OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 03 May 2021 04:24

Richard Anderson wrote:
02 May 2021 22:49
daveshoup2MD wrote:
02 May 2021 21:41
Fair response; thank you. Given the significance of the reality that an Allied army group-sized force could be sustained over the beach in the summer of 1943, however, I'd say it's not a stretch, especially compared to some of the concepts various and sundry boffins thought were necessary...
Like the 8,000-odd landing craft it was expected a three (or was it four) division assault would require when calculated in 1942? :lol: The doctrine matured as did the TTPs.
Given I'm not writing something for Proceedings or Parameters at the moment, I'll plead it really is too nice a day. Waves are breaking, palm trees are swaying, and there's a cold frosty one with my name on it on the lenai...
Lanai...sorry, couldn't resist after your correction of my year typo. I'm waiting to do much the same, except we just got back from the Pacific beaches, so I am back to staring at the inlet and Olympics.
But let's continue the conversation. It's more entertaining than spending the morning trying to get ahead of Monday's deliverables.
Take my advice, retire, or don't worry about it. :lol: If you start getting deliverables in on time they'll simply cut the time of delivery on the next one.
You say Lanai, and I say lenai:

Island: https://www.gohawaii.com/islands/lanai

Patio: https://4lifeoutdoor.com/outdoor-rooms- ... h-veranda/

Bottom line in all this is the Allies successfully created a lot of operational amphibious lift in 1942-44, more than any other coalition before or since; the types varied, but the capacity is undeniable, given the historical record of successful amphibious operations, from IRONCLAD and WATCHTOWER in 1942 to NEPTUNE and DRAGOON in 1944 - which is the proof, as opposed to theory about "Operation X was impossible without Gadget Y," which is simply a technical excuse for avoiding questions about policy decisions.

Obviously, there is a difference between capacity and strategy (means and ends), but from the perspective of historical, leadership, and policy-making, that's where it gets interesting in terms of competing aims, goals, and desired end states - but the capacity argument is often used to try and obscure the more important questions.

Alternative history is fantasy; but historical alternatives are worthy of analysis - and the question then is not "what if?" by "why not?"... that's the fascinating part.

My .2 sentimos

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 03 May 2021 04:27

Richard Anderson wrote:
02 May 2021 22:56
daveshoup2MD wrote:
02 May 2021 21:48
Cancelling SHINGLE would have been helpful. I agree.

By your numbers:
LST need (OVERLORD/ANVIL) - 315
LST active (not including any you described as "working up") - 356

LCI need - 215
LCI active (not, presumably, including any in US waters) - 468

No shortfall.
Absolutely, but then you get into the "we can't have all the fun and leave Bimbo and Clark to do nothing" issue :lol: , plus there is that niggly opportunity to take out an entire German army...again.

Meanwhile, the excess of LCI(L) is not something I actually noticed before I ran these numbers...one of the good things that can come out of these tail-chasing exercises. I suspect it may have been a carryover from the leeriness displayed at using them in HUSKY? They seemed to have made the naval types nervous in a way all the other vessels of the Gator Fleet did not...and the leeriness seems to have been more pronounced in Europe than the Pacific. It's a real oddity, especially given that a flotilla of about 18 of them could haul the personnel of a regiment of infantry.
Which is an interesting question, but it's not a "capacity" question - it's a "policy" question ... which is where things really get interesting. ;)

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Peter89 » 03 May 2021 09:22

Richard Anderson wrote:
02 May 2021 16:22

Why anyone would voluntarily interact with ljadw at this point is simply beyond me.
It's just the happiness of being in front of the screen again :milsmile:
“And while I am talking to you, mothers and fathers, I give you one more assurance. I have said this before, but I shall say it again, and again and again. Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars." - FDR, October 1940

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Sheldrake » 03 May 2021 14:20

daveshoup2MD wrote:
02 May 2021 21:55

HUSKY assault forces were (depending on how one counts various maneuver elements, of course) seven reinforced infantry divisions (US 1st, 3rd, 45th, British 5th, 50th, 51st; Canadian 1st)'; NEPTUNE was six (US 1st, 4th, 29th, British 3rd, 50th, Canadian 3rd). How many beaches do you need?
As Rick(?) has already pointed out to you, there was difference between the number of divisions afloat - which was seven including 7th British Armoured Division and the number of assaulting brigades/RCT. Each Assault Brigade/RCT followed the same template and included supporting craft and substantial armoured and engineer resources to support the clearance of obstacles and entrenched enemy. These were the formations which took the majority of the casualties on the beaches.

