OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

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Aber
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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#61

Post by Aber » 08 Apr 2021, 09:16

Sheldrake wrote:
07 Apr 2021, 19:25
This gets back to what seems to me to be the key question. What was going to be so great about launching Anvil simultaneously with Overlord? What would be the benefits that would outweigh any increased risk of Overlord failing?
See p334 from Global Logistics posted above:

"It looks as if we are throwing away ANVIL, an effective diversion during the critical period sometime after D+8..."

The key worry during the planning for Overlord was the "battle of the buildup", not the initial landings - see Montgomery's briefing of relative force ratios post landing.

The argument would be that ANVIL would prevent the Germans concentrating ALL their mobile reserves against OVERLORD. The counterargument would be that the Germans would be more likely to focus on the key risk and ignore ANVIL. A matter of opinion not fact.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#62

Post by Aber » 08 Apr 2021, 09:19

Tom from Cornwall wrote:
07 Apr 2021, 21:28
I'm not so sure Eisenhower would have cancelled Shingle:
Eisenhower to Wilson, Jan 16, 1944

[...]

I send you my best wishes on the forthcoming operation and am sure it will prove a great success.
IIRC there was an even stronger statement in Butcher's diary which did not make the published version - see Hamilton Master of the Battlefield p 515

Shingle has started well. It was a brilliant maneuver of which Eisenhower was the true progenitor, whatever the British press may say

sourced to Butcher's diary 23 Jan 1944.


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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#63

Post by Gooner1 » 08 Apr 2021, 12:21

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
07 Apr 2021, 19:59
Its been over three decades since I've looked at this. Drawing from the older histories of the Italian campaign such as WGF Jackson my take is the battles surrounding the Anzio beached were important to attritioning down Kesellrings armies. Not just in men & tanks, but in ammunition, & transportation exposed and lost in supplying those counter attacks. In the context of the situation from January to June I don't think Diadem would have worked without the bloody attrition of all aspects of the German forces in Italy.
There may be some confusion in western works about the German reporting of their strength figures, particularly when they refer to 'fighting strength'.
AOK 10 had a 'fighting strength' of 81,932 men on 23rd April, AOK 14 had 76,873 on 10th May.

From the British OH:
"As April was not a taxing month in the field, the Commanders and troops of AOK 10 were in confident mood after their successful defence of the Garigliano and Cassino fronts, and those of AOK 14 had settled to stalemate in the Anzio beachhead. Reinforcements were of variable quality but they were arriving in satisfactory numbers numbers, and equipment in satisfactory quantity. On 7th April von Vietinghoff [GOC AOK 10] declared that his divisions were among the best in the German army and that they had received more reinforcements than any others. There were of course some worries, particularly for the administrative staff and units who were struggling to keep the L. of C. working in spite of constant air attack. Yet supplies arrived, and, on 29th April for example, Westphal [COS to Kesselring] proposed to make a special issue of ammunition to bring AOK 10's stocks up to three 'issues' for most of its field guns. On 30th April Kesselring told AOK 10 and AOK 14 that the fuel available to their mobile reserves was to be brought up to five consumption units so that the formations concerned could move off at short notice. Thus fuel and ammunition were there .."

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#64

Post by Gooner1 » 08 Apr 2021, 12:30

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
07 Apr 2021, 20:09
I don't see any assurance. Limited & diversionary is a intent for economy of force & to avoid casualties. Some commanders screw that up, but its not guaranteed or assured such attacks wont be executed correctly. Theres kind of a assumption there the Allied commanders were mostly dull bashers who seldom executed a decent attack.
In attempting limited and diversionary attacks against the German winter line, the Allied commanders would be on a real hiding to nothing though.
Attack in enough strength to force the Germans to commit their mobile reserves and its going to be bloody, feint and the Germans have three or four Kampfwert I or II Pz and PzGr divisions available for deployment elsewhere.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#65

