Rundstedt's central reserve

Discussions on alternate history, including events up to 20 years before today. Hosted by Terry Duncan.
Post Reply
Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 6350
Joined: 01 Jan 2016, 22:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#136

Post by Richard Anderson » 29 May 2021, 17:23

Juan G. C. wrote:
29 May 2021, 11:49
AFAIK they weren't deployed there.
Two of the three-division "reserve" as it existed 6 June were on the left bank of the Seine. 12. SS was around Acon, between Dreux and Verneuil-sur-Avre, 84.5 km south-southwest of Paris. Lehr was around Nogent-le-Retrou (east of Alencon), 127 KM southwest of Paris. The third "reserve" division, 116. Panzer, was at Bernouville, 66 km northwest of Paris.

Or did you expect them to be in the arrondissements of Paris? :D
Initially they would be told that Hitler was dead and that the Army was suppressing a Party Putsch. The incorporation of the Waffen-SS into the Army would take place under that pretext. Most of their leaders would be taken into protective custody and replaced by Army officers, and units whose obedience is doubtful disarmed (except, of course, units fighting in the front, but I doubt they would rebel when facing the enemy). With most nazi leaders arrested and perhaps shot, they won't be in a state to rebel when the new government shows its true face.
Okay, no problems at all. :lol:
Ok. However, without the 116. we already have five Panzer and Panzergrenadier divisions. And, given the better situation in the Eastern front, perhaps another Panzer division can be brought to the West.
No, you have two complete Panzer divisions, two Panzer divisions with half a Panzer regiment, and one partially mobile Panzergrenadier division. You can raid 10. Panzer Brigade for Panthers, which is in effect what they did with Lehr, but that is robbing Peter to pay Paul, since those Panthers were intended for Ostfront divisions.

You do realize that by spring 1944, "better" on the Ostfront means "not near collapse"? If the situation was "better" it would be more likely that divisions would be going East to ensure the situation stabilizes and to prepare for more counterattacks.
It isn't another point of departure, but a decision the new government and high Command would have probably taken.
Yes, because the anti-Nazi putsch is so simple and elegant a solution. Why doesn't the Beck-Goerdeler government simply sue for immediate peace at any price?
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 6350
Joined: 01 Jan 2016, 22:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#137

Post by Richard Anderson » 29 May 2021, 17:28

Kingfish wrote:
29 May 2021, 13:33
Which will give you roughly two panzer divisions in a reserve role to cover a 60 mile front. The other three/four are forced into a static defensive positions - just like in the OTL - to cover for the now destroyed Atlantic wall divisions.
Try about a 400-mile front, Brest to Bruges, which is what they were expecting.
That will not get you this:
PS. No secrets: I admit here that I am searching for a way to defeat the Normandy landings.
Yep.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell


User avatar
Cult Icon
Member
Posts: 4472
Joined: 08 Apr 2014, 20:00

Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#138

Post by Cult Icon » 29 May 2021, 17:47

EKB wrote:
29 May 2021, 00:55
And why should they jam more vehicles on already congested roads?
I addressed the disaggregation of German forces in my previous comments (quite numerous) due to the changed tactical environment. In many posts I commented about how the German forces were not likely to fight in the "classical" style. To continue on that note I doubt that they would commit everything at once, but rather more in terms of waves given the constricted environment. From the start I referred to the attack to be "creeping". Meaning that the benefits of concentration would not be available.

My comments start on page 1 of this thread. But let me help you:
Fighter bombers hit the Pz Lehr division the worst as it was heading towards the beachhead, IIRC it lost 10% of its soft vehicles. The 12.SS also took losses but not as bad. Both were disrupted in their movement and wasted a lot of time as a result.

However in the case of an offensive by 6 Pz divisions circa June 16th, I think that the attacks will resemble the most common type of significant counterattack conducted in Normandy (examples, the Operational reserves deployed in SPRING, the Grimsbosq attack, 12SS village fights early campaign) a collection of small battles, loosely connected to each other and executed by the equivalent of a battalion of inf or less, supported by armor. They would not resemble the attacks of the British Canadians who used numerical superiority and sent 3-battalion infantry brigades, supported by a few squadrons of armor, to envelop and seize individual villages.

