Russia throws Serbia under the bus in 1914

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Re: Russia throws Serbia under the bus in 1914

Post by glenn239 » 10 Apr 2021 15:55

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
10 Apr 2021 00:16

Was have nato internal problem on balkan lands on 1990 years ? No.
You think Yugoslavia/Serbia was being bombed by UFO's in 1999?

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Re: Russia throws Serbia under the bus in 1914

Post by Terry Duncan » 10 Apr 2021 16:14

glenn239 wrote:
10 Apr 2021 15:42
How's that a world war issue, out of curiosity? Anyways, the Russians would have lost nothing by delaying on the position of "not one inch" of territorial adjustments while letting the Kaiser mediate. If the Austrians did as you say and the Entente decides that they'd rather have a world war than that, then the Russians can still mobilize, right?
In theory, Austria was expected to crush Serbia inside three months - six weeks being Conrads estimate. Russia had to intervene at the start to prevent Austria taking anything. You seem to see this as an Austria gets its way or its a world war. Fine. World War it is then, and we know the Central Powers came out of that rather badly. How about Austria examines the risks and negotiates in good faith rather than following German advice and going to war before pressure from the Entente forced a peaceful solution to the crisis?
glenn239 wrote:
10 Apr 2021 15:42
Certainly the Austrians were better off not doing so. One of the rare conflict situations where both sides (Austrians and Russians) were better off not marching.
So who was pushing for war? Who was it that was so desperate to avoid a peaceful settlement and why?
glenn239 wrote:
10 Apr 2021 15:42
Quality burn!
I try to provide quality input always!
glenn239 wrote:
10 Apr 2021 15:42
Ok, so you accept the reasoning that the Russians were seeking a direct test of strength with the Germans when in mid-August they made the public declaration of annexations of German and Austrian territory for the purpose of a greater Poland and Russia.
I am perfectly happy to accept that, and I presume you also accept Fischer's case that every single part of the September Program had featured in pre-war German thinking in one form or other and therefore shows intent and is not just readjusted thinking after war is declared? Doesnt look too good for the Central Powers if we go with Fischer - someone I have never quoted.
glenn239 wrote:
10 Apr 2021 15:42
We're not talking the GGS. We're talking the Russian leaders, none of whom were staff members of the German army. The Russian perspective was quite different than the German. The German army saw the emerging Russian 'steamroller' as a threat, but the Russians were more sensitive to the winds blowing in the Balkans and the recovery of the Ottomans. Whereas the French and Russian military spending was running at high gear, the Austrians and Germans could have seriously ramped up their own. The French were already maxed out. The Central Powers - not even close.
We are talking the GGS assessment of the Great Program, which in itself sought to make Russia the most powerful state in Europe. Both sides seem to accepted it would do so by 1917. The French have only 'maxed out' on conscription from the metropolitan population. There are the colonies as Mangin pointed out. The Central Powers have too many internal problems, from the German fixed budget limits to the Austrians suffering nationalist problems all across their lands. You want to arm more Czechs and Poles? More Bosnians? That is looking similar to St Petersberg in 1917.
glenn239 wrote:
10 Apr 2021 15:42
The Ottomans were entering the Central Powers camp in 1914. The alliance talks were underway as Russia was starting WW1. Even worse, the Ottomans were recovering from their Balkans defeat and so was Bulgaria. The 1913 Limon von Saunders crisis underscored what the Russians were terrified of; the Ottoman army being trained by the German army and the Central Powers navies joining with the Ottoman Navy.
The Ottomans had no dockyards for their 'dreadnoughts' if they did turn up, so they cannot repair them. McMeekin cannot even successfully identify either ship in his book and comes across as hopelessly confused on what should be the foundations of his case.
glenn239 wrote:
10 Apr 2021 15:42
Left to their own devices the Ottomans would have had something like 4 dreadnoughts by 1918. The Russian program could match that, but the situation was hopeless if the German and Austrian navies became allies of the Ottomans. The treaty on the Straights would prevent CP exercises in the Black Sea during peacetime, but it would not have stopped Central Powers Aegean naval exercises and the concentration of a dominant CP squadron in the Black Sea in wartime. Without naval superiority on the Black Sea, and with the Ottoman Army recovering, the whole Russian position suffers. (The domination of the Central Powers of the Balkans during the war was no accident).
Where do the Ottomans get these two extra ships from? Is this the 'super Erin' myth yet again? No such shit was ever ordered and the Ottomans had needed to run to public subscription to raise the money for the two ships they had paid for. A treaty wouldnt close the straits in wartime, the British, French, and Italian navies would do that. Technically the Ottomans held superiority with the Goeben, it didnt effect the land was one little bit. Two extra ships will multiply zero by whatever factor you wish. The answer is still no effect on the land war.
glenn239 wrote:
10 Apr 2021 15:42
The Russians were not certain of the British in 1914 and nothing about the British in the future inspired confidence. We cannot say what Russian leadership was actually thinking, but the situation seems to lend itself to the theory that in 1914 the British were as pro-Russian as they'd ever been since 1815, and there was no assurance that would last if the Russians did not seize the moment.