Husky, landing against light opposition could land in lots of places. Op Overlord was against a stronger enemy. Landing craft and shipping constrained the COSSAC Plan to three beaches - Omaha, Gold and Juno, with two assaulting RCT /Brigade groups on each. Montgomery and Eisenhower demanded that the seaborne landing be extended to five beaches adding Utah and Sword. These latter additions were only mounted with a single assault RCT/Brigade group, with the remainder following on. Three airborne divisions were added on the flanks

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Richard Anderson » 03 May 2021 15:55

daveshoup2MD wrote:
03 May 2021 04:27
Which is an interesting question, but it's not a "capacity" question - it's a "policy" question ... which is where things really get interesting. ;)
Well, I'd say it was a capacity, policy, and personalities question, which is indeed where things get interesting. Too many of these what ifs simply tweak capacity issues - what I call the "lets move these counters from here to there and win the war" syndrome - without really understanding what those capacity issues really were or how hard it is in real life to move men, equipment, and stores intercontinental distances, and then proceed to ignore the issues of doctrine, competing strategic aims, the introduction of new equipment and TTPs in a wartime environment of vastly expanding militaries, and the cussedness of people supposedly interacting with one another to achieve a goal.

I suspect that had it been solely a US Navy decision (there are various hints IIRC in the administrative histories of the 11th PHIB that point that way), the landing craft availability estimate of 90-95% may have been enough for the USN to accept a simultaneous NEPTUNE and DRAGOON, but that is just my suspicion.
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Richard Anderson » 03 May 2021 16:03

Sheldrake wrote:
03 May 2021 14:20
As Rick(?) has already pointed out to you, there was difference between the number of divisions afloat - which was seven including 7th British Armoured Division and the number of assaulting brigades/RCT.
I generally go by Rich, but Rick works too. :D

Anyway, I was counting the assault forces "afloat", so the assault divisions in Force U, O, G, J, and S, the follow on Force B and L, and the pre-loaded divisions, the 2d and 90th US for the Western Task Force and the 51st Highland for the Eastern Task Force.
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 03 May 2021 18:38

Richard Anderson wrote:
03 May 2021 15:55
...

I suspect that had it been solely a US Navy decision (there are various hints IIRC in the administrative histories of the 11th PHIB that point that way), the landing craft availability estimate of 90-95% may have been enough for the USN to accept a simultaneous NEPTUNE and DRAGOON, but that is just my suspicion.
Thats weirdly both surprising and unsurprising with me.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 03 May 2021 18:53

Juan G. C. wrote:
03 Apr 2021 08:43
... According to United States Army in World War II.: Cross-channel attack (pages 170-172):
As the result of conferences at Norfolk House (SHEAF headquarters) during the week of 13 February, a compromise shipping plan was worked out. SHAEF first proposed to reduce the current planning allocation by one LSI(H), 48 LST's, and 51 LCI(L)'s with a resulting loss of lift for 21,560 men and 2,520 vehicles. This loss would then be made up by overloading transports (APA's), carrying vehicles in the APA's, using AKA's (cargo ships) in the initial lift, and finding (presumably from new production) an additional 27 LCT's. This plan was subsequently revised to exchange the 6 AKA's with the Mediterranean theater for 20 LST's and 21 LCI (L)'s, on the grounds that the large cargo vessels could more easily be used in the calmer southern waters. The exchange would still leave an estimated two-division lift for ANVIL although it was doubtful whether Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson (Commander-in- Chief Mediterranean) would accept the loss of tactical flexibility which use of the AKA's involved.41 The SHAEF compromise still left a shortage of about fifteen LST's. General Eisenhower requested allocation of at least seven more LST's from U.S. production. The remainder of the deficit would have to be made up by increased loading of LST's on the third tide (morning of D plus 1) and increased serviceability.