The historical casualties inflicted in these small and short battles (1-2 days) by German small attacks were modest: eg. 300, 400 at most on the British-Canadians and the German KG often did pull backs due to artillery defensive fires. However if many small battles erupt all across the front, the defensive fire from British-Canadian artillery will be diluted instead of concentrated. Eg. The Grimsbosq attack, inflicting hundreds of casualties, was eventually settled by the ensuing Op TOTALIZE but also the firing of 17 field artillery regiments. If, however, there were more than one attack like this in the sector then the ammunition pool would have to be divided, and the defensive fire would be only a portion of what it was. This would lead to better progress in each small operation. Also, in a general offensive there would be reserves available for further commitment.
Excluding engineers the Pz division of the Army had approx. 5 combat battalions (infantry & recon). SS had had 7.

In an offensive this could be split into 5- 7 battalion sized- battlegroups. Or more if there are some 2-company groups for small missions. A 2-battalion sized battlegroup could be organized for a larger battle if it was tactically appropriate.

So with the 21.Pz, 9.SS, 10.SS, 12.SS, 2.Pz, Pz Lehr this would be maximum 36 battalion-sized battlegroups, lesser with casualties incurred June 6-15.

Richard Anderson
Member
Posts: 6350
Joined: 01 Jan 2016, 22:21
Location: Bremerton, Washington

Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#139

Post by Richard Anderson » 29 May 2021, 18:02

Cult Icon wrote:
29 May 2021, 14:44
1. These new "friends" came in after the salient was formed from the 4 mile front of SS-PzgR26. The offensive was called off after the counterattack. One of these is probably a KG (2.SS). This unit used KG Weidinger in action, the rest of the division was parceled up as a firebrigade in the US sector. Also some of these units are depleted from prior combat.
The assembly area of 2. SS was Torigny sur Vire-Canisy-Beaucoudray, so just south of St Lo. By 1 July, 11,195 officers and men were concentrated in Normandy, two-thirds of the division, with 6,088 still on the way. At that point in time, KG Weidinger as committed on the 30 Corps front comprised two of the three infantry battalions then present in Normandy, essentially two-thirds of the combat power of the division. Between 11-20 June it reported 103 battle casualties and a further 313 21-30 June and a total of 742 through 1 July. During that period the rest of the division remained in reserve, its combat power vested in the single infantry battalion of KG Wisliceny. KG Wisliceny and later KG Weidinger fought the Americans later in July and August.

Meanwhile, I SS Panzer Korps reported 3,056 battle casualties 7-10 June, 3,905 11-20 June, and 2,072 21-30 June in its battle to halt the British advance.
The 21.Pz and 12.SS were (approx.) over half infantry each.
All armored divisions were "(approx.) over half infantry each." That is simply a meaningless statement, apparently intended to obfuscate.
Lehr was pretty much finished. It was down to the last inf battalion (approx.) of 901/902 and would be withdrawn and sent against the US sector. 6 divisions plus a battlegroup, minus 2. The KG Weidinger (2.SS) would soon leave, too.
Lehr reported 2,972 battle casualties over two weeks and was "finished"? These German divisions were fragile, weren't they. Allied divisions took such casualties and fought on.
Richard C. Anderson Jr.

American Thunder: U.S. Army Tank Design, Development, and Doctrine in World War II
Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
Artillery Hell

User avatar
Cult Icon
Member
Posts: 4472
Joined: 08 Apr 2014, 20:00

Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#140

Post by Cult Icon » 29 May 2021, 18:24

Pascal. Kullmann. wrote:
29 May 2021, 12:55
Eh...the same can be said about a good portion of the "regular" army officers. Or were their counterattacks more successful?
Off the cuff, certainly JUPITER, GOODWOOD, ATLANTIC, SPRING had unqualified good effects from counterattacks leading to a tactical failure of the Allied operation.

PERCH, EPSOM, BLUECOAT, TOTALIZE, TRACTABLE have some that are viewed as good to great from one camp while some interpretations vary. A fair generalization is to call the German track record as "mixed" and just leave it at that. Great to poor with the Pz divisions, depending on the situation.

There are also the countless and lesser-known counterattacks and those that were integral to the Pz divisions' day to day existence. The counterattacks where they send local armor to intercept enemy tank formations were pretty reliable (with a share of failures too) in inflicting losses and taking all or a portion of the steam of the armored attack.

User avatar
Westphalia1812
Member
Posts: 575
Joined: 03 Jul 2019, 21:01
Location: Germany

Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#141

Post by Westphalia1812 » 29 May 2021, 19:24

My comment was referring to the myth that the regular army was more professional in the west (during offensive operations). But as you say, it often depended on the circumstances (though HJ really made a hash of things sometimes).
I love myself way more than I love you

And I think about killing myself

So, best believe, I thought about killing you today

User avatar
EKB
Member
Posts: 712
Joined: 20 Jul 2005, 18:21
Location: United States

Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#142

Post by EKB » 29 May 2021, 20:40

Pascal. Kullmann. wrote:
29 May 2021, 19:24
My comment was referring to the myth that the regular army was more professional in the west (during offensive operations).

