Ружичасти Слон wrote: ↑02 Aug 2021 14:34
Tom from Cornwall wrote: ↑02 Aug 2021 13:33
Of course, those few telegrams don't cover the complexity of the decision making.
On real history you can to read very clear what was decisions and who was make decisions and why was make decisions.
On ljadw imaginations storys every things are completest different.
On real history on 11.january 1941.year Wavell was have permission on advance on Tobruk. Not more.
Translation on english for ljadw = not have permission on advance on Benghazi not have permission on advance on Tripoli. Not big force not small force
On real history on 21.january 1941.year Wavell was have permission on advance on Benghazi. Not more.
Translation on english for ljadw = not have permission on advance on Tripoli. Not big force not small force
On 10.Febuary 1941.year Wavell was not have permission for to advance on Tripoli. Not small force not big force. He was send telegram on London for to get permission on advance on Tripoli on small force. On 11.febuary 1941.year Churchill was answer he not have permission.
ljadw wrote: ↑01 Aug 2021 19:07
The whole discussion is the usual after war myth,invented by journalists .As one can expect .
All datas was be on original documents on archives.
No datas was be from after war myths.
No datas was be invented by journalists.
Myths was be invented by ljadw.
1 Wavell agreed with Lustre .
2 Lustre did not exclude a small attack on Tripoli .
3 The War Cabinet did not oppose a small attack against Tripoli .
The whole story was invented by journalists who were searching for a good story with a scapegoat ( good story means for journalists : a best seller ): here : it was the fault of Winston that the war in NA lasted til May 1943 .
The post war history of WW 2 is swarming with such myths
It was the fault of Hitler that the BEF could escape from Dunkirk.
It was the fault of Hitler who slept at 5 AM 6 June that the Allied landing was successful .
It was because Hitler believed Garbo that 15th Army was not going to Dunkirk .
It was because Stalin did not believe Sorge that the Germans surprised the Soviets on 22 June 1941 .
FDR knew of the attack on Pearl Harbour .
FDR was hostile to the Treaty of Munich 1938
FDR betrayed Poland at Yalta .
Stalin proposed a separate peace to Germany in 1941
Stalin ordered his forces to stop before Warsaw so that the Germans could liquidate the Polish insurgents .
The Italians were no good .
The capture of Malta was essential for the survival of the Axis forces in NA .
Ultra shortened the war with at least one year .
Churchill knew about the attack on Coventry .
The attack on Dresden was a war crime.
The attack on Coventry was not a war crime .
Rommel was a Nazi .
Rommel was an opponent of Hitler .
Rommel was a genius.
Rommel was no good .
Manstein could have won Citadel,but Hitler (always him ) stopped the attack .
Montgomery was responsible for the failure of Market Garden ( myth very popular between Augusta and Sacramento )
The Luftwaffe was winning the Battle of Britain, but fat Goering ( fat people have a bad reputation ) or Hitler the Veggie ( vegetarians have a bad reputation ) prevented this .
Speer was a genius .
von Choltitz refused Hitler's order to destroy Paris .
The defeat was the fault of Hitler (still very popular in the Bundeswehr )
The Holocaust was the responsibility of Hitler only ,not of the German people (still very popular in Germany )
Etc.
Etc.
The Lustre decision is only one of these myths and these myths and these Myths started already almost immediately after the war : in 1946 the Czech colonel Miksche wrote a book with as title ''Les Erreurs stratégiques de Hitler ''and on P 131 he said that with 60 divisions Hitler could have conquered on 15 September the western part of the Mediterranean and with 25 additional divisions he could conquer eastern Africa .
Napoleon's Army died because of the cold during its retreat from Russia .( Very popular between Lille and Bayonne )
Etc.Etc .
And 20 years later, he was still writing and selling such myths .
An other fantasist was Liddel Hart .