1914 is a curious beast in that both sides feared the future in 1914. Hence, why there was a war.
The Russians thought they had seriously overplayed the naval talks and thought Britain would walk away, the British had never intended to come to an agreement for the rather obvious reasoning that deploying the GF into the Baltic was a bloody stupid idea and one way to lose the war at the outset. Russia also knew that Britain would not go to war over eastern Europe, even if they would do so over western Europe.

The fact they were uncertain even after they were at war with Germany is testament to the balanced nature of Grey's policy. He could not commit to supporting them early on, and if he had done so, they may well have taken a harder line than they did.

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Re: Russia throws Serbia under the bus in 1914

Post by Peter89 » 10 Apr 2021 18:04

In case of all more-or-less democratic societies, the decision making about war and peace always formed a pro and a con team.

Therefore, we are full of theories about "the Brits could make peace with the Axis, because there were pro-peace key opinion leaders in Britain", and "the US would stay out of the war, because a sizeable chunk of the public opinion was against the war "; but we never hear the same thing in totalitarian regimes, like there is no "the Germans apologize for what they have done and disarm in 1941" and "Soviets who would make peace with the Germans", although we know that in fact thousands of them served the Germans.

In the A-H Empire, Franz Ferdinand was a key policy maker and a major anti-war protagonist. Killing him removed the major obstacle in front of the pro-war team.

It doesn't mean that the war was supported unanimously inthe A-H Empire. Also Franz Ferdinand made a grave mistake by alienating Archduke Friedrich, who in turn protected Conrad von Hötzendorf, the leader of the pro-war team. We can only imagine how he could have supported FF if the heir marries not the handmaid but the daughter.

Also, war in Europe traditionally did not mean what it meant in WW1 or WW2. The A-H Empire and the Russian rulers did not realize that they are playing with their very existence.

Some territorial losses were of course on the table, but the complete dissolution of a half-thousand years old Empire, also the third most populous country of the continent, was not.

This was quite unprecedented and unimagineable, and this lack of foresight and caution facilitated the wrong decisions.

The classic example is the assassination of Sisi in Italy, which also could have triggered a war (perhaps not a world war, but still).

I for one think that the A-H should never be agressive, and should have released territories gradually, starting with Bosnia. But back in the day, war seemed to be so sweet after decades of peace, well-being and prosperity.
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Re: Russia throws Serbia under the bus in 1914

Post by sailorsam » 11 Apr 2021 02:15

I'm wondering
what about France and Britain? might they have gone to war for Serbia?
or is the point of this question that, without Russia, there would have been no escalation?

would have been nice any way WWI could have been avoided.
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Re: Russia throws Serbia under the bus in 1914

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 11 Apr 2021 12:18

glenn239 wrote:
10 Apr 2021 15:55
Ружичасти Слон wrote:
10 Apr 2021 00:16

Was have nato internal problem on balkan lands on 1990 years ? No.
You think Yugoslavia/Serbia was being bombed by UFO's in 1999?
Are you complete crazy ?
glenn239 wrote:
09 Apr 2021 13:58
Ружичасти Слон wrote:
08 Apr 2021 13:52

Best solution for all peoples was be for austria on not actively seeking a test of strength with serbia and world. When austria not attack serbia not be ww1 unless germany find some other problem for to make war.
By that logic NATO should have fought itself in the 1990's rather than unifying and defeating Serbia. The best solution for Europe in 1914 once Austria mobilized was for the Entente to back Austria against Serbia.
Nato was not have internal problem on balkan lands on 1990 years.
Austria was have internal problems on balkan lands on 1914.year and much years before. Citizen of austria empire was kill austria duke on austria lands because he was not want austria rule.