The serviceability rate of landing craft-or, in other words, the percentage of craft on hand which at any given date would be operationally available-was always a planning figure to conjure with. So narrow were the planning margins that a difference of 5 percent in the estimates of serviceability might mean the difference between adequate and inadequate lift for the assault. The serviceability rate was contingent chiefly on repair facilities and the stock of spare parts-both of which were critically limited in the United Kingdom.42 COSSAC in Outline OVERLORD had planned on an average serviceability rate of 85 percent for all craft and 90 percent for ships.43 These figures were substantially approved at the Quebec Conference. On advice of U.S. naval planners, however, the rate for U.S. craft was raised in January to 9 percent for LST's and 90 percent for LCT's. The British insisted on retention of the lower COSSAC figures. SHAEF accepted both estimates and distinguished in planning between U.S. and British craft, allowing the serviceability rate set by each country.44

The SHAEF shipping compromise was severely criticized by planners of 21 Army Group, mainly on the grounds that SHAEF considered the problem of providing lift only from a logistical and not from a tactical point of view. For example, they pointed out that SHAEF had not shown separately the Commando-Ranger lift for special assault missions against fortified positions. This separation was important, the army group planners argued, because there could be no question of loading to full capacity the LSI's carrying Commandos, and of course the excess capacity could not be used for lift of other assault troops. The SHAEF proposals, by pushing the loading of shipping toward the full theoretical capacity of the vessels, sacrificed flexibility, particularly in that they prevented the preloading in craft of adequate reserves. Army group thought it extremely important that reserve units for the assault waves be tactically loaded in craft so that their employment would not be affected by losses or time delays of the LCA (ship-to-shore) craft used in the initial assault. By increasing the personnel lift on the first tide of the assault without any corresponding vehicle increase, the SHAEF proposal either would land men who could not proceed with their task until their vehicles arrived, thus causing congestion on the beaches, or would compel half-loaded personnel ships to wait offshore, thus exposing both ships and men to unjustifiable risks.45

The validity of these objections was fully conceded by General Eisenhower, but he considered the sacrifices and risks worth accepting in order to permit the simultaneous diversionary attack on southern France. Although at first strongly opposed, General Montgomery at last agreed and the proposals were submitted to the British Chiefs of Staff.46 The Chiefs of Staff disapproved the compromise on the grounds, first, that it skimped both ANVIL and OVERLORD and, second, that the slow progress of the Italian campaign made the possibility of providing the necessary build-up forces for ANVIL "So remote as to be negligible."47 Employment, as planned, of ten divisions in southern France, General Brooke pointed out, would leave only twenty divisions to fight the critical battle of Italy and to meet "other commitments which might arise in the Mediterranean."48
According to these sources, it was ultimately the situation in Italy what doomed an ANVIL simultaneous with OVERLORD...

Best regards:
Juan G. C.
Picking back through this I'm reminded of a earlier thought about British opposition coming from a desire to continue the multiple avenue attacks on the Axis. Just skimmed through Bryants version of Brookes diary, which reviews his war time thoughts on strategy. What I see there is approval of Op NEPTUNE as a concentration of effort, Colossal Crack as it were, but also a desire to disperse effort at a higher level by continuing the offense in Italy. Dispensing with a active Italian front in order to concentrate effort in France & towards Germanies western frontier in a combined ANVIL/NEPTUNE effort is not considered desirable by the Brit opponents. At this late stage in the game I'm wondering what Dill thought.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 04 May 2021 04:50

Sheldrake wrote:
03 May 2021 14:20
daveshoup2MD wrote:
02 May 2021 21:55

HUSKY assault forces were (depending on how one counts various maneuver elements, of course) seven reinforced infantry divisions (US 1st, 3rd, 45th, British 5th, 50th, 51st; Canadian 1st)'; NEPTUNE was six (US 1st, 4th, 29th, British 3rd, 50th, Canadian 3rd). How many beaches do you need?
As Rick(?) has already pointed out to you, there was difference between the number of divisions afloat - which was seven including 7th British Armoured Division and the number of assaulting brigades/RCT. Each Assault Brigade/RCT followed the same template and included supporting craft and substantial armoured and engineer resources to support the clearance of obstacles and entrenched enemy. These were the formations which took the majority of the casualties on the beaches.