If what you say is true, then Hitler should have promoted a thug like Sepp Dietrich to run operations at Army Group B. As for myths, we have Paul Hausser to thank for greatly over-dramatizing the need for and value of Waffen-SS divisions.

User avatar
Westphalia1812
Member
Posts: 575
Joined: 03 Jul 2019, 21:01
Location: Germany

Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#143

Post by Westphalia1812 » 29 May 2021, 20:45

I meant regimental/divisional commanders and the overall conduct of operations. I don't think that the Waffen-SS performed better. But I also don't think that they performed worse. Can you find some examples where army divisions conducted their offensive operations more successfully than their SS counterparts (in Normandy)?
Last edited by Westphalia1812 on 30 May 2021, 10:51, edited 1 time in total.
I love myself way more than I love you

And I think about killing myself

So, best believe, I thought about killing you today

User avatar
Westphalia1812
Member
Posts: 575
Joined: 03 Jul 2019, 21:01
Location: Germany

Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#144

Post by Westphalia1812 » 29 May 2021, 20:54

EKB wrote:
29 May 2021, 20:40
Pascal. Kullmann. wrote:
29 May 2021, 19:24
My comment was referring to the myth that the regular army was more professional in the west (during offensive operations).

As for myths, we have Paul Hausser to thank for greatly over-dramatizing the need for and value of Waffen-SS divisions.
The "value" depended on the situation. E.g. 2. SS was an important formation for LXXXIV. Corps in July and 2. PzDiv was extremely important during PERCH.
I love myself way more than I love you

And I think about killing myself

So, best believe, I thought about killing you today

User avatar
Kingfish
Member
Posts: 3348
Joined: 05 Jun 2003, 17:22
Location: USA

Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#145

Post by Kingfish » 30 May 2021, 04:23

Pascal. Kullmann. wrote:
29 May 2021, 20:45
Can you find some examples where army divisions consucted their offensive operations more successfully than their SS counterparts (in Normandy)?
How could a fair comparison be made?

Besides the very small sample size there is also the different conditions and variables each division had to deal with.
The gods do not deduct from a man's allotted span the hours spent in fishing.
~Babylonian Proverb

User avatar
Westphalia1812
Member
Posts: 575
Joined: 03 Jul 2019, 21:01
Location: Germany

Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#146

Post by Westphalia1812 » 30 May 2021, 08:09

Kingfish wrote:
30 May 2021, 04:23
Pascal. Kullmann. wrote:
29 May 2021, 20:45
Can you find some examples where army divisions consucted their offensive operations more successfully than their SS counterparts (in Normandy)?
How could a fair comparison be made?

Besides the very small sample size there is also the different conditions and variables each division had to deal with.
That exactly matches my own opinion. I wasn't expecting an answer. It was more of a rhetorical question.
I love myself way more than I love you

And I think about killing myself

So, best believe, I thought about killing you today

User avatar
EKB
Member
Posts: 712
Joined: 20 Jul 2005, 18:21
Location: United States

Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#147

Post by EKB » 30 May 2021, 11:15

Pascal. Kullmann. wrote:
29 May 2021, 20:45
I meant regimental/divisional commanders and the overall conduct of operations.

Check the military education and appointments of Joachim Peiper, Wilhelm Mohnke and Kurt Meyer. They were psychopaths schooled by charlatans. Highly politicized by Nazi ideology, knowing that loyalty to the party was key to promotion. Surely the German army and its world famous war college, fortified with Prussian princes and aristocrats, produced better qualified officers to command a regiment.

Pascal. Kullmann. wrote:
29 May 2021, 20:54
EKB wrote:
29 May 2021, 20:40

As for myths, we have Paul Hausser to thank for greatly over-dramatizing the need for and value of Waffen-SS divisions.
The "value" depended on the situation. E.g. 2. SS was an important formation for LXXXIV. Corps in July and 2. PzDiv was extremely important during PERCH.

What I meant is value of all-volunteer formations, created by political action over military need. Allied and Axis generals raised objections to concentrating volunteers in a few combat units, because it weakened other combat units. Another example is German parachute divisions, which did not do much parachuting after the landings on Crete. Thereafter, their special training and equipment was a waste of resources.

Pascal. Kullmann. wrote:
30 May 2021, 08:09
Kingfish wrote:
30 May 2021, 04:23
Pascal. Kullmann. wrote:
29 May 2021, 20:45
Can you find some examples where army divisions consucted their offensive operations more successfully than their SS counterparts (in Normandy)?
How could a fair comparison be made?

