OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

[daveshoup2MD]

That still leaves the 8th Army with (at least) three British corps after GOLDFLAKE and the Polish II Corps, with the British 1st and 6th armoured, SA 6th Armoured; British 1st, 4th, 46th, 56th, and 78th divisions, the 4th, 8th, and 10th Indian divisions, and the Polish 3rd and 5th divisions, plus from 1-3 Italian division equivalents, which should be enough to keep the Germans occupied, and ready to follow up on any German withdrawal northwards...

Add the 2nd NZ division to that basket.

True; an oversight.

Does raise the question, if the Allied strategy in 1943-44 is to remain on the strategic defensive in Italy, does the 2nd NZ go back to the Pacific?

[daveshoup2MD]

To be born in mind if sacrificing operations in Italy for an earlier Anvil/Dragoon

c.4th June 1944
"Kesselring had lost the men of about four divisions, the artillery of five divisions, and the armour of about two panzer regiments. Moreover, very happily for the Allies' purpose of containing German forces in Italy and of drawing into Italy forces which might have been used to oppose 'Overlord', Hitler decided to reinforce the Italian campaign. Between the middle of May and the end of the first week in June four infantry divisions were ordered to Italy from other countries, as well as the equivalent of the infantry of three divisions if we reckon two three-battalion regiments to a division. In addition Kesselring committed two divisions from the Adriatic front and brought down three from northern Italy."
TMAME Vol. VI

No, it would have been a bad idea to leave the 'Italian Front' inactive. There still must be diversionary operations. Conversely committing to a series of bloody attacks into a prepared defense on a narrow front is a error at the opposite end. Churchill insisted on a short flanking operation, its correct that could have levered the defense out of the Gustav line & other positions south of Rome, but up sizing the SHINGLE operation to where it can succeed means delaying/reducing OVERLORD. Is that really the better trade off? Does capturing Rome get you to the final goal quicker, or does capturing Paris? You choose.

A "BRASSARD" equivalent in 1943-44, mounted from Corsica and Sardinia would have been an excellent diversion; narrow in scope (the French took Elba with about a division (-) but it makes a potential landing on the west coast of the peninsula look likely; if anything, the Germans have to spread their forces even wider than they did historically in 1944. The British in Bari and Taranto, and (ideally) absent the Dodecanese bloodbath, can make a threat towards Crete and Greece equally compelling.

[Aber]

Thanks chaps - but where does any part of the discussion on this thread lead to a better outcome for the allies than the historical strategic victory?

An earlier Overlord, because of better shipping serviceability rates or less vessels tied up in the Med?

Coastal defences are weaker, defenders are less well trained, and FAAA can launch operation in August weather and daylight rather than September. Might just get them across the Rhine.

[Juan G. C.]

Thanks chaps - but where does any part of the discussion on this thread lead to a better outcome for the allies than the historical strategic victory?

An earlier Overlord, because of better shipping serviceability rates or less vessels tied up in the Med?

Coastal defences are weaker, defenders are less well trained, and FAAA can launch operation in August weather and daylight rather than September. Might just get them across the Rhine.

No, in fact, for this compromise assumed that OVERLORD would be launched in early June.

[Juan G. C.]

An important question here is how would the proposed allocation of landing craft and the measures to obviate the shortage (overloading the APAs, carrying vehicles in the APAs, the use of AKAs in the initial lift in ANVIL, relying in increased serviceability, etc.) have affected OVERLORD and ANVIL? As the sources I quoted above say, the compromise was criticized by planners of 21 Army Group and the British Chiefs of Staff. They said that "both OVERLORD and ANVIL are skimped".

The most interesting aspect of all this is that the NEPTUNE landing ships and craft serviceability estimates were actually much lower than what was experienced. In fact, overall serviceability was around 98%, rather than the 80%-90% ranges COSSAC and later planning used. In the end, many of the assault convoys, especially on the British beaches, were able to take advantage of additional LCT loading, without having to overload the LCT. They may be found with LTIN where an "a" is appended.

So if the planners in February were perfectly prescient - I know, its a "what if", so of course they were - and had known what the actual serviceability rates and production and deployments of new ships and craft would be, then of course NEPTUNE and ANVIL probably could have been executed simultaneously.

Nevertheless, the increased serviceability was only one part of the allocation compromise. Or would a serviceability rate of 98% make up for all the deficit of landing craft?

[Richard Anderson]

Nevertheless, the increased serviceability was only one part of the allocation compromise. Or would a serviceability rate of 98% make up for all the deficit of landing craft?

Well, sure. U.S. Naval forces were 99.3% operational on D-Day, compared to 97.6% for home-based British forces. For purposes of planning, ANCXF had estimated that 90% LST and 85% LCI(L) and LCT would be operational on D-Day. The organization that accomplished that, COREP (Coordination of Repairs), which coordinated the activities of all agencies, civilian as well as naval, engaged in repair and upkeep of vessels, was not established until February.