Husky, landing against light opposition could land in lots of places. Op Overlord was against a stronger enemy. Landing craft and shipping constrained the COSSAC Plan to three beaches - Omaha, Gold and Juno, with two assaulting RCT /Brigade groups on each. Montgomery and Eisenhower demanded that the seaborne landing be extended to five beaches adding Utah and Sword. These latter additions were only mounted with a single assault RCT/Brigade group, with the remainder following on. Three airborne divisions were added on the flanks
IF the British 7th Armoured Division gets counted as an "assault" division for NEPTUNE, the the US 2nd Armored Division gets counted as one for HUSKY. Eight to seven.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 04 May 2021 04:59

Richard Anderson wrote:
03 May 2021 15:55
daveshoup2MD wrote:
03 May 2021 04:27
Which is an interesting question, but it's not a "capacity" question - it's a "policy" question ... which is where things really get interesting. ;)
Well, I'd say it was a capacity, policy, and personalities question, which is indeed where things get interesting. Too many of these what ifs simply tweak capacity issues - what I call the "lets move these counters from here to there and win the war" syndrome - without really understanding what those capacity issues really were or how hard it is in real life to move men, equipment, and stores intercontinental distances, and then proceed to ignore the issues of doctrine, competing strategic aims, the introduction of new equipment and TTPs in a wartime environment of vastly expanding militaries, and the cussedness of people supposedly interacting with one another to achieve a goal.

I suspect that had it been solely a US Navy decision (there are various hints IIRC in the administrative histories of the 11th PHIB that point that way), the landing craft availability estimate of 90-95% may have been enough for the USN to accept a simultaneous NEPTUNE and DRAGOON, but that is just my suspicion.
I think we're (more or less) in agreement that those are some of the more interesting questions. However, given the overall Allied capacity demonstrated - repeatedly - in 1943-45 to move assault troops and follow-on forces by sea, put them ashore "almost" anywhere desired on the Axis-occupied Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts, and then sustain and build-up those expeditionary forces, the wheat can be separated from the chaff.

Given the capacity demonstrated by history in 1942-45, the question is when were the policy decisions made, and - all else being equal, so no additional capacity beyond what was developed - could the options of historical alternatives A or B (or C) been weighed, and decisions made to execute one ... rather than the other.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 04 May 2021 05:10

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
03 May 2021 18:53
Juan G. C. wrote:
03 Apr 2021 08:43
... According to United States Army in World War II.: Cross-channel attack (pages 170-172):
As the result of conferences at Norfolk House (SHEAF headquarters) during the week of 13 February, a compromise shipping plan was worked out. SHAEF first proposed to reduce the current planning allocation by one LSI(H), 48 LST's, and 51 LCI(L)'s with a resulting loss of lift for 21,560 men and 2,520 vehicles. This loss would then be made up by overloading transports (APA's), carrying vehicles in the APA's, using AKA's (cargo ships) in the initial lift, and finding (presumably from new production) an additional 27 LCT's. This plan was subsequently revised to exchange the 6 AKA's with the Mediterranean theater for 20 LST's and 21 LCI (L)'s, on the grounds that the large cargo vessels could more easily be used in the calmer southern waters. The exchange would still leave an estimated two-division lift for ANVIL although it was doubtful whether Gen. Sir Henry Maitland Wilson (Commander-in- Chief Mediterranean) would accept the loss of tactical flexibility which use of the AKA's involved.41 The SHAEF compromise still left a shortage of about fifteen LST's. General Eisenhower requested allocation of at least seven more LST's from U.S. production. The remainder of the deficit would have to be made up by increased loading of LST's on the third tide (morning of D plus 1) and increased serviceability.

