doing, so... etc.
Why anyone would voluntarily interact with ljadw at this point is simply beyond me.
The joy of asking him to explain how knocking off 5,000 Canadian volunteers was a victory for the Allies.
That they were volunteers is meaningless .And the Canadians lost more men during the Battle of the Scheldt .Will you say that these losses are proving that the Battle of the Scheldt was a failure ?
The amount of losses can not be used to argue that an operation was a failure or a success .
If you want no losses : do not fight .
Failure or success is proved by the fact that the aims of the operation are not /are fulfilled . Not by the losses that were caused by the operation .
The Canadian contingent in Hong Kong was eliminated in December 1941 : 1975 men . But this is not a proof of the defeat of Hong Kong . The proof is that Hong Kong was captured .
In the context of the Canadian Army in 1939-45, actually, the fact they were volunteers is signifcant.

Again, how was JUBILEE a "success"?

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 02 May 2021 21:59

Juan G. C. wrote:
02 May 2021 20:37
Richard Anderson wrote:
02 May 2021 17:30
Juan G. C. wrote:
02 May 2021 17:02
In relationship with my OP, I have a problem with this excerpt from United States Army in World War II.:Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945 which I quoted earlier:
On 18 February an uneasy compromise emerged. The 21st Army Group staff, whether relying on American assurances of higher serviceability or on a reassessment of their own needs, dropped 7 LST's from the requirement of 42, and 30 LCI (L) 's from the requirement of 51. It was then proposed that 20 LST's and 2 1 LCI (L) 's be taken from Anvil (the vessels to depart the Mediterranean for the United Kingdom not later than 1 April) and, by way of compensation for the LST's, to transfer to the Mediterranean the 6 more or less unwanted AKA's, which represented roughly their equivalent in vehicle lift and were more suitable for amphibious employment under Mediterranean weather and tidal conditions than in the Channel . The remaining deficit of 15 LST's, it was hoped, might be absorbed by the various "probabilities" — higher serviceability, overloading, and new American production. Upon the last- named source Eisenhower put in a strong bid for at least 7 new LST's, which might be used in the build-up even if they could not arrive in time for the assault.
Does anyone have any idea why the 21st Army Group staff dropped 7 LST and 30 LCI (L) from the requirements, given that even after they dropped it, it was still hoped the the remaining deficit (15 LST) could be absorbed by "higher serviceability, overloading, and new American production" and so these could not have been the reason for the dropping?
Because, as it says, it was a compromise more acceptable to them than any other options...and, I suspect, because it helped delay ANVIL to the point where the CIGS hoped it would be cancelled.

I note you found why the AKA were not utilized in NEPTUNE. :D
I mean, the British were saying: "We need so much landing craft, and the only form of having It is cancelling ANVIL, so se must cancel ANVIL and use the landing craft allocated to It for NEPTUNE". And the Americans were saying: "We don't need so much landing craft, we can do well with what we have with [higher serviceability, overloading, new American production]". And the British say OK, we don't need 7 LST and 30 LCI (L). But there is still a deficit of 15 LST. How can we make it up?" And the Americans say: "[higher serviceability, overloading, new American production]". 8O It makes no sense to me.
Welcome to coalition warfare. Enjoy.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 May 2021 22:39

daveshoup2MD wrote:
02 May 2021 21:27
LST = Landing Ship Tank. It's a landing ship. It lands tanks. On the beach.

Wait, here's one doing just that during HUSKY ... "...Tanks from LST 2 helped repulse a German counter attack on the beachhead on July 11, immediately after disembarking."
Yep, on 11 July. When was the landing begun?

Anyway,

"July 8, 1943, o645, Underway from Gulf of Tunis, part of operations BIGOT-HUSKY Task Organization 80.6, Reserve Group KOOL, loaded with cargo consisting of: Twenty (20) medium tanks, thirty-eight (38) other miscellaneous vehicles, and two hundred and seventy-two (272) army personnel, total cargo weighing 995.3 tons.
...
July 10, 1943, 2025, anchored one (1) mile off Blue Beach 67.
...
July 11, 0614, Underway under orders from Commanding General KOOL, to procede to Blue Beach 67 to disembark cargo.
...
0634, Anchored by stern off Blue Beach 67, 300 yards of beach with two (2) fathoms of water at end of ramp. Cargo discharged by LCTs.
...
1025, [First five (5) tanks unloaded to beach.]
...
1100, Beachmaster came aboard requesting that tanks be unloaded as fast as possible, as they were urgently needed.
...
1715, LCT-491 left bow with last of cargo."