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 08 Apr 2021, 15:48

Gooner1 wrote:
08 Apr 2021, 12:30
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
07 Apr 2021, 20:09
I don't see any assurance. Limited & diversionary is a intent for economy of force & to avoid casualties. Some commanders screw that up, but its not guaranteed or assured such attacks wont be executed correctly. Theres kind of a assumption there the Allied commanders were mostly dull bashers who seldom executed a decent attack.
In attempting limited and diversionary attacks against the German winter line, the Allied commanders would be on a real hiding to nothing though.
Attack in enough strength to force the Germans to commit their mobile reserves and its going to be bloody, feint and the Germans have three or four Kampfwert I or II Pz and PzGr divisions available for deployment elsewhere.
So your argument is diversionary operations in Italy are not practical? & will usually be excessively costly?
Gooner1 wrote:
08 Apr 2021, 12:21
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
07 Apr 2021, 19:59
Its been over three decades since I've looked at this. Drawing from the older histories of the Italian campaign such as WGF Jackson my take is the battles surrounding the Anzio beached were important to attritioning down Kesellrings armies. Not just in men & tanks, but in ammunition, & transportation exposed and lost in supplying those counter attacks. In the context of the situation from January to June I don't think Diadem would have worked without the bloody attrition of all aspects of the German forces in Italy.
There may be some confusion in western works about the German reporting of their strength figures, particularly when they refer to 'fighting strength'.
AOK 10 had a 'fighting strength' of 81,932 men on 23rd April, AOK 14 had 76,873 on 10th May.
It appears so. Flipping back through Jackson I'm seeing significant attrition of Kesslerings armies described from December through May.
Gooner1 wrote:
08 Apr 2021, 12:21
From the British OH:
"As April was not a taxing month in the field, the Commanders and troops of AOK 10 were in confident mood after their successful defence of the Garigliano and Cassino fronts, and those of AOK 14 had settled to stalemate in the Anzio beachhead. Reinforcements were of variable quality but they were arriving in satisfactory numbers numbers, and equipment in satisfactory quantity. On 7th April von Vietinghoff [GOC AOK 10] declared that his divisions were among the best in the German army and that they had received more reinforcements than any others. There were of course some worries, particularly for the administrative staff and units who were struggling to keep the L. of C. working in spite of constant air attack. Yet supplies arrived, and, on 29th April for example, Westphal [COS to Kesselring] proposed to make a special issue of ammunition to bring AOK 10's stocks up to three 'issues' for most of its field guns.
If thats three issues per cannon at the battalion or division level is not much more than a couple days stock. If its across the board for the armies it look 'thin'.
Gooner1 wrote:
08 Apr 2021, 12:21
On 30th April Kesselring told AOK 10 and AOK 14 that the fuel available to their mobile reserves was to be brought up to five consumption units so that the formations concerned could move off at short notice. Thus fuel and ammunition were there .."
A few days reserve may be there, but I've not seen numbers indicating reserve sufficient for a sustained battle. Theres others suggesting there weren't. It is probably correct that X tons per division arrived, but if 3X were required to continue sustain a solid defense & that quantity could not be delivered then its a losing attritional battle. Whatever gains were made during some quiet weeks. This is the same problem Rundsteadt saw in the winter of 1943-44. The ability of the French transportation system was declining steadily. Circa March 44 he was considering the 7th & 15th Armies would be fighting out of their depots at hand & could not expect significant replenishment from late spring. With careful husbanding the army stock might last six to eight weeks. It looks to me like Kesselring was seeing a similar problem, probably with a smaller reserve in the army depots than Rundsteadt.

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#66

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 08 Apr 2021, 16:04

Aber wrote:
08 Apr 2021, 09:19
Tom from Cornwall wrote:
07 Apr 2021, 21:28
I'm not so sure Eisenhower would have cancelled Shingle:
Eisenhower to Wilson, Jan 16, 1944

[...]

I send you my best wishes on the forthcoming operation and am sure it will prove a great success.
IIRC there was an even stronger statement in Butcher's diary which did not make the published version - see Hamilton Master of the Battlefield p 515

Shingle has started well. It was a brilliant maneuver of which Eisenhower was the true progenitor, whatever the British press may say

sourced to Butcher's diary 23 Jan 1944.
Butcher would say that. Atkinson places the origin of Op SHINGLE as one of a series of proposals shown to Churchill in October or November 1943. Churchill latched on to it & directed it be developed. Returning from Terhan Churchill stopped in again & pressured Alexander to get on with the operation. At this point Im really curious what this early proposal described? Something at the same scale as what was executed, something smaller, or larger? In October when it originally emerged the availability of landing craft was larger in the short term & the future numbers uncertain. When Clarks staff worked it over in December the numbers for the amphib fleet were clearer & in Clarks judgement did not support a large enough assault and following force in January for a swift attack deep into Kesslrings rear.

Wilson and Alexander were in charge at this point, not Eisenhower. Tho I'm wondering what Brooke really thought of this. His diary entries routinely complain of having to talk Churchill out of pointless & impractical operations. Why this one got past him I don't know. Back to his diary I guess....

