Germany could win Barbarossa by suppressing Italy

[Tom from Cornwall]

Do you think what i was read can to have same information what was on your document ?

Possibly! Can you give me the references to the documents to which you refer and I'll have a look.

Edited to add:

I have read the Chiefs of Staff paper entitled "Review of our Policy in the Mediterranean" dated 18 Jan 1941. Have you? It's in CAB80/56/4. It certainly doesn't include a ringing endorsement of an attempt on Tripoli. In fact, it rather muddies the waters by talking about the importance of the Balkans and the opportunities that a position in Greece would give:

The defeat of Italian forces in Albania would strike a most serious blow to Italian morale. Greece gives us a position from which we could strke at both Italy and the Roumanian oilfields.

As for Tripoli?

There are, therefore, in our opinion, great strategic advantages in continuing our present advance as far as Benghazi in the immediate future. Although it would be necessary to retain a garrison in this area this should not be large in view of the serious difficulties of communications with which the enemy would be faced in any effort to dislodge us. A high scale of air defence would, however, be needed to enable us to use the port and the aerodromes. Our occupation of this area would encourage an Arab rising against the Italians in Tripoli and the enemy's grip on Italian North Africa would be seriously weakened. From Benghazi the way might be open for a combined operation or for raids upon the port of Tripoli with the object of accelerating the Italian collapse. It is important also to bear in mind the encouraging effect of operations in this area on the French in North Africa.

COS - Tripoli - 18 Jan 41.JPG

Regards

Tom

[Ружичасти Слон]

Do you think what i was read can to have same information what was on your document ?

Possibly! Can you give me the references to the documents to which you refer and I'll have a look.

Regards

Tom

On documents references was write
D.O.(41) 7th meeting
J.P.(41)105

[ljadw]

For sure ljadw was read telegrams. But ljadw was decide for to make conclusions completest opposite on what was write on telegrams.

What ljadw was write was show ljadw not be serious person for discuss real history. Can for only discuss jokes and funny stuffs on ljadw not real imaginations storys.

Did telegram 51265 prohibit to send a small force to Tripoli ?
Yes or no ?

Was you be serious?

Must i to give you lesson on english language.

On 10.febuary 1941.year Wavell was ask on permission for to send small force on advance Tripoli.
On 11.febuary 1941.year Churchill was answer not have permission.

O'Connor was think it was can be possible for to go to Tripoli.
Wilson was think it was can be possible for to go to Tripoli.
Wavell was think it was can be possible for to go to Tripoli.
Churchill was forbid.

Forbid was be advance on
extra small force
small force
medium force
big force
extra big force.

Churchill was forbid advance on Tripoli on all sizes.

Telegram 51265 : No serious effort against Tripoli .
NOT :no extra small force, NOT :no small force.Not : no medium force . NOT : no big force. NOT : no extra big force .
Churchill did NOT forbid advance on Tripoli on all sizes.
Wavell thought that only a small force could advance to Tripoli, but this depended on the Italians and on the Italians only .

English lesson number 2

This rules out any serious effort against Tripoli... not mean Churchill was change decision from not advance on Tripoli to now can advance on Tripoli

Only on ljadw not real imaginarys storys can to be such stupid translations.

No serious effort against Tripoli means : no attack with more than one division against Tripoli . It does not mean : no small attack against Tripoli .
It the War Cabinet meant : no small attack against Tripoli, it would have said this .
The War Cabinet did not say : no small attack against Tripoli, thus Wavell could have ordered a small attack against Tripoli .

[Tom from Cornwall]

On documents references was write
D.O.(41) 7th meeting
J.P.(41)105

Great, thanks. I'll see if I can find a copy.

Regards

Tom

[Ружичасти Слон]

Did telegram 51265 prohibit to send a small force to Tripoli ?
Yes or no ?

Was you be serious?

Must i to give you lesson on english language.

On 10.febuary 1941.year Wavell was ask on permission for to send small force on advance Tripoli.
On 11.febuary 1941.year Churchill was answer not have permission.