LST = Landing Ship Tank. It's a landing ship. It lands tanks. It lands miscellaneous vehicles. It lands equipment. It lands stores. It lands troops. On a secured (theoretically in this case) beach. In this case, it landed those tanks about 32 hours and 25 minutes after the assault began.
LCTs - I presume this is a typo, but "The first LCT-5 was completed and accepted in June 1943, the second in July 1942." Quite a trick, if not.
Here's a hint, if your only argument is over typos, then your argument is going down the tubes...or you're just being an ass.
470 LCTs by the end of 1943; 270 LCIs by the end of February, according to your numbers above, of which (also according to your numbers above) only 224 LCT 2/3/5 and c. 163 LCI(L) were assigned to HUSKY. So, from a total of 740 in existence (by your own numbers) only 387 were assigned to HUSKY. So, quite clearly, there were another 350 - at least - available.
Of 470 LCT-5 completed by the end of February 1943, 77 participated in HUSKY. Where were the others at this time? I suspect an equal number were in the Pacific. 170 went to the UK and I don't have an accurate count of the number used by the British in HUSKY. Ditto for the LCT-2 (I can find one that participated), LCT-3 (15 I know of), and LCT-4 (3). That leaves around 150 LCT-5 unaccounted for. They could have been working up still in the US.
Your summary sentence is illuminating: "Given that the NEPTUNE requirement was for 814 LCT of all types and DRAGOON 158 and that as of 1 June 1944, the USN and RN in Europe had just 1,019 on hand, with another 58 still working up on the US East Coast, 1 on the US West Coast, and 142 in the Pacific and Indian oceans, that was problematically tight, especially considering the expected versus the actual serviceability rates."

Need - 972
Active (setting aside those working up, again using your numbers): 1161.

No shortfall in terms of resources.
Um, using the assumed planning factor insisted on by the British, 85%, then of the 1,161 on hand, at any one time it was expected that 987 would be operational. That leaves 15 LCT for doing anything else in the Atlantic and Med that did not directly involve NEPTUNE and DRAGOON. That the actual serviceability approached 97% makes it much more doable is true, but that is the benefit of hindsight. As I said, "that was problematically tight". So problematic that the CSS with input from Eisenhower, Montgomery, Ramsay, et al, decided to not attempt it.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 May 2021 22:44

daveshoup2MD wrote:
02 May 2021 21:34
Richard Anderson wrote:
02 May 2021 17:52
daveshoup2MD wrote:
02 May 2021 17:29
And, it was actually six assault divisions afloat for NEPTUNE - US 1st, 4th, 29th; British 3rd, 50th; Canadian 3rd.

So, I'd suggest avoiding passive aggressive comments, and engage factually with the discussion or drop out.

Carry on.
Given the assault elements of the 29th Inf Div were attached to the 1st Inf Div and the 29th Inf Div was actually considered a follow-on division as part of FORCE B, the same advice may apply?

Meanwhile, technically the divisions "afloat" (including the "preloaded" divisions) for NEPTUNE were actually the 1st, 2d, 4th, 29th, and 90th US, the 3d, 7th Armoured, 50th, and 51st British, and 2d Canadian..
Are troops "afloat" in anything (in X-APs, APs, USATs, APcs, AKs, etc. and their US WSA and British Merchant Navy and Allied equivalents, much less aboard freighters and landing barges) the same as troops in "assault" (APAs, AKAs, LSIs (of whatever subtype you wish), LSDs, LSTs, LCIs, LCTs, etc.) shipping? Discuss amongst yourselves.