Besides the very small sample size there is also the different conditions and variables each division had to deal with.
That exactly matches my own opinion. I wasn't expecting an answer. It was more of a rhetorical question.

Your question is further complicated by that, under similar conditions, a division filled with volunteers would probably outperform a division filled with conscripts. Even if the conscripts had a better leader at the top.

User avatar
Westphalia1812
Member
Posts: 575
Joined: 03 Jul 2019, 21:01
Location: Germany

Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#148

Post by Westphalia1812 » 30 May 2021, 11:50

EKB wrote:
30 May 2021, 11:15
Pascal. Kullmann. wrote:
29 May 2021, 20:45
I meant regimental/divisional commanders and the overall conduct of operations.

Check the military education and appointments of Joachim Peiper, Wilhelm Mohnke and Kurt Meyer. They were psychopaths schooled by charlatans. Highly politicized by Nazi ideology, knowing that loyalty to the party was key to promotion. Surely the German army and its world famous war college, fortified with Prussian princes and aristocrats, produced better qualified officers to command a regiment.


I definitely agree with you on Peiper, Mohnke and Meyer but those weren't the only Waffen-SS regimental/divisional commanders serving in Normandy. I would say that Bittrich, Weidinger, Stadler or Tychsen were more capable than those three you named. I think I sounded a bit to offensive. I don't want the Waffen-SS to be better. I am genuinely interested in the differences between certain divisions.
I love myself way more than I love you

And I think about killing myself

So, best believe, I thought about killing you today

User avatar
Kingfish
Member
Posts: 3348
Joined: 05 Jun 2003, 17:22
Location: USA

Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#149

Post by Kingfish » 30 May 2021, 13:26

EKB wrote:
30 May 2021, 11:15
Another example is German parachute divisions, which did not do much parachuting after the landings on Crete. Thereafter, their special training and equipment was a waste of resources.
I can't think of a worse example than the Luftwaffe field divisions.
The gods do not deduct from a man's allotted span the hours spent in fishing.
~Babylonian Proverb

Juan G. C.
Member
Posts: 196
Joined: 18 Aug 2017, 17:57
Location: Madrid, España

Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#150

Post by Juan G. C. » 30 May 2021, 14:13

Richard Anderson wrote:
29 May 2021, 17:23

Two of the three-division "reserve" as it existed 6 June were on the left bank of the Seine. 12. SS was around Acon, between Dreux and Verneuil-sur-Avre, 84.5 km south-southwest of Paris. Lehr was around Nogent-le-Retrou (east of Alencon), 127 KM southwest of Paris. The third "reserve" division, 116. Panzer, was at Bernouville, 66 km northwest of Paris.

Or did you expect them to be in the arrondissements of Paris? :D
At least Gunther Blummentritt, Rundstedt's chief of staff, didn't consider that "in the area of Paris". In his biography of Rundstedt he wrote: "Furthermore , it transpired that these four divisions were not to lie as a single unit in the area round Paris , but were to be split up . The 12th S.S. Panzer Division and the Panzer Instructional Division were put into the zone west of Paris . The 1st S.S. Panzer Division remained in Belgium and the 17th S.S. Panzer Grenadier Division lay to the south of the Lower Loire" .

No, you have two complete Panzer divisions, two Panzer divisions with half a Panzer regiment, and one partially mobile Panzergrenadier division. You can raid 10. Panzer Brigade for Panthers, which is in effect what they did with Lehr, but that is robbing Peter to pay Paul, since those Panthers were intended for Ostfront divisions.
Without two encirclements and the subsequent los of equipment, there would be less need of those thanks in the Ostfront.
You do realize that by spring 1944, "better" on the Ostfront means "not near collapse"? If the situation was "better" it would be more likely that divisions would be going East to ensure the situation stabilizes and to prepare for more counterattacks.
If they expect a landing in the Channel, it doesn't make sense to me to send these divisions to the East, specially if the situation is better than IOTL.

I've found, by the way, that although the 9. SS Panzer was in the Riviera, the 10. SS Panzer was near the Channel coast, around Lisieux, when it was sent to the East.
Yes, because the anti-Nazi putsch is so simple and elegant a solution. Why doesn't the Beck-Goerdeler government simply sue for immediate peace at any price?
Because unconditional surrender was unacceptable for them at that time, at least for those which would have been at the helm. They wanted a negotiated peace, and thought It was still possible to get It, if Germany kept fighting.

Post Reply

Return to “What if”