O'Connor was think it was can be possible for to go to Tripoli.
Wilson was think it was can be possible for to go to Tripoli.
Wavell was think it was can be possible for to go to Tripoli.
Churchill was forbid.

Forbid was be advance on
extra small force
small force
medium force
big force
extra big force.

Churchill was forbid advance on Tripoli on all sizes.

Telegram 51265 : No serious effort against Tripoli .
NOT :no extra small force, NOT :no small force.Not : no medium force . NOT : no big force. NOT : no extra big force .
Churchill did NOT forbid advance on Tripoli on all sizes.
Wavell thought that only a small force could advance to Tripoli, but this depended on the Italians and on the Italians only .

English lesson number 2

This rules out any serious effort against Tripoli... not mean Churchill was change decision from not advance on Tripoli to now can advance on Tripoli

Only on ljadw not real imaginarys storys can to be such stupid translations.

No serious effort against Tripoli means : no attack with more than one division against Tripoli . It does not mean : no small attack against Tripoli .
It the War Cabinet meant : no small attack against Tripoli, it would have said this .
The War Cabinet did not say : no small attack against Tripoli, thus Wavell could have ordered a small attack against Tripoli .

No serious effort against Tripoli means : no attack with more than one division against Tripoli .
= stupid translation by ljadw for to make tosh not real imaginations storys.

[Ружичасти Слон]

.

Edited to add:

I have read the Chiefs of Staff paper entitled "Review of our Policy in the Mediterranean" dated 18 Jan 1941. Have you? It's in CAB80/56/4. It certainly doesn't include a ringing endorsement of an attempt on Tripoli. In fact, it rather muddies the waters by talking about the importance of the Balkans and the opportunities that a position in Greece would give:

Advices by Joint Planning Committee was be not advance on Tripoli.

Chiefs of Staffs was agree on advices and was say on Defence Committee (Operations).

Churchill was send message on Wavell not have permission on advance on Tripoli was be on basis advices on military on London.


Military on Egypt was think possible for to go Tripoli and be success. Military on London was not disagree but think on bigest strategys and on politicals.

Some military peoples on low ranks on war make many comments after war that was be bigest mistake on not go Tripoli. O'Connor was think same. Wavell was be very clear all times. He was not sure if advance will to be success but was want for to try. Wavell was be very ckear he was understand big strategy and politicals and was not disagree.

[Tom from Cornwall]

Advices by Joint Planning Committee was be not advance on Tripoli.

Chiefs of Staffs was agree on advices and was say on Defence Committee (Operations).

Churchill was send message on Wavell not have permission on advance on Tripoli was be on basis advices on military on London.


Military on Egypt was think possible for to go Tripoli and be success. Military on London was not disagree but think on bigest strategys and on politicals.

Some military peoples on low ranks on war make many comments after war that was be bigest mistake on not go Tripoli. O'Connor was think same. Wavell was be very clear all times. He was not sure if advance will to be success but was want for to try. Wavell was be very ckear he was understand big strategy and politicals and was not disagree.

Agreed mostly, although Wavell (and his fellow C-in-Cs) did warn the COS on 27 Jan 41 (CAB80/56/4) that they had insufficient naval resources even to use Benghazi and that they couldn't continue to take the same naval and air risks now that German airpower was arriving in Mediterranean.

Military advice from COS Committee in their Memo of 10 Feb 41 (CAB80/56/5) was that it might just be possible for Wavell to capture Tripoli but that it was "open to doubt" whether it would pay for the British to attempt to stay there for a variety of reasons - some operational and some strategic.

To be fair to ljadw, the COS also wrote:

In these circumstances, we think that the question of whether Tripoli should or should not be raided should be left to the Commanders-in-Chief on the spot.

I'll see tomorrow night if I can find out if the proposed telegram giving the C-in-C's in the Middle East that latitude was ever sent.

Regards

Tom

[ljadw]

Of course, those few telegrams don't cover the complexity of the decision making.

On real history you can to read very clear what was decisions and who was make decisions and why was make decisions.

On ljadw imaginations storys every things are completest different.

