Operation Typhoon aimed at southern USSR in 1941

[History Learner]

There was fuel in 1942 to supply Stalingrad, in 1943 to supply the forces in Tunisia and to defeat Bomber Command during the battle of Berlin .
And, one can not say that the pilots who left the training schools with less flying hours than their predecessors, did a worse job than their predecessors .
The fact that in 1943 more than the double of airmen left the training schools than in 1942,debunks the claims that the fuel problems were bigger in 1943 than in 1942 .
Thus, I like to see the proofs of these negative effects : a pilot with less training hours is not a priori a bad pilot .The US pilots at Midway were not worse than those before Pearl Harbour .

First, fuel =/= aviation fuel, nor does it follow that the fact the Germans were able to maintain operations in the field does not mean there was fuel shortage at home for training.

As for the overall point, you're the one making the claim and the onus is on you to back it up with evidence. So far, the gist of your argument is to cite the increase in pilot turnout while conceding the fact that the average training hours dropped precipitously which does nothing to back up your argument but rather confirms what we're saying in that there wasn't enough fuel to maintain training standards. If your belief is that fewer training hours doesn't result in a worse pilot than maintaining standards, let's see the evidence. Citing U.S. pilots, who had the same level of training or more, over that period of time does nothing for the German context where we know training standards declined.

[danebrog]

And, one can not say that the pilots who left the training schools with less flying hours than their predecessors, did a worse job than their predecessors
The fact that in 1943 more than the double of airmen left the training schools than in 1942,debunks the claims that the fuel problems were bigger in 1943 than in 1942 .
Thus, I like to see the proofs of these negative effects

3. Reduction of GAF Fighter Experience Level.
The cycle which underlay the deterioration of the GAF worked in this manner: When more pilots were killed In 1942 than the German High Command has anticipated, pressure was put upon the fighter training schools to speed the output of replacements. But Germany's fuel situation, Inherently weak, required careful allocation of all oil products, especially aviation gasoline. Increased fuel allocation for pilot training was very difficult for the schools to obtain. The alternatives were either to fall short of the number of replacements or to cut hours of training so that fuel allocations would be sufficient to train the requisite number of pilots. The Germans chose the latter course, with the result that replacements arrived at combat units subnormally trained (Reference Note 1). As skilled and experienced pilots we're killed, they were replaced with pilots with no battle experience and insufficient training. Thus, the average level of experience fell, reducing the tactical capabilities of the force. The rising tempo of combat worked cumulatively against the GAF. On the other hand, combat seasoned many Allied pilots who were fighting on a solid back¬ground of thorough training at less than expected rates of attrition.

http://www.allworldwars.com/The%20Defea ... Force.html

[ljadw]

And, one can not say that the pilots who left the training schools with less flying hours than their predecessors, did a worse job than their predecessors
The fact that in 1943 more than the double of airmen left the training schools than in 1942,debunks the claims that the fuel problems were bigger in 1943 than in 1942 .
Thus, I like to see the proofs of these negative effects

3. Reduction of GAF Fighter Experience Level.
On the other hand, combat seasoned many Allied pilots who were fighting on a solid back¬ground of thorough training at less than expected rates of attrition.

http://www.allworldwars.com/The%20Defea ... Force.html

This one is not correct : combat seasoned Allied pilots were sent back to the US/UK to the training schools .
There is no evidence that the heavy losses of the LW in 1943/1944 were caused by the reduction of the flying hours in the training schools .
The combat seasoned Allied pilots lost in October 1943 over Schweinfurt 200 aircraft (destroyed/damaged ) against 60 for the pilots of the LW with less training hours .
Thus, your claim is debunked .
Schweinfurt and Berlin disprove the theory of the reduction of the fighter experience level of the GAF.