Here's another problem, where and when are all the ships and craft in February? For example, of those units assigned to UTAH, LST FLOT 10 was still working up, not departing the US for the UK until 4 February and not arriving at Milford Haven with its 13 LST until 1304 2 March 1944. LCI (L) Flot 11 and its 22 LCI (L) was also underway to the UK during February. The 15 LCI (L) of FLOT 2 were at Naples in February.

Overall, as of the assumption of command by Admiral Hall of the 11th PHIBFOR on 27 November 1943, there were 235 USN landing ships and craft in England. By 1 June 1944, there were 2,458.

[maltesefalcon]

One factor I'd like to reflect on.

IRL Overlord was somewhat of a surprise attack. Partly due to extensive planning. Partly due to elaborate deception. Also due to the relatively short travel distance/time.

Anvil would require a much longer transit time. There was a much greater risk of discovery on the route. If the Germans got any inkling that this force was synchronized with a cross channel invasion, they would be able to raise the alarm.

Of course the Anvil invasion went ahead as planned IRL. What I would like to discuss is how much of a distraction the June 6 event was to potential air and naval patrols along the southern and west coast of France. Perhaps doing them in a delayed fashion actually worked in the Allies favour?

[Kingfish]

Does raise the question, if the Allied strategy in 1943-44 is to remain on the strategic defensive in Italy, does the 2nd NZ go back to the Pacific?

I really can't see the allies adopting a strategic defense in '43/44.
30+ allied divisions accomplishing very little would not sit well with the Russians or the home front(s).

[daveshoup2MD]

Does raise the question, if the Allied strategy in 1943-44 is to remain on the strategic defensive in Italy, does the 2nd NZ go back to the Pacific?

I really can't see the allies adopting a strategic defense in '43/44.
30+ allied divisions accomplishing very little would not sit well with the Russians or the home front(s).

Well, except the Allies would have been on the offensive in NW Europe in 1944, and the "hiatus" in Italy in 1943-44 would have been at exactly the same position on the peninsula south of Rome that both sides dug in at, historically; the difference is not engaging in SHINGLE, essentially; although avoiding the Dodecanese, which was a disaster for the Allies, would have been a net positive as well. Include a BRASSARD-equivalent as a precursor to ANVIL, and the Allies are actually in a better position for the 1944 offensives into France that they were historically.

[Carl Schwamberger]

One factor I'd like to reflect on.

IRL Overlord was somewhat of a surprise attack. Partly due to extensive planning. Partly due to elaborate deception. Also due to the relatively short travel distance/time.

At the strategic level it was no surprise. Everyone was expecting it in May, or June at the latest. Large reinforcements had been made, at the expense of the eastern & Italian fronts. A large fortification project had been underway since December. The coastal defenses better organized. ect.. ect...

At the tactical level the arrival of the airborne forces from 01:30 & on caused the entire 7th Army to go on alert. By 05:00 everyone who counted was at their battle position, From the 84th Corps commander Marcks down to Severloh & Glockel at their MG overlooking the beach. Yes it was shocking to see the hundreds of ships at sunrise, but it not was like the 7th Army or 84th Corps were just turning out to shave and stand roll call at 05:00

Operationally things were a bit more discombobulated, theres some argument suprise had its effects there. I'll leave those to others.

Anvil would require a much longer transit time. There was a much greater risk of discovery on the route. If the Germans got any inkling that this force was synchronized with a cross channel invasion, they would be able to raise the alarm.

The Germans knew the convoys of Operation TORCH were leaving Britain, were headed out south, were entering the Mediterranean. British deception had them thinking sequentially Brittany, Egypt, & Sardinia were the targets. When operations AVALANCHE, SLAPSTICK & GIANT set out The Germans had a confused understanding of what was going on. They guessed correctly southern Italy was the target, but sent reserves to several locations. Naples being the heaviest defended point. By the winter of 1943 German patrol boats & air reconnaissance in the western Med were well suppressed. There was some warning of large scale fleet activity in August, but after repeated false alarms concerning Genoa, the Riviera in late May & June, & Bordeaux in June-July, Army Group G no longer had much confidence in warnings. The Allied deception efforts were so successful that not only did they have Hitler back at OKW winging at shadows they had the field commanders baffled & cynical. The influence of the deception ops is usually underestimated. Holts 'Deceivers' is a good 800 page introduction to that side of the war.

Of course the Anvil invasion went ahead as planned IRL. What I would like to discuss is how much of a distraction the June 6 event was to potential air and naval patrols along the southern and west coast of France.