On real history on 11.january 1941.year Wavell was have permission on advance on Tobruk. Not more.
Translation on english for ljadw = not have permission on advance on Benghazi not have permission on advance on Tripoli. Not big force not small force


On real history on 21.january 1941.year Wavell was have permission on advance on Benghazi. Not more.
Translation on english for ljadw = not have permission on advance on Tripoli. Not big force not small force


On 10.Febuary 1941.year Wavell was not have permission for to advance on Tripoli. Not small force not big force. He was send telegram on London for to get permission on advance on Tripoli on small force. On 11.febuary 1941.year Churchill was answer he not have permission.

The whole discussion is the usual after war myth,invented by journalists .As one can expect .

All datas was be on original documents on archives.

No datas was be from after war myths.

No datas was be invented by journalists.

Myths was be invented by ljadw.

1 Wavell agreed with Lustre .
2 Lustre did not exclude a small attack on Tripoli .
3 The War Cabinet did not oppose a small attack against Tripoli .
The whole story was invented by journalists who were searching for a good story with a scapegoat ( good story means for journalists : a best seller ): here : it was the fault of Winston that the war in NA lasted til May 1943 .
The post war history of WW 2 is swarming with such myths
It was the fault of Hitler that the BEF could escape from Dunkirk.
It was the fault of Hitler who slept at 5 AM 6 June that the Allied landing was successful .
It was because Hitler believed Garbo that 15th Army was not going to Dunkirk .
It was because Stalin did not believe Sorge that the Germans surprised the Soviets on 22 June 1941 .
FDR knew of the attack on Pearl Harbour .
FDR was hostile to the Treaty of Munich 1938
FDR betrayed Poland at Yalta .
Stalin proposed a separate peace to Germany in 1941
Stalin ordered his forces to stop before Warsaw so that the Germans could liquidate the Polish insurgents .
The Italians were no good .
The capture of Malta was essential for the survival of the Axis forces in NA .
Ultra shortened the war with at least one year .
Churchill knew about the attack on Coventry .
The attack on Dresden was a war crime.
The attack on Coventry was not a war crime .
Rommel was a Nazi .
Rommel was an opponent of Hitler .
Rommel was a genius.
Rommel was no good .
Manstein could have won Citadel,but Hitler (always him ) stopped the attack .
Montgomery was responsible for the failure of Market Garden ( myth very popular between Augusta and Sacramento )
The Luftwaffe was winning the Battle of Britain, but fat Goering ( fat people have a bad reputation ) or Hitler the Veggie ( vegetarians have a bad reputation ) prevented this .
Speer was a genius .
von Choltitz refused Hitler's order to destroy Paris .
The defeat was the fault of Hitler (still very popular in the Bundeswehr )
The Holocaust was the responsibility of Hitler only ,not of the German people (still very popular in Germany )
Etc.
Etc.
The Lustre decision is only one of these myths and these myths and these Myths started already almost immediately after the war : in 1946 the Czech colonel Miksche wrote a book with as title ''Les Erreurs stratégiques de Hitler ''and on P 131 he said that with 60 divisions Hitler could have conquered on 15 September the western part of the Mediterranean and with 25 additional divisions he could conquer eastern Africa .
Napoleon's Army died because of the cold during its retreat from Russia .( Very popular between Lille and Bayonne )
Etc.Etc .
And 20 years later, he was still writing and selling such myths .
An other fantasist was Liddel Hart .

[Ружичасти Слон]

Agreed mostly, although Wavell (and his fellow C-in-Cs) did warn the COS on 27 Jan 41 (CAB80/56/4) that they had insufficient naval resources even to use Benghazi and that they couldn't continue to take the same naval and air risks now that German airpower was arriving in Mediterranean.

Military advice from COS Committee in their Memo of 10 Feb 41 (CAB80/56/5) was that it might just be possible for Wavell to capture Tripoli but that it was "open to doubt" whether it would pay for the British to attempt to stay there for a variety of reasons - some operational and some strategic.

Must to make separate things.
1) On Egypt military generals was think possible for to advance on Tripoli and success
2) Wavell was be not sure that navy and airforce will be able for to support occupation after success.

