Rundstedt's central reserve

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Leprechaun
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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#226

Post by Leprechaun » 16 Jun 2021, 17:17

@Cult
Should they not have cheap mobile artillery, rocket , mortar units which could have plastered the front lines and rapidly change positions before counter battery fire ? To be used in defence or attack ?

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#227

Post by Kingfish » 17 Jun 2021, 01:57

When did the Germans in Normandy ever "plaster" the front lines?
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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#228

Post by Cult Icon » 17 Jun 2021, 03:09

In 1940 the 10.Pz attacked to the English channel, and then rotated, and attacked along the coast, using the coast to secure one flank!

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#229

Post by Michael Kenny » 17 Jun 2021, 03:30

Cult Icon wrote:
17 Jun 2021, 03:09
In 1940 the 10.Pz attacked to the English channel, and then rotated, and attacked along the coast, using the coast to secure one flank!
The difference being that in 1944 there were over 1,000 Commonwealth tanks (5 Pz Divisions worth of tanks) landed on the first day. Landed because they wanted to have a big enough force ashore to defeat any Panzer Division rash enough to try and attack the beaches.

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#230

Post by Richard Anderson » 17 Jun 2021, 05:05

Cult Icon wrote:
17 Jun 2021, 03:09
In 1940 the 10.Pz attacked to the English channel, and then rotated, and attacked along the coast, using the coast to secure one flank!
Sigh...no, the XIX AK (mot) (1., 2., and 10. Panzer Division) moved south from an assembly area west of St. Omer and south of Calais on 31 May, south-southeast towards Amiens. Their western flank was actually "secured" by SS-T, which was deployed from Cap Gris Nez to Etaples.
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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#231

Post by Richard Anderson » 17 Jun 2021, 05:06

Michael Kenny wrote:
17 Jun 2021, 03:30
Cult Icon wrote:
17 Jun 2021, 03:09
In 1940 the 10.Pz attacked to the English channel, and then rotated, and attacked along the coast, using the coast to secure one flank!
The difference being that in 1944 there were over 1,000 Commonwealth tanks (5 Pz Divisions worth of tanks) landed on the first day. Landed because they wanted to have a big enough force ashore to defeat any Panzer Division rash enough to try and attack the beaches.
No, the difference was that in 1940 the XIX AK (mot) was advancing into a vacuum with its right (western) flank secured by SS-T.
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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#232

Post by Juan G. C. » 17 Jun 2021, 10:19

Cult Icon wrote:
16 Jun 2021, 16:41
The subsequent battle would probably end up being a grind affair with a salient driven into Allied lines, either to the coast or not. Basically like those Montgomery "offensives".
And what would have been the result of that, in your opinión?

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#233

Post by Michael Kenny » 17 Jun 2021, 10:42

Juan G. C. wrote:
17 Jun 2021, 10:19


And what would have been the result of that, in your opinión?
Seroius panzer losses as they hit the screen of AT Guns, SP AT guns and tanks. Massive infantry losses as field artillery and Naval gunfire target them. Lack of fuel and ammo as TAC destroys the resupply train.

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#234

Post by Cult Icon » 17 Jun 2021, 13:43

Peter89 wrote:
09 Jun 2021, 15:54

I think there was no good or prudent decisions in 1943, at least not on the level of strategy.

If the Germans decide to do what you described, which is a bit against not simply Hitler's ideas about standing fast, but also against the German military tradition, I don't think that might work.

All the same, I believe that the Germans had to be forced on the defensive. Neither Hitler nor the general staff would choose defense.
The last good sequence of offensive operations in the Eastern front were executed in the Spring of 1942. Case Blue was very damaging despite its disappointing results. All the Germans can do from 1943 onwards is to delay the progress of the Allies/Soviets. Their biggest problem wasn't the improved tactical qualities of their enemies or the deterioration of their army but the routine assignment of objectives that were far from their means. I do agree that it is against everything they stand for to remain defensive so this what if is far out there. This is why I do not participate much in these discussions.
Last edited by Cult Icon on 18 Jun 2021, 02:44, edited 1 time in total.