[ljadw]

There was fuel in 1942 to supply Stalingrad, in 1943 to supply the forces in Tunisia and to defeat Bomber Command during the battle of Berlin .
And, one can not say that the pilots who left the training schools with less flying hours than their predecessors, did a worse job than their predecessors .
The fact that in 1943 more than the double of airmen left the training schools than in 1942,debunks the claims that the fuel problems were bigger in 1943 than in 1942 .
Thus, I like to see the proofs of these negative effects : a pilot with less training hours is not a priori a bad pilot .The US pilots at Midway were not worse than those before Pearl Harbour .

First, fuel =/= aviation fuel, nor does it follow that the fact the Germans were able to maintain operations in the field does not mean there was fuel shortage at home for training.

As for the overall point, you're the one making the claim and the onus is on you to back it up with evidence. So far, the gist of your argument is to cite the increase in pilot turnout while conceding the fact that the average training hours dropped precipitously which does nothing to back up your argument but rather confirms what we're saying in that there wasn't enough fuel to maintain training standards. If your belief is that fewer training hours doesn't result in a worse pilot than maintaining standards, let's see the evidence. Citing U.S. pilots, who had the same level of training or more, over that period of time does nothing for the German context where we know training standards declined.

1 The average training hours dropped but not because of lack of fuel : they would also drop if there was enough fuel .
2 Schweinfurt proves that less training hours does not result in worse pilots .

[danebrog]

Thus, your claim is debunked .

That is not my claim, but an evaluation of all available German and American data by US Air Force analysts after the war.
But if their conclusions do not agree with your opinions, then they must of course be wrong, I have understood that by now.
Since Galland, Stilla and many others are equally wrong, I refrain from citing their amateurish misjudgements here as evidence.

[glenn239]

If one would look at ww 2 aircraft ;thread : RAF pilot training hours in 1940, one would see that in January the training lasted 28 weeks and in August 22 weeks and that in the US in 1940 the flight hours were between 1000 and 600 and in 1942 300 .
The Germans did the same in the second half of WW2,for the same reasons ,which is not shortage of oil, but shortage of pilots and shortage of time .

Frontline LW strength in 1944 was roughly 5,000 aircraft. If 5,000 pilots burn 35 gallons per hour training for 300 hours, and the frontline strength turns over 3 times per year, that's 15,000 pilots required, or about 550,000 tons of avgas. If the training is dropped to 100 hours, that's 185,000 tons of avgas.

I don't think the LW had 500,000 tons of avgas sitting around in 1944, so shortage of gas will have been a factor.

[glenn239]

Thus, I like to see the proofs of these negative effects : a pilot with less training hours is not a priori a bad pilot .The US pilots at Midway were not worse than those before Pearl Harbour .

My brother - who has over 6,000 hours single engine and has trained dozens of pilots over his career - says that you need 400 hours training to really get a pilot up to a level of combat proficiency. 200 hours for most pilots is just a stick and rudder man that can barely do the basic stuff, which does not include going up against seasoned veterans on the other side flying aircraft that are superior in characteristics.

[ljadw]

Thus, I like to see the proofs of these negative effects : a pilot with less training hours is not a priori a bad pilot .The US pilots at Midway were not worse than those before Pearl Harbour .

My brother - who has over 6,000 hours single engine and has trained dozens of pilots over his career - says that you need 400 hours training to really get a pilot up to a level of combat proficiency. 200 hours for most pilots is just a stick and rudder man that can barely do the basic stuff, which does not include going up against seasoned veterans on the other side flying aircraft that are superior in characteristics.

And why were these seasoned veterans defeated by pilots with only 200 hours,at Schweinfurt and Berlin ?

[ljadw]

Thus, your claim is debunked .

That is not my claim, but an evaluation of all available German and American data by US Air Force analysts after the war.
But if their conclusions do not agree with your opinions, then they must of course be wrong, I have understood that by now.
Since Galland, Stilla and many others are equally wrong, I refrain from citing their amateurish misjudgements here as evidence.

You must be desperate to use Galland as a source .