As in the Channel German reconnaissance was pretty much a dead letter. Early morning of 6th June one patrol boat out of LeHavre stumbled into the Brit side of it. They apparently were unable to get a radio message through. A utility boat servicing navigation bouys in the Bai du Seine had a similar experience. Radio jamming probably silenced them. Air recon seems to have been shut down over the Channel & southern UK in May. It was much the same along the southern French and Italian littorals. Aggressive Allied naval and air activity reduced the German reconissance significantly. Maybe they could get some useful information, but the actual track record is poor.

VLR patrols were still going out over the Atlantic in reduced numbers. Reporting traffic in the Atlantic.

Perhaps doing them in a delayed fashion actually worked in the Allies favour?

It did 6th Army Group a favor since the reserves in the south had been reduced to a single Pz Corps. Of course the missing corps were fightng in Normandy for six weeks, so no gain in that sense. Their redeployment to Normandy was delayed a few weeks by a deception op based on the ANVIL plan, but that was a different operation.

[Kingfish]

Well, except the Allies would have been on the offensive in NW Europe in 1944,

But not until the summer of '44, and that is irrelevant to the question of potential and results from 15th AG during the preceding 6 months.

and the "hiatus" in Italy in 1943-44 would have been at exactly the same position on the peninsula south of Rome that both sides dug in at, historically; the difference is not engaging in SHINGLE, essentially;

Not exactly, as their were a number of allied ops during the fall and winter, most notably 8th army's push across the Sangro. Winter on the Italian peninsula is not the best time to conduct military ops, but that didn't stop the allies from trying.

Include a BRASSARD-equivalent as a precursor to ANVIL, and the Allies are actually in a better position for the 1944 offensives into France that they were historically.

But can the allies get to that position is the question. If I understand your proposal correctly, once 5th army leaves to join 6th AG we still have over 15 allied divisions in Italy doing nothing more than waiting for the Germans to pull up stakes. Meanwhile 21st AG is forced to disband a division just to make up for the acute shortage in infantry. I just don't see how that level of inactivity could be justified.

[Gooner1]

No, it would have been a bad idea to leave the 'Italian Front' inactive. There still must be diversionary operations. Conversely committing to a series of bloody attacks into a prepared defense on a narrow front is a error at the opposite end.

In the context of Italy they are the same thing aren't they? Limited and diversionary attacks in Italy would almost assuredly end up as bloody failures.
As indeed they would in northern France and in southern France.

Churchill insisted on a short flanking operation, its correct that could have levered the defense out of the Gustav line & other positions south of Rome, but up sizing the SHINGLE operation to where it can succeed means delaying/reducing OVERLORD. Is that really the better trade off? Does capturing Rome get you to the final goal quicker, or does capturing Paris? You choose.

Not just Churchill in favour of Shingle, so was Brooke, Bedell Smith and Eisenhower. I don't think a flanking operation is the only way to open the front in Italy. Operation Diadem had cracked the Gustav line and the Hitler line before VI Corps began their breakout.
But then Allied Armies Italy went from 17 divisions at the time of Shingle to 26 divisions by Diadem whilst the Germans in Italy had only increased from 21 divisions to 23.

[Gooner1]

Well, except the Allies would have been on the offensive in NW Europe in 1944, and the "hiatus" in Italy in 1943-44 would have been at exactly the same position on the peninsula south of Rome that both sides dug in at, historically; the difference is not engaging in SHINGLE, essentially; although avoiding the Dodecanese, which was a disaster for the Allies, would have been a net positive as well. Include a BRASSARD-equivalent as a precursor to ANVIL, and the Allies are actually in a better position for the 1944 offensives into France that they were historically.

With no broken front in Italy the Germans are also much better placed to defend France in summer 1944. If both sides are dug-in on the Gustav line the Germans are effectively keeping about 5 divisions in army group reserve, plus the four historically sent to Italy before D-Day after the collapse of the front, all of which become available for France.

[Juan G. C.]

Here are the pages about the compromise from United States Army in World War II.:Global Logistics and Strategy: 1943-1945 which I referred in the first post, for what it's worth:

[Juan G. C.]

Nevertheless, the increased serviceability was only one part of the allocation compromise. Or would a serviceability rate of 98% make up for all the deficit of landing craft?

Well, sure. U.S. Naval forces were 99.3% operational on D-Day, compared to 97.6% for home-based British forces. For purposes of planning, ANCXF had estimated that 90% LST and 85% LCI(L) and LCT would be operational on D-Day. The organization that accomplished that, COREP (Coordination of Repairs), which coordinated the activities of all agencies, civilian as well as naval, engaged in repair and upkeep of vessels, was not established until February.

I am not so sure. But even if a serviceability rate of 98% would have made up for all the deficit of landing craft, SHAEF couldn't have known it, and consequently would still have overloaded the landing craft to make up for the deficit.