Your logic is complete tosh.

Again again again you was write anti-history tosh for to make imagination story.

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Re: Russia throws Serbia under the bus in 1914

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 11 Apr 2021 12:23

Terry Duncan wrote:
10 Apr 2021 16:14
glenn239 wrote:
10 Apr 2021 15:42
How's that a world war issue, out of curiosity? Anyways, the Russians would have lost nothing by delaying on the position of "not one inch" of territorial adjustments while letting the Kaiser mediate. If the Austrians did as you say and the Entente decides that they'd rather have a world war than that, then the Russians can still mobilize, right?
In theory, Austria was expected to crush Serbia inside three months - six weeks being Conrads estimate. Russia had to intervene at the start to prevent Austria taking anything. You seem to see this as an Austria gets its way or its a world war. Fine. World War it is then, and we know the Central Powers came out of that rather badly. How about Austria examines the risks and negotiates in good faith rather than following German advice and going to war before pressure from the Entente forced a peaceful solution to the crisis?
Everything what he was write was be twist on history for to make imagination story on austria destroy serbia was be good idea and everybody must to be angry on russia for want to stop war.

Crazy.

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Re: Russia throws Serbia under the bus in 1914

Post by sailorsam » 12 Apr 2021 17:12

Terry Duncan wrote:
10 Apr 2021 16:14

So who was pushing for war? Who was it that was so desperate to avoid a peaceful settlement and why?
everything I've read indicates Kaiser Willy was the driving force, insisting Austria force the issue and declining any offers to settle.

as for why he (reportedly) wanted war so bad...it would take a psychiatrist to address.

I'm still not sure why Britain and France were so insistent on joining.
as somebody posted, I'm sure nobody in those capitals ever imagined the war would be so large and bloody.
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Re: Russia throws Serbia under the bus in 1914

Post by glenn239 » 14 Apr 2021 17:03

Peter89 wrote:
10 Apr 2021 18:04
In the A-H Empire, Franz Ferdinand was a key policy maker and a major anti-war protagonist. Killing him removed the major obstacle in front of the pro-war team.
Indeed it did. Not only was a restraining force eliminated, but Berchtold the Foreign Minister veered hawkish after Sarajevo. So doubly bad and leaving Tisza more or less isolated.
Some territorial losses were of course on the table, but the complete dissolution of a half-thousand years old Empire, also the third most populous country of the continent, was not.
Not sure on that one. Seems to me the situation was more extreme, that the only assurance of the continuation of the Empire was in the end, the armies of the Central Powers. If these were defeated, so went the Empire.
I for one think that the A-H should never be aggressive, and should have released territories gradually, starting with Bosnia. But back in the day, war seemed to be so sweet after decades of peace, well-being and prosperity.
Surrendering territory is never a good idea because it signals weakness, and weakness draws isolation and predation. But, running with your idea, what I would agree with is that in Albania the Austrian position should have been that Italy gets everything and Serbia gets nothing. In Bulgaria, the Austrian position should have been that the 1913 treaty was illegal and that whenever Bulgaria decided to attack Serbia in a war of revenge, that the Austrians would finish the Serbians from the north. That is to say, don't give an inch of your own territory, but give thousands of square miles of someone else's.

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Re: Russia throws Serbia under the bus in 1914

Post by glenn239 » 14 Apr 2021 17:08

Ружичасти Слон wrote:
11 Apr 2021 12:23
Everything what he was write was be twist on history for to make imagination story on austria destroy serbia was be good idea and everybody must to be angry on russia for want to stop war.

Crazy.
Serbia needed to be isolated and dealt with. That doesn't mean 'destroyed' or any other nonsensical hysterical garbage you want to throw around. It meant a good sharp kick in the teeth with Europe watching. When the UFO's bombed Serbia in 1999, suddenly all that nonsense coming out of Belgrade about ethnic this who owns that stopped and Serbia turned into a far more useful and cooperative member of the European club. Same thing could have been done in 1914 with about 9,900,000 less men dead on the battlefield.