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#235

Post by Leprechaun » 17 Jun 2021, 17:40

Kingfish wrote:
17 Jun 2021, 01:57
When did the Germans in Normandy ever "plaster" the front lines?
They didn't, but reading the posts on here the big complaint is the allies had superior artillery support/air support and since they had been fighting the allies and losing since 1942.I was asking Cult as he's an expert on the Germans wether the above would have been a good idea ? :D

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#236

Post by Cult Icon » 17 Jun 2021, 18:49

Juan G. C. wrote:
17 Jun 2021, 10:19

And what would have been the result of that, in your opinión?
Who knows? It could end up badly and lead to strong flank or even rear attacks by the allies, which would force it to withdraw or even rout. 3 handicapped divisions is just too small of a force.

Although the routs you are looking for could happen especially if they make it the coast and the rotate the assault like in 1940.

I am currently reading books on the 7th Army in the Ardennes. The attack of the foot mobile 5th FJD (KW IV (conditionally suitable for defense as of Dec 1) makes little military sense, if one would have forecasted it they'd be halted by units of the US 28th Inf division with bloody losses. Instead they routed the divisional elements, decimated several American units, took over a thousand prisoners, and did this with trivial casualties and were the only unit to achieve the assigned objectives for Autumn Mist.

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#237

Post by Cult Icon » 18 Jun 2021, 14:50

Report on Battle Experience, 10th SS Panzer Division ‘Frundsberg’, July 1944
SS Panzer Grenadier Regiment 21, 10 SS Division ‘Frundsberg’

The 1st General Staff Officer
signed
S. Wagner
SS. Obersturmbannführer

Some selections:

No unit must be committed on the Western or Southern front without having been
carefully trained on the basis of our recent experience.
The March
(i) One must now figure at least three times the amount of time than previously allowed.
(ii) If the tracked vehicles travel by rail, it is advisable to arrange the route in such a
manner that the wheeled vehicles are close to the tracked vehicles in case rail
transport is interrupted.
(iii) It is most essential to arrange road marches so that the main body reaches the marchobjective before daybreak. The march may be started one or two hours before dark,
because it will be completely dark before the enemy can exploit his air
reconnaissance results.
(iv) In case a larger unit is to be transferred along a route where no ground contact with
the enemy is expected, the march will be more fluid if the unit marches in small serial
instead of in one great column. The smallest group permissible, however, is the
company.
(v) Armoured vehicles must be completely camouflaged, so that even low flying planes
cannot recognize the type of vehicle.
(vi) In case of enemy air activity, especially when fighter-bombers appear, each vehicle
will seek cover independently. All marching motion must cease completely so that
the enemy does not realize a large unit is on the move.
(vii) Bivouac areas will be revealed, therefore stay away from villages and civilians.
(viii) The march will continue only as long as darkness allows, and not as far as figured
out previously on maps. March only on side roads which must be well marked.
(ix) Send strong road-reconnaissance groups far ahead and keep another one in reserve
with the main body.
(x) No lights are allowed at night.
(xi) If a march in daylight is unavoidable keep an interval between cars of at least 200
yards.
(xii) Each vehicle must have an air sentinel facing the rear.
(xiii) Change the location of your CP frequently. In doing so avoid villages and the various
sections far apart.
(ii) Avoid all bunching up.
(iii) Own attacks to advance in loose formations. Dig in at once after reaching
intermediate objectives.
(iv) Keep only very few vehicles behind the first line. (Dig in to protect tires and motors.)
(v) Put warning markers at important crossroads and points which are constantly under
artillery fire.
Own Employment:
(i) Battle area consists of wavy terrain with poor visibility. In many cases terrain-waves
cannot be crossed by tanks, therefore, with a few exceptions, tanks are road-bound.
S-curves necessitate heavy use of deflection gear. Employment of tanks must be
confined to the support of the infantry. Close contact and liaison from both sides are
necessary. Paramount is the timely selection of trap positions to enable our own tanks
to put attacking enemy armour out of action.
(vi) Our own advancing tanks rely on mutual assistance and correct driving. First tank
gives fire protection and guards the terrain to get a quick view of road, (recon,
technique). When advancing with the infantry (always desirable) rifle-men proceed to
the left and to the right of the road ahead of the tanks to eliminate surprises from the
flanks.
(vii) Experience proves that many actions requiring lengthy preparations were failures,
because the enemy had a chance to find out our intentions. He then employed his
artillery and his air force and smashed our well planned attack. The best countermeasure discovered so far, is an inconspicuous filtering into the enemy sector which
is only weakly occupied by his infantry. The troops should be divided into numerous
small detachments, and good use of terrain waves and hedgerows must be made. At
the same time, though, terrain which the enemy is in a position to observe and cover
with fire must be avoided.