[ljadw]

If one would look at ww 2 aircraft ;thread : RAF pilot training hours in 1940, one would see that in January the training lasted 28 weeks and in August 22 weeks and that in the US in 1940 the flight hours were between 1000 and 600 and in 1942 300 .
The Germans did the same in the second half of WW2,for the same reasons ,which is not shortage of oil, but shortage of pilots and shortage of time .

Frontline LW strength in 1944 was roughly 5,000 aircraft. If 5,000 pilots burn 35 gallons per hour training for 300 hours, and the frontline strength turns over 3 times per year, that's 15,000 pilots required, or about 550,000 tons of avgas. If the training is dropped to 100 hours, that's 185,000 tons of avgas.

I don't think the LW had 500,000 tons of avgas sitting around in 1944, so shortage of gas will have been a factor.

The LW did not lose 15000 pilots in 1944 .Maybe 15000 aircraft,or 15000 airmen, but not 15000 pilots .Thus they did not need 15000 pilots in 1944 .
Besides, they did not train 15000 pilots in 1944 .
There was no relation between the number of pilots and airmen that were trained in 1943/1944 and the losses of airmen and pilots in 1944 . The number that was trained was determined in 1943 when their training started .
The training ,thus also the flying hours, was shortened already in 1943, not because there was a shortage of fuel, but because more airmen were needed to replace the losses,and this could only happen by shortening the training time .
The LW consumed 863000 ton of avgas in 1940,1,274,000 in 1941, 1,426,000 in 1942, 1,825,000 in 1943, 1,403,000 in 1944 .
As the consumption in 1943 was the highest of the war, this means that the shortening of the training in 1943 was not caused by shortage of oil .
The oil shortage started at the end of the Summer of 1944 .

[ljadw]

From WW2 aircraft net /forum
Thread :RAF pilot training hours 1940
Post 17 :'' US pilots graduating in 1943 had 350 hours of flying time . ''
Does this make them inferior pilots compared to those who graduated before PH with 600 or 1000 hours of flying time ?
Returning to the LW :
you are the commander of a Jachtgeschwader and asks for replacements for your losses .
You receive a phone call from Berlin,saying that you can chose between
1 10 new pilots next week each with 200 hours of flying time
or
2 next month 10 pilots each with 300 hours of flying time
or
3 in 3 months 20 pilots with 300 hours of flying time
What do you chose ?
It is obvious that you will chose the first proposition ,because you are in a desperate need : you need replacements now, as soon as possible and in the long run ( 3 months ) all of your pilots can be dead .

[glenn239]

And why were these seasoned veterans defeated by pilots with only 200 hours,at Schweinfurt and Berlin ?

The Luftwaffe won the Big Week battles, did it?

Training a mass levee to a high level of proficiency is very expensive in gasoline, and that pilots with less than 300 hours going into combat are much more likely to wind up as flags on the side of an enemy ace's aircraft than not.

[ljadw]

The LW defeat of the Big Week was not caused by the fact that the new German pilots had less hours of training .
And you are giving too much, much too much importance to the role of aces:their role was very minimal .

[thaddeus_c]

my particular view is that Germany needed to eliminate one of the three fronts (at least), and Leningrad seems more logical.

the southern front, even with further gains, appears (appeared) to be a longer term objective?

[Kingfish]

The combat seasoned Allied pilots lost in October 1943 over Schweinfurt 200 aircraft (destroyed/damaged ) against 60 for the pilots of the LW with less training hours .
Thus, your claim is debunked .
Schweinfurt and Berlin disprove the theory of the reduction of the fighter experience level of the GAF.

How is a fighter vs a bomber a valid comparison?
Training is not the same, mission profile is not the same, and airframes are nowhere near the same.

What would be valid is comparing air to air losses once the allies started employing P51 Mustangs with drop tanks in fighter sweeps ahead of the bombers.

You know, apples to apples.