The serviceability rate of landing craft-or, in other words, the percentage of craft on hand which at any given date would be operationally available-was always a planning figure to conjure with. So narrow were the planning margins that a difference of 5 percent in the estimates of serviceability might mean the difference between adequate and inadequate lift for the assault. The serviceability rate was contingent chiefly on repair facilities and the stock of spare parts-both of which were critically limited in the United Kingdom.42 COSSAC in Outline OVERLORD had planned on an average serviceability rate of 85 percent for all craft and 90 percent for ships.43 These figures were substantially approved at the Quebec Conference. On advice of U.S. naval planners, however, the rate for U.S. craft was raised in January to 9 percent for LST's and 90 percent for LCT's. The British insisted on retention of the lower COSSAC figures. SHAEF accepted both estimates and distinguished in planning between U.S. and British craft, allowing the serviceability rate set by each country.44

The SHAEF shipping compromise was severely criticized by planners of 21 Army Group, mainly on the grounds that SHAEF considered the problem of providing lift only from a logistical and not from a tactical point of view. For example, they pointed out that SHAEF had not shown separately the Commando-Ranger lift for special assault missions against fortified positions. This separation was important, the army group planners argued, because there could be no question of loading to full capacity the LSI's carrying Commandos, and of course the excess capacity could not be used for lift of other assault troops. The SHAEF proposals, by pushing the loading of shipping toward the full theoretical capacity of the vessels, sacrificed flexibility, particularly in that they prevented the preloading in craft of adequate reserves. Army group thought it extremely important that reserve units for the assault waves be tactically loaded in craft so that their employment would not be affected by losses or time delays of the LCA (ship-to-shore) craft used in the initial assault. By increasing the personnel lift on the first tide of the assault without any corresponding vehicle increase, the SHAEF proposal either would land men who could not proceed with their task until their vehicles arrived, thus causing congestion on the beaches, or would compel half-loaded personnel ships to wait offshore, thus exposing both ships and men to unjustifiable risks.45

The validity of these objections was fully conceded by General Eisenhower, but he considered the sacrifices and risks worth accepting in order to permit the simultaneous diversionary attack on southern France. Although at first strongly opposed, General Montgomery at last agreed and the proposals were submitted to the British Chiefs of Staff.46 The Chiefs of Staff disapproved the compromise on the grounds, first, that it skimped both ANVIL and OVERLORD and, second, that the slow progress of the Italian campaign made the possibility of providing the necessary build-up forces for ANVIL "So remote as to be negligible."47 Employment, as planned, of ten divisions in southern France, General Brooke pointed out, would leave only twenty divisions to fight the critical battle of Italy and to meet "other commitments which might arise in the Mediterranean."48
According to these sources, it was ultimately the situation in Italy what doomed an ANVIL simultaneous with OVERLORD...

Best regards:
Juan G. C.
Picking back through this I'm reminded of a earlier thought about British opposition coming from a desire to continue the multiple avenue attacks on the Axis. Just skimmed through Bryants version of Brookes diary, which reviews his war time thoughts on strategy. What I see there is approval of Op NEPTUNE as a concentration of effort, Colossal Crack as it were, but also a desire to disperse effort at a higher level by continuing the offense in Italy. Dispensing with a active Italian front in order to concentrate effort in France & towards Germanies western frontier in a combined ANVIL/NEPTUNE effort is not considered desirable by the Brit opponents. At this late stage in the game I'm wondering what Dill thought.
That three CIGs in as many years suggests something more about the minister of defense, rather than the CIGs?

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by daveshoup2MD » 04 May 2021 05:49

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
03 May 2021 18:38
Richard Anderson wrote:
03 May 2021 15:55
...

I suspect that had it been solely a US Navy decision (there are various hints IIRC in the administrative histories of the 11th PHIB that point that way), the landing craft availability estimate of 90-95% may have been enough for the USN to accept a simultaneous NEPTUNE and DRAGOON, but that is just my suspicion.
Thats weirdly both surprising and unsurprising with me.
Just imagine if they'd tried to mount the BAND assault in Normandy, as well...

And, of course, that while six assault divisions were crossing the Channel in June, 1944, there were two reinforced assault divisions (or three) on their way to the Marianas, from much farther away and in (generally) larger ships, while most of another division had been landed in yet another theater by yet another pool of amphibious craft about two weeks earlier...

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Richard Anderson » 04 May 2021 07:20

daveshoup2MD wrote:
04 May 2021 05:49
Just imagine if they'd tried to mount the BAND assault in Normandy, as well...