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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#238

Post by Richard Anderson » 19 Jun 2021, 00:51

Cult Icon wrote:
17 Jun 2021, 18:49
I am currently reading books on the 7th Army in the Ardennes. The attack of the foot mobile 5th FJD (KW IV (conditionally suitable for defense as of Dec 1) makes little military sense, if one would have forecasted it they'd be halted by units of the US 28th Inf division with bloody losses. Instead they routed the divisional elements, decimated several American units, took over a thousand prisoners, and did this with trivial casualties and were the only unit to achieve the assigned objectives for Autumn Mist.
Is it a book about myth-making?

5. FJD did not "rout" the 28th Inf Div or even parts of it. It attacked along the boundary of the 110th and 109th Infantry, hitting an area that was barely defended. The two available battalions of the 110th Infantry were defending a 15-kilometer line and were struck, from left to right (north to south), by the 560. VGD, followed by the 116. Panzer, the 26. VGD, followed up by 2. Panzer and Lehr, the 5. FJD, and the 352. VGD. A measure of the opposition the Germans faced was that Vianden was held by a single rifle platoon, which was overwhelmed by 4./Fallschirm-Pionier-Bataillon 5. The weight of seven divisions, including three Panzer, against a single overstretched infantry division, was sufficient to crush the defense. In the process the 28th Inf Div suffered 4,503 casualties 16-23 December.

14. FJR, which attacked right along the seam between the 110th and 109th was essentially foot-mobile, as were two of the battalions of 15. FJR, but the third battalion of the regiment was provisionally motorized and grouped with other motorized elements of the division and 11. FJ-StuG-Bde as the mobile striking element of the division.

By 23 December, the trivial casualties incurred by the 5. FJD were about 1,783. Those of the other six attacking divisions were 5,642. Of course not all were inflicted by the 28th Inf Div, just as the 5. FJD did not inflict all those 4,503 casualties in return.
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Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
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Westphalia1812
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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#239

Post by Westphalia1812 » 19 Jun 2021, 08:20

Cult Icon wrote:
17 Jun 2021, 18:49


I am currently reading books on the 7th Army in the Ardennes. The attack of the foot mobile 5th FJD (KW IV (conditionally suitable for defense as of Dec 1) makes little military sense, if one would have forecasted it they'd be halted by units of the US 28th Inf division with bloody losses. Instead they routed the divisional elements, decimated several American units, took over a thousand prisoners, and did this with trivial casualties and were the only unit to achieve the assigned objectives for Autumn Mist.
IMO the defense of 5.FjD against 4.AD was the more impressive performance. Especially since they were "trash talked" (partly justified) in Normandy, particularly by von der Heydte.
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Re: Rundstedt's central reserve

#240

Post by Richard Anderson » 19 Jun 2021, 17:39

Pascal. Kullmann. wrote:
19 Jun 2021, 08:20
IMO the defense of 5.FjD against 4.AD was the more impressive performance. Especially since they were "trash talked" (partly justified) in Normandy, particularly by von der Heydte.
Indeed. The reality is the division was in poor shape; it did not even have its artillery regiment, which was immobilized, only partly equipped, and attached to LIII AK as stationary artillery. Instead, it made do with the attachment of three battalions from 406. VAK and two from 18. VWB, the first horse-drawn and the second "motorized" with mostly impressed civilian vehicles. Nevertheless, it preformed well, skillfully using terrain to continue its advance, but suffered heavy casualties to its infantry in the advance on Bastogne - those 1,783 casualties were most likely incurred by the six battalions of the 14. and 15. FJR. 13. FJR was in corps reserve and was committed to reinforce the 352. Inf-Div attack, not rejoining the division until 21-23 December, so it is likely its casualties were reported through that division. At that point the division was stretched over nearly a 40 kilometer front and was hammered by the 4th Armd Div counterattack, losing at least another 4,100 men, reducing the division to a shell by 1 January. The attack by the American 90th Inf Div on 9-11 January effectively destroyed the remnants of the combat strength of the division, inflicting another 2,200 casualties, including about 1,200 captured.
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Cracking Hitler's Atlantic Wall
Hitler's Last Gamble
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