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Re: Russia throws Serbia under the bus in 1914

Post by glenn239 » 14 Apr 2021 17:33

Terry Duncan wrote:
10 Apr 2021 16:14
In theory, Austria was expected to crush Serbia inside three months - six weeks being Conrads estimate. Russia had to intervene at the start to prevent Austria taking anything. You seem to see this as an Austria gets its way or its a world war. Fine. World War it is then, and we know the Central Powers came out of that rather badly. How about Austria examines the risks and negotiates in good faith rather than following German advice and going to war before pressure from the Entente forced a peaceful solution to the crisis?
The problem being that throughout the war Conrad's estimates of anything bore no resemblance to the actual situation on the ground. Provided Bulgaria could be kept neutral (and this was likely), the Austrians had scant chance in 1914 of advancing too far south of Belgrade towards Nish. Winter campaigning in the mountains was not much of an option, so already the diplomats are looking to spring 1915 with the situation still in play. The Russians might mobilize an expeditionary force to Nish via Rumania and the Danube to improve their hand. All sorts of options existed for the Tzar other than the road picked.
So who was pushing for war? Who was it that was so desperate to avoid a peaceful settlement and why?
All sides wanted a settlement that avoided a world war, but all sides also preferred a great war rather than give into the other side's idea on what the course of action should look like.
I am perfectly happy to accept that, and I presume you also accept Fischer's case that every single part of the September Program had featured in pre-war German thinking in one form or other and therefore shows intent and is not just readjusted thinking after war is declared? Doesnt look too good for the Central Powers if we go with Fischer - someone I have never quoted.
After the war started the Entente newspapers were filled with stories of the partition of Germany and massive annexations and such. Then the Russians formally declared that large scale annexations would occur in the east, and shortly thereafer the Western Entente powers underwrote the Tzar's appetite in the London Declaration. Only after that did the German September Programme follow. Prior to this point, there was nothing but crickets. Therefore, I conclude the Entente announcements earlier caused the German reaction that came later. To say that the German programme drew upon ideas that pre-existed the war doesn't mean that Bethmann paid any attention to such ideas. The Entente first declared that the game would be for the highest stakes then the Germans decided what their objectives would be.

We are talking the GGS assessment of the Great Program, which in itself sought to make Russia the most powerful state in Europe. Both sides seem to accepted it would do so by 1917. The French have only 'maxed out' on conscription from the metropolitan population. There are the colonies as Mangin pointed out. The Central Powers have too many internal problems, from the German fixed budget limits to the Austrians suffering nationalist problems all across their lands. You want to arm more Czechs and Poles? More Bosnians? That is looking similar to St Petersberg in 1917.
No, we are talking the Russian assessment of the situation, not the German assessment. The Russians were looking at different things than the Germans were. The German army was focused on the Russian Steamroller. The Russians were more aware of the limitations of that particular instrument of policy and were looking at diplomatic trends in France, Britain, the Balkans, and Turkey.

In terms of the Austrian army, in 1915 despite the tremendous losses in the first campaigns they built up to something about 80 divisions and used Skoda to supply it with the artillery it needed. Austria's GDP per capita on armaments was the smallest in Europe, (except perhaps for the British). Czechs under arms? Sure, on the Italian Front...
The Ottomans had no dockyards for their 'dreadnoughts' if they did turn up, so they cannot repair them. McMeekin cannot even successfully identify either ship in his book and comes across as hopelessly confused on what should be the foundations of his case.
The case for the Central Powers domination of the Black Sea, had peace continued, is so overwelming that really it should not even be a point of discussion. As the Ottomans acquired dreadnoughts of course they would have built a dock to service them.
The Russians thought they had seriously overplayed the naval talks and thought Britain would walk away, the British had never intended to come to an agreement for the rather obvious reasoning that deploying the GF into the Baltic was a bloody stupid idea and one way to lose the war at the outset. Russia also knew that Britain would not go to war over eastern Europe, even if they would do so over western Europe.
The Russians were trying to secure a naval pact with Britain for joint operations in wartime because they 'knew' that Britain would not go to war? What would be the point of a naval pact then?
The fact they were uncertain even after they were at war with Germany is testament to the balanced nature of Grey's policy. He could not commit to supporting them early on, and if he had done so, they may well have taken a harder line than they did.
The sum result of Grey's evasiveness is that everyone - the French, the Germans, the Russians, the Austrians - they all viewed the British as a roll of the dice, an unknowable cypher. This then deterred no one.