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#67

Post by Juan G. C. » 08 Apr 2021, 18:27

Still nobody has answered the original question: How would this allocation, and the measures taken to make up for the deficit, have affected OVERLORD and ANVIL?

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#68

Post by Richard Anderson » 08 Apr 2021, 19:32

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
07 Apr 2021, 19:14
Rich might disagree, but I strongly suspect there was a bit of overloading anyway. In my direct experience its most often driven from the bottom & as the sections and companies drag along one more extra item. Overloading the individual Infantryman, Marine, or Paratrooper is micro example of this driven by the same imperative as squeezing a extra vehicle, or skid of ammunition aboard. There also a second push for it from mid level management as they deal with the friction of planning a complex operation. I recall two load plans based on the wrong TO/TE that was used all the way to the moment the vehicles were rolled up the ramps.

So, load plans are often exceeded by a couple percentage points, but its unrealistic to base a plan on something like that. The sort of risk that makes you a hero if you pull it off, but leaves most gamblers reviled by historians.
Yes, I will disagree, since the evidence is the vehicle and equipment loading was what was planned. Everything I have seen, both British and American, indicate that the loading diagrams were followed to a T. Given that the loading plans were "locked" on 27 May, it is doubtful any significant changes occurred over the intervening week (vehicle and equipment loading was completed 2-3 June, leaving just personnel loading on 4 June. The only cases I know of were vehicles that broke down in loading, but even those were few and far between and usually replaced by a different vehicle...the best example of that is the loading of the 741st Tank Battalion on OMAHA, where a last minute loading adjustments were made...and that was to reduce the load rather than increase it. In that case, LCT (A) 2287 was initially planned to carry three tanks plus a tankdozer, but was reduced to two tanks and a tankdozer - as for the others - when it was realized how unstable an arrangement that was.

Personnel may be a different matter, but there the variations were essentially individuals.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#69

Post by Sheldrake » 08 Apr 2021, 21:00

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
08 Apr 2021, 04:20
Sheldrake wrote:
07 Apr 2021, 22:10
I may be alone in this but I think Op Shingle was a great allied success. It did not deliver the dramatic results hoped for by Allied commanders, but the overall result was beneficial to the Allied cause.

1. Italy was SIDE SHOW. The war would never be won there. It was a theatre of operations where the allies could fight the Germans on land without serious risk of expulsion. It is where the allies could force the Germans to deploy a significant force and wear them down at an acceptable level of casualties. There were no geographic objectives that would result in a German collapse. Rome? Foggia Air fields? the Industrial areas of Northern Italy? So it did not really matter how far up Italy the allies reached by the Op Overlord D Day. All that mattered was that on D Day there were lots of Germans in Italy, preferably dead.

2. The attritional battle for Anzio cost the Germans more than the Allies. In Italy, it was usually the allies who had the burden of attacking, exposing themselves to mortars and artillery fire. Anzio allowed the Germans to throw away infantrymen against allied fire. It also drew lots of reinforcements to Italy that could have been used elsewhere.

3. The Germans saw Anzio as an ideal opportunity to show the allies how an allied landing in France could be thrown into the sea. The Anzio landing force was too small for its purpose, ill supplied and indifferently led. It was potentially the perfect target for a demonstration of German might. But the Germans failed spectacularly. This must have done nothing for the morale of those charged with defending France.
I don't disagree with most of that. My contention is it would have been better to use that combat power, or a large portion of it elsewhere, a point with greater strategic value for the long haul. To make those same gains over ground more useful than the southern Apennines & Romes marble ruins.
Such as?

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#70

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 08 Apr 2021, 21:58

Sheldrake wrote:
08 Apr 2021, 21:00
...

I don't disagree with most of that. My contention is it would have been better to use that combat power, or a large portion of it elsewhere, a point with greater strategic value for the long haul. To make those same gains over ground more useful than the southern Apennines & Romes marble ruins.
Such as?
[/quote]

I don't think we are talking about the Balkans LoL, or Turkey, not Norway right?

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#71

Post by Sheldrake » 08 Apr 2021, 22:54

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
08 Apr 2021, 21:58
Sheldrake wrote:
08 Apr 2021, 21:00
...

I don't disagree with most of that. My contention is it would have been better to use that combat power, or a large portion of it elsewhere, a point with greater strategic value for the long haul. To make those same gains over ground more useful than the southern Apennines & Romes marble ruins.