I appreciate the point of the statement about pedantry in your sig line.
Sorry, but no USAT, AK, or AKA in NEPTUNE. There was an LSD though, but it didn't Landing Ship Dock. :D

You might also appreciate that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. If you want to be pedantic yourself, expect pedantry in return. :welcome:
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 May 2021 22:49

daveshoup2MD wrote:
02 May 2021 21:41
Fair response; thank you. Given the significance of the reality that an Allied army group-sized force could be sustained over the beach in the summer of 1943, however, I'd say it's not a stretch, especially compared to some of the concepts various and sundry boffins thought were necessary...
Like the 8,000-odd landing craft it was expected a three (or was it four) division assault would require when calculated in 1942? :lol: The doctrine matured as did the TTPs.
Given I'm not writing something for Proceedings or Parameters at the moment, I'll plead it really is too nice a day. Waves are breaking, palm trees are swaying, and there's a cold frosty one with my name on it on the lenai...
Lanai...sorry, couldn't resist after your correction of my year typo. I'm waiting to do much the same, except we just got back from the Pacific beaches, so I am back to staring at the inlet and Olympics.
But let's continue the conversation. It's more entertaining than spending the morning trying to get ahead of Monday's deliverables.
Take my advice, retire, or don't worry about it. :lol: If you start getting deliverables in on time they'll simply cut the time of delivery on the next one.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Richard Anderson » 02 May 2021 22:56

daveshoup2MD wrote:
02 May 2021 21:48
Cancelling SHINGLE would have been helpful. I agree.

By your numbers:
LST need (OVERLORD/ANVIL) - 315
LST active (not including any you described as "working up") - 356

LCI need - 215
LCI active (not, presumably, including any in US waters) - 468

No shortfall.
Absolutely, but then you get into the "we can't have all the fun and leave Bimbo and Clark to do nothing" issue :lol: , plus there is that niggly opportunity to take out an entire German army...again.

Meanwhile, the excess of LCI(L) is not something I actually noticed before I ran these numbers...one of the good things that can come out of these tail-chasing exercises. I suspect it may have been a carryover from the leeriness displayed at using them in HUSKY? They seemed to have made the naval types nervous in a way all the other vessels of the Gator Fleet did not...and the leeriness seems to have been more pronounced in Europe than the Pacific. It's a real oddity, especially given that a flotilla of about 18 of them could haul the personnel of a regiment of infantry.
"Is all this pretentious pseudo intellectual citing of sources REALLY necessary? It gets in the way of a good, spirited debate, destroys the cadence." POD, 6 October 2018

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 03 May 2021 04:03

Richard Anderson wrote:
02 May 2021 22:39
Your summary sentence is illuminating: "Given that the NEPTUNE requirement was for 814 LCT of all types and DRAGOON 158 and that as of 1 June 1944, the USN and RN in Europe had just 1,019 on hand, with another 58 still working up on the US East Coast, 1 on the US West Coast, and 142 in the Pacific and Indian oceans, that was problematically tight, especially considering the expected versus the actual serviceability rates."

Need - 972
Active (setting aside those working up, again using your numbers): 1161.

No shortfall in terms of resources.
Um, using the assumed planning factor insisted on by the British, 85%, then of the 1,161 on hand, at any one time it was expected that 987 would be operational. That leaves 15 LCT for doing anything else in the Atlantic and Med that did not directly involve NEPTUNE and DRAGOON. That the actual serviceability approached 97% makes it much more doable is true, but that is the benefit of hindsight. As I said, "that was problematically tight". So problematic that the CSS with input from Eisenhower, Montgomery, Ramsay, et al, decided to not attempt it.
So what else is going on in the Atlantic/Med in this period beyond NEPTUNE/DRAGOON in a world where - according to the OP - the Allies are trying to do "OVERLORD and ANVIL" simultaneously?

BRASSARD?

And as far as the snark goes, all in all? Consider it re-payment in kind.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 03 May 2021 04:05

Richard Anderson wrote:
02 May 2021 22:44
daveshoup2MD wrote:
02 May 2021 21:34

Are troops "afloat" in anything (in X-APs, APs, USATs, APcs, AKs, etc. and their US WSA and British Merchant Navy and Allied equivalents, much less aboard freighters and landing barges) the same as troops in "assault" (APAs, AKAs, LSIs (of whatever subtype you wish), LSDs, LSTs, LCIs, LCTs, etc.) shipping? Discuss amongst yourselves.

I appreciate the point of the statement about pedantry in your sig line.
Sorry, but no USAT, AK, or AKA in NEPTUNE. There was an LSD though, but it didn't Landing Ship Dock. :D

You might also appreciate that what is sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. If you want to be pedantic yourself, expect pedantry in return. :welcome:
Doesn't mean they did not exist and could not have been marshalled (get it? huh, get it?) for this "OVERLORD and ANVIL" gambit, though, does it?

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