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Re: Russia throws Serbia under the bus in 1914

Post by Ружичасти Слон » 15 Apr 2021 14:50

glenn239 wrote:
14 Apr 2021 17:08
Ружичасти Слон wrote:
11 Apr 2021 12:23
Everything what he was write was be twist on history for to make imagination story on austria destroy serbia was be good idea and everybody must to be angry on russia for want to stop war.

Crazy.
Serbia needed to be isolated and dealt with.
Now you was explain your agenda very clear it can to make complete logic why you was change real history so much for to make your imagination stories.

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Re: Russia throws Serbia under the bus in 1914

Post by Terry Duncan » 15 Apr 2021 18:40

glenn239 wrote:
14 Apr 2021 17:33
The problem being that throughout the war Conrad's estimates of anything bore no resemblance to the actual situation on the ground. Provided Bulgaria could be kept neutral (and this was likely), the Austrians had scant chance in 1914 of advancing too far south of Belgrade towards Nish. Winter campaigning in the mountains was not much of an option, so already the diplomats are looking to spring 1915 with the situation still in play. The Russians might mobilize an expeditionary force to Nish via Rumania and the Danube to improve their hand. All sorts of options existed for the Tzar other than the road picked.
In 1914 everybody shared the same belief, a great power would crush a smaller power in very short order. Allowing a war to start in the first place was a mistake, as with any war you can start it when you like but you cannot pick when it ends or who else becomes involved.
glenn239 wrote:
14 Apr 2021 17:33
All sides wanted a settlement that avoided a world war, but all sides also preferred a great war rather than give into the other side's idea on what the course of action should look like.
That is a very strange way of saying that the Entente were the powers trying to get a peaceful settlement, and that the Central Powers were the one who were attempting to start a war. Is it so hard to record things as they were and not try and dance around the facts with a semantic version of Salome?
glenn239 wrote:
14 Apr 2021 17:33
After the war started the Entente newspapers were filled with stories of the partition of Germany and massive annexations and such. Then the Russians formally declared that large scale annexations would occur in the east, and shortly thereafer the Western Entente powers underwrote the Tzar's appetite in the London Declaration. Only after that did the German September Programme follow. Prior to this point, there was nothing but crickets. Therefore, I conclude the Entente announcements earlier caused the German reaction that came later. To say that the German programme drew upon ideas that pre-existed the war doesn't mean that Bethmann paid any attention to such ideas. The Entente first declared that the game would be for the highest stakes then the Germans decided what their objectives would be.
So, we now have to look to what newspapers said? I presume we shouldnt look at what the German papers were saying though?

Certainly, the Russian declaration was the first public utterance of this sort, though with regards Alsace-Lorraine/Elsass-Lothringen it had been accepted since 1871 that the French would take these areas back in any future war where they won. The German attitude towards Belgium in a war was not an afterthought, they had likewise decided in advance that a puppet government would be installed and the area would become a new German 'colony' similar to Alsace-Lorraine.

From 1878 onward the Germans also fully intended and planned for a future war with France to put in place a settlement so harsh it would forever reduce France to a second rate power, unable to ever regain her great power status.

However, lets not consider actual planning, lets look at what the newspapers were saying.
glenn239 wrote:
14 Apr 2021 17:33
No, we are talking the Russian assessment of the situation, not the German assessment. The Russians were looking at different things than the Germans were. The German army was focused on the Russian Steamroller. The Russians were more aware of the limitations of that particular instrument of policy and were looking at diplomatic trends in France, Britain, the Balkans, and Turkey.

In terms of the Austrian army, in 1915 despite the tremendous losses in the first campaigns they built up to something about 80 divisions and used Skoda to supply it with the artillery it needed. Austria's GDP per capita on armaments was the smallest in Europe, (except perhaps for the British). Czechs under arms? Sure, on the Italian Front...
The purpose of the Great Program was to put Russia at the top of the military power list, to make her unbeatable in a future war with Germany.