For sure Wavell was have big doubts on strategy on advance on Tobruk but he was agree that it was possible on tactics. Later on hindsight he was think that maybe it was not be tactical possible.

3) London generals and Egypt generals was have different intelligences. Egyot generals was think Italian army was less strong than real situation. London generals intelligence was be closest.

To be fair to ljadw, the COS also wrote:

In these circumstances, we think that the question of whether Tripoli should or should not be raided should be left to the Commanders-in-Chief on the spot.

I'll see tomorrow night if I can find out if the proposed telegram giving the C-in-C's in the Middle East that latitude was ever sent.

Ljadw was write complete tosh.

On 10.febuary 1941.year Wavell was ask on permission for to advance on Tripoli.
On 11.febuary 1941.year Churchill was answer NOT HAVE PERMISSION. Churchill answer was on advice on London generals.

[Ружичасти Слон]

Of course, those few telegrams don't cover the complexity of the decision making.

On real history you can to read very clear what was decisions and who was make decisions and why was make decisions.

On ljadw imaginations storys every things are completest different.

On real history on 11.january 1941.year Wavell was have permission on advance on Tobruk. Not more.
Translation on english for ljadw = not have permission on advance on Benghazi not have permission on advance on Tripoli. Not big force not small force


On real history on 21.january 1941.year Wavell was have permission on advance on Benghazi. Not more.
Translation on english for ljadw = not have permission on advance on Tripoli. Not big force not small force


On 10.Febuary 1941.year Wavell was not have permission for to advance on Tripoli. Not small force not big force. He was send telegram on London for to get permission on advance on Tripoli on small force. On 11.febuary 1941.year Churchill was answer he not have permission.

The whole discussion is the usual after war myth,invented by journalists .As one can expect .

All datas was be on original documents on archives.

No datas was be from after war myths.

No datas was be invented by journalists.

Myths was be invented by ljadw.

1 Wavell agreed with Lustre .
2 Lustre did not exclude a small attack on Tripoli .
3 The War Cabinet did not oppose a small attack against Tripoli .
The whole story was invented by journalists who were searching for a good story with a scapegoat ( good story means for journalists : a best seller ): here : it was the fault of Winston that the war in NA lasted til May 1943 .
The post war history of WW 2 is swarming with such myths
It was the fault of Hitler that the BEF could escape from Dunkirk.
It was the fault of Hitler who slept at 5 AM 6 June that the Allied landing was successful .
It was because Hitler believed Garbo that 15th Army was not going to Dunkirk .
It was because Stalin did not believe Sorge that the Germans surprised the Soviets on 22 June 1941 .
FDR knew of the attack on Pearl Harbour .
FDR was hostile to the Treaty of Munich 1938
FDR betrayed Poland at Yalta .
Stalin proposed a separate peace to Germany in 1941
Stalin ordered his forces to stop before Warsaw so that the Germans could liquidate the Polish insurgents .
The Italians were no good .
The capture of Malta was essential for the survival of the Axis forces in NA .
Ultra shortened the war with at least one year .
Churchill knew about the attack on Coventry .
The attack on Dresden was a war crime.
The attack on Coventry was not a war crime .
Rommel was a Nazi .
Rommel was an opponent of Hitler .
Rommel was a genius.
Rommel was no good .
Manstein could have won Citadel,but Hitler (always him ) stopped the attack .
Montgomery was responsible for the failure of Market Garden ( myth very popular between Augusta and Sacramento )
The Luftwaffe was winning the Battle of Britain, but fat Goering ( fat people have a bad reputation ) or Hitler the Veggie ( vegetarians have a bad reputation ) prevented this .
Speer was a genius .
von Choltitz refused Hitler's order to destroy Paris .
The defeat was the fault of Hitler (still very popular in the Bundeswehr )
The Holocaust was the responsibility of Hitler only ,not of the German people (still very popular in Germany )
Etc.
Etc.
The Lustre decision is only one of these myths and these myths and these Myths started already almost immediately after the war : in 1946 the Czech colonel Miksche wrote a book with as title ''Les Erreurs stratégiques de Hitler ''and on P 131 he said that with 60 divisions Hitler could have conquered on 15 September the western part of the Mediterranean and with 25 additional divisions he could conquer eastern Africa .
Napoleon's Army died because of the cold during its retreat from Russia .( Very popular between Lille and Bayonne )
Etc.Etc .
And 20 years later, he was still writing and selling such myths .
An other fantasist was Liddel Hart .