And, of course, that while six assault divisions were crossing the Channel in June, 1944, there were two reinforced assault divisions (or three) on their way to the Marianas, from much farther away and in (generally) larger ships, while most of another division had been landed in yet another theater by yet another pool of amphibious craft about two weeks earlier...
Sure, but then you get into the problem of sufficient ports to mount the assault from to add to the existing issues. To use the three Saipan divisions in a ship to shore operation you' might have to launch them from US ports to coordinate with the shore to shore operation out of England. Then there is the issue of space at the receiving end as well. BAND was finally deemed too close to the mass of coat artillery extending from Cabourg-Houlgate to Le Havre. For the same reason, SUGAR was not considered for the Cotentin because it was too close to Merville and the mass of batteries extending north to Barfleur. Fundamentally, the notion that the Allies could land anywhere, anytime is flawed, because they actually limited the potential landing places they would assault themselves based upon intelligence estimates of the defenses and their own estimation of the capabilities of those defenses. That the latter estimation was pretty much badly inflated is hindsight.

I also suspect that putting more divisions into the assault on a wider front would simply have exacerbated the logistical issues that developed due to the piss-poor decision making made by the ASF in Washington with regards to the planning assumptions made by the ETOUSA...which, curiously enough was originally a creature of ASF. Cutbacks to allocations of port and truck companies resulted in slow unloading over the beaches and ports, which was further slowed by lack of clearing capability for the supplies once landed and a disorganized depot system that required months to make reasonably functional; by the end of August, over 200 Liberty ships were swinging at anchor off the beaches waiting to unload, some of which had been idle there for weeks, while ADSEC had little idea of which ships contained what or what to prioritize for unloading...in June/July, 11,073 corn brooms, 12,789 cotton mops, 5,269 large garbage cans, and 32,616 reams of mimeograph paper were unloaded across the beaches (and yeah that's a cruel anecdote and those supplies may have been needed - the paper at least probably was - but it illustrates some of the issues that came with inexperience and attempting to supply large forces over the beach in a sustained continental war was compared to the early Mediterranean and Pacific island campaigns. Nor did those problems go away. As late as November, a major function of the officers of the Armor Section, 12th Army Group was to visit depots in Normandy in search of items like tank tracks, engines, transmissions, and the like, since COMZ had little idea of what was where.
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Sheldrake » 04 May 2021 12:05

Returning to the question I asked on several posts.

Regardless of whether hind sight allows us to argue that it might have been possible, what was the actual benefit going to be of launching Op Anvil simultaneously with OP Overlord? How was the strategic, or even operational outcome going to be improved significantly over the historic strategic allied victory in excess of anticipated results?

The only advantage I have seen so far was the argument that an earlier capture of Marseilles might have improved logistics in Q4 of 1944. That assumes that a simultaneous Op Anvil didn't also require a Transportation plan to isolate the target landing sector, which then trashed the rail connections to Marseilles. The other possibility is that this may have changed the German response from "fight for every inch", which led to the destruction of 7th and 5th Panzer armies to a delaying strategy that might have left half of France in German hands through the winter of 1944-45

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

Post by Gooner1 » 04 May 2021 12:36

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
03 May 2021 18:53
Picking back through this I'm reminded of a earlier thought about British opposition coming from a desire to continue the multiple avenue attacks on the Axis. Just skimmed through Bryants version of Brookes diary, which reviews his war time thoughts on strategy. What I see there is approval of Op NEPTUNE as a concentration of effort, Colossal Crack as it were, but also a desire to disperse effort at a higher level by continuing the offense in Italy. Dispensing with a active Italian front in order to concentrate effort in France & towards Germanies western frontier in a combined ANVIL/NEPTUNE effort is not considered desirable by the Brit opponents. At this late stage in the game I'm wondering what Dill thought.
Surely Anvil would be the dispersal of effort, not continuing operations in Italy?
In Italy the Allies can attack with 20+ divisions, in the south of France the Allies would start with just 3.

Most likely result of a near simultaneous Anvil/Neptune IMO is that all the Allied armies get stuck for longer than they were. Stuck in Normandy, stuck in Provence and stuck south of Rome.

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