There were lots of Czechs and Poles under arms in 1918, establishing their nations before any peace settlement, Versailles only confirmed what they had already decided. None of that will change the problems the Hapsburgs were having with their less that willing subjects, the rise of nationalism was going to put an end to multi-ethnic empires.
glenn239 wrote:
14 Apr 2021 17:33
The case for the Central Powers domination of the Black Sea, had peace continued, is so overwelming that really it should not even be a point of discussion. As the Ottomans acquired dreadnoughts of course they would have built a dock to service them.
You mean the dockyards to take ships like Goeben into them for repairs? The sort the Turks never even began to build by the time of Goeben's scrapping in 1972? The mine damage to the hull from 1917 was never repaired and the concrete coffer dam was still in place fifty years later!!!
glenn239 wrote:
14 Apr 2021 17:33
The Russians were trying to secure a naval pact with Britain for joint operations in wartime because they 'knew' that Britain would not go to war? What would be the point of a naval pact then?
The Russians wanted agreements similar to those the British had with France. The British didnt want the talks and mostly only went along with them to keep the Russians happy. The idea to put the Grand Fleet in the Baltic and land large numbers of Russian troops in Germany (Pomerania iirc) was absurd, Russia didnt even have the ability to transport the number of troops they wanted the British to escort! There was no consideration of mines or subs, let alone British naval priorities or capabilities.
glenn239 wrote:
14 Apr 2021 17:33
The sum result of Grey's evasiveness is that everyone - the French, the Germans, the Russians, the Austrians - they all viewed the British as a roll of the dice, an unknowable cypher. This then deterred no one.
There was no other option open to Grey as unlike almost every other person in his position, he needed the support in Parliament for any policy statement. Nice to see at last though that you accept he didnt encourage anyone to take a line based on British support. However, if Grey had stated support for Russia and France at the outset (the only vaguely possible other option he had) are you suggesting the lines taken by those powers would have been less assertive?

The idea Grey alone could have changed events is absurd, it ignores what was being said in the other capitals as well as ignoring how the British government works. We could always look at what the British position without Grey and Asquith, and that means Bonar-Law and the Conservative and Unionist party in government, with likely British support for France very early on.

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Re: Russia throws Serbia under the bus in 1914

Post by Peter89 » 17 Apr 2021 11:10

glenn239 wrote:
14 Apr 2021 17:03
Some territorial losses were of course on the table, but the complete dissolution of a half-thousand years old Empire, also the third most populous country of the continent, was not.
Not sure on that one. Seems to me the situation was more extreme, that the only assurance of the continuation of the Empire was in the end, the armies of the Central Powers. If these were defeated, so went the Empire.
I think not. The core of the problem was the lack of a proper political offer to the negotiative nations of the Empire: the Czechs, the Slovaks, and to a lesser extent, the Slovenes and the Croats. The former were natural part of the Empire, the latter were loyal depending on the offer (they had to declare either for Vienna or for Belgrade, neither of which was their dream).

There was no solution for the patchwork nature of the ethnic map of the region. Either the political rights were extended, or there would be war, oppression, deportation and devastation. The question is still the same, as millions live under more-or-less unfavourable foreign rule to this very day, and the last state was formed less than a decade ago, with the same unfortunate "birth defect", namely, that a country was concieved with a minority, which forms the majority in a region of the country. To make things worse, there is a nation state of that country right next to the border - a border which thus makes a problem for everyone.

Long story short, the military was not the cement in the mischung of the Empire: neither in 1848-1849 nor in 1918-1919. In case of a civil war, ethnicity would more-or-less split up the army. If there was a political offer or a lack of a counter-offer - as in case of the Slovaks in 1848-1849, they declared for their traditional flag.