The whole story was invented by journalists who were searching for a good story with a scapegoat ( good story means for journalists : a

Invention was be on ljadw tosh for to make not real ljadw imaginations storys.

1 Wavell agreed with Lustre . yes

2 Lustre did not exclude a small attack on Tripoli . not relevant. On date 10. and 11.febuary 1941.year Lustre was not exist. On 10.febuary 1941.year Wavell was think Greece was not want help.

3 The War Cabinet did not oppose a small attack against Tripoli . it was Defence Committee (Operations) that was forbid advance on Tripoli.

[Kingfish]

The logistic problems of the Germans were bigger than those of Britain : Britain had a harbor (Alexandria ) compared to which Tripoli was a small fishing port .And Britain had decent railways.

Yes...and???

And at the end of 1942 Germany had still only 2 PzD .

But not because the terrain prohibited the deployment of a larger force.

[ljadw]

The logistic problems of the Germans were bigger than those of Britain : Britain had a harbor (Alexandria ) compared to which Tripoli was a small fishing port .And Britain had decent railways.

Yes...and???

What Britain was doing can not be used as an argument for the claim that Germany could do more .
The Axis had not the possibility for the presence of AND a big German AND a big Italian Army in Libya .
Besides a bigger German army would imply a bigger Italian army .

[Kingfish]

What Britain was doing can not be used as an argument for the claim that Germany could do more .

And who made the claim that what Britain was doing was the reason Germany should do more?

The Axis had not the possibility for the presence of AND a big German AND a big Italian Army in Libya .

You seem to have a habit of arguing against claims no one made, because at no point had anyone mentioned the possibility of a big German army being deployed to North Africa.

That said, how big was the combined German/Italian army in Sonnenblume?

Compare that to Crusader, and then to Gazala, and then to El Alamein.

The latter in particular represents the furthest the Axis forces had advanced in the entire NA campaign, which also means the furthest they ever were from their supply hub at Tripoli. All that and they still were able to field 4 German and 8 Italian divisions.

[ljadw]

''Çompare that to Crusader,and then to Gazala and then to Alamein '' is using the strength of 8 th Army as an argument that the Axis could do what Britain did .
Saying that no one had mentioned the possibility of a big German army in NA AND saying that there were 4 German divisions at Alamein ,are two things that exclude each other .
At the start of Alamein bis, Italy's ground forces in NA were 128000,of whom 99000 in Egypt .
Of these 99000 ,46000 were at the front,which means 8 divisions of 5750 men .
German strength was 48,854 and 5 divisions with average manpower of 8215 .

15th Panzer : 9368
21th Panzer : 9517
90 th light : 6229
164th light : 9623
19th Flak : 6302
Ramcke : 4706
Höhere Artillerie Kommandeur Afrika : 3069
For Sonnenblume
Germans 19000 men in NA (it is unclear how many were at the front )
Italy : 136500 mid June of whom 61000 at the front ( 7 divisions )
4 and 7 divisions at Alamein is something meaningless .

[Kingfish]

''Çompare that to Crusader,and then to Gazala and then to Alamein '' is using the strength of 8 th Army as an argument that the Axis could do what Britain did .

Wrong, the later battles were in reference to the strength of the Axis forces. Your claim that the Germans could not deploy more than 2 Pz divisions because of the terrain simply does not hold water when you factor in the increase in total Axis strength as the campaign progressed.

Saying that no one had mentioned the possibility of a big German army in NA AND saying that there were 4 German divisions at Alamein ,are two things that exclude each other .

Does 4 divisions represent a big German army in your view?