Such as?
I don't think we are talking about the Balkans LoL, or Turkey, not Norway right?
So having crossed off almost every where in Europe, the fickle finger returns to hover over the Italian peninsular....

Soft underbelly of Europe mumble Knock the stuffing out of the Duce mutter air bases opening a second air front over southern Germany arrhem space for about twenty divisions but at the extreme end of the axis rail network. Come on you have to admit it the Italian front was a good place for a side show....

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#72

Post by Carl Schwamberger » 08 Apr 2021, 23:16

Sheldrake wrote:
08 Apr 2021, 22:54
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
08 Apr 2021, 21:58
Sheldrake wrote:
08 Apr 2021, 21:00
...

I don't disagree with most of that. My contention is it would have been better to use that combat power, or a large portion of it elsewhere, a point with greater strategic value for the long haul. To make those same gains over ground more useful than the southern Apennines & Romes marble ruins.

Such as?
I don't think we are talking about the Balkans LoL, or Turkey, not Norway right?
So having crossed off almost every where in Europe, the fickle finger returns to hover over the Italian peninsular....
Well, not quite. But the alternatives are a different discussion...

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#73

Post by daveshoup2MD » 09 Apr 2021, 05:45

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
08 Apr 2021, 04:20
Sheldrake wrote:
07 Apr 2021, 22:10
I may be alone in this but I think Op Shingle was a great allied success. It did not deliver the dramatic results hoped for by Allied commanders, but the overall result was beneficial to the Allied cause.

1. Italy was SIDE SHOW. The war would never be won there. It was a theatre of operations where the allies could fight the Germans on land without serious risk of expulsion. It is where the allies could force the Germans to deploy a significant force and wear them down at an acceptable level of casualties. There were no geographic objectives that would result in a German collapse. Rome? Foggia Air fields? the Industrial areas of Northern Italy? So it did not really matter how far up Italy the allies reached by the Op Overlord D Day. All that mattered was that on D Day there were lots of Germans in Italy, preferably dead.

2. The attritional battle for Anzio cost the Germans more than the Allies. In Italy, it was usually the allies who had the burden of attacking, exposing themselves to mortars and artillery fire. Anzio allowed the Germans to throw away infantrymen against allied fire. It also drew lots of reinforcements to Italy that could have been used elsewhere.

3. The Germans saw Anzio as an ideal opportunity to show the allies how an allied landing in France could be thrown into the sea. The Anzio landing force was too small for its purpose, ill supplied and indifferently led. It was potentially the perfect target for a demonstration of German might. But the Germans failed spectacularly. This must have done nothing for the morale of those charged with defending France.
I don't disagree with most of that. My contention is it would have been better to use that combat power, or a large portion of it elsewhere, a point with greater strategic value for the long haul. To make those same gains over ground more useful than the southern Apennines & Romes marble ruins.
Hum ... wonder where that could have been? ;)

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#74

Post by Sheldrake » 09 Apr 2021, 10:49

Carl Schwamberger wrote:
08 Apr 2021, 23:16
Sheldrake wrote:
08 Apr 2021, 22:54
Carl Schwamberger wrote:
08 Apr 2021, 21:58
Sheldrake wrote:
08 Apr 2021, 21:00
...

I don't disagree with most of that. My contention is it would have been better to use that combat power, or a large portion of it elsewhere, a point with greater strategic value for the long haul. To make those same gains over ground more useful than the southern Apennines & Romes marble ruins.

Such as?
I don't think we are talking about the Balkans LoL, or Turkey, not Norway right?
So having crossed off almost every where in Europe, the fickle finger returns to hover over the Italian peninsular....
Well, not quite. But the alternatives are a different discussion...
Slaps head...

Oh you don't mean revisiting the Casablanca conference and seeing if OP Roundup could be made to work in 1943? No side shows just the main effort on the obvious front. Just like how the American Civil War was won...

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Re: OVERLORD and ANVIL with the February 1944 compromise on landing craft allocation

#75

Post by Gooner1 » 09 Apr 2021, 11:45

Sheldrake wrote:
09 Apr 2021, 10:49
Slaps head...

Oh you don't mean revisiting the Casablanca conference and seeing if OP Roundup could be made to work in 1943? No side shows just the main effort on the obvious front. Just like how the American Civil War was won...
Montgomery thought it possible, in November and December '42 ...

The prolonged Tunisian campaign probably put paid to the opportunity even had Brooke been in favour of it.

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