glenn239 wrote:
14 Apr 2021 17:03
I for one think that the A-H should never be aggressive, and should have released territories gradually, starting with Bosnia. But back in the day, war seemed to be so sweet after decades of peace, well-being and prosperity.
Surrendering territory is never a good idea because it signals weakness, and weakness draws isolation and predation. But, running with your idea, what I would agree with is that in Albania the Austrian position should have been that Italy gets everything and Serbia gets nothing. In Bulgaria, the Austrian position should have been that the 1913 treaty was illegal and that whenever Bulgaria decided to attack Serbia in a war of revenge, that the Austrians would finish the Serbians from the north. That is to say, don't give an inch of your own territory, but give thousands of square miles of someone else's.
Well, the other route was to occupy Romania and elevate them into the ruling nations of the Empire; they had a lot to be afraid of Russia and Bulgaria, and had about third to half of their nation living under A-H rule. There was no other option. All the Poles could not be brought under the Empire; the Italians were out of the question for obvious reasons. The Southern Slavs, the obsession of the Habsburgs, were also not a good idea: those regions were extremely underdeveloped and had little cultural similarities with the Empire's "own" Southern Slavs, the Slovenes and Croats, who were Catholic, wrote with Latin letters, used the Gregorian Calendar and whatnot.
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Re: Russia throws Serbia under the bus in 1914

Post by ljadw » 17 Apr 2021 12:47

Futurist wrote:
06 Apr 2021 00:45
What if Russia would have thrown Serbia under the bus in 1914? Specifically, I am thinking of Russia tell Serbia to fully and unconditionally accept the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, however humiliating it might be, or, alternatively, to fight Austria-Hungary itself if it will refuse to fully accept Austria-Hungary's ultimatum to it. Granted, such a move might have been a bit out of character for Russian Tsar Nicholas II, but nevertheless AFAIK Russia had no legally binding treaty of alliance with Serbia like it had with France and Nicholas, in a rare moment of sanity, could have concluded that the Russo-Japanese War hasn't exactly worked out very well for him (sparking a Russian Revolution in 1905 after Russia lost this war) and that thus it would NOT be either wise or prudent for Russia to fight another war so soon after losing the last one, especially against a more powerful adversary in Germany, even if it will have France and possibly Britain as its allies by its side this time around.

Such a Russian move would have clearly hurt Russia's reputation and prestige, no doubt about that, but would this damage have been any worse than, say, a hypothetical decision on the part of the US to fully withdraw from South Vietnam in 1965 and thus to abandon South Vietnam to the Communists? If the US would have been capable of seeing its credibility and reputation eventually recover after this, why exactly would the same not have been true for Russia if/after it would have abandoned Serbia in 1914? Russia could, after all--like the Cold War-era US--claim that a *genuine* Great Power requires freedom of maneuver in regards to its actions and decisions, including choosing where and when to pick its fights.

I also wonder what the consequences of this would have been. Serbia might have very well drifted out of the pro-Russian orbit and into a more neutral or even pro-Austro-Hungarian position, feeling that its friendship with Russia isn't worth very much. At the same time, though, Russia can reacquire Bulgaria as an ally and of course can continue focusing on pulling Romania out of the Germano-Austro-Hungarian orbit, which should become easier to do after King Carol's death in late 1914. I'm not sure whether Austria-Hungary or Russia would have actually had more influence in Greece. But Yeah, a Russia that pulls Bulgaria and Romania into its own orbit while continuing to put pressure on the Ottoman Empire would be in a pretty good position in the Black Sea. Austria-Hungary could, of course, take joy in the fact that it will solidly dominate the Adriatic region together with Italy, who might become a maritime rival of sorts to Austria-Hungary.

Anyway, which additional triggers for World War I might there eventually be in this scenario, and when exactly?
You start from the wrong assumption that WWI was caused by the attack of Sarajevo .Serbia and Russia were irrelevant .Sarajevo was a fallacy . The war between Serbia and AH was not the cause of WWI,but the result of WWI .
AH told Germany that there was no proof for the involvement of the Serbian government in the attack and the shooting between both countries did NOT cause a war between Germany and Russia .Without the war between Germany and Russia (started by Germany which declared war on Russia, not the opposite ) there would have been no war between AH and Serbia, but,at most, a punitive expedition,as was happening in Mexico when the US army was entering searching for Mexican terrorists .

ljadw
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Re: Russia throws Serbia under the bus in 1914

Post by ljadw » 17 Apr 2021 12:58

And, about Romania : it was NOT in the German/AH orbit : it was considered by Tisza as the biggest enemy of Hungary .Bulgaria,OTOH, was nothing , it was considered by Tisza as a potential ally, only because it was an enemy of Romania .The Kaiser had a very negative opinion of the king of Bulgaria .

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